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Introduction and Acknowledgements 
The thesis enters several under-examined areas. First, improvisatory music will be 
considered as a human phenomenon in the widest sense (Chapter 1 ), and a 
phenomenon destined to suffer relative decline in the cultural environment of the 
modem West (Chapter 2). In consequence, the language in which improvisatory music 
is now discussed in the West will be shown to carry a negative charge (Chapter 3). 
Among various philosophies of music in the Western tradition, none appears to have 
foregrounded improvisatory music specifically. However Heidegger's philosophy, it 
will be suggested, harbours inner trends which favour the idea of music as a central 
component in philosophical discourse (Chapter 4) and may be used as a starting point 
for a re-emergent understanding of musical improvisation as a metaphysical principle 
(Chapter 5). Improvisation in music will be seen to be linked to the centrality of hope 
in human experience, and this will be exemplified in relation to certain cultures and 
twentieth-century composers (Chapter 6). Further to this connection between 
improvisation and hope, improvisation in a Christian liturgical context will be 
examined. There is a dearth of existing discussion, not only regarding improvisatory 
music in Christian liturgy, but liturgical spontaneity in general (Chapter 7). 
I wish to thank Dr Bennett Zon, my supervisor, for his versatile and wide-ranging 
guidance. From the Benedictine Community of SS. Joseph and Columba, Glenstal 
Abbey, Ireland, I am especially grateful to the Rev. Francis McHenry for bringing to 
my attention relevant work by Jacques Maritain, to the Rev. Patrick Hederman, without 
whose friendly support it might have proved difficult to complete the present work, and 
to the Rev. Gregory Collins for proofreading. 
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PART ONE: MUSICAL IMPROVISATION AND 'HOMO SAPIENS' 
Chapter 1 
Improvisation and Human Universals 
Ethnomusicologist Bernard Lortat-Jacob asked thirteen contributors to his collection 
L'Improvisation dans les musiques de tradition orale to join him in providing a short 
definition of improvisation. 1 From the highly diverse responses, certain phrases tend 
to emerge: improvisation is composition in real time; it is the desire for unique and 
unpredictable utterance; it is composition in movement rather than repose; spontaneity. 
For one writer, improvisation is where music becomes most fully human, because 
human behaviour is spontaneous. Nevertheless, it is understood that all improvisations 
are rooted in some kind of pre-existent model. This will presumably be the wider 
model implied by the stylistic horizon which the improviser adopts automatically as a 
result of his own musical culture, as when a Western European improviser improvises 
to sound like Western art music or folk music. Or it will be a wider cultural musical 
model which the improviser more or less consciously assumes, as when a European 
improvises so as to sound like Oriental or African music. Or again it may involve a 
model consisting of more specific pre-existent material, very often a pre-existent tune 
or motif. For another writer, an improviser can genuinely improvise only in a musical 
tradition with which he is familiar and does not play "anything that comes to mind', 
'1 
but 'anything that comes to mind' within a predetermined, limited sound-conception. ,-
It will be suggested in what follows that improvisation is, pre-eminently, the 
universal of human music-making, being the expression of a human nature which 
combines the ability to produce sounds with an innate curiosity. Humans possess 
1 See Bernard Lortat-Jacob, "Improvisation: quatorze definitions." In L'Improvisation dans les 
musiques de tradition orale, Bernard Lortat-lacob (ed.), (Paris: S. E. L. A. F., 1987). pp. 67-70. 
2 Lukas Foss, Notes, Studies in Improvisation. Improvisation Chamber Ensemble. RCA LM-2~~X 
(1961). p. 12 (documentation sic). Cited in Gregory E. Smith, "In Quest of a New Perspectiyc on 
Improvised Jazz: A View from the Balkans." The World o/Music 33, no. 3 (1991): 29-~2; p. 33. 
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'consciousness of the power of sound, which may be expressed with whatever means 
are available: at minimum the voice, the body, the activated environment.,J 
Exploratory sound-making of any kind, and for any purpose, is musical improvisation. 
If, as will be suggested, music inhabits all speech, then even prosodic inflections of the 
voice, its 'timbre, tempo and inflection,,4 can be the medium of musical improvisation 
and musical improvisation may share in the universality of language itself. 
This raises the issue of musical universals, the idea that there are aspects of human 
musical behaviour which can be known to be common to the entire human race. There 
is already general agreement that music itself is universal, for '[mJusic, like language 
and possibly religion, is a species-specific trait of man. All known human societies 
make music (and this includes societies in whose languages the word 'music' does not 
exist)' .5 This position is held with the qualification that '[ mJusic is universal, but its 
meaning is not.,6 In this connection, Titon and Slobin instance an Asian musician 
unfamiliar with Western music who, at an orchestral concert, enjoyed the prior tuning 
noises of the orchestra more than the works performed. However, the idea that all 
known societies make music by improvisation is unlikely to find strong current support 
within ethnomusicology. As Bruno Nettl observed in 1974, issues of improvisation 
have not been extensively addressed within this discipline, and it is still the case that 
'ethnomusicologists are only at the beginnings of their study of improvisational 
3 Richard Orton, "From Improvisation to Composition." In Companion to Contemporary Musical 
Thought, vol 2, John Paynter, Tim Howell, Richard Orton, Peter Seymour (eds.), (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 762. 
4 Daniel Belgrad, The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar America (Chicago: 
Chicago Univ. Press, 1998), p. 11. 
S Kofi Agawu, "The Challenge of Semiotics." In Rethinking Music, Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist 
(eds.), (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), p. 141. Reference to John Blacking, How Musical is Man? 
(Seattle: Washington Univ. Press, 1973), p. 7. Note on typography: throughout the thesis square 
brackets, when placed within a citation, enclose any present alteration of. or interpolation made within 
the citation. Where such square brackets enclose a single letter, this indicates that an upper-case latter in 
the original source has been replaced in the present thesis citation by a lower-case letter (as here), or vice 
\'ersa. 
6 Jeff Todd Titon and Mark Slobin, "The Music-Culture as a World of Music." In Worlds of.\lusic: An 
Introduction to the J\'llisic of the World's Peoples, Jeff Todd Titon (ed.), (New York: Schirmer. 1996). p. 
1. 
4 
technique,. 7 Moreover the very idea of universals, beyond that of the generalised 
universality of music itself, has been found controversial within ethnomusicology. 
Nettl considers that we know insufficient about anthropology and music history to 
speak with confidence of what is universal, or even define universality with finality. 8 
Attempts to address this perceived problem include the work of Mary Louise Serafine 
who differentiates 'generic' processes, which are found in many cultures, from 'style-
specific' processes, which are found in only one.9 For Peter Jeffery 'nothing is truly 
universal except the human brain and the body it controls.' 10 
The methodological approach adopted by ethnomusicology is largely empirical in 
orientation. It is, as N ettl implies, details of the history and anthropology of the human 
race which furnish the data. If such empirical assumptions and no others are 
considered, any generalisations made about human beings (and universals are clearly 
generalisations) may always in theory be at risk of contradiction by some new 
empirical finding. However, the empirical approach to proving universal assertions is 
itself questionable. Karl Popper argues that the traditional paradigm of scientific 
induction is problematic. Induction involves a movement from 'singular statements' 
such as the results of experiments to 'universal statements' such as theories. Popper 
asserts that it is uncertain whether the mind may justifiably move from the singular to 
the universal simply on the basis of repeated inference. Theoretical discovery always 
requires a sort of 'creative intuition.' There cannot be logical justification for 
'universal statements' about reality. 11 As Popper observed: 'The belief that science 
7 Bruno Nettl, "Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach." The Musical Quarter~v 60, no. 
1 (1974): 1-19; p. 18. 
I! See Bruno Nettl, The Study of Ethnomusicology: Twenty-Nine Issues and Concepts (Urbana: Illinois 
Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 36-43. 
9 See Mary Louise Serafine, Music as Cognition: The Development of Thought in Sound (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 39-42. 
10 Peter Jeffery, Re-Em'isioning Past Musical Cultures: Ethnomusicology in the Study of Gregorian 
Chant (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1992), p. 54. 
II See Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), pp. 27-32. 
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proceeds from observation to theory is still so widely and so firmly held that my denial 
of it is often met with incredulity' .12 Yet if Popper is right, empirical data can never 
ultimately support the claim to the existence of any universals. For Popper, universal 
statements, though unverifiable, can nevertheless be falsified. 13 However, even this is 
questioned by Michael Polanyi: 
Sir Karl Popper has pointed out that, though not strictly verifiable, scientific generalisations can be 
strictly refuted. But the application of this principle cannot be strictly prescribed. It is true that a single 
piece of contradictory evidence refutes a generalisation, but experience can present us only with 
apparent contradictions and there is no strict rule by which to tell whether any apparent contradiction is 
an actual contradiction. The falsification of a scientific statement can therefore no more be strictly 
established than its verification. Verification and falsification are both formally indeterminate 
procedures. 14 
Echoing Popper's emphasis on intuition, Polanyi continues: '[T]he final sanction of 
discovery lies in the sight of a coherence which our intuition detects and accepts as 
real; but history suggests that there are no universal standards for assessing such 
coherence. ,15 
Consequently, the claim in what follows that improvisation is a musical universal is 
not based, nor could it be based, on wide-ranging cultural evidence for the universality 
of improvisation itself, evidence which is ever open to change, as musical cultural 
practices are understood afresh, or more cultures are discovered. The claim is based on 
a coherent intuition concerning the 'nature of the human brain and the body it 
controls,' which, as Jeffery asserts above, is 'truly universal.' Clifford Geertz concurs 
in a cautious formulation that '[t]he doctrine of the psychic unity of mankind, which so 
far as I am aware, is today not seriously questioned by any reputable anthropologist ... 
asserts that there are no essential differences in the fundamental nature of the thought 
12 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963) (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). p. 46. 
13 See Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 40-42. 
14 Michael Polanyi, "The Creative Imagination." Chemical and Engineering Ne .... fs -+-+. no. 17 (2Sth 
April. 1966): 85-93; p. 85. 
15 Ibid, p. 90. 
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processes among the various living races ofmen.,16 Applying this principle to music, 
'[e]ssential physiological and cognitive processes that generate musical composition 
and performance may even be genetically inherited, and therefore present in almost 
every human being.' 17 Keeping in mind the distinction between intuitions about a 
universal human nature, and empirical observations of human culture, the defence 
developed below of the universality of musical improvisation in human experience will 
not emphasise evidence for improvisation gathered across cultures and history, but 
rather stress argument from the universal nature of the human brain as exploratory and 
body as sound-producing. It will adopt this emphasis despite Nettl's claim that 
'[ d]emands of human physiology and anatomy do not provide a very convincing 
argument' 18 for universals. By contrast, for Donald Brown, 'human biology is a key to 
understanding many human universals.,I9 For Leonard Meyer, 'it is strange that 
musicologists ... have ignored the discipline ofbiology,.2o 
What follows will consider first the implications of some current infancy research in 
the area of musical behaviour, while also recognising its inconclusiveness, for 
'[ d]etailed information on the early musical responses and productivity of normal 
children prior to 2 years of age is notably absent'.21 Here, 'behaviour which could 
possibly be musically relevant is the ability of infants to mimic the intonational contour 
of speech. This is the pre-speech vocal exploration often called 'babbling,.,22 'Widely 
16 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geerr::! (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), p. 62. 
17 Blacking, How Musical is Man?, p. 7. 
18 Nettl, Study of Ethnomusicology, p. 42. 
19 Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1991), p. 6. 
20 Leonard B. Meyer, "A Universe of Universals." The Journal of Musicology 16, no. 1 (1998): 3-25; p. 
22. 
21 Linda Kelly and Brian Sutton-Smith, "A Study of Infant Musical Productivity." In Music and Child 
Development, J. Craig Peery, Irene Weiss Peery, Thomas W. Draper (eds.), (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1987), p. 35. 
~2 John A. Sloboda, The Musical Mind: The Cognitive Psychology oj.\fusic (1985) (Oxford: Clar~ndon, 
1993), p. 200. 
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divergent views are held about all aspects of [the babbling] stage. ,23 According to 
Anthony Storr, babbling is not only imitation of heard sounds for it occurs 'even if they 
are born deaf or blind. ,24 'Deaf mutes start babbling because they are biologically 
determined to do so, and stop it because they lack the ability to hear the sounds around 
them which would otherwise stimulate the development of their babbling. ,25 For 
infants with hearing, '[a ]fter birth, vocal interchange between mother and infant 
continues to reinforce mutual attachment ... The crooning, cooing tones and rhythms 
which most mothers use when addressing babies are initially more significant in 
cementing the relationship between them than the words which accompany these 
vocalisations. ,26 Storr favours this phenomenon as an interpretation of the origins of 
music in general: 'It will never be possible to establish the origins of human music 
with any certainty; however, it seems probable that music developed from the prosodic 
exchanges between mother and infant which foster the bond between them.,27 Initially 
more reminiscent of waves than of particular pitch attacks, a change occurs at about the 
age of a year and a half, when children can start to produce discrete pitches.28 
In connection with possible links to adult musical improvisation, the exploratory 
nature of these vocal sounds should be emphasised. Sloboda confirms that 'at about 
the age of 18 months ... there is no evidence that children are attempting to imitate 
heard songs; rather it seems as though they are experimenting with melodic interval 
construction. ,29 This may describe an early expression of musical improvisatory 
activity, for it is in fact only later '[b]y the age of two-and-a-half [that] a new milestone 
23 Salwa Anwar Ahmed Abd EI-Rahman, "An Infant's Language Progress: Crying, Babbling, and First 
Words." Ph. D dissertation, University of Hull, 1987, p. 73. 
24 Anthony Storr, Music and the Mind (1992) (London: Harper Collins. 1993), p. 8. 
25 Abd EI-Rahman, "Infant's Language Progress," p. 95. 
26 Storr, Music and the J\/ind, p. 9. 
27 Ibid, p. 23. 
21' See Howard Gardner, Art, A1ind and Brain: A Cognitz\'e Approach to Creatinfr (New York: Basic 
Books, 1982), p. 150. 
29 Sloboda, ;\1usical.\/ind, p. 202. 
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is reached. Children begin to attempt to imitate parts of the songs they hear around 
them.,30 This early sonic experimentation parallels the process of sentence acquisition: 
'Children do not just repeat the sentences they hear, but create new sentences by 
applying the rules they have abstracted from their language. A similar proposal can be 
made for the way in which children learn and create music'. 3 J Just as infants know 
how to produce an unlimited number of sentences, so they appear to know how to 
create novel sequences in music. Linked to essential communication between mother 
and infant, sound exploration thus appears as a characteristic of human nature, with 
one possible explanation that 'inborn in humans is a genetic motivation to train the 
language-handling network in the processing of simple, organized, but otherwise 
biologically irrelevant sound patterns - as they occur in music' .32 For Kelly and 
Sutton-Smith genetic explanations are speculative,33 while others propose that the 
elements of music are 'a reflection of the organization of the human central nervous 
system.,34 From yet another point of view, these sounds may arise first from facial 
muscle movements, experiments with mouth and tongue, which happen additionally to 
produce sound which is then found interesting, repeated and explored by the infant 
through muscle-sound association.35 Thus, in the case of apparent babbling in deaf 
children, they might be moving muscles which only happen to produce sound.36 
However, whatever theoretical basis for babbling is proposed, Deacon can speak of a 
spontaneous, 'unstereotypic' 'sampling' where 'human infants begin spontaneously 
30 Ibid, p. 204. 
31 Rita Aiello, "Music and Language: Parallels and Contrasts." In Musical Perceptions, Rita Aiello 
(ed.) with John Sloboda, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 42. 
32 Juan G. Roederer, "Physical and Neuropsychological Foundations of Music: The Basic Questions." 
In Music, Mind and Brain: The Neuropsychology of Music, Manfred Clynes (ed.). (New York: Plenum. 
1982), p. 42. 
33 See Kelly and Sutton-Smith, "Study of Infant Musical Productivity," p. 51 
J.+ 1. Craig Peery and Irene Weiss Peery, "The Role of Music in Child Development." In Music and 
Child Development, Peery, Peery, Draper (eds.), p. 3. 
3) See Jean Aitchison, The Articulate Mammal: An Introduction to Psycholingllistics (1976) (London: 
Routledge, 1998), pp. 77; 79. 
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and incessantly experimenting with sound production, sampling most of the range of 
possible phonemes that speech will later employ. No other mammal species' babies 
produce even a tiny fraction of the sort of unstereotypic vocal play that human babies 
produce.,37 'That all children babble, is more or less a universal view,.38 
What also emerges from the above extracts is that the maintenance (though, given 
evidence from the deaf, possibly not the inception) of babbling presupposes the ability 
to listen. Human nature is that of a linguistic, heuristic animal who early in life listens 
to sounds, including those emanating from his or her body. Sound produced by the 
body will be investigated, as the whole of the environment is investigated by humans, 
in an exploratory way. Scruton concurs that the initial discovery by human beings that 
music can be made by them always involved improvisatory exploration of sounds. For 
Scruton, this is a corollary of the way in which humans listen. He identifies listening 
for listening'S sake as exclusively human, for 'when we attend to the sound with no 
view to informing ourselves, we must inevitably take an interest in how it sounds, 
which is an interest in the act of listening.,39 For Juan Roederer, '[p ]itch probably is 
perceived by higher animals in nearly the same way as by humans. But animals are not 
spontaneously motivated to listen to abstract pitch successions and superpositions, nor 
36 Mayumi Adachi, personal electronic mail communication, University of Sheffield, 2nd March, 2000. 
Adachi is a developmental psychomusicologist of international visibility. 
37 Terrence Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human Brain 
(London: Penguin, 1997), p. 251. 
38 Abd EI-Rahman, "Infant's Language Progress," p. 107. Regarding the possibility of a link between 
babbling and speech, there is much division of opinion. In favour of such a link (the Learning Theory) 
see O. H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and Symbolic Processes (London: John Wiley, 1960); H. Winitz, 
"The Development of Speech and Language in the Normal Child." In Speech Pathology, R. Rieber and 
R. Brubaker (eds.), (Amsterdam: North Holand [sic], 1966). The Learning Theory holds that babies 
imitate the vocal sounds of carers who are associated with food and warmth. See Abd El-Rahman, ibid, 
p. 74. Against the link with language (Maturation Theory) see E. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of 
Language (London: John Wiley, 1967). Maturation theory holds that babies babble because 
'biologically determined to do so.' Abd EI-Rahman, ibid. There is 'no connection with later speech 
development.' Ibid, p. 75. Similarly, Jakobsonian Theory holds that 'babbling is more maturational 
than a learning process [bearing] no connection with later speech development.' Ibid, p. 76. See R. 
Jakobson, Child Language, AphaSia and Phonological Universals (The Hague: Mouton, 1968). All 
book references above from Abd EI-Rahman, ibid, pp. 74-76. 
39 Roger Scruton. The Aesthetics ofJ/lisic (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997). p. 218. 
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do they respond emotionally to such events. ,40 This unique manner of listening will 
lead the human to take an interest in the sounds she can make herself, and cause her to 
make sounds for their own sake. Scruton notes: 'Music begins when people listen to 
the sounds they are making, and so discover tones. Of all musical experiences, there is 
none more direct than free improvisation . . . and this should be understood as a 
paradigm of listening - the form of listening from which music began. ,41 
Improvisation thus answers the question: "How do I sound?" 
Ethnomusicology is a young discipline still concerned mainly with factual 
observation. An empiricist mindset which dominates it, along with certain other 
disciplines, discourages theory in the promotion of a common-sense rejection of 
'useless' speculation as a diversion from everyday practical concerns.42 
Ethnomusicology's position in fact resembles that of "mainstream" musicology in the 
early 1960s. Speaking of the latter in 1961, Arthur Mendel said: 'Music history, being 
a young science, is still, to a greater extent than some other forms of history, concerned 
with establishing basic facts ... We shall for some time to come continue to be busy 
establishing what are called individual facts ... by reasoning from the evidence' .43 
Joseph Kerman observed: 'Within a dozen years . . . [of] the Second World War . . . 
such leaders as emerged in the much larger field of musicology were notably deficient 
in thinking (and writing) about the philosophy or merely the unspoken assumptions 
underlying activity in their field. ,44 A recent commentator on the rise of 
ethnomusicology, Ann Schuursma, adopts a parallel critique of ethnomusicology. 
40 Roederer. "Physical and Neuropsychological Foundations of Music," p. 4l. 
41 Scruton,Aesthetics, p. 217. 
42 See Keith Jenkins, "Introduction: On Being Open about our Closures." In The Postmodern History 
Reader, Keith Jenkins (ed.), (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 10. 
43 Arthur Mendel, "First Public Address: Evidence and Explanation." In The International 
Musicological Society: Report of the Eighth Congress, Nel\' York 1961, vol 2 Reports (London and New 
York: Barenreiter Kassel, 1962), p. 14. 
44 Joseph Kennan, Jvfusicology (London: Fontana;Collins, 1985), p. 163. 
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Ethnomusicology '[a] century or more ago ... was beginning to emerge as a subject in 
its own right' .45 'By the beginning of the 1960s ethnomusicology was poised to grow 
out of its childhood and into its adolescence. ,46 'In the prevailing atmosphere of 
positivism, the 1960s was a time to be as 'scientific' and 'objective' as possible.,47 'In 
the seventies ... fieldwork method became increasingly important. ,48 It seems in fact 
only by the time Schuursma is publishing, in 1992, that this state of affairs is changing. 
She writes of how '[t]he diminishing of description-centered scholarship in favor 
of . . . interpretation . . . characterizes recent ethnomusicological research in America. 
The move away from 'objectivity' ... and the emergence of research models based 
on ... 'interpretive' anthropology ... are keys to current research. ,49 
Ethnomusicologists sometimes affirm that there exists a universal human nature, as 
Jeffery's observation above demonstrates, even if the subject is not to the fore in 
discussion. Some recognition of the questions surrounding the idea of universals is 
reflected in publications in ethnomusicology cited by Schuursma. However, 
considering ethnomusicology's mainly empiricist traditions, it is not surprising that the 
arguments advanced in these recent articles would tend to suggest a lack of consensus 
on whether or not one may speak of universals in music, and, if so, what they might 
be.50 The publication dates of Schuursma's selection of representative material, 
45 Ann Briegleb Schuursma, Ethnomusicology Research: A Select Annotated Bibliography (New York: 
Garland, 1992), p. xvii. 
46 Ib·d ... 1 ,p. XVlll. 
47 !b·d . 1 ,p. XIX. 
48 Ibid, p. xx. 
49 Ibid, pp. xxv-xxvi. 
50 See ibid, pp. 9-66, Chapter 2, "Theory and Method in Ethnomusicology" which cites a number of 
studies. They are: John Blacking, "Can Musical Universals Be Heard?" The World of Music 19. nos. 1-
2 (1977): 14-22; Blacking '[ c ]onsiders musical processes, rather than musical products, vital to the 
discussion of universals in music ... Concludes that much research needs to be done before we can even 
begin to speak of musical universals'. SchuUfsma, ibid, pp. 12-13. Charles Lafayette Bioles, 
"Universals of Musical Behavior: a Taxonomic Approach." The World of Music 26, no. 2 (1984): 50-
65: Bioles works 'from the basic premise that there are no absolute universals of music, but that all 
peoples have the same type of musical behaviour'. Schuursma, ibid, p. 17. Frank Harrison, "Universals 
in Music: Towards a Methodology of Comparative Research." The World of Music 19, nos. 1-2 (1977): 
30-36; Harrison claims that '[u]niversals are taken to mean elements in common use by all the world's 
inhabitants . . . Concludes that the most striking manifestation of uniyersals in music is music' s 
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considered in relation to the date of the publication of her Bibliography (1992), suggest 
that, at the time of the latter's compilation, any discussion on universals had not been 
significantly advanced for some years. Ethnomusicology is not alone in its quietude 
around philosophical issues of universality. It has been observed of the contemporary 
community of academic historians, whose discipline is likewise empirically based that 
'[q]uestions about relativism, truth, and objectivity are relegated to the philosophy of 
history or left to those few historians ... with announced interests in such issues. ,51 In 
a similar vein, Joseph Kerman writes: 'Ethnomusicology encompasses the meaning 
and value of music along with everything else about it, but what is usually considered 
is the meaning of a musical genre to its culture and the value of a musical activity to its 
society.,52 Alan Merriam's 'famous definition of ethnomusicology as 'the study of 
music in culture' carries with it a corollary saying what ethnomusicology is not. It is 
universality.' Schuursma, ibid, p. 23. Dane L. Harwood, "Contributions from Psychology to Musical 
Universals." The World of Music 21, no. 1 (1979): 48-64; Harwood 'outlines some of the questions 
faced in looking for 'universal' behavior'. Schuursma, ibid, pp. 23-24. Dane L. Harwood, "Universals 
in Music: A Perspective from Cognitive Psychology." Ethnomusicology 20, no. 3 (1976): 521-533; 
Harwood '[e]xamines the search for universals in music from the cognitive psychologist's 
perspective . . . what humans have in common in perceiving, remembering, understanding and using 
musical information'. Schuursma, ibid, p. 24. George List, "On the Non-Universality of Musical 
Perspectives." Ethnomusicology 15, no. 3 (1971): 399-402; List '[d]oubts that there is a universal 
response to music. The single universal aspect of music is that most people make it.' Schuursma, ibid, 
p. 32. David P. McAllester, "Some Thoughts on 'Universals' in World Music." Ethnomusicology 15, 
no. 3 (1971): 379-380; McAllester '[r]emarks that scholars stress differences among musics and that 
maybe it is time to look at similarities ... there are probably no absolute universals in music because of 
human variability and complexity. Feels there are lots of near-universals'. Schuursma, ibid, p. 34. 
Leonard B. Meyer, "Universalism and Relativism in the Study of Ethnic Music." Ethnomusicology 4, 
no. 2 (1960): 49-54: Meyer 'help[s] to clarify the correlative problem of universality vs. relativity'. 
Schuursma, ibid, p. 38. J. H. Kwabena Nketia, "Universal Perspectives in Ethnomusicology." The 
World of Music 26, no. 2 (1984): 3-24; Nketia regards as universal the idea of 'processes capable of 
application . . . outside their original environment'. Schuursma, ibid, p. 44. Charles Seeger, 
"Reflections upon a given topic: Music in Universal Perspective." Ethnomusicology 15, no. 3 (1971): 
385-398. Seeger presents the 'outline of a taxonomy hierarchy of the parameter of speech semantic 
variance, which he calls an abstract-universal-concept and concrete-particular-percept.' Schuursma, 
ibid, p. 56. Klaus P. Wachsmann, "Universal Perspectives in Music." Ethnomusicology 15, no. 3 
(1971): 381-384. Wachsmann '[c]oncludes that music is a special kind of time and the creation of 
musical time a universal occupation of man.' Schuursma, ibid, p. 65. In addition, it is to be noticed that 
the following editions of the periodical The World of Music are wholly devoted to the discussion of 
possible musical universals: vol 19, nos. 112 (1977) and vol 26, no. 2 (1984). 
51 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob, "Telling the Truth about History." In Postmodern 
Histon' Reader, Jenkins (ed.), p. 215. 
52 Ke~an, Musicology, p. 16. 
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not the study of music or musics as autonomous systems or structures, ,53 nor, on this 
definition, is it primarily a study of humankind's relationship to music in general. 
Such a methodological stance, found within ethnomusicology, which inhibits a 
possible recognition of universals if they exist, would tend to be reinforced by the 
contemporary postmodern intellectual climate, in which totalising concepts, like that of 
universality, conflict with the prevailing rejection of grand narrative modes of 
interpretation. 'Postmodernism asserts that grand narratives of legitimation are no 
longer credible. Rather, we must now celebrate differences, multiple voices, 
conflicting perspectives, unorthodox readings. ,54 This postmodern stance whereby 
'[rJelativism is now an issue in every branch of knowledge from science to literature,55 
continues a longer trend for '[ t Jhe postwar generation has questioned fixed categories 
previously endorsed as rational by all thoughtful men, and has denaturalized social 
behavior once presumed to be encoded in the very structure of humanness. ,56 Yet, 
whatever, and however extensive, the universal characteristics of mankind are taken to 
be, it has been claimed that, 'in the absence of a universal human nature, there would 
be no universal cultural pattern, and ... in the absence of a universal culture pattern 
there could be no science of anthropology. ,57 As Clifford Geertz remarks, 'some 
conception of what a human individual is, as opposed to a rock, an animal, a rainstorm, 
or a god, is, so far as I can see, universal. ,58 Brown suspects that 'nowhere in the 
ethnographic literature is there any description of what real people really did that is not 
53 Ibid, p. 164. No documentation of citation from Merriam. 
5-1 Ellen Koskoff, "What Do We Want to Teach When We Teach Music? One Apology, Two Short 
Trips, Three Ethical Dilemmas, and Eighty-two Questions." In Rethinking Music, Cook and En~rist 
(eds.), p. 545. 
55 Appleby, Hunt, Jacob, "Telling the Truth," pp. 216-217. 
56 Ibid, p. 211. 
57 Melford E. Spiro, "Human Nature in its Psychological Dimensions." American Anthropologist 56 
(1954): 19-30; p. 26. 
5R Clifford Geertz, Local f.:nowledge: Further Essays in Interpreti\'(! Anthropology (1983) (London: 
Harper Collins/Fontana, 1993), p. 59. 
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shot through with the signs of a universal human nature. ,59 Leonard Meyer writes of 
an early twentieth-century emphasis on musical universals. 6o Albrecht Schneider 
recalls the nineteenth-century hopes for 'the universal principles underlying music-
making,61 in studies by Benjamin Ives Gilman and Herbert Spencer in the 1890s who 
were concerned to extract generalities from comparative cultural research. However, 
since the early twentieth century, comparative musicologists rejected a unified view of 
humanity, and were fascinated by cultural diversity partly as a result of distaste for 
ethnocentrism. 62 Thus 'in the development of a general methodology of 
ethnomusicology as promulgated by leaders like Hornbostel, Sachs, Herzog, Kunst, 
Merriam and Hood, the non-universality of music looms as a major point of 
agreement' .63 
Exploratory sound-production in infancy is defined as a universal human act, as will 
be shown in more detail in Chapter 5. This is true even if its individual manifestations 
may be culturally-specific in sound, given that the phenomenon is essentially imitative 
of heard sounds. This means that any methodological bias towards music as a 
culturally particular rather than a universal human phenomenon might be expected to 
inhibit in advance the range of discussion concerning how a universal infantile 
paradigm, if it exists, may perdure somehow in human music-making during the 
remaInIng lifetime of the human person. In addition, the examination of any 
connection between infant behaviour and human music-making could only take place 
in an interdisciplinary environment which linked psychology and ethnomusicology, 
59 Brown, Human Universals, p. 5. 
60 See Meyer, "Universalism and Relativism," p. 49. 
61 Albrecht Schneider. "Psychological Theory and Comparative Musicology." In Comparative 
Musicology and Anthropology: Essays on the History of Ethnomusicology, Bruno Nettl and Philip V. 
Bohlman (eds.). (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1988), p. 293. References to Benjamin Ives Gilman. 
"On Some Psychological Aspects of the Chinese Musical System." Philosophical Review 1, no. 1 
(1892): 54-78; no. 2, 154-178: p. 54. footnote 1. Also Herbert Spencer, "The Origin of Music." Mind 60 
(1890): 449-468. 
62 See Nett!, Study of Ethnomusicology, p. 37. 
6.1 Ibid. 
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and this is an additional practical obstacle. Thus published interdisciplinary materiaL 
engaging the full expertise of both these disciplines, and discussing a possible 
connection between babbling and specifically improvisatory music practices in later 
life is at best exiguous. It is not possible to state categorically that any exists.64 
'Ethnomusicology tended to be shaped by the same theoretic currents which shaped 
anthropology. ,65 It is to writers from anthropology that reference will now be made for 
accounts of the nature of universality in human experience as it is understood by 
anthropologists in a given time or place. A shift towards an emphasis on the diversity 
rather than the universality of the human condition took place in both American and 
British anthropology in the early decades of the twentieth century, a shift which 
comparative musicology reflected not least in the replacement of the latter term by the 
term "ethnomusicology.,,66 It has been suggested that in Britain a renewed sense of the 
particular urgency of field-work tended to displace concern with generalities and 
implant a preference for particulars and accumulation of data.67 This concern was 
generated in part by a fear that primitive peoples were fast disappearing.68 Thus, 'the 
hallmark of British anthropology in the first two decades of this century was a cautious 
and sceptical attitude to any grand theoretical formulation' 69 and the idea of 
64 Eric F. Clarke, a scholar of international visibility in musical cognition, advises that he is unaware of 
any literature which addresses a possible connection between these two areas. He identifies as experts in 
the areas of infant vocalising Sandra Trehub, Laurel Trainer and Mayumi Adachi. Personal electronic 
mail communication, University of Sheffield, 22nd February, 2000. Adachi concurs that there is no 
absolute consensus on why infants babble. She distinguishes the theory that babbling is innate, whereby 
it is motivated by an exploratory impulse, from the theory that babbling is learned/facilitated, that is, 
arising from contact with caregivers. The positions are not mutually exclusive. In the former case, 
Adachi asserts, 'it would not be so difficult to link between infants' babbling and adults' informal 
singing.' She suggests that 'adults' improvisatory singing is a good topic for music psychology.' 
Personal electronic mail communication, University of Sheffield, 25th February, 2000. 
65 Alan P. Merriam, The Anthropology of Music (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 4-5. 
66 'The study-object of ethnomusicology, or, as it originally was called: comparative musicology, is the 
traditional music and musical instruments of all cultural strata of mankind ... The position ... is that 
each race, each population group has its own manner of musical expression'. Jaap Kunst, 
Ethnomllsicology: A Study of its Nature, its Problems, Methods and Representative Personalities to 
which is added a Bibliography (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1959), pp. 1-2. 
67 See Adam Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: the Modern British School (1973) (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 5. 
6!! See ibid. 
69 Ibid, p. 4. 
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universality is clearly such a formulation. Similarly, for followers of the American 
Franz Boas 'each population had its own culture ... Moreover, this culture imposed 
distinct modes of experiencing the world.' 70 In America the Boasian trend continued 
to make headway, studying primitive peoples for their own sake, rather than to gather 
material for a general theory of the development of culture or society. The objective 
was "inside" description of the manner of life of non-western societies.7l 'The Boasian 
tradition of cultural anthropology was ... always relativist, insisting that other people 
saw the world differently from ourselves' 72 and emphasising the differences between 
cultures. As Brown notes: 'From 1915 to 1934, American anthropologists established 
three fundamental principles about the nature of culture: that culture is a distinct kind 
of phenomenon that cannot be reduced to others (in particular, not to biology or 
psychology), that culture (rather than our physical nature) is the fundamental 
determinant of human behavior, and that culture is largely arbitrary.' 73 In consequence, 
'this profound interest in the various cultures as unique patterns of human life more 
than ever brought to light the great extent of cultural differentiation . . . All human 
thought and action, or so it seemed, must be determined by culture. ,74 
In the 1930s and 1940s, Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovits provided 
comprehensive philosophical theories which would seek to undergird an 
anthropological methodology based on cultural relativism. For Herskovits, '[t]he 
anthropologist attempts to view human behavior from out of the cultural context of 
which it is a part and thus foregoes interpretation inspired by a 'preconceived frame of 
reference,' hence also avoids interpretation indicated by the frame of reference of his 
70 Ibid, p. 184. 
71 See J. Tennekes, Anthropology, Relativism and Method: An Inquiry into the Methodological 
Principles of a Science of Culture (Assen, Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Compo N. V., 
1971), pp. 4-5. 
72 Kuper, Anthropolo&Tl,' and Anthropologists, p. 187. 
73 Brown, Human Unil'crsals, p. 6. 
7.+ Tennekes, Anthropology, p. 5. 
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own culture.' 75 Herskovits is concerned for "an epistemology that derives from a 
recognition of the force of enculturative conditioning in shaping thought and beha\'ior.' 
. . . All human jUdgements are based on experience and experience is interpreted by 
every individual in terms of his own enculturation.,76 'For Herskovits reality as such is 
actually culturally determined: it makes no sense to speak of reality apart from one's 
experiencing that reality.,77 Consequently, 'in terms of the framework of our 
knowledge of the psycho cultural processes of enculturation, the relativist can only once 
again pose his basic query: Whose objective reality?,78 '[Herskovits's] thinking then, 
is as follows: All human judgements are determined by the culture in which the subject 
is enculturated; among the various cultures differences are so great that one cannot 
speak of, for instance, cross-cultural norms; hence: all human judgement is relative 
since the basis for cross-cultural validity is non-existent.' 79 
However, this philosophy is highly problematic: 
How can Herskovits hold ... that all human judgements are culturally determined (and thus 'culturally 
relative ') and at the same time maintain that the scientist is required to be utterly objective in his 
investigation and to avoid all ethnocentrism? If there is no such thing as an 'objective reality' and if 'the 
force of enculturative experience channels all judgements' - how then can the anthropologist be objective 
in the sense intended by Herskovits?80 
As has been observed, '[ m Jan may be culturally determined, but that does not detract 
from the fact that he is also socially, psychically, and biotically determined. ,81 Perhaps 
mankind's music-making is profoundly determined by socially, biotically or 
psychically determined tendencies exhibited from the first moments of the life of the 
human person, such as vocal sound exploration. Another critical trajectory which has 
75 Ibid, p. 8. 
76 Ibid, p. 9. Citation from Melville 1. Herskovits, "Tender- and Tough-Minded Anthropology and the 
Study of Values in Culture." South Western Journal of Anthropology 7 (1951): 22-31; p. 24. Reference 
to Melville 1. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York: [prob. Knopf], 1949), p. 63. 
77 Tennekes, ibid, p. 24. 
7S Melville 1. Herskovits, "Some Further Comments on Cultural Relativism." American Anthropologist 
60 (1958): 266-273; p. 271. 
79 Tennekes, Anthropology, p. 11. 
so See ibid, p. 31. Citation from Herskovits, "Further Comments," p. 270. 
R I Tcnnekes. ibid, p. 219. 
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been adopted against cultural relativism entails pointing out that human culture (the 
diversity of which forms the basis of the relativist thesis) is itself rooted in the unity of 
human nature.82 All cultures are a response to general aspects of the human situation 
and its biology. The helplessness of infants, need for food and warmth, the various 
capacities of old and young, male and female, all these present basic similarities far 
outweighing variations in the human condition.83 'The relation between culture and 
nature is often viewed as if man had culture in addition to his nature. Essentially this is 
the same misconception as when animal rationale is interpreted as if man were animal 
plus intellect. On account of mind the whole man is another sort of being. On account 
of his culture the nature of man is utterly different from that of an animal: the nature of 
man is being culture. ,84 
So difficult has it proved to eradicate the idea of psychic and biological universals, 
that it is possible to identify a paradoxical survival of belief in them even within the 
American relativist ethos itself. As Geertz explains: 'The fundamental identity of 
mental functioning in homo sapiens, the so-called 'psychic unity of mankind,' had 
remained a background article of faith among even the most thoroughgoing of them, 
anxious as they were to do away with any notion of primitive minds or cultural 
racism. ,85 However the fundamental mental identity as understood by them was 
restricted to the most generalised capacities, hardly more than the capacity for learning, 
feeling, abstraction, and power of analogy. 86 An American anthropologist, Ralph 
82 See ibid, p. 26. Reference to Herskovits, Man and His Works, p. 475. 
83 See A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, with the assistance of Wayne Untereiner and appendices by 
Alfred G. Meyer, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archceology and Ethnology, Han'ard 
Uni\'ersity 47, no. 1 (1952) "Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions," p. 176. 
S4 B. Delfgaauw, Geschiedenis en Vooruitgang. vol 1 (Baarn: n.p., 1962), p. 163. Cited in Tennekes, 
Anthropology, p. 58. 
85 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 150. 'Boas and many other anthropologists took vigorous steps to 
employ anthropology to combat racism.' Brown, Human Universals, p. 55. 'It is extremely important to 
notice Boas's concern with racism. In the early decades of this century the eugenics movements and 
other trends had succeeded in ... incorporating racist criteria into the U. S. immigration laws.' Ibid. 
86 See Geertz, ibid. 
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Linton writing in 1954 observed: 'Every culture includes a number of values which are 
so abstract and so generalized in their expression that they carry little emotional effect 
in themselves, although they lie at the base of the whole cultural structure. ,87 He 
writes: 'If universal values exist, they must be sought for at the level of the deepest and 
most generalized conceptual values, those which stand in closest relation to the 
individual needs and social imperatives shared by the whole of mankind. ,88 Linton 
opts in due course to present a list of thirteen universal values, demonstrating all the 
more forcibly that the latter will not go away.89 Nevertheless, relativist influences 
continue to be strong in America. 'The postmodemist movement in American 
anthropology is essentially a radical development of the Boasian programme . . . The 
ethnographic object is multi-faceted, it can only be partially and fleetingly glimpsed 
from anyone perspective, and it cannot be analysed. ,90 There is a perception that all 
grand narratives have been ideologies in disguise, and date from the time when 
'scientists had promised that they would understand the world and change it for the 
better. ,91 
It has already been observed how ethnomusicology is rooted in anthropological 
traditions of scholarly enquiry. Bruno Nettl observes that many leaders In 
ethnomusicology have backgrounds in anthropology. 92 It is also significantly In 
American scholarship that the historical roots of ethnomusicology are particularly 
strong. It has been variously pointed out that '[ e ]thnomusicology has been sometimes 
87 Ralph Linton, "The Problem of Universal Values." In Method and Perspective in Anthropology: 
Papers in Honor of Wilson D. Wallis, Robert F. Spencer (ed.), (Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ. Press, 
1954), p. 151. 
88 Ibid, p. 152. 
89 See A. L. Kroeber, "Critical Summary and Commentary." In Method and Perspective. Spencer (ed.), 
pp.284-285. Kroeber here summarises Linton in "The Problem of Universal Values." 
90 Kuper. Anthropology and Anthropologists, pp. 187-188. 
91 Ibid, p. 188. Kuper is referring to the 'naive optimism of the nineteenth century when science and 
progrt?ss wert? expected to abolish all evils'. Ignace Lepp, Death and Its .Yf1'Steries (New York: 
Macmillan, 1968). p. xxi. 
92 See Bruno Nettl, "The Institutionalization of Musicology: Perspectives of a North American 
Ethnomusicologist." In Rethinking Music. Cook and Everist (eds.), pp. 300-301. 
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characterized as a North American field. ,93 'North America is the ancestral home for 
ethnomusicology,.94 In this connection, it is of interest to show the genealogical 
descent from anthropology to ethnomusicology in terms of one or two specific 
scholars: thus, for example, N ettl says that George Herzog used '. . . Boasian 
anthropological perspectives,.95 And in due course, the influence of Herzog was felt in 
its tum in the work of distinguished ethnomusicologist David P. McAllester author of 
Peyote Music, Enemy Way Music, Myth of the Great Star Chant, and Navajo 
Blessingway Singer (co-edited with Charlotte J. Frisbie).96 It is reasonable to expect 
that whatever characterises American anthropological approaches will be prominent in 
ethnomusicology on account of the latter's heavy weighting of American influence, 
and it has been noted here that cultural relativism has been the prevailing ethos of 
American anthropological thought for the greater part of the twentieth century. 
However, 'ethnomusicologists began in the late 1960s to return to the study of 
universals.,97 Nettl writes in 1983: 
Universals in the conceptualization of music and in musical behavior are harder to isolate, but let me 
attempt a short list. Surely first among them must be the association of music with the supernatural. All 
known cultures accompany religious activity with music ... Further, there is the conception of music as 
an art that consists of distinct units of creativity which can be identified, by place in ritual, by creator or 
performer, by opus number. One does not simply 'sing,' but one sings something. Music is composed 
of artefacts, although cultures differ greatly in their view of what constitutes such an artefact ... 
Also in this category of universals is the musical association with dance and speech. There is no 
culture that does not have some dance with musical accompaniment, nor one whose singing is 
completely without words, without poetry. These, then, are a few universals of the sort present in all or 
at least the overwhelming majority of musics, in practically all cultures, but not in each musical 
utterance.98 
Neil Sorrell notes In 1992: 'The new discipline of ethnomusicology, while drawing 
most of its impetus from the differences between cultures and examining each in its 
93 Bruno Nettl, "The Dual Nature of Ethnomusicology in North America: The Contributions of Charles 
Seeger and George Herzog." In Comparative Musicology, Nettl and Bohlman (eds.), p. 266. 
94 Daniel Neuman, "Epilogue: Paradigms and Stories." In Ethnomusicology and lv/odern Music 
History, Stephen Blum, Philip V. Bohlman, Daniel M. Neuman (eds.), (Urbana: Illinois Univ. Press, 
1991),p.275. 
95 Nett\, "Dual Nature of Ethnomusicology," p. 270. 
96 See Jeff Todd Titon, description of contributors. In Worlds o/Music, Titon (ed.), p. xvii. 
97 Nettl, Stlll~V 0/ Ethnomusicology, p. 37. 
98 Ibid, p. 40 
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own right, is nevertheless motivated by this need to discover universals that unite 
rather than divide humankind. ,99 It is noteworthy that these remarks, despite a 
willingness to consider issues of universality, nevertheless retain a preoccupation with 
musical characteristics displayed by cultures, rather than music-making tendencies 
exhibited by the human person, as, for instance, in infantile sound production. 
This subsequent shift to universals within ethnomusicological discussion, as 
described by N ettl, seems to have been a late reflection of a slow resurgence of the idea 
of universality within anthropology itself, whose incipient developments can be traced 
to Britain in the 1920s and which represented a counter-trend to American relativism. 
Part of Wissler's Man and Culture (1923), a book not much noticed at the time, was 
devoted to this problem of the universal categories of culture. Malinowski published 
his A Scientific Theory of Culture in 1944. He sought to show a universal culture 
pattern on the basis of the needs of the biotic substrate. In 1945, Murdock wrote "The 
Common Denominator of Cultures."loo This British movement was still only a 
tentative beginning of recovery of interest in universality, and it could be said even 
after the Second W orId War that a considerable division was present in Britain 
between the more empirical anthropology represented by Alfred Radc1iffe-Brown, and 
the new movement to universal principles represented by Edmund R. Leach. Leach 
had been influenced by the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss felt he 
could 'get 'behind' the flux of real behavior to the unconscious generating structure ... 
Beyond the unconscious models lies the human mind, and the final goal is to uncover 
the universal principles of human mentality.' 101 The confused atmosphere at the time, 
99 Neil Sorrell, "Improvisation." In Companion to Contemporary Musical Thought. vol 2, Paynter, 
Howell, Orton, Seymour (eds). p. 783. 
100 See Tennekes, Anthropology, pp. 121-123. References to Clark Wissler. Man and Culture (New 
York: Thomas Crowell, 1923); Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture (New York: North 
Carolina Univ. Press, 1944); George P. Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures." In The 
Science ofJ/([/I in the World Crisis, Ralph Linton (ed.), (New York: Columbia Uniy. Press, 1945). 
101 Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 165. 
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the criticism by Leach of British empirical approaches and the rise under his aegis of 
the new structuralist methodology based on Levi-Strauss, have been well characterised. 
Leach described the followers of Radcliffe-Brown as "butterfly collectors" while the 
latter in tum distrusted the theoretical and deductive demands of Levi-Strauss's 
approach. 102 Leach's approach based on Levi-Strauss made considerable headway and 
'in 1959, delivering the first Malinowski memorial lecture, which he provocatively 
entitled 'Rethinking Anthropology', Leach challenged his audience [to] ... drop 
comparison in favour of generalization' .103 In due course, Leach's ideas generated a 
school based on structuralism. 104 '[In the 1960s and 1970s] social anthropology was a 
small field, with fewer than two hundred professionals in Britain.' 105 Perhaps all the 
more because of the rapidity of personal interaction this smallness in numbers 
facilitated, by the 1960s a rising generation was reappropriating the idea of universality 
with vigour: 'The generation that came into the discipline in the 1960s, as research 
students or as young lecturers, were influenced by structuralism . . . Later they were 
impressed by what Quentin Skinner identified as the revival of grand theory in the 
social sciences.' 106 As a consequence of the changing ethos, the paradoxical balance 
between universality and relativity was now more discriminatingly acknowledged: 
consequently, '[t]hat thought is spectacularly multiple as product and wondrously 
singular as process has . . . come to be a more and more powerful animating paradox 
within the social sciences'. 1 07 In 1991, Brown could write that 'what we know about 
102 See ibid, pp. 177-178. Reference to Edmund R. Leach, Rethinking Anthropology (London: n.p., 
1961), p. 2. The confrontation was perhaps more subtle than these remarks suggest. As Kuper notes: 
'[Radcliffe-Brown's] ultimate goal was not in doubt. This was to formulate generalizations about the 
common features of all human societies.' Kuper, ibid, p. 51. 
103 Ibid, p. 156. 
10-1 See ibid, p. 173. 
105 Ibid, p. 180. 
106 Ib'd . I ,p. Xl. 
107 Geertz, Local ;":nowledge. p. 151. 
23 
universals places clear limits on the cultural relativism that anthropologists haye 
developed and disseminated widely.' 108 
This revival of interest in universals has been shown to be a British phenomenon, 
which might imply that, on account of deep American roots and influence, 
ethnomusicology will have been found slow to embrace it. Despite more recent 
expressions of balanced support for, and interest in universality from within the 
ethnomusicological community as instanced above (quoting Nettl and Sorrell), the 
influence of American relativism has been pronounced in the continuing formation of 
its methodology. Alan Merriam, who published an influential book The Anthropology 
of Music in 1964, had earlier said, as was noted above, that ethnomusicology is 'the 
study of music in culture.' 109 There is a strong flavour of Herskovits in this assertion; 
indeed, Merriam's 1964 book is dedicated to Herskovits. llo It has been claimed that 
'[b]eginning with Alan Merriam's The Anthropology of Music (1964), the assumption 
grew that ethnomusicology is the study of music in its cultural context ... Each music 
derives from its own cultural surrounding and history.' III This assumption parallels 
those of the scholars who gave birth to the relativist tradition in America where 
'[ a ]nalysis of separate cultures ... was seen as a means to the end, i.e., to gain insight 
into the cultural factor within human existence.' 112 Ringer, publishing in 1988, speaks 
of 'the stress on music as a cultural phenomenon which became the hallmark of 
ethnomusicology with its strong anthropological bias, especially in the wake of World 
War II.,113 Lupwishi Mbuyamba, publishing in 1992 observes that 'the 
108 B H U . I .. rown, uman mversa s, p. Vll. 
109 Alan P. Merriam, "Ethnomusicology: Discussion and Definition of the Field." Ethnomusicology 4, 
no. 3 (1960): 107-114: p. 109. 
110 See Merriam, Anthropology of Music, p. v. [No page number marked on page.] 
III Pirkko Moisala, Cultural Cognition in Music: Continuity and Change in the Curung Music of Nepal 
(Jy\"~iskla: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1991). p. 9. 
II' 
- Tennekes, Anthropology, p. 6. 
11-' Alexander L Ringer, "One World or None? Untimely Reflections on a Timely Musicological 
Question." In Comparative Musicology, Nettl and Bohlman (eds.), p. 187. 
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ethnomusicologist will search for the role and function of music within a gIven 
tradition.,114 The same writer points to 'the apparent irreducibility of musical 
languages. In the name of specific identities we are tempted, in fact, to regard musical 
worlds in terms of juxtaposition and incompatibility.' 115 
One problem of confining musical investigation to cultural factors in this way was 
anticipated by Leonard Meyer, writing in 1960: 
What we should ask about, when considering the problem of universals, is not whether the data itself is 
common to different cultures - any more than we decide whether there are scientific laws on the basis of 
particular physical events. What we should ask is whether, beneath the profusion of diverse and 
divergent particulars, there are any universal principles functioning. Stated thus it becomes apparent that 
the descriptive method is less satisfactory for dealing with the problem of universalism vs. relativism 
precisely because it ignores those psychological concepts which might provide common principles for 
interpreting and explaining the enormous variety of musical means found in different cultures. I 16 
There is a parallel with Popper here, since, for Meyer (see the second half of his first 
sentence), a hiatus exists between purely empirical methodology and a capacity to 
settle matters of universality. Meyer also speaks here of the importance of 
'psychological concepts,' 'universal principles' functioning beneath the outward forms 
of music-making, of which, it may be suggested, infantile vocalising is one. In a recent 
article Meyer writes: '[O]ne cannot comprehend and explain the variability of human 
cultures unless one has some sense of the constancies involved in their shaping.' 117 
'Recognizing the existence of universals and theorizing about their nature is 
indispensable because we can construct a coherent aesthetic and a viable history of 
music only by scrupulous attention to nature as well as to nurture, [emphasis added] 
and by trying to understand and explain their intricate interactions. . . The real 
[emphasis original] work remains to be done.' 118 Meyer's insistence here on a 
consideration of human 'nature' is consistent with the aims of the present Chapter 
11,\ Lupwishi Mbuyamba, "World Music: Musics of the World." In World Music: Musics of the World, 
Max Peter Baumann (ed.), (Wilhelmshaven: Florian Noetzel, 1992), p. 71. 
liS Ibid, p. 76 
116 Meyer, "Universalism and Relativism," pp. 118-119. 
117 Meyer. "Universe of Universals," p. 3. 
IIR Ibid, p. 25. 
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which seeks to show the foundations of human music in universal phenomena of infant 
vocalising; indeed, Meyer touches briefly upon issues of infant psychology.119 It might 
be possible to describe infant vocalising as a biological universal productive of human 
musical cultural forms. This would accommodate Meyer's preferred recent 
formulation that there are, strictly speaking, no musical universals 120 but only 
'acoustical universals of the physical world and the bio-psychological universals of the 
human world.,121 Infant vocalising would certainly be accommodated within the latter 
category. The present writer would not wish to follow Meyer's claim that there are no 
musical universals, but prefers to speak in this context of a universal of human nature 
(babbling) giving rise to a musical universal (improvisation). 
If there is a prejudicial weighting in the ethnomusicological community against the 
search for universals, arising from the American cultural antecedents of the discipline 
itself as currently pursued, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that aspects of 
musical universality may have gone unrecognised, or under-recognised. It has been 
shown how music in general has been widely acknowledged as a human universal by 
ethnomusicologists, but it will be suggested here that it is to musical improvisation that 
this universal label properly attaches. The term "music" is ambiguous. "Music" can 
have its basis in a wide variety of processes: the musical event may be based on a score 
which in tum may be more or less strictly interpreted; the score may be read in 
performance or it may be previously memorised; again, there may be no external 
representation of the music in existence and, if this is the case, the music may be 
memorised in the context of an oral tradition, or it may be created on the spur of the 
moment, that is, in improvisation. Indeed, even in improvisation itself, stylistic or 
cultural influences may be deliberately embraced, or they may be less conscious and 
119 See ibid, pp, 19-20, 
PO S 'b'd 6 
- ee 1 1 ,p, , 
121 Ibid, 
26 
more elusive; in addition, music may be improvised from a memorised scheme,122 or 
more freely. Permutations and possibilities ramify as to how music might be defined. 
What exactly lies at the heart of this "music" which is claimed by ethnomusicologists 
to be a human universal, when music is produced through so many different cultural 
practices? 
The suggestion here, is that improvisation is a universal whose implications 
ethnomusicologists do not yet fully recognise and which undergirds the entirety of 
humanity's music-making. If ethnomusicology has not been successful in 
discriminating this most specific aspect of music's universality, enough has already 
been said to demonstrate that this state of affairs may have arisen in consequence of an 
imbalance in the method employed by ethnomusicologists to the present time, resulting 
in the inability so far to address with confidence the search for universality itself, or to 
recognise its importance. F or Meyer, '[ ethnomusicologists '] preoccupation with the 
peculiarity of cultures led to the neglect of universals, including those of human bio-
psychology. ,123 This is not to imply that no hints whatsoever have already arisen in 
ethnomusicological writing to suggest that universality may be correctly attributed to 
musical improvisation in some form. For example, without actually adverting to the 
apologia for improvisation which his definition of music here clearly implies, John 
Blacking has written: 
Music is like many of the paintings and sculptures of traditional African societies: the art was in the 
making rather than in the fmished piece. The labour of love was what mattered and what uplifted human 
beings, and the subsequent fate of its product was comparatively unimportant. The intricate body-
paintings of the Nuba were washed off after a ritual; and I have seen women of the Nsenga of Zambia 
spend over two hours making a beautiful sculpture on the ground for a girls' initiation ritual, knowing 
that it would be destroyed in two minutes when the young novices danced on it. Similarly, there is 
nothing left after a musical performance except the memory, and perhaps the retention, of feelings. 124 
122 Sec Leo Treitler, "Medieval Improvisation." The World of Music 33, no. 3 (1991): 66-9l. 
m Meyer, "Universe of Universals," p. 5, footnote 7 (pp. 5-6). 
124 John Blacking, 'A Commonsense View of all Music': Reflections on Perc), Grainger's Contribution 
to Ethnomusicology and Music Education (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 24-25. 
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This passage contains an unacknowledged description of improvised music: only of 
such music can it be said that there is 'nothing left after a ... performance except the 
memory.' Elsewhere, Blacking's remarks seem to point to the idea of improvisation as 
a fundamental expression of the nature of human society, although he does not come to 
this conclusion explicitly: 
A culture is always being invented and re-invented by individual decision-making, and although it may 
give the impression of being more permanent than the individuals who constitute it, and cultural 
evolution has depended on the accumulation of knowledge and the expansion of societies, it is really 
humanity that is permanent and constantly evolving, and culture that is transient and dependent on 
human whim. 
Music expresses these contradictions of the human condition most faithfully ... Its structures reflect 
the replication and repetition of ideas and sequences of action and the need to share sentiments and 
concepts, which are essential features of culture, while the obligation to remake music at every 
performance, and the possibility that it may be felt anew inside each individual body, reflect the 
evolutionary condition of nature that an organism, to survive, should constantly adapt to its changing 
environment. 125 
The musical 'structures' which reflect a culture may be regarded as the stylistic traits of 
that culture's music, while the only way in which such musical traits can be truly 'felt 
anew' is in improvisation. 
For Blacking elsewhere, '[t]he creation of music can be described as a sharing of 
inner feelings in a social context through extensions of body movement, in which 
certain species-specific capabilities are modified and extended through social and 
cultural experience. Music is a metaphor of feeling that draws on man's own nature 
for many of its forms. ,126 'Inner feelings' always flow spontaneously from the human 
person as part of the flow of life itself. Thus inner feelings artistically represented are 
most fully represented in real time. Similarly,' [w ]hat distinguishes an improvisation 
from a performance is the human effort to compose in real time.' 127 Improvisation is 
'the spontaneous creation and performance of musical materials in a real-time format, 
125 Ibid, p. 23. 
126 John Blacking, "The Study of Man as Music-Maker." In The Performing Arts: Music and Dance. 
John Blacking and Joann W. Kealiinohomoku (eds.), (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), p. 6. 
127 David Elliott, Music Matters (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 169. 
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where the reworking of ideas is not possible.' 128 It is thus the improvisatory aspect of 
making music that best expresses these 'inner feelings' identified by Blacking. 
Moreover, Blacking refers above to 'man's ... nature' and to 'species-specific 
capabilities . . . modified and extended through social and cultural experience.' 
Infantile babbling is, as has been seen above, a species-specific capability, and, given 
its sonic characteristics, it would be arbitrary to dismiss its possible relationship to 
music-making later in the life of the human person, for much adult behaviour has roots 
in infancy. Such dismissal is not prevalent, and it is already accepted that the 
possibility of some historical continuation in the life of a human from his or her early 
babbling to the infant singing which arises out of it, and from this singing to adult 
spontaneous singing and music-making in general, represents one plausible account of 
the origins of musical activity in the developed human person. 129 However, despite 
babbling's apparently exploratory character, a possible link with improvisation in adult 
music-making is scarcely made, and certainly not systematically explored. 130 Yet 
following Blacking's observation above, it would be appropriate to look for musical 
128 Ed Sarath, "A New Look at Improvisation." Journal of Music Theory 40, no. 1 (1996): 1-38; p. 3. 
129 Activity, because babbling may probably not be regarded as the source of a person's entire musical 
experience, since listening precedes it. Hearing infants maintain their babble because they can listen. 
Developed, because all ideas of the first origins of musical activity in primitive man are understood to be 
highly speculative. For various proposals put forward regarding music's earliest origins see G. Revesz, 
Introduction to the Psychology of Music (1946) (London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1953), pp. 218-
235; Storr, Music and the Mind, pp. 1-23. 
John M. Holahan identifies three successive levels of babbling. See John M. Holahan "Toward a 
Theory of Music Syntax: Some Observations of Music Babble in Young Children." In Music and Child 
Development, Peery, Peery, Draper (eds.), p. 104. Sometimes, certain aspects of babbling have been 
connected with singing, and other aspects not. 'Moog distinguished between babbling as a precursor of 
speech and babbling that was considered music.' Linda Bryant Miller, "Children's Musical Behaviors in 
the Natural Environment." In ibid, Peery, Peery, Draper (eds.), p. 207. Reference to H. Moog, "The 
Development of Musical Experience in Children of Preschool Age." Psychology of Music 4 (1976): 38-
45. Yet even babbling linked to speech must presumably train the prosodic or sonorous capabilities of 
speech. and the latter in tum might be connected with tones and hence singing and music. 
130 Adachi concurs that only certain aspects of babbling are a foundation for spontaneous singing, and 
also that the three phenomena, babbling, infant and adult spontaneous singing, have important 
characteristic differences, not least in quantity, resulting partly from varying levels of environmental 
stimulation. (Reference to Kelly and Sutton-Smith, "Study of Infant Musical Productivity," n.p.) 
Nevertheless, Adachi asserts, 'if you just focus on the fact that both children and adults sing casually, of 
course all spontaneous singing is similar and thus can be classified as one big phenomenon.' Mayumi 
Adachi. personal electronic mail communication, University of Sheffield. 2nd March, 2000. 
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babbling's possible social and cultural consequences in adult musical practices. These 
practices might consistently reflect not only babbling's musical but also its exploratory 
properties which are suggestive of improvisation. Obviously, in suggesting that 
improvisation is a universal feature of music in this way, it is not implied that every 
musical event conforms to what common parlance would designate "an 
improvisation." The permanent residue of improvisatoriness within all music-making 
will find expression outside this confine. 
In cultures such as the European, where music is often symbolically represented, as 
in notation, improvisatoriness will include the "expressiveness" which informs the 
performance of a symbolic text, for expressiveness necessarily involves real-time 
performance decisions. For example, even though a crescendo marking on a fixed 
score is already present in virtue of a decision taken by the composer of that score, its 
exact process of volume-growth, and indeed its overall degree, involve real-time 
performance decision-making. It generally escapes attention that this phenomenon is 
implicitly improvisatory: '[T]he 'interpretative' aspect of western music displays many 
of the properties of an improvised musical culture ... condensed into a micro-realm of 
expressive adjustments which we 'hear through' much as in Schenkerian listening we 
'hear through' foreground prolongations or embellishments to middleground and 
background levels' . 131 To another writer likewise the spontaneity called 
expressiveness seems to be widely regarded as part of the process of interpreting a 
fixed score. 132 Once it is seen that the idea of improvisation encompasses that of 
131 Carl Humphries, "Between Act and Image: Continuity and Polarisation in the Creation and Reception 
of Musical Experience." Paper presented at the 3rd Triennial British Musicological Societies' 
Conference, University of Surrey, 15th-18th July, 1999, p. 4. 
m See Patrik N. Juslin, "Emotional Communication in Music Perfonnance: A Functionalist Perspective 
and Some Data." Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal 14, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 383-418; p. 
390. References to Gabrielssohn, in press; A. Gabrielssohn, "Interplay between Analysis and Synthesis 
in Studies of Music Perfonnance and Music Experience." Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal 3 (1985): 59-86; C. E. Seashore, Psychology of Music (1938) (New York: Dover, 1967); L. H. 
Shaffer, "How to Interpret Music." In Cogniril'EJ Bases of Musical Communication, M. R. Jones and S. 
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musical expressiveness in general, improvisation is seen to be fundamental even to 
forms of musical culture which emphasise the fixed text of music and with which 
musical improvisation in the more widely received sense of the term is not especially 
associated. Thus enlarged to include the expressive dimension, the improvisatory 
impulse becomes the non-negotiable aspect of any definition of music, in contrast to 
negotiable aspects such as memorisation of music, or writing down of music, or any 
other aspects which mayor may not be present. For while a mechanical device like a 
pianola might reproduce a score exactly as it stands, humans introduce expressive 
freedoms and flexibilities arising from expressive spontaneity into their music-making. 
Even if, as in some Western pop-music performance styles, the live performance is 
expected to "sound like the record" in not displaying any on-the-spot expressive variety 
in its performance decisions, this restriction nevertheless takes place against the 
cultural horizon of a society in which expressive performance flexibility is the 
established norm. It represents a departure from a known norm, not the absence of a 
norm, and is no more indicative of any non-universality of improvisatory/expressive 
musical practices than the existence of a person who cannot walk would demonstrate 
the non-universality of walking. For Mantle Hood, universality is 'high probability of 
occurrence.' 133 Where real-time expressivity is reduced to a minimum in a musical 
performance, as in these pop-music styles, this is not because, as a mode of musical 
creativity, it is absent from the musical culture which gives rise to that performance, 
but because it has been deliberately repressed in that performance context. Fred 
Lerdahl and Ray lackendoff have written in a slightly different context: '[O]ne would 
not claim, because a particular artistic idiom made use only of black and white, that the 
Holleran (eds.), (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1992); L. H. Shaffer. "Musical 
Perfonnance as Interpretation." Psychology of Afusic 23 (1995): 17-38. 
113 Mantle Hood, "Universal Attributes of Music." The World of Music 19, nos. 1-2 (1977): 63-69; p. 
66. 
31 
intended viewers could not make use of principles of color perception.' 134 On this 
analogy, the pop musicians referred to here, in suppressing the spontaneity which 
belongs innately to human music-making, are like photographers or artists who have 
deliberately restricted their productions to black and white images. Something similar 
could be said of music by Reich and Glass which is deliberately predictable. In Reich 
and Glass, it is precisely the absence of expressive flexibility which is noticed by the 
listener, thus confirming that the context in which their music is received entails wider 
expectations concerning the expressivity of human music-making. Likewise, in 'pre-
recorded, usually electroacoustic music, whose tape or computer disc is itself the only 
authentic performance,135 the absence of spontaneity is strongly featured, creating a 
marked presence-in-absence of the spontaneity which humans know to be present in 
normal music, and expect to hear, but which is here withheld through the use of novel 
compositional techniques. Stated another way, the witholding of musical 
expressiveness is a kind of reverse-expressive decision which alludes covertly to the 
expressiveness, and hence improvisatoriness, which is a universal feature of music. In 
so witholding, the performer is always aware of repressing something usual, in much 
the same way as a person who deliberately speaks in a monotone (for '[i]ntonation is 
universal . . . every language possesses intonation. ') I 36 Although' [u ]niversals are 
immutable, constraining relationships in the physical, biological and cultural 
worlds .... their action can be qualified or contravened.' 137 Yet, to revert to the 
1)../ Fred Lerdahl and Ray lackendoff, A Generative Theory a/Tonal Music (Cambridge MA: M. I. T., 
1983), p. 279. 
135 George Pratt, "Aural Training: Material and Method." In Companion to Contemporary Musical 
Thought, vol 2. Paynter, Howell, Orton, Seymour (eds.), pp. 852-853. 
1J6 Daniel Hirst and Albert Di Cristo, "A Survey ofIntonation Systems." In Intonation Systems: A 
Survey a/Twenty Languages, Daniel Hirst and Albert Di Cristo (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1998). p. 1. 
137 Meyer, "Universe of Universals," p. 5. footnote 6. 
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analogy of the black-and-white photograph, no amount of immersion in black-and-
white photography ever causes humans to forget that the real world exists in colour. 
The fundamental place occupied by improvisation in human music has perhaps now 
been persuasively suggested, and also the reason for the neglect of a similar conclusion 
among ethnomusicologists In favour of such universality accounted for. 
'Improvisation in one form or another has certainly existed, throughout the world, in 
most periods of musical history of which evidence remains.,138 For Nett!, '[i]n a 
certain sense, the history of ethnomusicology is one of tension between the conviction 
that each culture has its own music, distinct from all others, derived from its own 
history, value structure, and types of social relationships, and, on the other hand, the 
search for musical universals.,139 It is a hopeful sign that Nett! can observe that '[i]f 
the concept of improvisation can be said to be at all viable, it should be considered one 
of the few universals of music in which all cultures share in one way or another.' 140 
138 Alan Durant, "Improvisation: Arguments after the Fact." In Improvisation: History. Directions. 
Practice, commentator Eddie Prevost (London: Association of Improvising Musicians, 1984), p. 6. 
139 Bruno Nettl, "On the Question of Universals." The World o/Music 19, nos. 1-2 (1977): '2-7; p. 2. 
140 Nettl, 'Thoughts on Improvisation," p. 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Improvisation in the Modern West 
I European Musical Improvisation in Decline: the Historical Impact of the 
'Cogito' 
Distinguishing the improvisation latent In musical expreSSiveness from 
improvisatory musical practices as more usually defined, it may be said that the later 
eighteenth century marks the beginning of a significant decline in improvisatory 
musical practice in Western Europe. From the point of view of human culture taken in 
its widest sense, this has resulted in an unprecedented state of affairs, for' [a ]lthough it 
may be surprising to a Westerner, improvisation is at the centre of rather more musical 
traditions in the world than composition ... It is actually only in Western music that 
there has ever been any significant period in which improvisation was not central.' 1 
This decline was a consequence, it will be suggested, of the influence of Descartes 
(1596-1650) whose major philosophical works were starting to be widely read: 'By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, Cartesianism had passed ... from opposition to 
power; in France at least, Descartes had become an establishment figure.,2 A rich 
culture of musical improvisation prevailed in Europe up to this time. In connection 
with the eighteenth century itself it has been observed that only an expert improviser 
can come close to the essence of Baroque music.3 In addition to Baroque styles of free 
improvisation, there were also those consequent upon the idiomatic performance of 
I Hazel Smith and Roger Dean, Improvisation, Hypermedia and the Arts since 1945 (Amsterdam: 
Harwood, 1997), pp. 55-56. Reference to S. Frith, World Music, Politics and Social Change 
(Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1989). 
2 Nicholas Jolley, "The Reception of Descartes' Philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to 
Descartes, John Cottingham (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), p. -l18. Reference to (no 
given name) Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartesienne, vol 2 (incomplete documentation), p. 5-l7. 
3 Sec Sorrell, "Improvisation," p. 781. 
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particular styles of notation, such as the Italian harpsichord toccata and the harpsichord 
preludes of Louis Couperin.4 
No longer widely practised as in the eighteenth century, European traditions of 
improvisation are also little studied. Ernst Ferand's Die Improvisation in der Musik, 
treating the history of European improvisation, was published in 1938. A book 'but 
little reviewed and ... received with only mild enthusiasm,5 it was regarded by Bruno 
N ettl in 1974 as still the most comprehensive general history of European 
improvisatory practices. For Nettl, 'in the area of scholarly conceptualization Ferand is 
still the last word,.6 Larry Solomon, publishing about ten years later than Nettl could 
write that '[ s ]ince it rarely occurs as an academic study and its ephemeral nature does 
not submit easily to analysis, improvisation has gained a reputation of mystery and 
superstition.,7 Solomon speaks of the unjustified neglect of improvisation 'considered 
unrefined, primitive, undisciplined, or inferior to composition.,8 In 1997, Hazel Smith 
and Roger Dean wrote of the non-repeatable nature of improvisatory art which gives 
rise to the fact that 'there has been a long-standing prejudice against improvisation ... 
The critic often presumes that such events are incomplete preparations for a later 
finished performance, and does not appreciate the quite distinct nature of an 
4 See Luigi Ferdinando Tagliavini, "The Art of 'Not Leaving the Instrument Empty'." Early Music 11, 
no. 3 (July 1983): 299-308; p. 306. Tagliavini provides reference to a comparison 'of the two types of 
notation - that of the Frenchpretude non mesure and that of the Italian toccata' (ibid, footnote 47) in A. 
Curtis, Preface to Louis Couperin, Pieces de clavecin, Le pupitre, 18 (Paris: n.p., 1970); also to Davitt 
Moroney, "The Performance of Unmeasured Harpsichord Preludes." Early Music 4, no. 2 (April 1976): 
143-151; p. 143. 
5 Nettl, "Thoughts on Improvisation," p. 1. Reference to Ernst Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik: 
Eine EntH'icklungsgeschichtliche und Psychologische Untersuchung (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1938). 
6 Nettl, ibid, p. 2. 
7 Larry Solomon, "Improvisation (1)." In Larry Austin, AMM (Eddie Prevost and Keith Rowe), Derek 
Bailey. Harold Budd, Vinny Golea and Lee Kaplan, Elliott Schwartz, Larry Solomon, Malcolm 
Goldstein. John Silber, Da\'ey Williams, Pauline Oliveros, "Forum: Improvisation," Barney Childs and 
Christopher Hobbs (eds.). Perspectil'es of NeH' Music 21, nos. 1-2 (FalllWinter 1982 and 
Spring/ Summer 1983: combined edition): 26-111; p. 72. 
8 Ibid. The word' inferior' appears as 'interior': in this context presumably a misprint. 
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improvised work.,9 In 1999, R. Keith Sawyer noted: 'Improvisation is a relatively new 
topic for creativity research, only beginning to receive attention in the 1990s.' 10 
The post-Cartesian marginalisation of improvisation will be shown to have its 
roots in the wider marginalisation of performance over against composition when 
performance comes to be associated with "body" within the Cartesian mind-body 
problematic. The structure. of modem European language vocabularies, with their 
separate words for musical "composition" and "performance," indicates how firmly 
established now within the European mind has become the distinction between the 
notated work of music, and the performing processes associated with it. 11 It will be 
argued that the severity of this dichotomy may be attributed to the fact that, after 
Descartes, this linguistic usage came ultimately to be a vehicle for one permutation of 
the Cartesian mind-body problematic (cogito ergo sum), 12 in which the composing of 
9 Smith and Dean, Improvisation, pp. 5-6. 
10 R. Keith Sawyer, "Improvisation." In Encyclopedia of Creativity, vol 2, Mark A. Runco and Steven 
R. Pritzker (eds.), (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), p. 31. 
II The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) gives the earliest known 
printed uses in English of these two words. It is interesting that the earliest given use of "composition" 
to mean "musical work" emerges only after the time Descartes's ideas had begun to circulate in France, 
even though, in the sense of "process of writing music," the word was not itself new. Thus a sixteenth-
century use of "composition" is cited in which the word meant the composing process rather than the 
thing produced. 'You lacke nothing of perfect musicians, but only vse [sic] to make you prompt and 
quicke in your compositions.' Morley, In trod. Mus. p. 182 (1597). Cited in OED, vol 3, p. 624. In the 
sense of referring to the composed product, the first given use of "composition" is post-Cartesian. 'The 
whole composition is most excellent.' Pepys' Diary, 12th February, 166617. Cited in OED, vol 3, p. 
625. If it is implausible to propose that Descartes's ideas affected within so short a time the English in 
which Pepys wrote, it is less implausible to suggest a single cultural force at work behind both 
Descartes's ideas and changes in language, a mindlbody conceptualisation of the human person which 
Descartes's philosophy articulated and reinforced, and late seventeenth-century English also reflected. 
The idea of musical "performance" seems to emerge in print only in the eighteenth century. 'The 
Opera of Pyrrhus and Demetrius was performed with great applause.' Steele, Tatler, no. 4, section 4 
(1709). Cited in OED, vol 11, p. 543; 'Several ... songs are performed.' Entick, London IV, p. 447 
(1766). Cited in OED, vol 11, p. 543. Historically therefore, the word "performance" and its cognates 
would seem to have been precipitated as the "other" of "composition" in the latter's rising connotation of 
musical product, to which Descartes's ideas gave impetus. 
Note on usage: throughout the thesis the genitive form "Descartes's" will be used. For this usage (as 
opposed to the usage "Descartes' ") see R. W. Burchfield (ed.), Fowler's Modern English Usage 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), "Apostrophe (2)," section D, para 4, p. 61. 
12 'In the letter where [Descartes] says that the dictum, 'I think, therefore I am,' is so obvious that it 
might havc come from anyone's pen, he observes that its real value is that it can be used to 'establish that 
this I which is thinking is an immaterial substance with no bodily element'.' Peter Markie, "The Cogito 
and its Importance." In Cambridge Companion to Descartes, Cottingham (ed.). p. 142. Elscwhere 
Descartes writes: 'Indeed, I do not know whether I have a body; you have shown me that it is possible to 
doubt it. I might add that I cannot deny absolutely that I have a body. Yet even if we keep all these 
suppositions intact. this will not prevent me from being certain that I exist. On the contrary. these 
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the musical work, being a largely noetic process, came to be equated with mind, and 
the perfonned process of music-making, being inherently physical, came to be equated 
with body. And just as in the Cartesian problematic, it is the mind which is privileged 
over the body, likewise, there now came about within Western music a long tradition 
of privileging the work over perfonnance. 
David Elliott draws upon philosopher Gilbert Ryle, and has sought to elucidate 
this musical compositionlperfonnance-based binarism by pointing out that, 
particularly with reference to the Cartesian philosophy of mind which gave rise to and 
fostered it, 'actions follow from verbal thoughts in a two-step sequence of think -act, 
think-act, ad infinitum. The first event is mental (speaking silently to oneself), and the 
second event is physical (bodily movement). The dualistic assumption is that thinking 
and knowing are always verbal and that bodily actions are nonverbal, or dumb.' 13 
Where this model in epistemology is dominant within a particular culture, as it was in 
the West prior to the influence of Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949), there will be a 
perception of action as subordinate to thought in every human sphere. However, as 
Ryle pointed out, in his refutation of this theory, if this 'think-act' sequence were true, 
'the first event (verbal thinking) would become an action that would itself require a 
preceding act of theorizing, thereby leading us to the absurdity (or infinite regress) that 
no one can act until he or she completes an infinite number of verbal thoughts.' 14 
According to such a theory, human activity could never begin. Ryle's insight has led 
to the contemporary view in which activity is in fact not the 'dumb' consequence of 
suppositions simply strengthen the certainty of my conviction that I exist and am not a body. Otherwise, 
if I had doubts about my body, I would also have doubts about myself, and I cannot have doubts about 
that. I am absolutely convinced that I exist, so convinced that it is totally impossible for me to doubt it.' 
From Rene Descartes. The Search for Tn/th by Means of the Natural Light (1701). Cited in The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol 2. John Cottingham, Dugald Murdoch, Robert Stoothoff (eds.), 
(Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. 1985), p. 412. 
1\ Elliott l\4usic Matters, p. 55. 
14 Ibid. Reference to Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Penguin, 1949), pp. 30-32. 
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the idea. Actions are 'nonverbal forms of thinking and knowing in and of 
themselves.,15 In the words of Ryle: 'Overt intelligence perfonnances are not clues to 
the workings of minds; they are those workings.' 16 If Ryle's analysis of the Cartesian 
dichotomy is correct, it is clear that perfonnance of music can no longer be considered 
as a marginalised counterpart to composition. In the modem view of Elliott and Ryle, 
the older binary model, when applied to the relationship between the noetic process of 
composing and the practical activity of music-making, tends in due course to make the 
latter subordinate, so that perfonning will be disesteemed. This state of affairs will be 
revised once we see more clearly that 'our musical thinking and knowing are in our 
musical doing and making. ,17 
It is from some of its observable effects in various sociological aspects of musical 
activity that it becomes certain that such a marginalisation of practical activity in 
music has actually occurred. In the case of music education the consequences of this 
binarism have, for example, been serious. This is evidenced by the fact that over a 
long period until the 1970s in Britain and elsewhere, academic musical education and 
perfonning education were assigned almost exclusively to different types of 
institution: universities and conservatoires respectively. Underlying this 
methodological schism between academic and perfonning musical education was the 
erroneous assumption that perfonnance, being chiefly a fonn of activity, was not a 
fonn of musical intelligence like the study of composition or analysis or music history, 
and could therefore not be accommodated within the thought-based milieu of the 
university. This schism arguably still prevails to some degree. 'Only in the last ten 
years or so has musical perfonnance started to attract the range and level of scholarly 
15 Elliott, ibid. 
16 Ryle. Concept ofJ\find. p. 57. Cited in ibid. 
17 Elliott, ibid. p. 56. 
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attention it has always merited but inconsistently received.' 18 A parallel with current 
practice in psychology 'where action has tended to be studied separately from 
perception and cognition' 19 has been identified by Eric Clarke. 
Belief that thought could exist without action (cogito ergo sum) marginalised the 
idea that there is such a thing as musical performing intelligence. The performing of 
music was considered a matter of physical activity and emotional sensitivity, coupled 
with the modest intellectual requirement of being able to read and perhaps memorise 
notation. What was forgotten were the musical decisions required in performance, the 
skilful modification of performance in the light of these decisions, and the ability to 
evaluate alternative possible decisions while performing.2o Yet holding together a 
piece as a convincing unity, or balancing polyphonic voices at the keyboard, or 
responding promptly to situations arising in performance are all intelligent acts and 'a 
competent, proficient, or expert performer must continuously reflect upon, judge, and 
adjust his or her thinking-in-action on the basis of internalized sets of practical or 
heuristic understandings.,21 Because improvisation is a species of performance, it was 
subject to a consequent attrition within this composition/performance matrix. It might 
be claimed that improvisation's attrition was all the more severe than that of 
performance in general, since, while from one point of view it stands to be viewed as 
an expression of performance, seen as a phenomenon of composition-through-
performance it occupies a no-man's-land between composition and performance, with 
the consequence that it cannot be accommodated within the Cartesian dichotomy at 
all. It seems to be neither of the mind nor of the body. 
18 John Rink, Review of Jonathan Dunsby, Performing Music: Shared Concerns (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1995). Music and Letters 77, no. 2 (May 1996): 253-257; p. 253. 
19 Eric F. Clarke, "Improvisation, Cognition and Education." In Companion to Contemporary Musical 
Thought. vol 2. Paynter, Howell, Orton, Seymour (eds.). p. 795. 
20 See Vernon Howard, Artistry: The Work of Artists (1982) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), pp. 182-185. 
21 Elliott, Music Matters, p. 59. 
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The incipient decline of a strong improvisatory tradition, and the simultaneous 
gradual rise of the work under the impact of Cartesian philosophy, gave rise in the 
eighteenth century to a paradoxical tradition of improvisation within a musical culture 
that prized rational structure. This raises historical and aesthetic issues not yet 
explored.22 Improvisation may be understood in this historical context to include 
semi-improvisatory practices within scored music, such as the practice of keyboard 
improvising above a figured-bass, or the free ornamentation of pre-existent 
compositions. However, it is clear that, in line with the present argument, both 
practices were in steady decline throughout the late eighteenth century. 23 More 
concretely, the decline of the continuo player was a consequence of the rise of the 
conductor,24 who, of course, presides over and marshals the requirements of a score 
which in tum embodies a composition. The ushering aside of improvisation by a 
rising aesthetic based on the composition is here virtually personified. Ferand 
remarked that' [w ]ith the gradual decline of the thorough-bass in the second half of the 
18th century, the last traces of improvisation in Western ensemble music 
d· d ,25 Isappeare . 
It is likely also that the growing use of ornamentation tables in the later eighteenth 
century tended to render more rigidly prescriptive an area of relative creative freedom 
for the performer, hitherto circumscribed only by a sense of orally transmitted 
tradition, and, in so doing, restrained improvisatory freedom. 'Instructional and 
theoretical works come, through their sheer quantity, to assume a new importance to 
the student of ornamentation as the Classical period began and music publishing 
~2 See David Schulenberg, "Composition and Improvisation in the School of J. S. Bach." In Bach 
Perspectil'cs, vol 1, Russell Stinson (ed.), (Lincoln: Nebraska Univ. Press, 1995), p. 1. 
23 See Peter Williams, "Continuo." In The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, vol 4, 
Stanley Sadie (ed.), (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 685. 
24 See Jack Westrup, "Conducting." In New Grove, ibid, p. 643. 
~5 Ernest T. Ferand, Improvisation in Nine Centuries of Western Music: An Anthology with a Historical 
Introduction (1956) (Cologne: Arno Yolk Verlag, 1961), p. 19. 
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flourished. ,26 Perhaps ornamentation tables were increasingly needed for the guidance 
of players because the art of competent ornamentation was already in decline. Dennis 
Libby has suggested that' [w ]ith the increase of amateur music-making in the 18th and 
19th centuries there arose a large class of performers who could not be expected to 
have the knowledge or sensitivity necessary to provide their own ornamentation. This 
formed a further stimulus to writing it OUt.,27 The prevalence of incompetent 
ornamentation may well underlie C. P. E. Bach's strictures on 'prodigal 
embellishments [which are] spices which may ruin the best dish or gewgaws which 
may deface the most perfect building. ,28 Peter Hurford suggests that improvised 
ornamentation had by this time become a 'notorious practice. ,29 
The unsatisfactory performing of ornaments as referred to here by C. P. E. Bach 
could be understood by him as 'prodigal' in one, or another, or indeed a combination 
of two senses, and either sense has implications for a Cartesian interpretation of this 
particular development in performance practice. In the first sense, C. P. E. Bach may 
mean that players ornamented perhaps more profusely and certainly badly. Indeed, as 
has been observed elsewhere, '[ m ]any sources comment - usually they complain -
about an increase of improvized ornamentation during the course of the 18th century, 
both among singers and instrumentalists. ,30 If there was indeed a proliferation in the 
quantity of ornamentational activity it should be noted that this is not contrary to the 
26 William Crutchfield in Andrew V. Jones and William Crutchfield, "Ornamentation." In The New 
Grove Dictionary o/Opera, vol 3, Stanley Sadie (ed.), (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 764. 
27 Dennis Libby, "Improvisation: Western after 1800." In Imogene Horsley, Michael Collins, Eva 
Badura-Skoda, Dennis Libby, "Improvisation I." In New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, vol 
9, Sadie (ed.), p. 49. 
2R Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments (1753) (London: 
Cassell, 1949), p. 81. 
29 Peter Hurford, Making Music on the Organ (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), p. 107. 
30 John Spitzer, "Improvized Ornamentation in a Handel Aria with Obbligato Wind Accompaniment." 
Ear!}' Music 16, no. 4 (November 1988): 514-522; p. 520. References to Esteban de Arteaga. Le 
rivoiuzioni del teatro musicale italiano dala sua origine fino al presente (Venice: n.p .. rev 2, 1785). iii, 
pp. 5-6; Domenico Corri, The Singer's Preceptor (London: n.p., 1810), trans. as The Porpora Tradition. 
Edward Foreman (ed.), (incomplete documentation.), pp. 2-3; Anon, Wahrheiten die Musik betreffend -
gerade herausgesag! \'011 einem teitschem Biedermann (Frankfurt: n.p., 1770), pp. 71-72; John Potter. 
Observations on the Present State of Music and Afusicians (London: n.p., 1762), pp. 79-81. 
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present thesis that improvisation was In decline, for devaluation can lead to 
proliferation, and decadence can be linked to hypertrophy and exaggeration. A living 
tradition had formerly sustained ornamentation and provided a framework within 
which to contain it: tradition had sanctioned at this level of oral culture often highly 
specific ways in which ornamentational practices were appropriate. This cultural 
framework was being undermined by a slow trend against improvisation which led 
inevitably to a rising sense that ornamentation was less important. Because the 
context for principles of ornamentation became less exigent, and a feeling for earlier 
practice was waning, ornamentation came to be perceived as a slight and indifferent 
matter, and became untrammelled from former guiding principles. These had of 
course included limiting principles indicating where ornamentation should not be 
inserted. In this interpretation of C. P. E. Bach's words, late eighteenth-century 
ornamentation had degenerated somewhat into a thoughtless reflex. Thus the decline 
of ornamentation here is understood not necessarily as a matter of diminishing 
frequency of occurrence, but more widely as the failure of improvisatory 
ornamentation to present itself to the listeners as tasteful in quantity, well-executed 
and attractive; a decline, that is to say, in its ability to enhance a performance. 
C. P. E. Bach may mean 'prodigal' in another sense, however, or at least combined 
with another sense. This second sense is less obvious than the first, but of 
considerable interest in the present philosophical context. With the rise of the late 
eighteenth-century ideal of composition, which, as IS being argued, rendered 
performing and improvisatory issues more and more subordinate, the score was 
increasingly viewed as the embodiment of a work which could be treated less freely by 
performers than hitherto, and C. P. E. Bach's stricture may result from gradually 
changing views of how a musical text should be treated in performance. He possibly 
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regards ornamentation as a decadent impulse on the part of performers, who failed to 
balance their improvisatory creativity with respect for the score. The improvised 
ornamental interpolations were perceived by him as perhaps to some extent 
stylistically 'prodigal' precisely as such, not because of the nature or amount of them, 
but simply because they were there at all. We know that, increasingly the ethos of the 
scored composition dominated the mindset of the Bach family, for there is an 
indication that within the circle of Bach's composer sons, 'embellishments, cadenzas, 
even entire pieces that might have originated in disciplined but still improvisatory 
flights of fancy could - indeed must - be fixed and brought to perfection by writing 
them down as precisely as possible. ,31 Improvisation must, for them, increasingly be 
captured within the sphere of the work. Examples of this principle that improvisatory 
music should find its way into notation are the highly florid and improvisatory notated 
keyboard Fantasias of C. P. E. Bach, which were 'nothing but improvisations written 
down,32 and it is significant that '[a]lthough Friedemann and Emanuel became famous 
for their improvisations and their improvisatory free fantasias, they appear to have 
written down few such pieces until relatively late in life. ,33 A possible implication of 
this chronology is that, as the prestige of the work considered as the normative 
expression of musical activity exerted increasing cultural pressure toward the end of 
the eighteenth century, these celebrated improvisers no longer felt it appropriate to 
leave their improvisations in unnotated form. It is also indicative of the rise of this 
trend towards notation that whereas C. P. E. Bach's notated "improvisatory"-style 
Fantasias are numerous, his father 1. S. Bach had only notated one complete work in 
this style, the Chromatic Fantasia for harpsichord, in addition to the Fantasia of the 
Fantasia and Fugue in G minor for organ. As Forkel claimed of the Chromatic 
31 Schulenberg, "Composition and Improvisation," p. 38. 
32 Carl Dahlhaus, Schoenberg and the New Music (1987) (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), p. 
269. 
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Fantasia, '[t]his fantasia is unique, and never had its like.,34 Forkel presumably did 
not mean that Bach had never improvised anything else on the harpsichord resembling 
the Chromatic Fantasia. What Forkel meant to say here is that the Chromatic 
Fantasia was the only whole "improvisatory" piece of its type that 1. S. Bach notated. 
1. S. Bach did not normally feel the pressure to notate this type of improvisation 
because the cultural pressure subsequently felt by his children to have their 
improvisations written out was not yet prevalent so as to affect him. 
It has been observed by Darbellay that 'C. P. E. Bach's musical notation far 
exceeds in precision and thoroughness everything before it' .35 Possibly Darbellay 
overlooks a possible antecedent in the precise notational principles of Fran90is 
Couperin in his harpsichord music, who may have influenced C. P. E. Bach through 
Quantz,36 and, in connection with this textual precision, it may be significant that 
Couperin, like Descartes, is French. C. P. E. Bach's precision undoubtedly extended 
to every aspect of expression and even included keyboard fingering. 37 ' ... C. P. E. 
Bach's notation matches in fact ... his aesthetics. To the degree that one is persuaded 
of a language's unambiguousness, it must be possible to codify it exactly. ,38 The new 
concept of the work in which music is codified as exactly as possible has to be 
unambiguous, for it is an outcome of Descartes's philosophy of clear and distinct 
ideas. This trend would lead eventually in the nineteenth century to a concept of the 
work so detached from performance considerations that, among other characteristics, 
33 Schulenberg, "Composition and Improvisation," p. 33. 
34 Johann Nicolaus Forkel, Uber Johann Sebastian Bachs Leben, Kunst und Kunstwerke (1802) (Berlin: 
n.p., 1982). p. 98. Cited in George B. Stauffer, '''This fantasia ... never had its like': On the Enigma 
and Chronology of Bach's Chromatic Fantasia and Fugue in D minor, BWV 903." In Bach Studies, Don 
O. Franklin (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), p. 160. 
35 Etienne Darbellay, "c. P. E. Bach's Aesthetic as Reflected in his Notation." In C. P. E. Bach Studies, 
Stephen L. Clark (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 6l. 
36 Douglas Hollick, personal communication, University of Hull, 6th December, 1999. Hollick is a 
harpsichord performer and teacher of international visibility, and a recognised expert on eighteenth-
century keyboard practices. 
37 See Darbellay. "e. P. E. Bach's Aesthetic," p. 61. 
311 Ibid, p. 62. 
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occasionally '[ c ]omposers will notate intentions that cannot be realised in practice 
(something that C. P. E. Bach never does). For instance, in piano music there may be 
seen a crescendo on a single note, or there may be verbal remarks intended to make the 
performer think of helpful associations of images. ,39 An example of the use of an 
unplayable "crescendo" marking on a held piano chord is found in the fourth and fifth 
bars from the last of Liszt's Sonata in B minor4o while an example of 'helpful 
associations of images' is found on the score of F erruccio Busoni' s piano transcription 
of the D minor Chaconne for solo violin by 1. S. Bach, in which the pianist is exhorted 
to try to make the piano sound like trombones (quasi Tromboni).41 In the Busoni, it is 
ultimately only the notated page which embodies the transcriber's conception, for only 
by filtering their act of listening to the piece through a familiarity with the score could 
any listener reasonably be expected to hear "trombones." Busoni's conception of the 
piece is thus found only in the mind's ear attentive to the notated page, rather than in 
the performance per se. 
The decline in improvising in the freer sense of the term (solo keyboard fantasias, 
for example) is of greater significance here than the decline of semi-improvisatory 
practices (such as figured-bass). This is because the decline of the practice of 
improvising in the latter more limited sense within semi-improvised, precomposed 
contexts, which usually exhibit the desire to contain improvisation as far as possible 
within the confines of the precomposed work, does not show the decline of 
improvisation in such high relief as a situation where there is attrition in improvisation 
pursued for its own sake. Improvisation in the latter, freer sense was exhibited in the 
concerto cadenzas of the later eighteenth century, which despite having a thematic 
39 Ibid, p. 61. 
40 Franz Liszt, Sonata for Pianoforte, in B minor (Milan: Curci. n.d.), p. 43. 
41 Bach-Busoni. Chaconne in D minor, for piano, from the Second Partita for solo violin by 1. S. Bach, 
BWV 1004 (Wiesbadcn: Breitkopf und Hartel, n.d), p. 12. 
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basis in the themes of the concertos in which they were set, were prized precisely as 
free improvising, in the sense that their duration and style were left to the performer to 
a far greater extent than in the more constrained improvising on a figured-bass or 
ornamentation of pre-existing scores. Moreover, unlike the figured-bass player, who 
functioned within the ensemble as a discreet accompanist, and unlike ornamentation, 
which was generally perceived as stylistically peripheral to the structure of a musical 
work, the concerto cadenza was a highly-featured improvisation by a prominent soloist 
presented as an accomplished individual contrasted with the relative anonymity of the 
orchestra. The concerto cadenza, associated as it was with the public concerts, rather 
than domestic music-making of the later eighteenth century could be described as a 
"public rite" which celebrated musical improvisation for its own sake, rather than an 
improvisatory practice exhibited en passant within contexts where the improvisatory 
nature of what is occurring does not form the main basis for the interest of the music 
being heard, as in the work of a figured-bass realiser. This arguably makes the decline 
of improvisation as reflected in the decline of the free concerto cadenza a more public 
attrition of improvisatory activity than the attrition of semi-improvisatory practices. 
The decline of the improvised concerto cadenza at the end of the eighteenth 
century, when it was replaced increasingly by written-out cadenzas, is consequently a 
particularly symbolic moment in the decline of improvisation because it took place 
before the wider public of the proliferating concert halls. 'Though a cadenza ought to 
give the impression of spontaneity, of on-the-spot improvisation on a theme or themes 
from the movement just played, by the late eighteenth century, these 'improvisations' 
frequently were written out and rehearsed beforehand' .42 The number of cadenzas 
later decreased and came to be regarded chiefly as a means for displaying technicaL 
-12 Reinhard G. Pauly, Afusic in the Classic Period (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 137. 
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rather than improvisatory, musical skil1.43 This was the moment when improvisation 
capitulated in the presence of the crowd. The nineteenth century saw the rise of a 
middle class, growing numbers of amateur musicians, and the elevation of the 
individuality of the composer now released from aristocratic patronage; it also saw the 
rise of the modem concert hall and '[i]t is likely that this change, with its attendant 
standards of taste and behaviour, has not provided the most conducive environment 
for improvisation. ,44 Improvisation was also marginalised by the rising social role of 
composers and composition, both consequential upon the rise of the work. Carl 
Dahlhaus identifies particularly the years 1830 to 1847 as a transitional period in 
which there arose 'a new instrumental tradition emphasizing themes as a mode of 
musical cognition. ,45 These themes 'tended to produce 'logical' forms which ... 
granted considerably more leeway to composers than to improvisers ... In the same 
moment that improvisation reached its culmination as a part of cultural history, it was 
endangered from within by the march of compositional history. ,46 
Improvisation was in fact endangered at first in public, but not in private. 
Arguably, improvisation finally dwindled as a mainstream musical practice only later 
in the mid-nineteenth century '[ w ]ith the decline of the salon . . . in which 
improvisation was more at home than in the increasingly formal atmosphere of the 
concert hall' .47 This point will be considered in more detail later. Despite such 
prodigious and famous exponents as Franz Liszt, the earlier cultural status of 
improvisation in mainstream Western musical practice prior to the mid- to late-
eighteenth century was never regained. As a result, '[i]mprovisation is not generally 
-I, S 'b'd 
. ce 1 1 . 
-1-1 Sorrell, "Improvisation," p. 778. 
45 Carl Dahlhaus. Nineteenth-Century Music (Berkeley: California Univ. Press. 1989), p. 137. 
-I(l Ibid, p. 138. 
47 Libby, "Improvisation: Western after 1800," p. 50. For the decline of the salon see James Methuen-
Campbell, "Chopin in Perfonnance." In The Cambridge Companion to Chopin, Jim Samson (ed.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), p. 201. 
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accepted as part of the mainstream musical process for today's concert-going pUblic. 
It remains a somewhat 'fringe' activity, which one might meet in specialized concerts, 
in the new music 'ghettos'. ,48 
II The Contradictions o/the Work: Attitudes Against Improvisation 
In the binary mind-body model arising from Cartesianism, not only is practical 
music-making subordinated, but composition, as has been seen, is correspondingly 
privileged. At this point, the discussion will shift its emphasis to the other factor in 
the binarism: the work. A cultural shift to the musical work does, of course, have 
some antecedents prior to the eighteenth century. Looking back briefly to earlier 
watersheds in the history of the rise of the work, Jacques Charpentier has described a 
Western movement away from a more improvisatory culture at the end of the Middle 
Ages, when, from the time of the rise of staff notation and the representation of note 
lengths, an attempt was made to render the score an exact description of the intended 
music. '[F]rom that moment on, a musical work was no longer strictly musical; it 
existed outside itself, so to speak, in the form of an object to which a name was given: 
the score. ,49 Later, Caccini (c. 1545-1618) is another important earlier figure in the 
rise of the score. 'Caccini ... exhibits a tendency to insist upon his right to exercise 
greater control over the performance of his music than had previously been the case. 
What was once improvised is increasingly composed into the score. ,50 These 
quotations might suggest that it was instances of the earlier rises of musical scores 
which engendered the rise of the musical work concept as much as the effects of a 
.jX Orton, "From Improvisation to Composition," p. 763 . 
.jl) Jacques Charpentier, no documentation. Cited in Derek Bailey, Improl'isation: Its Nature and 
Practice in ;\fusic (London: The British Library National Sound Archive, 1992), p, 59. 
50 Tim Carter, "On the Composition and Perfonnance ofCaccini's Ie nuove musiche (1602)," Ear~l' 
Music 12, no. 2 (May 1984): 208-217, p. 209. See also Giulio Caccini, Nuove musiche e nuova maniera 
di scrivcr/e (1614). 
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Cartesian anthropology. In truth, all these influences have been important, and 
constitute separate, though parallel, cultural watersheds. It is however clearly the 
Cartesian watershed which, as the most recent, has had the most direct influence on 
developments from the eighteenth century onward. 
Although composition is, especially since Descartes's influence, presumed to be 
the process productive of the "work," in reality the idea of the work as an identifiable 
and repeatable event proves elusive in the widest sense. Because a piece of music can 
never be repeated as exactly the same in respect of its expressive nuances, the idea of 
the work is seriously compromised. The presence of improvisatoriness in the form of 
real-time expression, as well as other possible factors, effectively deconstructs the 
work. 'With European art music we tend to think that we can determine the musical 
work from one performance, but even a computer composition that attempts to control 
all variables is dependent upon specific speakers in a specific room, to say nothing of 
the specific audience.'51 As was seen, it is the idea of the work of music rather than 
the performing process of music which has been profoundly formative in European 
thought starting from the eighteenth century. Yet, as Dahlhaus has said, 'the idea that 
music is exemplified in works, no matter how firmly it has become rooted in the past 
century and a half, is far from self-evident. ,52 Kurt Blaukopf concurs that 'the score as 
an end result of musical creation is a relatively recent phenomenon in Occidental 
music. ,53 Against this point it might be objected that the notion of the "score" is 
dispensable here and that '[t]he concept of 'composition' could, with some 
justification, also be applied to music conceived without writing. ,54 However, the idea 
51 Jose A. Bowen, "The History of Remembered Innovation: Tradition and Its Role in the Relationship 
between Musical Works and Their Performances." The Journal of Afusicology 11, no. 2 (1993): 139-
173; p. 167. 
52 Carl Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 198~), p. lO. 
53 Kurt Blaukopf, .\fusical LVe in a Changing Society (Munich: R. Piper, 1982), p. 256. 
54 Ib'd 1'i7 1 ,p,..... , 
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of the work is already highly problematical even prior to any consideration of the use 
of musical script, for even in the context of oral tradition the idea of the work is hardly 
valid at all. Here, in fact, even more obviously, it can be seen that the exact 
reproduction of a piece of music is impossible, because, having no text to which to 
refer, the degree to which no two performances can ever be the same is often all the 
more striking than in literate musical cultures. In oral cultures, the differences often 
extend beyond the question of varying expressiveness to the notes themselves. 
'Romanian ethnomusicologist Constantin Brailoiu has insisted (he was probably the 
first) that in fact there is no single standard version for a given popular song (identified 
by its title), since every time a new performance is recorded, we notice significant 
differences' .55 Doing and making afresh thus always co-exist with whatever 
continuities enable us to recognise a heard piece of music as the "same" piece as we 
have heard before, because, in the words of Jean-Jacques Nattiez, 'in all musico-
symbolic forms, process coexists with stabler aspects. ,56 Where performance of any 
work is concerned, '[ m ]uch unspecified performance detail is provided by relevant 
traditions of performance practice, some is provided by the performer's rehearsed 
interpretation, and some will be different every time due to the vagaries of human 
action. ,57 
This bias in Western thought towards the work has been identified also by Lydia 
Goehr as having developed after the late 1700s. Prior to this, most European 
musicians did not have the opportunity or intention to pursue music as an art centred 
55 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music (Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1990), p. 87. Reference to Constantin Brailoiu, "Esquisse d'une methode de folklore 
musical." Revue de musicologie 12, no. 40 (1931): 233-267. Brailoiu describes this as the 'impulse 
fOlmrd variation (Variations-trieb).' Nattiez, ibid. Brailoiu's term Variationstrieb (he does not 
hyphenate it) appears in Brailoiu, ibid, p. 254. 
S6 Nattiez, ibid, p. 89. 
57 Jeff Pressing, Synthcsi~cr Performance and Real-Time Techniques (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1992), p. 23. 
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on the independent product. 58 However, music came to need a counterpart to the 
objects of the respected fine arts, an object that could be considered as separate from 
everyday contexts, and be contemplated for its own sake. Whereas performances are 
transitory events, the idea of the work fulfilled this objectivising need.59 One by-
product of the rise of the work in this sense was the rise of the idea of "musical 
classics": 'In the year 1700 it would have seemed more than mildly ludicrous to put 
on regular public concerts offering only music more than twenty or so years old . . . 
Yet in 1776 a group of noblemen founded just such a musical society, the proudly 
backward-looking Concert of Antient music.,6o Weber adds: 'Music had no canon or 
classics before the eighteenth century . . . Works were composed, used, and 
discarded. ,61 Dahlhaus locates the paradigm-shift to the work perhaps slightly later 
than Goehr, and claims that it was Beethoven for whom 'a musical text, like a literary 
or a philosophical text, harbors a meaning which is made manifest but not entirely 
subsumed in its acoustic presentation ... a musical creation can exist as an 'art work 
of ideas' transcending its various interpretations. ,62 For Dahlhaus, the pre-Beethoven 
ideology can still in fact be detected, surviving as late as the work of Rossini for 
whom the score 'is a mere recipe for a performance, and it is the performance which 
forms the crucial aesthetic arbiter as the realization of a draft rather than an exegesis of 
a text. Rossini's musical thought hinged on the performance as an event, not on the 
work as a text passed down and from time to time given acoustical 'explications" .63 
Yet, wherever it is situated chronologically, it will be clear that the later "strong" view 
58 See Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p. 178. 
59 Scc ibid, pp. 173-174. 
60 William Weber, The Rise of Musical Classics in Eighteenth-Century England: A Study in Canon, 
Ritual and Ideology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p. 1. 
61 Ibid, p. 2. 
62 Dahlhaus, Nineteenth-Century Music, p. 10. 'Does he think I have his silly fiddle in mind when the 
spirit talks to meT Ludwig van Beethoven. Cited in Lukas Foss, "The Changing Composer-Perfonner 
Relationship: A Monologue and a Dialogue." Perspectil'es of.Ye\\' Music 1, no. 2 (Spring 1963): -l5-53: 
p. -l6. 
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of the work will tend in due course to shift perfonnance into the background, both 
perfonnance of written music, and, as seen above, improvisatory perfonnance.64 
Although the unity and integrity of art-works had been discussed in earlier eras, 
'what emerges from such familiar notions in the late eighteenth century is the curious 
idea of the work of art as a kind of subject. It is, to be sure, a peculiar kind of subject, 
this newly defined artefact, but it is a subject none the less. ,65 Lawrence Kramer also 
concurs in linking the strong concept of the work to the Cartesian idea of the subject: 
'Classical music and the modern subject have interlocking histories, the crux of which 
is the fonnation of the concept of the aesthetic in the mid-eighteenth century. ,66 
Kramer refers to modern studies which have 'figured the musical articulation of self 
against other as the opposition of fonn and sensuous plenitude. ,67 In the context of the 
63 Dahlhaus, ibid, p. 9. 
64 One by-product of this aesthetic was the prejudice which it engendered against composing with the 
aid of the keyboard. A composer can sometimes choose to explore his new ideas at the keyboard in what 
is essentially an improvisatory procedure preparatory to the process of writing them down. However, as 
Rosen writes of the nineteenth century: 'The finer composer, it was felt, should be capable of elaborating 
the work of music solely in his head, and ought not to need the crutch of trying it out at the keyboard. 
This is an interesting example of the snobbish idealism that wishes to separate body and mind, with the 
body considered morally inferior to the less material, more ethereal mind. We have here an interesting 
aesthetic prejudice: the work of music should be conceived not directly in material sound, but as an 
abstract form. The realization in sound then oddly becomes secondary.' Charles Rosen, "On Playing the 
Piano." The New York Review of Books 46, no. 16 (21st October, 1999): 49-54; p. 51. 'Schumann, in 
particular, felt ashamed of his reliance on the piano for inspiration.' Ibid. A parallel aesthetic prejudice 
was present in the sphere of nineteenth-century poetry: 'It may be hard for the people of today to 
understand either how little poetry was then heard, or how much it was read. Until Yeats spoke it was 
very little heard; so little, that many critics condemned the use of words that were spelled as though they 
did not rhyme, even if they were pronounced as though they rhymed. Writers using such words were 
told that they were using 'cockney rhymes' or 'ear rhymes'. They would be trounced for rhyming 'guest' 
with 'best'; and would have been flayed for rhyming (had they ever dared) 'blood' with 'mud' ... 
'Blood' ... had to rhyme with such words as good or wood or hood. It was forbidden to rhyme it with 
could or would or should; as this was judged to look ill upon the page.' John Masefield, So Long to 
Learn: Chapters of an Autobiography (London: William Heinemann, 1952), pp. 135-136. 
65 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 4. 
66 Lawrence Kramer, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge (Berkeley: California Univ. Press, 
1995), p. 34. 
67 Ibid, p. 35. References to Leo Treitler, "The Politics of Reception: Tailoring the Present as 
Fulfillment of a Desired Past." Journal of the Royal Musical Association 116 (1991): 280-298; Susan 
McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality (Minneapolis: n.p., 1991): Jeffrey Kallberg, 
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present discussion, we might wish to parallel his words 'form and sensuous plenitude' 
with the words "work and improvisation." The emphasis on the musical work was 
further reinforced by the ideas of Immanuel Kant. The motif of Cartesian 
disembodiment resonates here too. In the Critique of Judgement, art is autonomous, 
'purposiveness without purpose. ,68 Thus removed from ordinary life, it is attended to 
with 'an attitude independent of any motivation to do with utility, economic value, 
moral judgements, or peculiarly personal emotion, and concerned with experiencing 
the object 'for its own sake. ,69 Before the rise of the autonomous work in the 
eighteenth century, 'works were generally written to celebrate personal events,' 70 in a 
way which reinforced the link between music and society. The twentieth century saw 
some revival of this aesthetic. Hindemith, in his concept of Gebrauchsmusik 
supported 'the view that music for specific uses and particular occasions - pageants, 
national events, civic presentations, even for teaching situations - is as valid as the 
Romantic approach to a composition as a 'grand' work ofart.,71 Yet Kant had argued 
that aesthetic judgement 'concerns itself with particular objects, and is both 
'disinterested' ... and free of concepts ... Its aim is neither scientific knowledge nor 
right action, but rather the contemplation of the individual object for its own sake, as it 
is in itself, in the light of the particular sensuous experience it generates.' 72 It is from 
the ideas of Kant, Hegel, Schiller, Coleridge and others, that the modem idea of the 
artistic artefact largely derives. After Kant, what had hitherto been socially situated 
Pitch: The New Gay and Lesbian Musicology, Philip Brett, Elizabeth Wood, Gary C. Thomas (eds.). 
(New York: n.p., 1994). 
68 Harold Osborne (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), unattributed article 
"Kant," p. 622. 
69 C. Janaway, "Aesthetic Attitude." In The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich (ed.), 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 8. 
70 Weber, Rise of Musical Classics, p. 2. 
71 I:Hiott Schwartz and Barney Childs, "Introduction: The Revolution in Musical Esthetics." In 
Contemporary Compost!rs on Contemporary Music, Elliott Schwartz and Barney Childs (eds.), (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. xiii. 
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creativity in music, art, and drama was increasingly considered under the new and 
esoteric category of the aesthetic, and discussion of the nature of art considered in 
itself proceeded with new intensity.73 
'Ask any member of a local choir or orchestra if they have 'their music,' and they 
will understand you to mean not musical skill or memory or experience but a copy of 
the requisite printed (or occasionally hand-written) notated text.' 74 Contemporary 
thinking is, however, gradually moving away from this view of the musical work 
which exists in the form of a static score apart from any implementation in the human 
activity of music-making, a view whose parallel with the disembodied Cartesian 
cogito is so evident. Edmund Husserl, in the early twentieth century, put in place an 
important challenge to the cogito. For Husserl, the mind is not a self-contained cogito, 
for it always thinks of something: this characteristic he speaks of as the mind's 
'intentionality.' He writes: '[I]ntentionality is the fundamental characteristic of 
'psychic phenomena' - and actually lays open the method for a descriptive ... theory 
of consciousness' .75 As a result of intentionality, '[ t ]he psychical does not constitute a 
world for itself; it is given as an ego or as the experience of an ego ... and this sort of 
thing reveals itself empirically as bound to certain physical things called bodies. This, 
too, is a self-evident pre-datum.' 76 Therefore, the mind is now conscious of a world 
intuited as being as real as thought itself. This represents a break with the Cartesian 
mind-body dichotomy. 'All experience, Husserl now claims, has a tri-partite structure: 
the 'ego-cogito-cogitatum'. The subject-pole is the experiencing subject, the 
73 See Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 20-21. 
74 Ruth Finnegan, Literacy and Orality: Studies in the Technology o/Communication (Oxford: 
Blackwell. 1988), p. 125. 
75 Edmund Husser!, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 41. Cited in 
Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth, Russell Keat Understanding Phenomenology (Oxford: BlackwelL 
1991),p.62. 
76 Edmund Husser!' "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science." In Phenomenology and the Crisis 0/ 
Philosophy, Quentin Lauer (cd.), (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). p. 85 
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transcendental Ego; the object-pole is the cogitatum, the object experienced; and the 
cogito is the stream of experiences which link ego and cogitatum. ,77 Thus, contrary to 
Descartes, the cogito is now integrated with the world, the cogitatum. 'The Cartesian 
question was, how do we know, given that we have at best our own clear and distinct 
ideas and nothing else, that the world exists as we suppose it does ... Through the 
concept of intentionality, it has become absurd to attempt to distinguish between the 
contents of the mind ... and the objects to which our consciousness is directed. ,78 
If this critique of Descartes's cogito possesses some validity, it might be expected 
that in societies unaffected by Descartes's ideas, music has always been more 
embodied, or integrated into social life. Anthony Storr concurs, observing that 
nowadays in the West we set aside particular periods of time for appreciating music 
and the other arts. These are often sequestered in places like concert halls and art 
galleries. On the other hand, in pre-literate cultures, the arts are more closely 
integrated with ordinary life: 'In Western societies, the arts tend to occupy a special 
niche of their own, as if they might be a lUXury rather than a vital part of human life. 
This has made it possible for the unenlightened to argue that music and the other arts 
are some kind of substitute for, or escape from, 'real' life.,79 Indeed, in Eagleton's 
slightly modified perspective, '[t]he assumption that there was an unchanging object 
known as 'art', or an isolatable experience called 'beauty' or the 'aesthetic', was 
largely a product of the ... alienation of art from social life. ,80 
In order to take up a critical stance towards the Cartesian inheritance in Western 
music, it will be necessary to 'renounce our myopic focus on works of art and look at 
the social practices of art,' and also 'look at the interplay between works, practices. 
77 Hammond, Howarth, Keat, Understanding Phenomenology. p. 73. Reference to Husserl, Cartesian 
.\/editations, p. 50. 
n< Mary Warnock, Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), p. 43. 
79 Storr. Music and the .\find. p. 89. 
80 Eagleton, LireI'm}' Theon', p. ~ 1. 
55 
and participants in the practices. ,81 There will then be less inclination to think of 
music chiefly in term of the work. In Western music, '[i]t is the work which imposes 
itselfby its own power and which exerts its power over the public ... The work comes 
between the public and the artist. ,82 Thus the performer becomes an intermediary 
between the listeners and a fixed musical object. 'We have lost the feeling that the 
most important thing is the event and that music is primarily a process and not a fixed 
object. So the accepted terms of composition and performance never really give a 
feeling of what music making is, that the event of music making is primary. ,83 A 
foregrounding of music-making as living event naturally tends to empower the on-the-
spot creativity which arises out of the musical event itself, liberating the improvisatory 
impulse. 
III Schelling, Liszt and Improvisation 
If Cartesian assumptions tended to work against a positive appraisal of 
improvisatory musical practices, the rise of Kantian and subsequent German 
philosophy seems to have encouraged a certain mitigation of this trend. Kant's 
influence is in fact paradoxical, since, as has just been shown, it consolidated the 
rising prestige of the work and the idea of the autonomous aesthetic. Kant certainly 
reinforced the stress on the composed work, the aesthetic artefact at the expense of 
concrete performance. His thought is, in this respect at least, especially uncongenial to 
any positive evaluation of improvisatoriness: 
Specifically, for Kant, the art-work ... suggests both fonnal necessity and fonnal fmality. We feel that 
its parts fit together as if tending toward some ultimate goal, and we feel that the parts are so required by 
81 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Work of Making a Work of Music." In What is Music? An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Music, Philip A. Alperson (ed.), (1987) (University Park Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1994), p. 109. 
~~ Jean During, "Le Jeu des relations sociales: elements d'une problematique." In L 'Improvisation, 
Lortat-Jacob (ed.), p. 21. 
83 Simone de Haan in Simone de Haan and Roger Dean, "Improvising the Listener: The Listener 
Impro\'ises. An Edited Conversation." Sounds Australian: Journal of Australian Music 32 (Summer 
1991-1992): 45-50; p. 45. 
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the setting of this goal that, were a single note in the Mozart sonata different, were a single chord or 
counter-rhythm in the Beethoven symphony other than it is, we would, according to Kant, fear that the 
entire work would collapse. 84 
The improvisatory being 'spontaneous, the fortuitous, the incomplete, ,85 it thus 
appears as an antithesis to the Kantian view of the art-work. However, Kant's 
philosophy, insofar as it dealt in a new way with the imagination, seems also to have 
generated a counter-trend which actually favoured improvisatoriness, especially when 
expanded through the subsequent work of Fichte and Schelling. This counter-trend 
began to make itself felt in the private sphere of nineteenth-century music-making at 
the same time as the hegemony of the work was being consolidated in the public 
sphere, as will be seen. Although improvisation was never to reacquire the cultural 
status it possessed until the eighteenth century, this nineteenth-century counter-trend 
which fostered improvisatoriness against a new post-Kantian philosophical horizon 
continued into the twentieth century to form one important philosophical undercurrent 
to the twentieth-century musical avant-garde. To use a political metaphor, 
improvisation entered the opposition in the nineteenth century, and may be said to 
have embarked upon a fruitful career as a musical "other" outside the mainstream. 
Kant's view of the imagination effected a radical revision in the understanding of 
the process by which human intelligence comes to grips with the world in which it 
finds itself. For Kant, the mind is not simply tabula rasa receiving passively the 
information presented to it from outside, as, for example, in Locke's contrasting view 
of the mind for which there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the 
experience of the senses.86 For Kant, the mind is a power which synthesises what it 
receives and contributes from its own resources to what it finally comes to know. In 
84 Daniel Herwitz, "John Cage's Approach to the Global." In John Cage: Composed in America. 
Marjorie Perloffand Charles Junkerman (eds.), (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1994), p. 192. 
85 Ibid, p. 193. 
86 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). 
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other words, humans mentally construct their world. For Kant, the synthesis which the 
mind makes of what it receives is 'the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind 
but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge 
whatsoever,.87 Kant described this new understanding of knowledge, with imagination 
at its heart, as his "Copernican Revolution." Kant in his first edition of the Critique of 
Pure Reason argued that the immediate experiences presented by the senses could not 
explain the organised structure of the world to which everyday human experience bears 
witness. To explain the structure it is necessary to assume that understanding imposes 
preconditioned ways of thinking upon sense experience. Kant concluded that the mind 
itself provided organising categories and forms which explained why perceptions were 
coherent, why objects were perceived as unities, why they were causally interrelated, 
and why they were experienced in space and time.88 
In that Copernicus, like Kant, reversed the perceived order of reality by pointing out 
that the earth goes round the sun, a comparison between the two men is useful. In 
Kant's thought, the faculty of imagination, formerly disparaged by the Cartesian 
philosophical tradition in favour of reason is now situated, like the sun of Copernicus, 
at the centre of the mind. 'Descartes' commitment to rationalism prompted him to 
consider the image as no more than a quasi-material residue of sensory experience 
which, in fact, obscures the self-reflection of the cogito. ,89 The philosophy of 
Descartes 'yielded two kinds of reliable knowledge that reinforced each other. On the 
one hand, knowledge consists in rational logical coherence, discerned by a detached, 
disinterested, disembodied mind. On the other, knowledge comes from what is 
117 Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason A (1781) 78 / Critique of Pure Reason B (1787) 103. 
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experiential, empirical, and factual. ,90 Because imagination could not be 
accommodated within either of these two categories, its role had come to be 
minimised. Yet now, for Kant, imagination organises the information presented to it 
by the senses. Kant's insight remains the basis for modem cognitive psychology 
which, in words of Dane Harwood, 'assumes that the human mind is active and 
flexible: we construct and synthesize our universe from moment to moment, rather 
than passively receiving a rigidly-structured environment. That is, we act upon our 
world, and in doing so give it meaning. ,91 In the twenty years after the publication of 
the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's understanding of the power of 
imagination would be further developed especially by Fichte and Schelling. As one 
commentator on this later tradition explains: 'Imagination is life in its most developed 
form or, as Schelling would say, in its 'highest potency,.,92 
Kant comes in his later work to attribute a particular significance to artistic 
imagination. In the Critique of Judgement, 'Kant has effectively circumscribed the 
creative role of imagination; he has confined its full freedom within the boundaries of 
art. ,93 In the Critique of Judgement 'the aesthetic dimension and the corresponding 
feeling of pleasure emerge not merely as a third dimension and faculty of the mind, but 
as its center'. 94 In Schelling, this view of imagination is extended. Thus, in the words 
of Herbert Read: '[Schelling] imagined, as basic to the universe, an energy, or creative 
impulse which, when unconscious, is manifested as nature: when conscious, as art ... 
The ideal work of art and the real world of objects are products of one and the same 
90 Walter Brueggemann, The Bible and Postmodern Imagination: Texts Under Negotiation (London: 
SCM, 1993), p. 5. 
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aesthetic activity. Art is the only permanent revelation of the nature of reality. ,95 In 
this way Kant's understanding of the imagination as the foundation of all knowledge 
leads in Schelling to an apotheosis of the artist. This was the philosophy which gave 
impetus to the Romantic movement in the nineteenth century. In Schelling's words, 
'art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy,.96 For 
Schelling, art visibly embodies the essence of being: 'Art is not a mere imitation of 
existing phenomena - it is 'the holy, eternally creative elemental power of the world, 
which generates all things out of itself and brings them forth productive'. ,97 As Carl 
Dahlhaus has observed, '[ t ]he concept of art first acquired metaphysical dignity in the 
Romantic era. ,98 According to this Romantic philosophy, the work of the artist unveils 
the essence or form of reality, and, essential to the unveiling effected by the artist is the 
principle of intuition. The genius of the artist consists of 'an unconscious power which 
he possesses (or which possesses him) and which enables him for a moment to identify 
himself with the formative energy of the universe,.99 
Having identified these developments in Kant and Schelling, the present discussion 
will return to Kant and examine also the rise of a subsidiary motif within the trends 
already outlined. This is the idea of spontaneity. For Kant, spontaneity lies at the heart 
of the imagination which, as was just seen, gives rise to our world. Spontaneity is 'the 
mind's power of producing representations from itself.' 100 He speaks, in the Critique 
of Judgement of 'a faculty of complete spontaneity of intuition' 101 as 'an understanding 
in the widest sense of the term.' 102 And again, for Kant, 'receptivity makes cognition 
95 Herbert Read, The True Voice of Feeling: Studies in English Romantic Poetry (London: Faber and 
Faber. 1953).p.167. 
96 Friedrich Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) (Charlottesville: Virginia Urnv. Press, 
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97 Read, True Voice of Feeling, p. 16. No documentation of the quotation. 
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102 Ibid. 
60 
possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now, this spontaneity is the basis of a 
three-fold synthesis necessarily occurring in all knowledge: namely, the apprehension 
of representations of the mind in intuition; the reproduction of these representations in 
imagination; and their recognition in a concept.' 103 (Later, Heidegger would confinn 
the prominence of spontaneity in the Kantian understanding of knowing. He asks: 
'[D]oes Kant not generally suppose that understanding and reason are simply identical 
with spontaneity?,)104 Arguably, what Kant means is that as experience rises up to 
meet the human mind and we synthesise it imaginatively in the process by which it 
becomes our knowledge, we do so by means of an extremely rapid succession of 
imaginative acts which are inherently spontaneous presumably because they are 
elicited by the unpredictable nature of the experiences with which they have 
continuously to grapple. 
Moreover, there seems to be for Kant an artistic counterpart, and this artistic aspect 
of spontaneity is significant in the present context, because improvisation in music is 
artistic spontaneity in a particularly focused and indeed conscious fonn. In the case of 
the experience of the beautiful and consequent judgements of taste, Kant writes at one 
point in the Critique of Judgement: 'Now, if in the judgement of taste the imagination 
must be considered in its freedom, it is ... regarded ... as productive and spontaneous 
(as the author of arbitrary fonns of possible intuition).' 105 This implies that an 
improvisatory spontaneity lies at the heart of all artistic creation and perception. Of 
this citation from Kant, Crawford observes: 'This view of the productive and 
spontaneous faculty (function) of the imagination has an air of plausibility about it for 
103 Kant, CPR A 97. 
104 Martin Heidegger. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1997). 
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the creative activity of the artist'. I 06 This could suggest that spontaneous art-forms like 
improvisation exemplify externally and with special clarity something centrally 
operative in all artistic creativity and human imagination in general. ' ... Kant says, 
somewhat obscurely, that in aesthetic judgement imagination and understanding enter 
into a 'free play.' It is from this free play that aesthetic delight arises.' 107 Kant does 
not develop this idea of free play in relation to musical creativity, although he does 
make one explicit reference to spontaneous improvised music in his Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View, which though published in 1797, represented the 
substance of lectures given by him for thirty years. 108 Unfortunately the reference is 
not very illuminating. He refers to the case of an organist who improvises while 
holding a conversation and suggests that the conversation may illuminate his musical 
creativity in the same way as a microscope illuminates the nature of what it is used to 
examine, with the result that he improvises better than if he had not tried to hold a 
conversation while playing. The conversation is supposed to elicit the musician's 
"obscure ideas.,,109 It is immensely improbable that any practising musician would 
verify this experience since such conversation would distract an improviser. Kant's 
low estimation of the importance of music among the arts 11 0 appears to be combined 
with a low level of insight into the musical creative process. 
For Kant, spontaneity does not merely ground the experience of knowing other 
things: it grounds the knowing self. Kant writes: '[T]his representation ('I think') is an 
act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility.,} II 1. G. 
106 Crawford, ibid. 
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Fichte in his Science of Knowledge of 1794 echoes Kant's dual understanding of 
spontaneity when he writes: 'So far we have been considering possibilities of human 
thought. It was the spontaneity of the human mind which brought forth, not only the 
object of reflection - those very possibilities of thought, though according to the rules 
of an exhaustive, synthetic system - but also the form of reflection, the act of reflecting 
itself.,112 Likewise: 'From this absolute spontaneity alone there arises the 
consciousness of self. - Not by any law of nature, nor by any consequence of such 
laws, do we attain to reason; we achieve it by absolute freedom, not through a 
transition, but by means of a leap.' 113 Fichte, indeed, considered that '[0 ]nly the ego 
existed. The world came to be because of it.' 114 Schelling differed in respect of this 
point: for him 'nature existed in its own right and preceded the human subject.,115 
Notwithstanding this distinction with Fichte, which makes of Schelling an objective, 
rather than, as Fichte, a subjective idealist, Schelling is in a line of philosophical 
influence from Fichte as well as Kant. In this way it appears that Schelling inherits an 
understanding of human thought and selfhood as both rooted in the idea of spontaneity. 
Having already seen above the place occupied by art in Schelling's philosophy, the 
time has come to draw out the implication of these preoccupations with art and 
spontaneity which clearly undergird Schelling's thought. Spontaneity and art: art and 
spontaneity. Where might such philosophical influences lead in the sphere of cultural 
influence and artistic practice? 
The Romantic movement in European music, as will be seen, was sympathetic to 
the idea of musical spontaneity in the form of free improvisation when pursued in an 
intimate environment, and this will be shown to be in large measure a consequence of 
112 1. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge (1794) (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1970), p. 198. 
113 Ibid. p. 262. 
11-1 Johannes Hirschberger, A Short History of Western Philosophy (1971) (Guildford: Lutterworth, 
1976), p. 149. 
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Schelling's ideas. In connection with this nineteenth-century interest in improvisation, 
it might be possible to conjecture also a cultural influence of Friedrich von Schiller's 
idea of 'aesthetic play central to [the] concept of a fully realised humanity.,116 For 
Schiller, the famous poet-dramatist (d. 1805), 'man only plays when he is in the fullest 
sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays. ,117 
Perhaps one indication of this playful climate of thought in a musical context may be 
found in the adoption of the title "Impromptu" for short piano pieces, a title not known 
before 1822, and taken up by Schubert's publisher, Haslinger, in 1827, suggesting that 
the publishing house thought the improvisatory connotations of this title ("impromptu" 
means "improvised") would respond to current fashion and appeal to potential buyers 
of Schubert's music. llB Schiller had observed: 'Man adorns himself. Free delight 
takes a place among his wants, and the superfluous is soon the chief part of his 
pleasures. ' 119 Although it has been observed that '[ t ]he disciples of Friedrich Schiller 
are, after 1815, rare birds: few were inclined to accept play and aesthetic creation as 
privileged areas of humaneness' 120 yet, '[ w]hat was striking in the years after 1815 was 
the coalescence of some romantic . . . values . . . into splintered or reduced 
interpretations of the high-romantic model, or into diminutive prettifications.' 121 
'[D]iminutive prettification' aptly characterises the mode in which the genre of the 
musical impromptu takes up the Schillerian motif of aesthetic playfulness at this 
period, even if the actualities of Schubert's music rise above the trivialising 
connotations of Haslinger' s title. 
116 Patrick Gardiner, "Freedom as an Aesthetic Idea." In The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of 
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Taking in for a moment a rather broad sweep of history, it may be seen that the 
social context of Romantic improvisation differed somewhat from that of many former 
epochs, for now improvising is essentially emphasised as a solitary pursuit. Group 
improvisation is a well-attested practice at certain earlier periods in Europe. However, 
there is not seen in the nineteenth century much to compare with various sixteenth-
century practices in this area. 'Sethus Calvisius (1592) ... describes, clearly and in 
detail, three main possibilities of 'harmonia extemporanea', as he calls improvised 
counterpoint ... Calvisius believes, a 'tolerable harmony' may be produced.' 122 This 
practice of improvised vocal counterpoint was at one time prevalent in Church music 
and also many secular walks of life, though the following citation also locates its 
historical point of decline: 'German theorists of the period 1550-1650 observed that 
extemporized counterpoint, although by then rare in churches, was still being practised 
among miners, horsemen, tailors, cobblers, shepherds . . . both during work and in 
public taverns.' 123 Such corporate musical improvising, which seems to have 
flourished widely in the Western culture of some earlier ages, seems long defunct once 
the nineteenth century is underway, at least as far as non-folk musics are concerned, 
even if its folk counterpart lived on into the twentieth century, as in the case of 
Hungarian gypsy bands. 124 Given the long link being made here between nineteenth-
century improvisatory practices and the improvised counterpoint of the Baroque and 
earlier, the historical perspective adopted might at first seem somewhat diffuse. Yet it 
tends to throw into prominence a certain important generality, namely the fact that 
Romanticism, despite its concern for improvisatory spontaneousness) did not show any 
interest in the revival of musical improvisation as a group practice. One reason why 
122 Ferand, Improvisation in Nine Centuries, p. 9. 
123 Rob C. Wegman, "From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low 
Countries. 1450-1500." Journal of the American Musicological Society 49, no. 3 (1996): 409-479; p. 
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Romantic composers might have been expected to show such an interest is 
'romanticism's yearning for remote times and places,125 and concern for reviving 
antique customs, among which group improvisation clearly figures. 'Relationships to 
music of the past ... became a conscious linking in the nineteenth century ... One of 
the typical traits of the nineteenth century is the parallel growth of an urge to ever new 
horizons and a consciousness of dependence on history.' 126 However, not even Franz 
Liszt, who came to epitomise the improvisatory culture of the nineteenth century, and 
whose music reflects among other values a commitment to 'gypsy music . . . the 
indigenous music of the Hungarian people,' 127 seems to have shown any interest in 
improvising as a group activity, despite the fact that he may well have encountered folk 
music in such a corporate improvisatory style from his musically-conscious 128 
Hungarian farmhouse background129 close to the culture of village life. Liszt, 
descended from at least three generations of 'German peasants and craftsmen' 130) would 
certainly have been aware of the popular musical culture of his homeland. 
It seems in fact that for the Romantic movement some ideological force weighed 
against the revival of corporate improvising, and this force is probably rooted in the 
philosophical milieu. As David Simpson points out, philosophical ideas at this period 
were a constant source of inspiration for artists: '[I]t seems almost impossible to 
overestimate the influence of Kant and his successors on the artists, writers and critics 
of the time. There was a continual and creative interchange between the poets and the 
philosophers, to a degree that may be impossible for us to imagine now'. 131 The 
12-1 See Ferand, Improvisation in Nine Centuries, p. 21. 
125 Nemoianu, Taming of Romanticism, p. 8. 
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ImprovIsIng which characterised the nineteenth century was that of the private 
individual, and this particular emphasis was funded by the influential new Schellingian 
theory of private intuition, that of the solitary genius who communes with ultimate 
reality through artistic creativity. Strictly speaking, it might be incomplete to place the 
entire responsibility for the privatisation of improvisation on the shoulders of early 
nineteenth-century philosophy without regard to previous movements in the same 
direction. F erand has interpreted the rise of the improvised concerto cadenza in the 
eighteenth century as an early shift towards the individualisation of improvisatory 
practice. F or him, '[ t ]he cadenza in the instrumental concerto may be regarded as a 
kind of transition from ensemble to solo improvisation.' 132 This development, prior to 
the influence of Schelling, presumably has to be seen as a consequence of the rise of 
the dominance of the work-concept: improvisation had to be "quarantined" as a 
segregated occurrence within the concerto movement, in order that the movement's 
structural self-sufficiency might continue to be perceived as inviolate and its structural 
integrity as a fully scored work compromised as little as possible. Nevertheless, solo 
improvisation, as it came to be seen in the nineteenth century, was powerfully informed 
by the new Schellingian themes: 'The spontaneous outpouring of an artist's inspiration 
afforded a glimpse of genius in the very process of creating.' 133 Here is the artist 
abstracting the essence of being in accordance with the doctrines of Schelling, and 
intuition is a private experience for Schelling. 'The sole immediate object of 
transcendental concern is subjective; the sole organ of this mode of philosophizing is 
therefore the inner sense' .134 
132 Ferand, Improvisation in Nine Centuries, p. 19. 
133 Valerie Woodring Goertzen, "By Way of Introduction: Preluding by 18th- and Early 19th-Century 
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I.q Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 13. 
67 
Increasingly in the nineteenth century, the act of musical improvising belonged to 
the private forum, not only in the sense of being produced by an individual person 
rather than by or within a group, but also in the sense of failing to maintain a foothold 
in the increasing number of public concert halls. Public concerts increased, yet 
improvisation in public concerts did not thrive. Documents of the period strongly 
suggest that the public concert tradition which advanced rapidly in the nineteenth 
century gradually left improvising behind, further indication of the nuances of inspired 
solitary communion with reality which improvising had come to suggest. Inevitably 
this philosophical perception of the solitary artist communing with reality would entail 
that concert-hall improvising came to be seen as the inappropriate importation of a 
private activity into a public sphere. Improvisations on the piano at public concerts 
had more or less died out by 1830 and by the mid-nineteenth century there was a 
perception that public improvisation at the piano was a declining practice, associated 
with the period c. 1770 to 1830.135 In 1842, the following review by Charles Halle 
contains a reference to the decline of concert-hall piano improvising, here called a 'free 
fantasy': 'His performance recalls the golden age, in which a Clementi, Mozart, Field, 
Klengel, Ries, Cramer, or Hummel was still in vogue; but he would have recalled that 
age even more had he also played a free fantasy, as those kings of the piano did. 
Unfortunately this most noble branch of piano playing, by which one used to recognize 
the true pianist, has been lost for the most part' .136 Janet Ritterman has also written of 
this changing fashion: 
In several of his early concerts, Chopin concluded the programme with an improvisation on vocal 
themes. This was not unusual: until about the 1830s, those performers most confident of their skills of 
spontaneous musical invention frequently ended their concerts with improvisations based on tunes likely 
to be familiar to the audience. As reviews indicate, the connection between improvisation and composed 
fantasies or variations was extremely close. 
Contemporary comments on these improvisations also reflect changing views of the skills expected of 
the professional pianist. Until the late 1820s. audiences and critics alike appear to have been unstinting 
IYi See Goertzen, "By Way of Introduction," p. 333. 
136 Review by C[arl] G[ollmick] in Allgemeine musikalische Zeitllng 44 (21st September, 1842): 747. 
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in their admiration of the qualities demonstrated. But as concerts became more frequent, displays of this 
kind more predictable, and critics more experienced, concert reviews reflect more ambivalent attitudes 
towards the inclusion of improvised items. By the mid 1830s it was rare for an aspiring pianist to 
include an improvisation in a public concert. 137 
It is interesting to note that the date particularly associated with improvisation's 
public decline as identified in these citations coincides closely with the rise of 
Schelling's intellectual influence as described by another source. In connection with 
this date 1830, Frederick de Wollf Bolman's assessment dovetails neatly, when he 
says: 'The history of the complex period of German thought from 1830 until about the 
middle of the century is in no small measure a many-sided commentary upon the later 
thought of Schelling.' 138 These quotations show how, for the sensibility of the mid-
nineteenth century, improvisation gradually dissociated itself from the public and 
communal spheres. Yet it is known that piano improvisation as a private culture 
flourished in the seclusion of private gatherings and in 'the intimacy of the salon.' 139 It 
was for performance in this type of milieu that Chopin, whose public performances 
were rare,140 probably composed his Fantasie-Impromptu (1835) and his three 
Impromptus (1837, 1839, and 1842), composed pieces whose titles implicitly celebrate 
improvisation, and whose dates from after 1830 are suggestive in this Schellingian 
context. 
It is to the cultural impact of philosophical ideas that this removal of improvisation 
to the private setting is attributable. It was noted earlier how it was in spontaneity that 
the Kantian self is constituted and how for Fichte, '[ fJrom this absolute spontaneity 
alone there arises the consciousness of self.' 141 In such private piano improvisations as 
137 Janet Ritterman, "Piano Music and the Public Concert, 1800-1850." In Cambridge Companion to 
Chopin, Samson, (ed.), pp. 25-26. 
138 Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr., "Introduction." In Friedrich Schelling, The Ages of the World (New 
York, Morningside Heights: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942), p. 6. 
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140 See Arthur Hedley and Maurice 1. E. Brown, in Arthur Hedley, Maurice 1. E. Brown, Nicholas 
Temperley, Kornel Michalowski, "Chopin, Fryderyk Franciszek." In New Grm'e Dictionary of A-ll1sic 
and Musicians, vol 4. Sadie (ed.). pp. 294-295. 
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those of Franz Liszt, the spontaneously arising Fichtean self, and also the Schellingian 
artist with his free vision of ultimate reality, coalesced in order to fulfil their high 
calling as proclaimed by the philosophies of the day. Borrowing words of Jacques 
Maritain: 'Now subjectivity is revealed, I mean as creative. At the same time and by 
the same token is also revealed the intuitive, and entirely individualised, way through 
which subjectivity communes with the world in the creative act.' 142 So close was the 
link between improvisation and the idea of the intimacy of the salon, that in due 
course, one writer even claims, '[ w]ith the decline of the salon as a centre of musical 
performance, in which improvisation was more at home than in the increasingly formal 
atmosphere of the concert hall, improvisation gradually died out. ,143 
This is a large and unsubstantiated generalisation, although it certainly seems to be 
true in respect of the practice of preluding. By 1849, the pianist Kalkbrenner, referring 
to the custom whereby pianists had often improvised preludes before a piece, could 
protest: 'How many of our best pianists can make an even moderately satisfactory 
prelude? And as for students there is not more than one in a thousand who try to go 
b d h e d .. ··,144 eyon t e perlect ca ence In ImprOVIsatIOns. This state of affairs doubtless 
facilitated the emergence of sets of printed preludes for pianists who could not 
improvise. But even here, in due course, as Goertzen writes, '[t]he diminishing 
interest in preluding among amateurs is reflected in the drop in the number of new 
collections of preludes in many or all the keys published for piano after mid-century 
(though publication of sets for organ continued to be strong).' 145 As a result, '[0 ]ne 
finds fewer references to preluding in the later nineteenth century. It is clear, however, 
1-12 Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry: The A. W .''vfellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 
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that the practice continued, at least among German- and French-trained pianists.' 146 
Even though improvised preluding undoubtedly declined, and although '[ s ]alon 
pianists throve in the early romantic period and then died away never to return,' 147 it 
does not follow from this that improvisation suffered a decline, merely the loss of 
certain known stylistic and social outlets. As an increasingly private phenomenon it 
would inevitably be harder to document. The practice was probably sustained by 'the 
establishment of the piano as a fixed feature in bourgeois homes.' 148 
In some cases the influence of post-Kant ian philosophy upon musical practice came 
not merely through subtle cultural influences but directly through musical publications. 
Katharine Ellis remarks that: 'Fetis's aim in setting up the Revue musicale [in Paris] 
was primarily didactic ... Much of Fe tis's philosophy of music derives ultimately from 
the German transcendental idealists, as indicated in a letter of 1838 to the Paris 
publisher Troupenas in which he listed specific works by Kant, Fichte and Schelling as 
primary influences on his philosophy of music.' 149 Ellis observes that this Revue 
musicale, produced virtually single-handedly by Franc;ois-Joseph Fetis from 1827 to 
1833 150 is a 'supremely important cultural document.' 151 '[M]any of the ideas 
contained within his criticism represent the application to music of important cultural 
and philosophical notions of the 1820s.' 152 Ideas by Schelling are particularly noted as 
having been included in a lecture series published by F etis in this magazine in the 
1830s and 1 840s, written by the influential Victor Cousin. 1S3 The significance of this 
146 Ibid, p. 332. 
147 Harold C. Schoenberg, The Great Pianists (London: Victor Gollancz, 1978), p. 191. 
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149 Katharine Ellis, Music Criticism in Nineteenth-Century France: "La Revue et Gazette musicale de 
Paris, 1834-80" (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 34-35. Reference to Rosalie 
Schellhous, "Fetis's Tonality as a Metaphysical Principle: Hypothesis for a New Science." Music 
Theory Spectrum 13, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 219-240; p. 222 and notes 13-14. 
150 See Ellis, ibid, p. 33 
151 Ibid. 
15~ Ibid. 
153 See ibid, p. 4 L. References to Victor Cousin, lectures (1836) subsequently published as Du vrai, du 
beau et du bien (Paris: n.p., 1853). Cousin was a 'philosopher and educational administrator, born ... in 
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becomes still clearer when it is realised that there was 'a sudden expansion of the 
musical press in the 183 Os, triggered in part by the success and example of F etis 's 
Revue' .154 'Fetis's concept of genius was taken ... from the German idealist notion of 
the creative artist as participating in a teleological process' 155 and, if his idea of genius 
was of this kind, this would have dictated the choice and slant of the articles which he 
made as editor, thus exercising an influence over the formation of philosophical 
attitudes in his readers. This would further suggest that a large measure of influence is 
attributable to the Revue in promoting Schelling's ideas of art at this time within 
musical circles, not just in its own pages, but indirectly through publications set up, as 
was noted, to some extent in imitation of its success. The latter must often have 
deliberately pursued the same ideological goals and editorial policy as the Revue with a 
view to entering an intellectual market whose appetite had been whetted by Fetis's 
philosophical outlook, and where lucrative sales might be achieved. 
The influence of Fetis, and of Schelling upon Liszt during Liszt's early years in 
Paris is well documented, and Liszt must in tum be regarded as a figure of supreme 
importance in any discussion of improvisatory music during the nineteenth century. 
Liszt arrived in Paris in 1827, and by the l830s had become renowned as an 
improviser. Klara Hamburger places this musical phenomenon within a philosophical 
context: 
Extemporization, identification with the instrument, an expression of the artist under the spell of the 
moment as a cosmic manifestation of nature - all this was a general mark of the romantic style, and 
particularly of the young Liszt ... Musical works were born in these inspired moments of improvisation, 
1792 . .. [He] developed a system of thought to which he himself ... gave the name eclecticism and to 
which his critics ... gave the name spiritualism. [In] his later period [he came] under the influence of 
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evanescent visions heard only once, by chance, or those later also committed to paper. Liszt's own 
individual abilities predestined him for this: already in his early childhood he amazed people fIrst of all 
with his improvisatory talent. During his fIrst years in Paris he hardly ever wrote down his 
compositions; at his recitals Ferenc Liszt the composer was represented not by fmished compositions, 
but by the improvisations of the performer. 156 
Fetis influenced Liszt at this fonnative time: 'In 1832 [Liszt] heard lectures by Fetis on 
musical philosophy. Fetis, a learned Belgian scholar of great prestige, was the editor of 
the Revue musicale launched in 1827, the first Parisian musical periodical of 
importance. ,157 Liszt's connection not merely with Fetis but with his magazine, 
particularly under its subsequent title of Gazette musicale de Paris is illustrated by the 
fact that articles by Liszt appear in the magazine during the 1830s and 1840s. 158 He 
may even have been on its editorial board. 159 In addition, Alan Walker has preserved 
an account of a meeting in 1836 between Liszt and a certain Major Pictet at a private 
party, in which the latter engaged Liszt in an extended conversation on the fashionable 
ideas of Schelling. 160 To be considered a fashionable intellectual at this time it was 
certainly necessary to be au courant with the ideas of Schelling, and there is evidence 
that Liszt devoured philosophy and literature, at least in part as a result of a sense of 
the inadequacy of his schooling. 161 
As well as Liszt' s importance as a figure who gave impetus to an improvisatory 
culture, Carl Dahlhaus has drawn attention to Liszt's opposition to Hegel's view that 
'music appears as a stage on the way to poetry.,162 At this period '[m]usic, especially 
instrumental music, seemed, to the cultured individuals among the many who despised 
it, an art without tradition, an art of humble rank, which did not reach up to poetry.' 163 
156 Khira Hamburger, Liszt (n.p.: Corvina, n.d.) (Originally Budapest: Gondolat, 1980), p. 34. 
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The influence of Kant is felt in this prejudice. 164 This was the 'common opinion felt as 
a challenge by Liszt,165 who accordingly grasped 'in the name of music what was 
poetry's property.' 166 The programmatic nature of some of Liszt's output finds 
explanation in the fact that 'in Liszt's view the program was a means of establishing 
the dignity of instrumental music, its claim to be 'culture' and not merely 'enjoyment,' 
as Kant had scornfully maintained.' 167 Liszt's artistic profile appears, consequently, as 
that of a figure who promoted not merely the art of musical improvisation, but, more 
that this, promoted the art of music itself within the context of the promotion of 
musical improvisation. In arguing for the status of music, and at the same time 
maintaining a name for himself as a improviser, Liszt signals by his deeds an 
endorsement of improvisation as an important aspect of music in the form in which he 
seeks to promote it, and he would scarcely have improvised as much as he did if he had 
not felt that the idea of music as improvisation supported his particular understanding 
of instrumental music among the arts. In addition to his improvisatory emphasis, Liszt 
originated the idea of the solo recital,168 as well as the 'public concert devoted to a 
single composer - himself, as it happened': 169 these three aspects, improvisation, solo 
performance and single-composer presentations share an implicit concern with the 
promotion of the ideal of Schelling's artist as solitary, creative genius. 
Influences from the philosophical thought of Victor Cousin himself, mentioned 
above as the pro-Schellingian contributor to Fetis's Revue may also have played their 
164 See Wayne D. Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 
pp.85-86. 
165 Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, p. 61. 
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part in Liszt's ideology. While in the context of the discussion of the relative values of 
music and poetry, Liszt would certainly not have been a follower of Cousin for whom 
'the art par excellence, that which surpasses all the others, because it is incomparably 
the most expressive, is poetry,' 170 it remains the case that other implicit aspects of 
Cousin's thought would have fuelled a high valuation of purely instrumental, that is 
wordless, music in a way which paralleled Liszt's ideas. As Peter Ie Huray and James 
Day point out, 'if Cousin believed that music's 'proper effects' were 'vagueness,' 
'obscurity' and even 'infinitude,' he did not choose to develop the idea to its logical 
conclusion, namely that the highest forms of music were purely instrumental.' 171 A 
further ally in the field of contemporary philosophy, who shared Liszt's interest in 
promoting the status of music, was Schopenhauer, whose first edition of The World as 
Will and Representation had appeared in 1819. This early edition appears to have 
attracted 'little attention,' 172 and thus it is likely that any influence upon Liszt of 
Schopenhauer's philosophy, a philosophy according to which music is the direct 
representation of the will, is to be attributed to the 1844 edition which 'achieved 
success and a reputation for its author." 73 'Schopenhauer's discussion of art 
culminates in a celebration of music unrivalled in philosophical writing and which 
assigns to music pride of place amongst the arts.' 174 Liszt's advocacy of instrumental 
music, where '[ t ]he meaning lies in the music, and words cannot reach it'175 has been 
shown by Ronald Taylor to parallel closely the philosophical ideas of Schopenhauer. 176 
170 Victor Cousin, Du vrai, du beau et du bien (Edinburgh: n.p., 1854). Cited in Music and Aesthetics, 
Ie Huray and Day (eds.), p. 320. 
171 Ie Huray and Day. Introductory remarks to citations from Cousin, ibid. In ibid, Ie Huray and Day 
(eds), p. 313. 
m Ie Huray and Day. In ibid, Ie Huray and Day (eds.), p. 323. 
I n Ibid. 
174 Malcolm Budd, Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories (1985) (London: Routledge. 
1992), p. 76. 
175 Taylor, Lis::!, p. 84. 
176 See Artur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation [pub!, 1819 and 1844] (incomplete 
documentation). Cited in ibid. 
75 
It has been seen how the Kantian idea of spontaneity as the apex of the imaginary 
entailed that it was specifically spontaneous acts within perception which were the 
creative activity by which human reality was produced, including, as Fichte 
emphasised, the very sense of self. Schelling then further embraced artistic 
imagination within this Kantian conception of imagination rooted in spontaneous 
creativity. The Kantian idea of spontaneity was also embraced by Schelling in the 
form of a pronounced emphasis on freedom. 'Freedom is our All-high, our Godhead, 
which we desire as the Final Cause of all things ... perfect spirit is for us only spirit 
which is also absolutely free.,177 It is reasonable to infer that Schelling's emphasis on 
the role of freedom must at least in part take its rise from the central role which Kant's 
epistemology grants to spontaneity. Clearly, freedom is only a potential to act in a 
certain way, whereas spontaneous activity is precisely freedom expressed in its 
fullness. For Schelling, freedom must indeed be implemented in action for, as he says: 
'man is born to act and not to speculate.' 178 One commentator remarks that for 
Schelling, '[t]he emphasis upon activity is recurrent, whether with reference to the 
activity of man or of nature.' 179 Thus the combination in Schelling's metaphysics of 
the principles of the creative imaginary, freedom, action and art is highly suggestive in 
the context of a discussion of musical improvisation, since the latter too is practically 
defined as a conjunction of imagination, freedom, action and art. It is argued here that 
ideas in Schelling's philosophy were culturally appropriated within circles of practising 
177 Friedrich Schelling, Siimmtliche Werke, 2nd series, III (documentation sic) K. F. A. Schelling (ed.), 
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Of Human Freedom (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), p. xliv. Schelling is echoing Kant and the spirit of 
the German Enlightenment: '[F]or this enlightenment ... nothing is required but freedom, and freedom 
of the most harmless sort among its various defmitions: freedom to make public use of one's reason at 
every point. But I hear on all sides, 'Do not argue!' The officer says: 'Do not argue but drill!' The tax 
collector, 'Do not argue but pay!' The cleric: 'Do not argue but believe!" Immanuel Kant, An Answer 
to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784) Cited in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, 
Simpson (ed.), p. 3l. 
17R Schelling, Siimmtliche Werke, I. p. 243. Cited in Gutman, ibid, p. xxxvii. 
179 G 'b'd utman, 1 1 . 
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artists according to a reception which highlighted their application to improvisatoriness 
and funded Liszt' s outlook. 
There is, however, another central issue for Schelling's thought; namely the relation 
which holds between freedom, act and inner necessity. It has been observed that '[t]he 
conviction that genuinely free activity is action through inner necessity, appears early 
in Schelling's writings' .180 Schelling writes of 'the testimony of all artists, that they 
are involuntarily driven to create their works, and that in producing them they merely 
satisfy an irresistible urge of their own nature' .181 This idea of inner artistic necessity, 
which appears also in Schopenhauer, Schelling's near contemporary, subsequently 
'migrates . . . into the vast abundance of late-nineteenth-century popular 
philosophy,,182 and acquires immense cultural influence. Freedom and act thus now 
conjoin with this very inner necessity, with the result that, in the words of Schelling, 
'just as this inner necessity is itself freedom; man's being is essentially his own 
deed. ,183 Applying this combination to artistic imagination, improvisation might be 
interpreted as something which has to happen through inner necessity as part of the 
way in which imagination engages the world itself and the self is produced. This 
Schellingian philosophy that art expresses, in the highest degree, the spontaneity of 
imagining which, in Kant's sense, creates the world, gives rise to an implied 
ontological hermeneutic of artistic improvisation as an indispensable activity if human 
experience is to come into its fullness. Schelling himself also made some strong 
IRO Ib'd ... 1 ,p. XXXV Ill. 
IRI Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 222. 
181 Eberhard Freitag, "Gennan Expressionism and Schoenberg's Self-Portraits." Journal of the Arnold 
Schoenherg Institute 2 (1978): 164-172; p. 171. 
183 Schelling, Of Human Freedom, p. 63. 
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claims for music, when he observed in an early work that '[ m ]usic is ... nothing other 
than the aurally perceived rhythm and harmony of the visible universe itself.' 184 
The fonns of music are the forms of eternal things insofar as they can be contemplated from the 
perspective of the real . . . Thus music manifests, in rhythm and hannony, the pure fonn of the 
movements of the heavenly bodies, freed from any object or material ... [Rhythm, hannony and melody 
are the] fIrst and purest fonns of movement in the universe ... [M]usic soars through space to weave an 
audible universe out of the transparent body of sound and tone. 18S 
Thus the kinship between Schelling's thought and specifically musical improvisation 
seems close. 
Liszt's piano improvisation found philosophical nourishment within this tradition of 
thought. Indeed it has been noted that letters written by him in the 1870s and l880s 
reveal 'his absorption in literary and philosophical movements. His references to and 
quotations from many authors attest the attention he paid to his reading.' 186 It is 
significant when evaluating the influence he in tum exerted on musical practice, that, 
in the words of one commentator '[h]is tours throughout Europe from [1840] until 
1848 were received with a hero worship probably unequalled in musical history.' 187 
His fame doubtless helped to keep improvisation alive, as did the personal influence he 
exerted over his numerous pupils. 188 Moreover, 'although he stopped giving paid 
concerts in 1847, he gave constant charity concerts to the end of his life and acted as 
musical director of the Weimar court.' 189 Comparison with a modem pop star could 
well be made. 190 On account of his extreme fame and recognition arguably the most 
prestigious exponent of nineteenth-century musical improvisation, and indeed one of 
184 Friedrich Schelling, "Philosophie der Kunst." (Lectures delivered at Jena, 1802-1803). In Werke, 
vol 3 (Erganzungsband), Manfred Schroter (ed.), (Munich: n.p., 1959), pp. 142-155. Section 83. Cited 
in Music and Aesthetics, Ie Huray and Day (eds.), p. 280. 
185 Schelling, ibid. In Sdmmtliche Werke, vol 5, [K. F. A.] Schelling (ed.), pp. 501-503. Cited in Mark 
Evan Bonds, "Idealism and the Aesthetics of Instrumental Music at the Tum of the Nineteenth Century." 
Journal of the American Musicological Society 50, nos. 2-3 (1997): 387-420; pp. 403-404. 
186 Edward N. Waters, "Introduction." In The Letters of Franz Liszt to Olga von Meyendorff J 8 7 J -J 886 
in the Mildred Bliss Collection at Dumbarton Oaks, Edward N. Waters (ed.), (Washington: Dumbarton 
Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, 1979), p. xviii. 
lR7 Howard E. Hugo, "Introduction." In The Letters of Franz Liszt to Marie zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
Howard E. Hugo (ed.), (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953), p. 5. 
IR8 See Schoenberg, Great Pianists. p. 170. 
IR9 Ibid, p. 164. 
190 S TIL' . ee ay or, [SZ!, p. Xl. 
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the most cosmopolitan performance practitioners ever seen in Western music, Liszt 
was a major fountainhead of improvisatory practice. He 'loved to teach ... attracted 
students from many countries, and . . . through them, dominated for a time the 
technique and philosophy of his instrument. ,191 It will be seen in a later Chapter that 
his indirect influence on Schoenberg, and, through him, John Cage may have 
contributed to the awakening of an improvisatory style of composition in the twentieth-
century avant-garde, an awakening which slightly mitigates the general decline in the 
role of musical improvisation after the eighteenth century described in this Chapter as a 
whole. The influence of Schelling will be seen also to have been formative on 
improvisatoriness in Charles Ives. 
191 Michael Murray, Marcel Dupre: The Work of a Master Organist (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 
1985), p. 116. 
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P ART TWO: MUSICAL IMPROVISATION AND LANGUAGE 
Chapter 3 
Rewriting Improvisation: An Experiment in Demarginalising Discourse 
I Improvisation: Its Marginalisation through Language 
A marginalisation of improvisation now inhabits Western vocabulary itself as a 
consequence of the cultural developments described in the last Chapter. Even when 
discussion of improvisation occurs in the context of an attempted objectivity in 
evaluating the nature of improvisation or, as it is sometimes called, extemporisation, 
such discussion tends to take place within the underlying influence of negative cultural 
critiques on account of the history and structure of these very words. The two terms, 
"improvisation" and "extemporisation" appear to be used interchangeably even within 
the more critical forum of musicological discourse. Ed Sarath has made a distinction 
between them with a view to labelling a broadly improvisatory type of musical process 
under two aspects which he seeks to identify. However the relationship between his 
distinguishing uses of these words and any distinction traditionally present between 
them in common usage, if any, is unclear.l 
The Oxford English Dictionary gives the earliest known printed uses in English of 
these words, their cognates, and their derivations. An ambivalence in attitude towards 
what is referred to seems to inhabit the given instances of both words. Numerous 
examples are given for "improvisation" and its cognates in which the ability to 
improvise, especially in poetry or rhetoric, is strongly admired. However the negative 
connotations associated with the idea of off-hand-ness are also present in specific 
instances. Thus (1863): '[H]e let Gaddi have the credit of the improvised welcome.,2 
The main force of the argument that the word "improvisation" has a negative 
I See Sarath, "New Look at Improvisation," p. 6-7. 
, 
- George Eliot, Romola (1863) ii, p. xxvi. Cited in OED, vol 7, p. 753. 
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connotation, however, lies in aspects of it situated below the surface of its application 
to particular situations. The word "improvise" is, in its derivation, essentially 
privative, from the Latin improvisus, unforeseen, unexpected, that is to say, not 
provisus, from providere, to foresee. A word which, in its etymological structure, 
defines a thing in relation to what it is not, has the effect of implicitly comparing that 
thing with its "other." Where that "other" is commonly felt to be a desirable quality 
(e.g., as here, foreseeability: something which can be foreseen can be prepared for, 
perhaps controlled, and control is linked to feelings of mastery and competence) then it 
may be said that the underlying cultural force of the word is negative, even when some 
specific instances of its usage do not necessarily reflect this. Moreover, the very 
development whereby precisely this, and not some other word, came to describe the 
activity in question may reflect a negative evaluation of the activity itself, an evaluation 
which the word it generated subsequently returns to reinforce. The unconscious effect 
of language habits profoundly affects the way reality appears. Indeed, people 
experience as they do largely because their language makes them see the world in a 
particular way.3 
"Improvisation" being, by implication of the word itself, highlighted in terms of 
"that which is not prepared," this word invites an implicitly unfavourable comparison 
of improvisation with the prepared and scored work. This is a historically conditioned 
perspective from within Western culture which is arguably at variance with wider 
historical, cultural, and philosophical perspectives, as will be demonstrated. It arises 
against a cultural horizon in which the score has risen to prominence, but this is only 
one kind of musical culture. The word "improvisation" also implicitly proposes that 
the salient attribute of improvisation is its unpreparedness, so that recognition of other 
:I See Mary Douglas. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (London: Barrie and Rockliff. The 
Cresset Press, 1970), pp. 20-21. 
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attributes of the thing itself, like freedom and flexibility, is veiled by depreciating 
terminology. Ed Sarath has observed that '[t]he orientation in music theory toward 
study of composed-notated works, while giving rise to a rich tradition of analytical 
thought, has also engendered a deeply-rooted tendency to view all modes of musical 
expression through the formal and architectonic perspective of resultant structure' . .f 
Turning to the word "extemporisation" and its cognates, negative connotations 
appear more obviously in its surface usages than in the case of the word 
"improvisation" and the ambivalence in attitude to the thing described is clearly 
present. Once again The Oxford English Dictionary gives a number of uses in which 
the ability to extemporise, usually in speech, is admired. However, a long-established 
connotation of "extemporary" as meaning makeshift is also present. Thus (1636): 
'Many foolish things fall from wise men, if they speak in haste, or be extemporal's 
(1812). 'Th'extemporizer's art who knows, Than pray had rather hear him blow his 
nose.,6 
Unpreparedness need not be regarded as the salient characteristic of the 
phenomenon under discussion. For Jeff Pressing, 'there is the perspective 
overwhelmingly found in historical Western texts, that improvisation is real-time 
composition and that no fundamental distinction need be drawn between the two.' 7 
The word "extemporisation" seems indeed to embody just this 'real-time' 
understanding, deriving as it does from the Latin extempo ra lis , "arising out of the 
moment," ex tempore. 8 Yet the term 'real-time composition' remains problematic. By 
using the tenn "composition," it generates possible misunderstandings arising from the 
.j Sarath, "New Look at Improvisation," p. 28. 
5 Ben Jonson, Discov. (1636). In Works (Routledge), p. 742/l. Cited in OED, vol 5, p. 593. 
6 Author not given. In Reiigionism 62 (1812). Cited in OED, vol 5, p. 594. 
7 Jeff Pressing. "Improvisation: Methods and Models." In Generative Processes in Music: The 
PSl'choiogy of Performance. Improvisation. and Composition, John A. Sloboda (ed.), (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1988), p. 142. 
R See OED, vol 5, p. 593. 
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effects of the composition/performance binarism (Chapter 2, Section I) whereby what 
is referred to may be in some sense perceived as not quite fully performance as well. 
Moreover, the strict sense of 'real-time composition' is that of an act of composing in 
standard notation or other symbolism which takes place at the same speed as the 
performance of the work composed. For example, if a composer writes a line of music 
in minims where each minim is to be played at five second intervals (minim equals 
twelve) and also writes down each minim on his manuscript paper at five second 
intervals, this could be deemed real-time composition. If this compositional 
methodology ever came to be prevalent enough to need a descriptive term, the obvious 
term would be "real-time composition." It would then appear inappropriate if the latter 
term were already in use for improvisation, to which it is less applicable. Nor is the 
expression "real-time music" any more satisfactory than "real-time composition" as a 
substitute for "improvisation." While this expression avoids the word "composition," 
the term "real-time" is itself still problematic. The intended idea of music produced in 
"real time" is that of music arising as far as possible within a single stretch of clock 
time, where there is no conscious contribution from "preparation time," for example, 
prior composition in manuscript. Yet such preparation time is not unreal. Music is no 
less real for having been produced over more than one stretch of time, as in 
composition followed by performance. 
Western prejudices in favour of the work described in Chapter 2 are all the more 
paradoxical when it is seen that, although the musical score became the ideal 
expression of music in Western culture after Descartes, the score's repeatability in 
realisation, and thus its identity, are ultimately illusory. As was seen, musical works 
are dependent on performances which are inherently variable events. This recognition 
of variables undermining the work is threatening for those who believe in the stability 
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of the work as something existing apart from specific and varied instantiations in 
performance, interpretation, context and reception. Stigmatising improvisation was 
perhaps a psychological mechanism for projecting cultural anxieties about the unstable 
nature of the work, for all those attributes which impair the work's stability are still 
more evident in improvisation. Thus improvisation was made a scapegoat, laden with 
these cultural anxieties. No less than improvisation, the musical work is dependent on 
contextual realisations which are never identical, even though this uniqueness attaching 
to all realisations of a work may not be as obvious as in the case of improvisation. 
Conversely, however, the improviser is not bound by the musical decisions of a 
decontextualised present, but anticipates and remembers over a larger span in a way 
analogous to the procedures of a composer of a musical work. His or her 
improvisation does not proceed unthinkingly, that is, with no regard for form, but she 
remembers what she has previously done in the same improvisation, and anticipates 
what she will do in the same improvisation, and this affects the way her improvisatory 
performance decisions are made at any given instant. Indeed,' [ 0 ]ne of the most 
significant recent issues in ethnomusicology concerns the argument that improvisation, 
far from being unencumbered by structure, models and formulae, planning, and 
disciplined study, can involve as much of these elements as composed music does.,9 
Thus, work and improvisation are seen not to be polar opposites but the two outer 
points on a creative continuum of lesser-to-greater musical spontaneity. 
There may be a parallel between the bi-polar view of musical creativity presented 
here and Bakhtin's understanding of language: 
Bakhtin proposed two opposing forces in language: the one toward unity and the need to understand 
each other, and the other toward the specific and the desire to express our uniqueness. The unifying or 
centripetal force, as Bakhtin called it, manifests itself in an abstract set of postulated normative 
conventions which operate to keep the possibilities of communication open. The stratifying or 
centrifugal force is more omnipresent and apparent through the presence of stratified dialects and sub-
9 Rolf Groesbeck, "Cultural Constructions of Improvisation in Tayampaka, a Genre of Temple 
Instrumental Music in Kerala, India." Ethnomusicology 43, no. 1 (1995): 1-30; p. 1. 
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languages particular to certain professions, classes or generations. This dichotomy can also be expressed 
as the tension between individual expression and communication or between innovation and tradition. 
Every verbal speech act is a unique utterance which acts as the focal point in the reciprocal 
relationship between these two forces. 10 
In words of Bakhtin: 'Language ... is never unitary. It is unitary only as an abstract 
grammatical system of normative forms, taken in isolation from the concrete, 
ideological conceptualizations that fill it, and in isolation from the uninterrupted 
process of historical becoming that is characteristic of all living language.' 11 Likewise, 
music is never unitary, but an intersection of textuality and sound-event. The score 
must be converted into sound: conversely, even the improviser constructs a text by 
analogy. Indeed in the latter case, it is the creation of an analogical text that gives rise 
to an improvisation rather than to the production of random sounds. ('Random sounds' 
here means random sounds without aesthetic intent: clearly an attempt to produce them 
with a view to their being received as a musical work, as in some twentieth-century 
styles, constitutes the production of a "text.") Again, in Bakhtin's words, '[e]very 
concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as 
centripetal forces are brought to bear. The process of centralization and 
decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersects in the utterance.' 12 
Likewise, in the case of the musical work: 
Even in the most note-specific music ... dynamics, tempo, phrasing, rhythmic placement, accent, rubato, 
timbre, use of vibrato and portamento and all of the other factors that a performer adds to the pitch 
content are highly variable ... It is clear that we believe that some part of the work exists among these 
nuances, or we would not be trying to recover anything by the use of historical performance practices. 13 
Musical improvisation appears, when contextualised in relation to these ideas of 
Bakhtin, as a type of musical productivity in which the centrifugal is allowed particular 
foregrounding. Sound, not the fixed score is the starting-point for what is produced, 
and the centripetal, or "textual" dimension has to be recovered in and through the 
10 Bowen, "History of Remembered Innovation," p. 143. 
II Mikhail Mikhailovitch Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, Four Essays (Austin: Texas Univ. Press. 
1981), p. 284. Cited in ibid. 
12 Bakhtin, ibid, p. 272. Cited in Bowen. ibid, pp. 143-144. 
13 Bowen, ibid, pp. 148-149. 
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creative process, in a way which is the mirror image of the idea, more familiar to 
literate musical cultures, of adding expression to the perfonnance of an existing score. 
In improvisation, it is the analogical "score" which is added to the perfonnance. 
II Improvisation: Seeking a Demarginalising Discourse 
Western European discourse on improvisation is written from a standpoint inside 
the same culture as that which earlier marginalised and largely still marginalises this 
type of music. As will be seen in more detail later, in twentieth-century Western 
philosophy, it is widely understood that the human mind cannot think anything without 
seeking language in which that thing best comes to expression. This means that 
improvisation can only be given full existence in conjunction with words attempting to 
describe it. Yet current conventional Western discourse, it was seen, harbours 
repressive forces which have distorted understanding of improvisation. Following 
'Derrida . . . Lacan, Foucault, Althusser . . . language creates experience rather than 
merely reports it.' 14 'The content of our lives - consciousness, the unconSCIOUS, 
expenence, even self - is constructed from semantic and semiotic symbols we 
encounter in our interactive dialogue with the world.,I5 For Gadamer, 'Being that can 
be understood is language,I6 and 'language is the universal medium in which 
understanding itself is realised.' 17 This entails that, since Western discourse on 
improvisation will be unconsciously bound within a vocabulary and conceptual 
structures generated by the historical marginalising process described in Chapter 2, no 
continued use of this "improvisation" discourse can ever avoid perpetuating that 
marginalisation to some degree, even if only that of subtle prejudice. 
14 Maureen O'Hara, "Constructing Emancipatory Realities." In The Fontana Postmodern Reader, 
Walter Truett Anderson (ed.), (London: Harper Collins, 1996). p. 149. 
15 Ibid, p. lSI. 
16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (1960) (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), p. xxii. 
17 Ibid, p. 350. 
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Still more problematically, consider as an unsubtle consequence of the same 
marginalisation the following from The New Grove Dictionary of Opera: 
It is scarcely surprising that evidence about improvisation should be sparse and often imprecise. Writers 
were often more concerned to criticize what they considered excessive or tasteless embellishment than to 
give positive advice as to what was appropriate. For music of the repertory conclusions have to be based 
on inference and hypothesis, one source of which is the tendency of what was once improvised 
embellishment to graduate into notated melodic decoration. 18 
The writer is trying to discuss improvisation in an unbiased way. He usefully observes 
that improvisation has tended to be discussed relatively little, and that what little was 
said tended to be negatively critical. He indicates that one reason why improvisation 
has received discussion is that it found its way into notation, and introduces thereby 
some useful suggestion of how it was discussed from the standpoint of, and 
marginalised by, the work. However, at the end of the citation, which makes explicit 
improvisation's marginality, he reveals an inability to transcend the negative discourse 
he correctly identifies. Improvisation, he notes, can become notated, and when this 
happens, it graduates. By way of further illustration, it is notable that both medieval 
plainchant and modem jazz are now discussed musicologically without marginalising 
discourse. Consider now the near-comic effect of applying this type of marginalising 
discourse in these cases, by means of the following invented absurdities: 
i) In the later Middle Ages, plainchant graduated into polyphony. 
ii) Thanks to Gershwin's Rhapsody In Blue, jazz has now graduated 
into the sphere of art music. 
Because the marginalised nature of improvisation has not yet been systematically 
addressed in musicology, a remark exactly parallel to these grotesques has found its 
way into a mainstream musical dictionary. 
A demarginalising discourse on improvisation, however desirable, cannot be 
achieved with words which perpetuate a marginal ising discourse, for such attempted 
18 Jones, in Jones and Crutchfield, "Ornamentation," p. 760. 
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demarginalisation will be weighted by the marginal ising connotations of its 
vocabulary. Thus any modem European attempt to adopt a demarginalising critique of 
improvisation using existing vocabulary and concepts implicitly adopts an impossible 
standpoint in which the writer does not belong to the same cultural transmission as 
perpetuated the marginalisation. Such discourse seeks, impossibly, to evade fully the 
prejudices latent in the vocabulary in which the writer is bound. 'The problem with the 
project of restoration is that it is attempted on the assumption that we are now out of a 
living connection with tradition' .19 Moreover, for Gadamer, more generally, a wholly 
unsituated or unprejudiced discourse is never available, whatever the vocabulary. 
'[P]rejudgements are not something we must or can dispense with; they are the basis of 
our being able to understand history at all. ,20 'Gadamer in fact tries to show that our 
'judgements, ' which contain our most self-consciously methodical efforts to 
'understand,' do not break free from our 'prejudices'; our knowledge always remains 
part of our 'being'. ,21 Gadamer follows Heidegger here, for whom '[a]n interpretation 
is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us. ,22 For 
Gadamer, these prejudgements live on in language.23 Thus, not even revised 
vocabulary can demarginalise improvisation for those who do the revising, even 
though it may achieve this effect for later generations. Engrained prejudice always 
remains ensconced in deliberate methodological attempts to circumvent it, as here, and 
"positive discrimination" in the use of language, the consciousness of compensation, 
still reverberates with the prejudiced values of a disowned cultural horizon. Its users 
remain within the horizon of the same prejudice. 
19 Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: 'Phronesis' and Techne' in Modern Philosophy and in 
Aristotle (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 111-112. 
20 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher. Dilthey. Heidegger. and 
Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969), p. 182. 
21 Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground, p. 112. 
22 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1927) (London: SCM, 1962), section 32, pp. 191-192. 
23 See Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground, p. 138. 
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Between undesirable marginalising and immediately unattainable demarginalising 
discourse there is a middle way, however. Again with Gadamer, once the unavoidable 
situation of prejudice is acknowledged, a new type of discourse can seek not to 
transcend but to work productively within that situation. A post-marginalising 
discourse will be described in what follows, which will occupy an intermediate 
position between existing marginalising discourse and fruitless attempts at 
demarginalising discourse. At its best, post-marginalising discourse recognises that, 
bound within existing vocabulary and conceptual structures, demarginalising discourse 
is unattainable and that '[t]radition furnishes the stream of conceptions within which 
we stand, and we must be prepared to distinguish between fruitful presuppositions and 
those that imprison and prevent us from thinking and seeing. ,24 The word 
"improvisation" imprisons in this sense. For Gadamer, '[i]nterpretation is most fruitful 
when undertaken by an 'historically effected consciousness' which has been sensitized 
to the boundaries of its own comprehension. ,25 It is 'a consciousness of one's 
hermeneutical situation with the prejudices that are embedded in it. ,26 Thus, 
"[ e ]ffective-historical consciousness' strives toward a reflective appropriation of the 
effect of tradition on and in one,.27 At its best, post-marginal ising discourse is a 
conscious movement away from marginal ising discourse within the given limitations 
of existing marginalising language, and it is motivated by a compensatory desire to 
understand what is discussed with minimum bias, though using the existing 
terminology. It may, however, be approached from the opposite direction. Writers 
who think they are successfully demarginalising "improvisation" discourse may, by 
24 Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 183. Reference to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode 
[(Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960)], p. 263. 
2~ David Clifton Robinson, "From Quantum Moment to Ritual Moment: Notions of Time and the 
Development of Theological Models." Ph. D dissertation, New York Graduate Theological Union, 
1995. p. 93. 
26 Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground, p. 120. 
27 Ibid, p. 119. 
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undiscriminatingly preservIng the existing vocabulary and a certain conceptual 
structure of marginalising discourse, also lapse into a kind of uncritical post-
marginalising discourse by default and without knowing they are doing this. One such 
is Leo Treitler. 
Treitler's discourse on musical transmission in Western plainchant follows the 
historical development of "oral" (hence richly improvisatory tradition), through 
"written," to "literate" transmission. ("Transmission" refers to 'processes by which 
., d ,)28 musIc IS passe on. Treitler builds upon the Parry-Lord theory of formulaic 
transmission in ancient epic poetry. Milman Parry's assertion of the formulaic 
principle in connection with the Homeric epics was revolutionary in the history of the 
understanding of orality. For Parry, Homer's poetry is made up substantially of 
prefabricated parts, consisting of often highly predictable formulas. 29 The formulas 
made continuity in the recitation possible at times when the singer was at a loss for 
words.30 For Treitler, the formulae of plainchant are not, however, fixed and repeated 
motifs like the Homeric for Parry, designed to facilitate an invariant type of 
memorisation, but rather flexible conventions used to 'generate ... afresh' :31 'Thus 
the central concept of Treitler's view of oral transmission seems not to be the 
"formula" (as it was for Parry) but what [Treitler] calls the 'generative system,.,32 
Treitler believes a trained chanter would have used a generative system to recreate 
28 Jeffery, Re-Envisioning Past Musical Cultures, p. 51. 
~lJ Walter 1. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 
22-23. 
30 See Eric A. Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity 
fa the Present (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), p. 11. 
31 Jeffery, Re-Envisioning Past Musical Cultures, p. 15. 
J2 Jeffery, ibid. Reference to Leo Treitler, "From Ritual through Language to Music." In Schweb!r 
Jahrbuch/iir Musikwissenschaft, N. F. 2 (1982 [recte 1984]): 109-123; p. 118, footnote 6. For 'further 
bibliography on generative reformulations of the Parry-Lord theory' Jeffery refers the reader on the same 
page (footnote 3) to John Miles Foley (ed.), Oral Traditional Literature: A Festscrift for Albert Bates 
Lord (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1981), pp. 72-74: 113. 
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chants afresh at each performance, and that a scribe would have done likewise each 
time he wrote chants down.33 For Treitler: 
it does not matter whether the generation is an actual aural perfonnance (an example of oral 
transmission) or a mental recreation made during the act of writing the melody down in music notation 
(an example of written transmission). The two processes are not 'fundamentally different' from each 
other, but they are both to be clearly distinguished from performing or writing that relies directly on 
previously written prescriptive notation.34 
When it is a notated manuscript, rather than a 'generative system,' that detennines the details of a 
perfonnance or a writing out, then Treitler would speak of 'literate transmission,' the kind that (I 
understand him to believe) musicologists trained in the literate tradition of Western art music sometimes 
presuppose unwittingly whenever they work with medieval chant manuscripts (it is called 'The Modem 
Paradigm' in Treitler).35 
Treitler is trying to rediscover the importance of improvisation in Western practice: he 
is, in short, seeking to demarginalise it. Nevertheless, an essential post-marginality in 
Treitler's discussion of improvisation is rooted, as will be explained, in his use of the 
words "oral," "written" and "literate" to describe forms of transmission. In addition to 
this, he is setting up binarism based on "orality" and "literacy." This is clear from the 
citation above from Jeffery (footnoted citation 34): "oral" and "written" transmission 
belong together as 'not 'fundamentally different',' while "literate" transmission is 
distinct. Treitler certainly wishes to make a demarginalising claim for the importance 
of oral and hence improvisatory traditions which historically underpin Western music, 
especially the semi-improvisatory 'generative' practices which gave rise to plainchant 
prior to the rise of notation in the eighth and ninth centuries, of which he comments: 
'In place of ... an act of composition that produces a piece which, in the absence of 
writing, is submitted to memory and then repeatedly reproduced in performance, we 
might think of a repeated process of performance-composition' .36 This process falls 
33 See Jeffery, ibid, p. 15 (main text). 
34 Jeffery, ibid. Reference to Leo Treitler, "Oral, Written, and Literate Process in the Transmission of 
Medieval Music." Speculum 56 (1981): 471-491; p. 480. 
35 Jeffery, ibid. References to Treitler, ibid; also to Leo Treitler, "Transmission and the Study of Music 
History." In International Musicological Society, Report of the Twelfth Congress, Berkeley, 1977 , 
Daniel Heartz and Bonnie Wade (eds.), (Basel: Barenreiter, 1981), pp. 202-211. 
36 Leo Treitler, '''Centonate' Chant: Obles Flickwerk or E PluribusUnus?" (italics original) Journal of 
the American Musicological Society 28, no. 1 (1975): 1-23; p. 11 
The basic link between orality and improvisation is of course more fundamental than Trcitler's 
particular approach to it. The link lies in the fact that it is fIxed symbolism outside the music itself, such 
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somewhere between 'the reproduction of a fixed, memorized melody and the 
extempore invention of a new one. ,37 Yet, in having recourse to the vocabulary and 
conceptual structure of a literate/oral binarism, he does not, in fact, demarginalise oral 
and improvisatory music, and so his critique is unconsciously post-marginalising. 
This is because hidden value judgements inhabit the binarism of orality and literacy. 
In the present-day West, orality is perceived as the marginalised "other" of literacy. 
This particular value judgement is not inevitable or invariant for all cultures. It has not 
been true for all societies that, where both literate and oral forms of verbal transmission 
have been present, the oral dimension has been marginalised in relation to the literate. 
Ong points out that earlier cultures in which both were available did not necessarily 
attach more value to the written than to the spoken word. Sometimes' [w ]itnesses 
were prima facie more credible than texts because they could be challenged and made 
to defend their statements, whereas a text could not' .38 'Hearing rather than sight . . . 
dominated the older noetic world in significant ways, even long after writing was 
deeply interiorized.,39 '[E]ven today, we speak of 'auditing', that is, 'hearing' account 
books, though what an accountant actually does today is examine them by sight. 
as literate notation, which makes it easy to attempt to fIx a performance for repetition. It is such 
symbolism which oral cultures lack. 'The further back one goes in music history, the fewer aspects of 
performance there are that composers established precisely in writing.' Howard Mayer Brown in 
Howard Mayer Brown and James W. McKinnon, "Performing Practice." In New Grove Dictionary of 
Music and Musicians, vol 14, Sadie (ed.), p. 370. Apart from fIxed symbolism, attempts to fIx 
performances flounder on the imperfect nature of the human memory and this causes improvisation to 
arise as an expedient in performance when memory fails. Apart from such improvisation as an 
expedient, there is also improvisation as something poetically creative for its own sake, and in oral 
societies where fIxed symbolism is not available this latter aesthetic is arguably the only way of 
inventing new music. Clearly the two categories may overlap; indeed, the distinction between expedient 
and poetic creativity need not be present to the oral mind, even though Finnegan's fIeld-work would 
suggest that some oral societies can distinguish improvisation as fIlling in for lost memory from 
improvisation as a creative art in its own right. She refers to 'specifIc genres in Zulu and Xhosa where 
there is a poetic tradition of both memorization and improvisation.' Finnegan, Literac.v and Orality, p. 
167. Reference to 1. Opland, "'Scop' and 'Imbongi' - Anglo-Saxon and Bantu Oral Poets." English 
Studies in Africa 14 (1971). Treitler's view of plainchant improvisation is that it adopts the former 
model, for the generative system was not intended to promote improvisation and creativity. Its 'object 
and effect is to preserve traditions, not play loose with them.' Leo Treitler, "Homer and Gregory: The 
Transmission of Epic Poetry and Plainchant." The Musical Quarterly 60, no. 3 (1974): 333-372; p. 346. 
37 Treitler, "'Centonate' Chant. " p. 11. 
38 Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 96. 
39 Ibid, p. 119. 
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Earlier, residually oral folk could understand even figures better by listening than by 
looking. ,40 
These quotations describe social conditions in which literate and oral 
communication survived together but without any marginalisation of orality. However, 
nowadays, a different set of value judgements from those described above inhabits the 
words "literate" and "oral." The former term, used in writing by a literate like Treitler, 
writing for literate modem readers, in a shared horizon of literate education, does not 
only refer to an idea, it expresses a camaraderie. From this camaraderie non-literates 
are excluded as marginal "illiterates." Written from within, and into, the horizon of 
Western literateness, the word "literate" h as' a primary resonance of approbation, 
while "oral" possesses a primary resonance of denigration. No amount of secondary 
explanation to the effect that oral culture is really just as valorisable after all as literate 
culture wholly eradicates these primary resonances of approbation and denigration 
which arise from a vernacular use of these terms, existing as a semantic foundation 
from which any more refined or specific uses are distilled explicitly only in the second 
instance. Finnegan writes: 'We tend to associate [illiteracy] with an individual or 
group that has failed to master the generally accepted skills of the culture and is thus 
cut off from the cultural heritage of contemporaries without having anything of his or 
their own to put in its place. ,41 However, this judgement does not apply to non-
literates in cultures lacking in written communication, who in their own context may 
be as well educated as educated literates are in a literate society. The reason why it is 
easy to slip into the habit of mind of thinking of non-literate oral culture in terms of 
illiterate Western culture, is the primary resonance of the word "literate" used by us as 
a tenn of approbation. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Finnegan, Literacy and Orality, p. 60. 
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Moreover the cultural emphasis on justifying any second-instance connotation of 
the type which Treitler desires to attach to these words "oral" and "literate" bears 
witness to the power of the primary resonance and the constant need to suppress it. For 
Westerners, "oral" can never lose its primary derogatory connotation of "illiterate": 
"illiterate" means "under-educated" and "under-educated" implies "marginal." 
Although considered on their own terms oral cultures are neither under-educated nor 
marginal, semantic structures which imply this bias have invaded Treitler's discourse 
so that he continues the handing on of values he seeks to challenge. Wishing to 
demarginalise, he has, by default, in consequence of his discourse, post-marginalised. 
Although he achieves within the chosen semantic structures a relative reduction in the 
marginalised conception of improvisation, by at least discussing the importance of 
orality, Treitler nevertheless perpetuates a bias whereby the discussion arises from the 
standpoint of literacy. However '[y]ou cannot without serious and disabling distortion 
describe a primary phenomenon by starting with a subsequent secondary phenomenon 
and paring away the differences. Indeed, starting backwards in this way - putting the 
car [sic] before the horse - you can never become aware of the real differences at all. ,42 
Likewise in words of Finnegan: 'Over many years studying aspects of oral literature, I 
have been increasingly struck by the strength of the European preoccupation with 
written forms and the way this colours thoughts and definition - the 'literacy paradigm' 
of scholars, as it is well put in Treitler. ,43 Treitler, however, does not break with this 
'literacy paradigm' he identifies, and his discourse is post-marginalising despite its 
attempt to be demarginalising. 
42 Ong, Orality and Litera(l'. p. 13. 
43 Finnegan, LiteraC1' and Orality, p. 124. Reference to Leo Treitler, "Orality and Literacy in 
Transmission of Medieval European Music." Paper at International Council of Traditional Music 
Conference, 'The Oral and Literate in Music," Tokyo, published in Tokumaru and Yamaguti, 1986. 
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III Improvisation, or "Primary Transmission? " 
The present discussion will now re-open the question of whether post-marginalising 
discourse concerning improvisation can be transcended in favour of demarginalising 
discourse for the modem Western European mind, and, if so, how. In fact, as will be 
seen, discussion of improvisation may occur in anyone of four species of discourse: 
non-marginalising; marginalising; post-marginalising and demarginalising. The \ i st 
below will sufficiently clarify the next main point in the present discussion, which is 
that a demarginalising discourse may in fact be established if existing vocabulary and 
semantic structures are subverted. It may be thus established, however, notfor us who 
subverted the vocabulary, but only over a subsequent trans-generational process of 
change. The meaning of the fourfold classification may be summarised as follows: 
1) Non-marginalising discourse: This discourse is found in social contexts where 
improvisation has never been marginalised. 
2) Marginalising discourse: This discourse IS found in social contexts where 
improvisation is devalorised in relation to other forms of musical creativity. 
3) Post-marginal ising discourse: This discourse is found in social contexts where 
improvisation has been seen, but is no longer seen, as marginal. The vocabulary used 
is the same as that employed in marginalising discourse. However, within the same 
vocabulary, there is an attempt to correct marginalising attitudes. 
4) Demarginalising discourse: Like post-marginalising discourse, this discourse is also 
found in social contexts where improvisation has been seen, but is no longer seen, as 
marginal. However, unlike post-marginalising discourse, it employs deliberately new 
vocabulary which breaks with the marginal ising vocabulary still present in post-
marginalising discourse. 
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Thus demarginalising discourse is about new vocabulary and conceptual structures. 
Demarginalising discourse aspires to the condition of non-marginalising discourse, and 
although never attaining this condition for the first generation of users, sometimes 
approaches it asymptotically. It is a construct to emulate the evaluative neutrality of 
non-marginalising discourse in the latter's freedom from marginalising conceptions. 
Demarginalising discourse will seek to minimise as nearly as possible to vanishing 
point the weight of marginalising bias in the language in which improvisation is 
discussed. It can never do so completely, for it is still implicated in a biased 
interpretation of what it describes. Those who first use it know it is invented, and why. 
Demarginalising discourse says, in effect "we ought not to be biased," which implies 
that "we still are biased." An idea which needs rehabilitation by means of positive 
linguistic discrimination in this sense is, culturally, still marginalised, and figured 
within the horizon of old prejudices. Yet, despite this retained prejudice, 
demarginalising discourse is not simply "post-post-marginalising." This is because, for 
a new generation of speakers growing up to use demarginalising discourse unself-
consciously rather than as an adopted strategy, it could become non-marginalising 
discourse, and free discussion of improvisation from the specific historical biases 
inhabiting "improvisation" and "extemporisation." It will no doubt introduce other 
biases, because, following Gadamer, judgement is never free from prejUdice. 
One possible demarginalising term already considered is 'real-time composition,' as 
discussed by Pressing. Potentially to our cultural descendants, it is non-marginal ising 
with respect to specific biases connected with the words "improvisation" and 
"extemporisation" which prejudicially overstress the unprepared dimension of this type 
of music. The term's relative usefulness in this respect is apparent. Yet, in addition to 
reservations expressed above to the effect that 'real' here counterfactually valorises 
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audible "production" time over "preparation" time, it also opposes some conception of 
"real" to "unreal" time (hallucinations, dreams, perhaps) and implicitly valorises as 
normative those psychological states in which humans are presumed to be aware of 
"real," "objective," presumptively "scientific" time, rather than states dominated by 
"subjective" perceptions of time (as when time goes slowly in boredom, quickly in 
euphoria). There is a particular model of time-consciousness in mind. It is already 
possible to see how subsequent generations might come to see "real-time" as a 
marginalising term and might seek to replace it with their own new demarginalising 
discourse of a kind which might not marginalise other forms of temporal experience, 
the latter seen as no less real by them, or, indeed more real than our "real" clock time. 
They might perhaps point out that, if "real" time is defined as time in which reality is 
disclosed to the mind, this might be taken to include a scientist's reaching a valid 
conclusion in a dream, in which case, presumably his dreamed time is real time. 
'While we dream, we are busy exploring the links between old and new memories, 
which may help explain how we can sometimes solve problems in our sleep. ,44 Yet, 
though arguably real, dream time is not always like clock time, or even sequential. 
Unending complications arise for "real-time" terminology in the case of somebody 
who actually improvises music while asleep. In what sense or senses is he producing 
mUSIC III "real" time? Another perhaps less frivolous formulation of the same 
difficulty is linked to strong associations In some non-western cultures between 
improvisatory music and trance states where clock time is not perceived. In these 
cultures improvisation is sometimes actually the vehicle for achieving detachment from 
the sense of clock time. It becomes in this situation the antithesis of what Pressing 
refers to as 'real-time composition.' (Shamanic ecstasy and its links to musical 
44 Helen Philips. "Perchance to Learn." New Scientist 2205 (25th September. 1999): 27-30; p. 29. 
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improvisation are discussed later.) Thus it is apparent that the demarginalising status 
of "real-time" discourse is, from the first, highly vulnerable to review, and it would not 
be as durable as other discourses which might be advanced on the basis of more critical 
stances adopted in regard to notions of temporality. 
An attempt will now be made to set up a demarginalising discourse of 
improvisation with minimum conceptual bias and maximum durability. The basis for 
this new discourse will be Treitler's post-marginalising discourse already discussed, 
which is largely correct in substance, though weak in choice of terminology. Treitler's 
discourse-structure will first be illustrated in the form of a pyramid. The three 
elements of the pyramid, descending, indicate the passage of the history of 
transmission, each lower element chronologically subsequent to the one above. (This 
is because Treitler's categories "oral," "written," and "literate" are in chronological 
order: 'Even after 'written transmission' had become common alongside oral 
transmission, it took many centuries to complete the shift to 'literate transmission'. ,)45 
The size of the type-face suggests the associations which subliminally attach to the 
words used in Treitler's post-marginal classification when received by modem Western 
European listeners and readers, for whom "oral" tends to suggest "ignorant," "literate" 
tends to suggest "educated," and "written," situated in middle place for Treitler, and 
associated for the same listeners and readers with the basic ability to write, tends to 
suggest some kind of intermediate level of social empowerment and integration: 
4S Jeffery, Re-En\'isioning Past Musical Culture, pp. 15-16. References to Treitler, "Oral, Written, and 
Literate Process in the Transmission of Medieval Music," pp. 481-482; Leo Treitler, "Oral and Literate 
Style in the Regional Transmission of Tropes." Studia Musicologica Academiae ScientiaJ1lnl 
Hungaricae 27 (1985): 171-183. 
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ORAL TRANSMISSION 
WRITTEN TRANSMISSION 
LITERATE TRANSMISSION 
This post-marginal ising trichotomy will now be reclassified in terms of 
demarginalising discourse. It is important to remember that no issue is here being 
taken with at least the broad historical accuracy of Treitler's analysis, but with its 
value-laden terminology. A new pyramid, in which the three concepts proposed by 
TreitIer are renamed, is now proposed thus: 
PRIMARY TRANSMISSION 
ABSTRACTED TRANSMISSION 
SILENT TRANSMISSION 
This new trichotomy seeks to be, in the ideas to which it refers, identical to Treitler's, 
but its discourse and consequently its value judgements are revised. In this new 
pyramid, "primary transmission" corresponds in all but name to Treitler's "oral 
transmission," "abstracted transmission" In all but name to Treitler's "written 
transmission," and "silent transmission" In all but name to Treitler's "literate 
transmission." As with the first pyramid, the SIze of the type-face suggests the 
valuations which subliminally attach to the words In the new demarginalising 
classification. In this second pyramid, Treitler's former "oral" transmission, inhabited 
by the marginalising term "oral," becomes primary transmission. Like oral 
transmission, primary transmission is defined as transmission free of written 
connections in any form, yet primary transmission, because of the high valorisation 
inhabiting the word "primary," is described with a positive connotation, as a core 
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phenomenon of musical transmission, a historical fact which literary and musical 
studies of primary oral cultures attest. This is why it now appears in the largest type-
face. In Jeffery's words: 
Oral transmission is not a peculiar feature of some music at certain times, but rather a universal 
characteristic of almost all music at almost all times. What we call 'oral transmission' is what most 
human beings throughout history have known simply as 'music' - something to play or hear rather than 
something to write or read. We modern Westerners are the ones who do things differently, and our 
preference for writing is our handicap. 46 
In the new pyramid, primary transmission is thus no longer represented as the "other" 
of some more highly-prized mode of musical creativity, such as the score or the work, 
as was the case when it was cast as "oral transmission" in relation to "literate" in 
Treitler's scheme, exemplified in the first pyramid. 
In the new pyramid, after primary transmission, abstracted transmission is the 
equivalent of Treitler's "written transmission." However, rather than being implicitly 
valorised more highly than "oral transmission," through being described by a word 
("written") which suggests a level of social empowerment slightly above that of 
illiterate persons, as in Treitler, it is represented as a process of music's being 
abstracted from its primary form and thereby brought into a relation with something 
other than itself, the text, and, in a sense, sundered from itself, from its own integral 
presence to itself. Next, silent transmission is equivalent to Treitler's "literate 
transmission." "Literate transmission" stood implicitly at the high point of prestige in 
Treitler's classification on account of the resonations of the word "literate." In the new 
pyramid, however, "silent" becomes the "other" of "primary," the latter being the high 
point of prestige in the new classification. The transmission formerly valorised as 
"literate" in Treitler thus now becomes the "other" of the transmission which Treitler 
marginalised as "oral," and their places of relative prestige are reversed. It would 
hardly be possible to think of a more devaluative adjective to apply to music than 
46 Jeffery, ibid, p. 124. 
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"silent." Even 4' 33" by John Cage includes noises from the soundscape of real life 
(birdsong, coughing of audience, etc.). Yet, indubitably, the musical score, mere paper 
or parchment, is silent. It is as far from producing musical sound as anything that can 
be imagined. A score is somehow a transmission of music without any musical sound 
being produced. A notated text is not the musical work for 'music exists as sound ... 
Indeed, music is commonly thought not to exist except as sound, real or imagined, and 
the notated version is no more than a source of advice or instructions for recreating the 
music. ,47 Despite this, under Treitler's post-marginalising category of "literate," the 
score enjoyed the highest valuation within music of all the three components of his 
scheme. Paradoxically, the score became "the music." The true culturally subordinate 
role of "literate" or, as it is here renamed, silent transmission, is of course also shown 
clearly by the fact that primary (for Treitler "oral") transmission can exist alone in a 
culture apart from the other two elements. Moreover, the products of silent (for 
Treitler "literate") transmission are brought to life only by events, performances, which 
transcend the notated information and reinstate the expressive flexibilities 
characteristic of primary, "oral" musicianship, not to mention the sound itself. It is 
clear that to suggest that primary transmission is the marginalised "other" of silent 
transmission, as Treitler's post-marginal conceptual framework does with its terms 
"oral" and "literate," is inappropriate to the facts under description. 
Moreover the term "silent" transmission is more inclusive than Treitler's "literate" 
transmission. The former leaves room for the possibility of forms of symbolism which 
people in oral cultures might have used to try to fix musical performances but which 
were non-literate. Even if Treitler does recognise the possibility of fixing 
performances other than by writing or notation in the literate sense, "literate 
~' Stanley Boonnan, "The Musical Text." In Rethinking Music. Cook and Everist (eds.). p. 405. 
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transmission" is not an apt term to use for the manifestations of such hypothetical 
instances, since "literate" derives from littera, "letter," a Latin word which did not 
refer to a broader range of symbols but only to the written symbol. There is no reason 
to assert definitively that oral cultures (including medieval oral cultures) could not 
have tried to fix performances by referring agreed aspects of a performance to selected 
exterior objects or events other than written symbols, and especially to human gestures. 
Agreed conducting gestures could have functioned like prescriptive notation.48 Even if 
no documentary evidence supports this use of gestures in respect of early plainchant 
transmission, any term which purports to describe all possible cases where 
performances are prescriptively fixed (and Treitler's term "literate" does so purport) 
needs to be able to refer to the widest possible spectrum of such practices, if ever 
history provides evidence for their existence, and "literate" does not successfully 
describe those which may not have been written down. Any such prescriptive 
transmission based on non-literate symbolism, if it existed, would of course still be the 
"other" of primary transmission, because human beings must still produce music by 
primary transmission to be thus fixed. 
The anthropological priority of primary transmission is not opposed to the fact that 
the composed products of silent forms of transmission, once such transmission is 
established within a culture, may not merely record, but also actually influence 
compositional procedures within the limits of the same culture. That is to say, ability 
to write down music in a given culture may not only record, but can stylistically affect 
music composed in that culture. Thus, for that culture the lineaments of the already 
proposed descending pyramid: 
48 The musical sign-language, or cheironomy of the ancient Egyptians may have functioned in this way. 
See Kunst. Ethnomusicology. p. 51. 
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PRIMARY TRANSMISSION 
ABSTRACTED TRANSMISSION 
SILENT TRANSMISSION 
may be obscured, as happened in the West where pnmary transmission was 
marginalised. This point may be illustrated. High complexity of counterpoint is a 
silently transmitted (or "literate") genre. Oral musical cultures have not constructed 
music of this type, precisely because it requires the complex symbolisation only 
possible with silent transmission and, arguably, scored notation. It cannot be imagined 
or built up by a human mind without some external aide-memoire. The contrapuntal 
complexity of the type which increasingly characterises Western music after the rise of 
organum and came to a climax in the eighteenth century, is not found in oral cultures, 
and '[i]t is hardly surprising that, with the development of a sophisticated graphic 
notation, Western instrumental music has been able to rise to heights of extraordinary 
complexity. ,49 As has been noted: 
In the 16th century much music was printed in partbooks. When composers stopped writing each line of 
their music successively and began to conceive the entire polyphonic complex simultaneously, they may 
have worked with wax tablets which could be erased once the parts were copied out. 50 
The interest of this citation is that it illustrates how the desired complexity of 
composition here called eventually for the mnemonic aid of wax tablets. But the 
previous ability to notate the contrapuntal lines successively by means of partbooks 
itself foreshadowed and inspired the wax-tablet method for imagining polyphonic 
complexity 'simultaneously.' Thus the later music in this example could be conceived 
only with the aid of wax tablets able to display all the parts at once to the eye, yet these 
49 Philip Alperson. "On Musical Improvisation." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43, no. 1 
(1984): 17-29; p. 22. Reference to Walter Wiora, The Four Ages of Music (New York: n.p .. 1965), pp. 
130-135. 
50 Brown, in Brown and McKinnon, "Performing Practice," p. 378. 
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wax tablets are a historical development of the partbooks. Here, complexity of 
counterpoint first elicited a need for silent transmission in the form of part-books; this 
silent transmission, consisting of part-books, then itself suggested higher possibilities 
in complexity of counterpoint through wax tablets, which served as a development of 
the part-books. Silent transmission influenced compositional style. 
Specific musical cultures (most of modern Western music included) can thus be 
formed as a result of the rise and development of silent transmission; indeed, it is hard 
to avoid the suggestion that some of the notated polyphony of the late Middle Ages 
was validated in its musical construction by the look of the page, rather than solely the 
effect of the sound. Late Medieval and early Renaissance composers appear to have 
been fascinated by musical symmetry, including visual, for 'balancing of 
proportionally related sectional divisions and even of symmetrically organized 
mensurations in motets and secular songs all demonstrate that what we might call the 
extra-auditory dimension of music was valued as highly as what was heard. ,51 Virginia 
Newes writes of retrograde canonic writing at this period which cannot be perceived by 
hearing the music but only by looking at it. 52 Foucault's analysis of the Renaissance 
episteme as based in the idea of the world as written "text" is suggestive of the 
powerful influence the musical text may have had on compositional practice. For 
Foucault, the world was understood as a text written by God, '[a] universe where 
words were symbolically ordered amongst themselves in the same manner as things 
and were read as perfect mirrorings of things. [In] the episteme of the Renaissance ... 
words resembled things and things resembled words. ,53 There was thus every reason 
51 Virginia Newes, "Writing, Reading and Memorizing: the Transmission and Resolution of Retrograde 
Canons from the 14th and early 15th Centuries." EarZr Music 18, no. 2 (May 1990 misprinted on 
Contents page as May 1989): 218-234: p. 218. 
52 See ibid. 
53 Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 
1986). p. 287. Reference to Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences (n.p.: Pantheon, 1970 and n.p.: Tavistock, 1972). 
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why music should resemble its own text, the thing resemble the "word." Thus silent 
transmission in the West was reciprocal with musical styles, by both recording and also 
generating them. 
The musical score does not only have the power to generate compositional styles in 
this way (most modem Western music was conceived in dependence upon the notated 
symbol) but can even influence primary transmission (improvisation) within a culture. 
Treitler's problematic trichotomy, in addition, as has been seen, to adopting post-
marginalising discourse in his designations "oral," "written," and "literate," fails, 
according to Jeffery, to account for such situations as where "oral" transmission is 
influenced by "literate" transmission. Jeffery prefers Brian Stock's analysis "orality, 
textuality, and literacy,,54 which he considers is better able to suggest influences of 
"literate" transmission upon "oral" transmission. "Textuality" is a more nuanced and 
inclusive idea than Treiler's "written transmission," since it can describe not only the 
writing down of oral material, but also a state of orality influenced by literacy where 
'oral discourse effectively ... function[s] within a universe of communications 
governed by texts. ,55 Unlike Treitler, for whom there is but one orality, Stock 
distinguishes two types of orality: "pure orality, that is verbal discourse uninfluenced 
by the written mode' and 'verbal discourse which exists in interdependence with texts' 
which is . . . 'the type of orality for which the Middle Ages furnishes the most 
abundant evidence'. ,56 
A new tenn will be adopted here: post-primary transmission. Post-primary 
transmission is the practice of primary transmission where it reflects stylistic 
influences rooted in silent transmission, in the manner just described by Stock. (To 
54 Sec Jeffery, Re-Envisioning Past Afllsical Cultures, p. 16, footnote. Citation from Brian Stock. The 
Implications of Literacy: H'ritten Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Centuries (n.p.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 6. 
~~ 
-. Stock, ibid, p. 3. Cited in Jeffery, ibid. 
56 Jeffery, ibid. Citations from Stock, ibid, p. 8. 
105 
revert momentarily to more familiar terminology, post-primary transmission will here 
be the term for improvisation in a musical style which arose in consequence of 
notation.) A good example of post-primary transmission is improvised counterpoint. 
Although inseparable in creative elan from the spontaneity of primary transmission, it 
is clear that, in style, Medieval and Renaissance improvised counterpoint consciously 
or unconsciously imitated the notated vocal polyphony and its musical structure as 
heard in the churches of the period, and this fact makes for its correct classification as a 
form of post-primary transmission. There is direct evidence for this influence of 
notated compositional techniques on improvised counterpoint for '[in] addition to ... 
works presenting species counterpoint in terms of written composition, there are others 
that use contrapuntal species to teach vocal improvisation - singing 'above the book' 
(super librum) as Tinctoris called it. ,57 This implies that counterpoint by silent 
transmission and improvised counterpoint shared a pedagogy. Another major form of 
post-primary transmission in the West has been the figured-bass. 
When the vocabulary through which improvisation is discussed is adjusted, this will 
engender a wider cultural reception of the fact that, as Nettl observes: '[T]he 
approaches developed in ethnomusicology can underscore something already 
understood but rarely expounded, that oral (or more correctly, aural) transmission is the 
norm . . . and that it dominates the musical life of a society and the life of a piece of 
music. ,58 It is this perspective that any demarginalising discourse seeks to re-express. 
Given that conceptual structures are historically conditioned here, it is suggested that 
the form of demarginalising discourse just advanced (primary, abstracted, silent and 
post-primary transmissions) represents a relatively durable proposal because its terms 
of reference are based in less shifting human categories than others which might be 
57 Joel Lester, Compositional Theory in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 
1992), p. 30. 
5R NettI, Study of Ethnomusicology, p. 200. 
106 
thought of, including those linked with "real time." The new terminology presupposes 
human concepts of sequential priority, removal, and presence/absence/degree of sound. 
These are probably less mutable human ideas than others which might be proposed 
with a view to changing cultural attitudes to improvisation. 
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Chapter 4 
Music and Metaphysics: Discovering the Hidden Heidegger ? 
I Heidegger and the Linguistic Turn 
It is notable that, already from within the musicological community' [e ]fforts to 
characterize the improvisatory mode of expression from a listener's perspective have 
been made in recent writings in aesthetics using the analogy of speech. ,1 For example, 
for Francis Sparshott, humans tend to listen to improvising as they listen to speech, 
listening past any "mistakes" in order to attend to the development of the underlying 
'd 2 1 eas. Christopher Small associates musical improvisation with conversation.3 
Sawyer has sought to apply 'semiotic theory and analysis to both musical and verbal 
improvisation.,4 For him, 'both linguistic and musical performance, as found in 
cultural contexts, are forms of creative improvisation'. 5 Group musical improvisation, 
in particular, is seen by him as resembling verbal conversation.6 Thus 'group 
improvisational performance could provide a new perspective on the semiotic attempt 
to apply models of language to musical performance.' 7 
Speech is a major preoccupation in twentieth-century Western philosophy. The 
twentieth-century linguistic tum in Western philosophy has been a development 
comparable in importance to the tum to the subject of Descartes's cogito. Thinkers 
such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Wittgenstein and Derrida all redefine philosophy in 
linguistic terms. Many today would no longer accept a model of knowledge according 
to which a "self' has experience of an "objective" world which it then translates into 
1 Goertzen, "By Way of Introduction," p. 311. Reference to Alperson, "On Musical Improvisation," 
drawing on Francis Sparshott, The Theory of the Arts (Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1982). 
2 See Alperson, ibid, pp. 23-24. References to Sparshott, ibid, p. 255; p. 609, footnote 40; David 
Sudnow, Talk's Body (New York: n.p .. 1979). 
3 See Christopher Small, "No Meaning Without Rules." In Improvisation. Prevost (commentator), p. 3. 
4 R. Keith Sawyer, "The Semiotics of Improvisation: The Pragmatics of Musical and Verbal 
Performance." Semiotica 108, nos. 3/4 (1996): 269-306; p. 269. 
5 Ibid, p. 272. 
/1 Sec ibid, p. 274. 
7 Ibid, p. 270. 
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language. 'There is no subject and no object, no self and no world to which we have 
privileged access: there is only representation, only language, propagating and 
disseminating itself across the face of the world. Indeed, the 'world' is nothing more 
nor less than the sum of linguistic self-production.,8 'Because philosophy has been so 
dominated by the Cartesian standpoint, the erosion of Cartesianism has been 
interpreted by some as signalling the 'death of philosophy.' If anything is dying, 
however, it is the intellectual rule of a particular model of knowledge and reality.,9 
The older idea that language arises in the self as a result of contact with objects has 
roots in Judaeo-Christian tradition. In Genesis, God, having created things, names 
them. However, according to the terms of many linguistic philosophies, language 
precedes experience: the world is modelled to fit language. This implies that language 
determines the way people think, a view which Chomsky's theory of innate, deep 
structures in language tends to support. 10 
'[T]he thought that all our perceptions are imprisoned by language itself - not any 
particular language but the very practice of articulation - is disarming. It really does 
seem ... to make language the sole constituent of such a reality.,J 1 Not all 
philosophies representing the linguistic tum, however, go as far as to 'make language 
the sole constituent' of reality. The latter position, better described by the term 
'linguistic determinism,12 should not be taken as synonymous with the linguistic tum 
as a whole. Such determinism 'pretty much coincides with the 'theory of linguistic 
relativity' put forward by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf.,13 In this theory, 
R George Pattison, Agnosis: Theology in the Void (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 139. 
9 Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (Albany: State Univ. of 
New York Press, 1987), p. 114. 
10 See Felipe Femandez-Annesto, Truth: A History and a Guidefor the Perplexed (1997) (London: 
Transworld, 1998), pp. 201-202. 
II Ibid, p. 202. 
12 Stephen Pinker, The Language Instinct (1994) (London: Penguin, 1995). p. 59. 
13 Gary B. Madison, The Hermeneutics of Postmodernit)': Figures and Themes (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1990), p. 84. 
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'reality would be constituted differently in accordance with the different ways we use 
to speak about it, and, in the final analysis, there would be as many 'realities' as there 
I ,[4 are anguages. However, the 'famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic 
determinism,' states Stephen Pinker, 'is wrong, all wrong.,[s For example, if humans 
sometimes utter or write a sentence and then realise that it was not quite what they 
meant to say, this implies that there is a "what they mean to say" that is different from 
what was said. Indeed, sometimes no available words seem properly to convey a 
thought. Similarly, humans often remember the gist of an idea, not the exact words, so 
there has to be a gist that is not the same as the words themselves. Moreover, if 
thoughts depended on words no new words could be coined nor could a child learn a 
word to begin with. 16 Pinker refers to a body of scientific studies 'that break the word 
barrier and assess many kinds of nonverbal thought.' 17 
An attempt will be made in Chapter 5 to present musical improvisation as part of 
the overall phenomenon of language and to situate it within the linguistic-philosophical 
framework proposed by the thought of Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, situated in 
the tradition of the linguistic tum, language is the condition of experience and the 
medium in and through which we exist. 18 Heidegger's understanding of language is as 
the place where "Being speaks" or "Being is given." Elucidating Heidegger's idea that 
Being "speaks" or "is given," John Macquarrie writes: 'We cannot say 'Being is' ... 
but we do say, 'There is Being' ... In German, the words are Es gibt, 'It gives' ... 
Heidegger says clearly that Being is a gift of the 'It gives' and that Being belongs to 
14 Ibid. 
15 Pinker, Language instinct, p. 57. Reference to Edward Sapir, Language (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1921). 
:~ See Pinker, ibid, pp. 57-58. 
Ibid, p. 67. 
1M This position is stated in Heidegger, Being and Time, section 34, pp. 203-211. It is well summarised 
in Palmer Hermeneutics, pp. 124-161. 
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gIvIng. The 'It gives' is the ultimate in Heidegger's philosophy.d9 Because it is in 
language that "Being speaks," in words of another commentator: 'Speech speaks in 
order to summon the world and things to their essence, whereby the world worlds and 
the thing things.,2o "World' refers here to something that happens in language, as in a 
dynamic event. When the world shows itself in language, it is in this dynamic state of 
'worlding'. ,21 In what follows, Heidegger's Es gibt will be rendered as "Being speaks" 
rather than "Being is given," for since Heidegger considers that Being is given in and 
through language, "Being speaks" would seem to be a more attentive rendering of the 
German than "Being is given.,,22 
Heidegger does not conceive of human knowledge of reality in terms of the 
Cartesian subject-object model, nor does he follow the Sapir-Whorf determinist model 
of language. '[L]anguage neither 'refers' to 'extra'-linguistic reality nor does it merely 
'express itself; language is the way in which, as humans, we experience what we call 
reality, that is, the way in which reality exists for us. ,23 Something more exists than 
language, namely experience, and language expresses this experience. However 
experience is not "outside" language, something other than language to which language 
merely refers. Language is the meaning of experience and the two belong to each 
other. Thus language does not merely articulate experience; it is experience which 
comes to acknowledge itself to be this or that experience. For example, if we find a 
more subtle way of describing an emotion, it is our emotional life itself which becomes 
19 John Macquarrie, Heidegger and Christianity (London: SCM, 1994), p. 98. 
~o Theodore Kisiel. "The Language of the Event: The Event of Language." In Heidegger and the Path 
of Thinking, John Sallis (ed.), (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1970), p. 98. 
21 See Lawrence Ferrara, Philosophy and the Analysis of Music: Bridges to Musical Sound, Form and 
Reference (New York: Greenwood, 1991), p. 132. 
22 The phrase "Being speaks" will be used frequently in the present work. Where reference to 
Heidegger's own ideas forms the context for its use, it will be enclosed, as here, in inverted commas. 
Where the phrase is contextualised anew, in relation to the new ideas which will form the original basis 
of this thesis, it will appear without inverted commas. Occasionally, the context has been such that it has 
not been possible to determine decisively which usage is more appropriate. 
23 Madison, Hermeneutics of Postmodernity, p. 165. 
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more refined, not just the way we describe it. 'If it is true, as Heidegger said, that 
language is das Haus des Seins [the House of Being], it is even truer that it is the home 
of meaningful experience. Experience is not really meaningful until it has found a 
home in language, and without lived experience to inhabit it, language is an empty, 
lifeless shell. ,24 Belief that we have captured a wordless thought is illusory for words 
of some kind are always hovering in the background.25 Our "prelinguistic and 
metalinguistic' dawnings, dumbnesses and silences in which the immediate meeting 
with the world expresses itself . . . happen only against a background of language 
towards which, in some way or another they are always being drawn. ,26 Indeed when 
the mind tries to find the right words to say what it wants to say, this generally occurs 
within words; the unsatisfactoriness of the present formulation incites us to look for a 
better one; we do not start from a pristine, pre-linguistic thing-in-itself. Thus neither 
experience and understanding, nor language are available independently of each other; 
they are an indissoluble unity.27 'How can I know what I think till I see what I say?,28 
Ineffable or obscure ideas do not constitute an exception to this principle whereby all 
thinking gravitates towards at least some form of linguistic expression. In such 
instances the language in which the thoughts are expressed may take the form of 
phrases like: "I see what I mean but I don't know how to say it," or "I have an idea 
which no words suffice to express." 
The view that language is integral to human thought process finds support from the 
natural sciences. There is a scientific presentation of the human person not simply as a 
2.t Ibid. For the phrase 'House of Being' see Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason (Der Sat:: vom 
Grund, Pfullingen: Neske, 1957) (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1991), p. 96. 
25 See Dwight Bolinger and Donald A. Sears, Aspects of Language (1968) (London: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1981), pp. 135-136. 
26 Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground, p. 138. Citation from Hans-Georg Gadamer, "On the Origins of 
Philosophical Hermeneutics." In Philosophical Hermeneutics (1977) (Cambridge MA: M. I. T. Press, 
1985), p. 179. 
27 S D 'b'd ee unne, 1 1 . 
28 E. M. Forster, no documentation. Cited in Frank Whitehead, The Disappearing Dais: A Study of the 
Principles and Practice of English Teaching (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966). p. 13. 
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creature who speaks language, but a creature whose mode of existence is biologically 
defined in tenns of language. Terrence Deacon propounds the view that language is 
not added to thought but is the source of it: 'The remarkable expansion of the brain that 
took place in human evolution, and indirectly produced prefrontal expansion, was not 
the cause of symbolic language but a consequence of it. ,29 He remarks also that 'the 
requirements for efficient speech analysis and production have all the qualities to 
become progressively internalized in patterns of neural architecture. It is even 
conceivable that there could be some degree of genetic assimilation of specific, highly 
regularized phoneme-distinction mechanisms. ,30 If, as Deacon speculates, language 
produces the fonn of the brain as we know it, it may thus be claimed anatomically, in a 
manner parallel to the Heideggerian speculations treated here, that language is the 
origin of the human person. Chapter I suggested that, in babyhood, babbling and 
language acquisition may be allied with exploratory musical vocalisation. In Chapter 5 
such musical vocalisation will be integrated into and included in the philosophical 
claims made for language by Heidegger and corroborated by the natural sciences. 
Heidegger's understanding of the primordiality of language is arrived at from a 
phenomenological consideration of the structure of human understanding. 
Understanding appears not chiefly as a specific type of activity initiated so that it may 
be applied to specific situations. This model cannot be foundational, since it provides 
no way of understanding the act of understanding itself. Humanity cannot stand 
outside understanding in order to objectify it in this way. '[Understanding] can never 
be objectified, for it is within understanding that all objectification takes place. ,31 For 
Heidegger, understanding is the whole of our lived experience, not a special kind of 
event within it. It is not a tool for something else, but the medium in and through 
29 Deacon, Svmbolic Species, p. 340. 
10· . 
. Ibid, pp. 336-337 . 
. 1\ Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 228. 
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which we exist: an event of the world upon man, not an autonomous activity of man. 
'Understanding is ... the medium by which the world comes to stand before a man; 
understanding is the medium of ontological disclosure. ,32 Man cannot survey 
understanding from the outside: understanding is the standpoint from which all that is 
seen is seen, so it cannot be an object. Our being-in-the-world, and our understanding 
are one and the same thing. 
The world comes to stand before man through his five senses, and this 
impressionability is already understanding. However the world does not come to stand 
for man purely in the vague impress of sounds, sights and stimuli in the wider sense. 
The world also comes to stand for man as a shared world. My existence is interlocked 
with that of others. The deeper meaning of the world cannot be grasped as though I 
alone existed, and must include also what other people understand by the world. 
However, my primary sensory wash cannot perceive what other people understand by 
the world. They have to communicate this to me, and they do this through language. 
Another reason why the world can only fully come to stand for me through language is 
that this shared world is not just a world of the present, of the now. It has a past, and 
much of the world's richness of meaning comes down from the past. Just as I have no 
sensory access to other people's thoughts, neither have I direct sensory access to the 
past. Both the shared and the historical nature of my being-in-the-world must therefore 
come to stand for me through language. 'Language is equally as primordial as 
understanding, for understanding is linguistic; it is through language that something 
like a world can arise for us. ,33 In short, it is through language that the world comes to 
stand before me, because the world is co-understood: 'Being-with belongs to Being-in-
the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concemful 
32 Ibid . 
.\.\ Ibid. 
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Being-with-one-another. ,34 'Language for Heidegger IS not a mere instrument of 
communication, a secondary device for expressing 'ideas': it is the very dimension in 
which human life moves, that which brings the world to be in the first place.,35 A 
'world' exists in the human sense only where there is language. For Heidegger, 
language has an existence of its own. Human beings come to participate in language 
and only thereby acquire their humanness for language exists prior to the individual 
person as the horizon within which the person's life arises, and contains 'truth' less in 
the sense of being a means for the exchange of information than in being the medium 
in which the real is disclosed to contemplation.36 
For Heidegger, in Being and Time language is primordially speech discourse. 'The 
existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk. ,37 And in another 
place, he observes: 'Being with one another in the world, having this world as being 
with one another, has a distinctive ontological determination. The fundamental way of 
... having world there with one another, is speaking . .. It is predominantly in 
speaking that man's being-in-the-world takes place. ,38 For Deacon also, 'the primary 
language medium,39 is speech. Pinker cites an experiment involving a baby suggesting 
that the primary linguistic activity is speech,4o while, in words of Walter Ong, 
'language is so overwhelmingly oral that of all the many thousands of languages . . . 
spoken in the course of human history ... most have never been written at all ... The 
basic orality of language is permanent. ,41 Once this speech-oriented, and consequently 
34 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 34, p. 204. 
35 Eagleton, Literary Theory, p. 63. 
36 S 'b'd ee 1 1 . 
\7 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 34, p. 203. 
38 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time (1924) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 8E. 
39 Deacon, Symbolic Species, p. 339. 
40 See Pinker, Language Instinct, pp. 263-264. 
41 Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 7. Ong cites B. Siertsema, A Study in Glossematics: Critical Survey 0/ 
its Fundamental Concepts (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); Garrick Mallery (ed.), Sign Language 
among North American Indians compared with That among Other Peoples and DeafMutes (1881) with 
articles by A. L. Kroeber and C. F. Voegelin. Approaches to Semiotics 14 (The Hague: Mouton, 1972): 
A. L. Kroeber. "Sign Language Inquiry." In Mallery. ibid; William C. Stokoe, Jr, Semiotics and Human 
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auditory and vocal character of language is understood, it suggests that a link between 
music and language may exist, so that music may join hands with language as being 
equally (in Heidegger's phrase) the place where "Being speaks." There is perhaps a 
depth-layer at which language and music coalesce as the voice of Being for the human 
person. In Chapter 5, musical improvisation will be seen to be integrated with human 
language, where "Being speaks," and to be an equiprimordial human propensity with 
speech. The starting-point for the investigation will be the pre-linguistic babbling of 
the infant, which appears to be linked to a musical exploration. As a preparation for 
this, what follows in the present Chapter will suggest that Heidegger's ideas regarding 
language are already conducive to an interpretation which sets music in some sense at 
the heart of his linguistic philosophy, even though this is not a conclusion which 
Heidegger himself ever drew from them, nor one widely represented in the critical 
literature. 
II Heidegger, Art and the Human Person 
Heidegger's understanding of the human person is sufficiently at variance with 
traditional Western understandings for him to coin a new concept to encompass it. The 
word for Heidegger's new concept is Dasein. Only Dasein consciously reflects on 
existence as existence and asks the ontological question, 'Why is there anything at all?' 
Dasein designates man 'in respect of his being. ,42 '[1]f this kind of being is found 
elsewhere than in humanity, then the term Dasein could be appropriately applied. ,43 
However, Heidegger's view is that undoubtedly '[h]uman beings ... are special kinds 
Sign Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1972); Munro E. Edmondson, Lore: An Introduction to the 
Sciences of Folklore and Literature (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 323, 332 . 
.j~ John Macquarrie, Existentialism (1972) (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 66. 
43 Ibid. 
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of beings in that their way of being embodies an understanding of what it is to be.,44 
There is no Dasein which is not human. Moreover Dasein does not understand its 
existence in the first place conceptually. ' ... Dasein 's understanding of being is not a 
belief system implicit in the minds of individual subjects, as Cartesian philosophers 
have generally held. ,45 For Heidegger, Dasein's understanding of Being arises as a 
result of pre-theoretical, intuitive experience and its fundamental situatedness within 
language. The reason why it is important to distinguish Dasein from a broadly 
transcendental or Cartesian view of the human subject bears directly on the question of 
Being. Being is not known by Dasein as subject, but rather disclosed linguistically in 
Dasein. Disclosure must precede knowledge by, since apart from the fact that the real 
is disclosed, it cannot be an object of knowledge: 'Truth in its original sense is ... the 
happening of unconcealment [U nverborgenhei t] , .46 
For Heidegger, Being in the first instance intuitively disclosed in Dasein may 
subsequently be elucidated philosophically according to a conception of "world and 
earth." In this elucidation, "World' is neither the aggregate of beings present at hand 
nor simply a representation on the part of human beings. World is that non-objective 
and non-object-like dimension [das UngegensUindliche] which first makes possible all 
of our manifold ways of comporting and relating ourselves to beings. ,47 Whereas 
'world' is the sphere of Being's unconcealment, 'earth' is the protective, sheltering and 
preserving agency out of which unconcealment happens. A scientific-calculating 
attitude can to a degree objectify and control the earth, yet it cannot render the earth 
44 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's 'Being and Time', Division 1 
(Cambridge, MA: M. 1. T. Press, 1991), pp. 14-15. 
~5 Ibid, p. 19. 
46 Giinther P6ltner, "Mozart und Heidegger: Die Musik und der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes." Heidegger 
Studies 8 (1992): 123-144. Unpubl. translation by Nicholas Walker, as "Mozart and Heidegger: Music 
and the Origin of the Work of Art," p. 5. It is perhaps significant of the dearth of published material on 
any relationship between Heidegger's thought and music that. to date. this is the only article on that 
theme in the periodical Heidegger Studies since its inception in 1985. 
47 Ibid (trans.). p. 4. Reference to Martin Heidegger, Der Urspnmg des Kunstwerkes (Stuttgart: 
Redam, 1960), pp. 44f. 
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comprehensible as the earth, in the sense of man's prior dwelling place. Whereas 
nature can be seen as a source of energy for our exploitation, earth as such cannot be 
opened up. There will for ever be more to discover and this makes earth as such 
mysterious and undisclosable.48 However,' [t ]his 'strife' of world and earth is not an 
absolute polarisation, since '[ e ]arth mostly withdraws but will also rise up into the 
world, for example, when humanly manipulated or named as 'nature,' and human 
decision and action is always based on and drawn towards, something not fully 
mastered - the earth. ,49 
As has often been noted 'every known society has various forms of esthetic 
expression: music, the dance, and graphic arts. ,50 Heidegger develops the polarity of 
world and earth by asserting further that Being is unconcealed in an interaction 
between the primordial forces of world and earth as disclosed in art. 'There is this 
'existing-in-itself of nature, its way of eluding us ... To experience this 'eluding' 
means to open up to the fascinating closedness, to the 'earthness' of nature. Art 
attempts nothing else.,5! For example, the weight of a stone may be measured and its 
colours analysed as light waves, yet these analyses fail to describe the feel of the 
stone's weight in the hand, or the impact of its colours on the eye. Art, however, can 
bring these unquantifiable aspects of the stone to light and disclose them. 52 Thus, for 
Heidegger, 'the peculiar character of a work of art consists in bringing world and earth 
to each other,S3 for 'it is by virtue of setting up a world and setting forth the earth that 
the work is a work.' 54 '[T]he elemental contention between World and earth is 
48 See Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study by Walter Biemel (1973) (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 99. 
49 Jeff Collins and Howard Selina, Heidegger for Beginners (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1998), p. 130. 
50 Constantin Brailoiu, Problems of Ethnomusicology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), p. 
165. 
51 Rudiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1998), p. 298. 
52 See ibid. 
S.' Biemel, Heidegger, p. 97. 
54 Ib'd 1 ,p. 99. 
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stabilized and made manifest under the guise of the work's form. ,55 Moreover, the 
things of 'earth' are used, humanised and disclosed as 'world' in the art-work not only 
through what the art-work may depict, but through the medium it employs: 'The 
element in which art creates . . . is brought forth into its ownmost, proper character 
[sein Eigenstes]: 'the metals come to gleam, the colours to glow, the tone to resonate, 
the word to speak'. ,56 Indeed, 'the work of art ... lets the material element or stuff be 
completely itself. ,57 So it comes about that works of art belong to both world and 
earth. They are not things of earth like grass or sunshine, nor are they practical items 
of equipment from the human world like tables or tools. Art-works constitute an 
interstice between the arena of human projects and decisions and the uncontrollable 
background of 'earth' against which humans live out their lives, an interstice without 
which human life could not be understood. 
Even when an art-work imitates an object in the world, as in representative painting, 
clearly for Heidegger art is ultimately true at a deeper level than representation. 
Fundamentally, the art-work does not imitate truth, it discloses it: art does not simply 
affect a subject by imitating an object, but enlightens her or him by disclosing it in a 
way which presents it as more truly itself. 'The beautiful is thus not explained in terms 
of subjective experience, of how the work affects a subject, but in terms of the 
openness that becomes manifest in a work of art, of the basic phenomenon of 
unconcealedness.,58 In other words '[t]his altered approach shows the work as being 
demanded by truth itself, in the sense of the installation of truth, its taking concrete 
form. ,59 Heidegger gives the example of a Greek temple, which does not represent 
55 William 1. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974), p. 407. 
56 P6ltner, "Mozart and Heidegger," p. 4. Citation from Heidegger, Ursprung, p. 47. 
57 P6ltner, ibid. Reference to Heidegger, ibid. 
~R B' 
, Iernel, Heidegger. p. 106. 
59 Ibid, p. 108. 
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anything, but has primordial significance in the fact that it embodies both a world and 
the earth. The world is where human life and culture take place; the earth is the 
primordial material disclosed in the temple. The truth of the work of art takes place in 
the revealing action of this coming together.6o By choosing an architectural art-work, 
which is not mimetic or representative, Heidegger illustrates how the ultimate 
happening of truth in art is not intrinsically linked to the idea of representation.61 As 
manifested in the temple, '[a]rt is ... neither ... a realm of cultural achievement, 
nor . . . a manifestation of spirit, but belongs rather to the appropriative event 
[Ereignis] from out of which the 'meaning of being' ... is first determined.,62 
Where an art-work does represent some material object, one important 
consideration is that it simultaneously reveals what it depicts, yet at the same time is 
not actually that thing, hence concealing it. Therefore, '[i]t is art that allows the later 
Heidegger to delineate, to make as palpable as he can, the antinomy of truth's 
simultaneous hiddenness and self-deployment'. 63 This is the hiddenness of 'earth' 
contrasted with the self-deployment of 'world.' Nor is the art-work chiefly defined in 
terms of something the artist produces. Instead, both artist and art-work are 
concomitant expressions of the way in which Being comes out of concealment. Artist 
and work belong together. 'The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin 
of the artist. Neither is without the other. ,64 For Heidegger the work of art does not 
chiefly express the feelings of the artist but brings Being itself to light. As an example 
of representative art, a painting by Van Gogh is instanced by Heidegger and shown to 
be, on a deeper level, a revealing as well as a representation of what is depicted. 
hO See Macquarrie, Existentialism, pp. 267-268. 
hi Sec Poltner, "Mozart and Heidegger," p. 3. 
1>2 Heidegger, Ursprung, p. 99. Cited in Poltner, ibid, p. 6. 
1>3 George Steiner, Heidegger (1978) (London: Fontana, Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 134-135. 
M Martin Heidegger, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwcrkes." Holzwege (1950) (Frankfurt: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1957), p. 7. Cited in Macquarrie, Existentialism, p. 267. 
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Heidegger considers Van Gogh's painting of an old, worn-out pair of shoes. The 
painting enables us to experience the innennost reality and meaning of the shoes, for 
however carefully scientific knowledge might analyse the shoes, its discoveries about 
their physical nature would be pure abstractions; while the knowledge obtained by the 
wearer of these shoes is essential to knowing them as they are, but it is interested 
knowledge, knowledge of the shoes in actual use. Only through the painting do the 
shoes achieve their full being. Long after they are of no more scientific interest or of 
no more practical use, the truth of the shoes is preserved by the painting.65 'The Van 
Gogh painting is not an art-work because it provides a correct and factual 
representation of a pair of shoes. There is not a simple copy relation to the real shoes. 
It functions as a work of art because it discloses the being of the shoes'. 66 
In general it is useful, when considering this theory of Being as revealed in art, to 
remember that the link between truth and art found in Heidegger in fact represents a 
philosophical recovery. 'Even [the] suggestion that [art] means nothing depends on the 
emergence of the notions of aesthetic autonomy ... in the 18th century'. 67 
III Heidegger, Poetry and Music 
Despite these illustrations drawn from the sphere of the visual arts, Heidegger in 
fact privileges the linguistic work of art, in the fonn of poetry. Like all art, poetry 
hides and reveals its meaning, because although it uses words in the sense of 
signification, hence revealing what is said, the words are also intended to tail off into 
extended realms of allusion and connotation and hide themselves in possibilities of 
meaning not laid bare by their univocal sense. However, poetry is privileged, because 
65 Sec Steiner. Heidegger, pp. 133-134. 
66 Ferrara, Philosophy and the Ana~vsis of Music, p. 129. 
67 Andrew Bowie, "Adorno, Heidegger. and the Meaning of Music." Thesis Eleven 56 (1999): 1-23; p . 
., 
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language possesses the additional general quality, in view of the linguistic turn which 
Heidegger represents, of being the prior medium in which the whole of human 
existence and understanding take place. Thus poetry becomes in a certain sense the 
paradigm of art. 'The definition of art in terms of poetry offered by Heidegger does not 
at all mean reducing all the arts to poesy, but rather that, in all art, what is projected or 
composed ... is truth in the sense of unconcealedness. Language itself ... is that 
through which entities are brought into the open. ,68 Poetic language discloses Being in 
a special way, for 'Heidegger will say that, in order to open oneself to a 'moment of 
vision', it is necessary to break with everyday discourse. ,69 
Heidegger says little about music in his philosophical writings. It might therefore 
be deduced that the subject of music has no bearing on his thought; alternatively, it 
might be speculated whether his thought is implicated with music in ways which he 
himself never realised but which commentators may be able to discern. As Poltner 
observes: 'In the treatise on the work of art ... [m]usic plays virtually no role. I 
am ... interested in attempting to render the fundamental features of art, as uncovered 
by Heidegger, fruitful with regard to music.' 70 The same writer notes a reference in 
Heidegger's Der Satz vom Grund to a letter attributed to Mozart 'which is capable of 
placing one of the central claims of Heidegger's essay on the work of art - the priority 
accorded to poetry - in a new and different light. In view of Heidegger's silence 
concerning music, this prioritisation appears to be rather questionable. ,71 This letter 
will be discussed in Section V. Perhaps music represents an unconscious agenda, or at 
68 B' I H~me , Heidegger, p. 111. 
69 Susan Marguerite Bowles, "Rupture in the Temporality of Music in Relation to Heidegger's Concepts 
of Angst and Nothingness: A Practical Study to Show that the Early Writings of Martin Heidegger offer 
a Resolution to certain Dichotomies in Music Aesthetic Theories which Relate to Affective Response to 
Music." M. Phil dissertation, University of Essex, 1996, p. 30. 
70 P "I M d H 'd "2 
, 0 tner.·' ozart an el egger. p. . 
I Ibid, p. 1. References to Heidegger, Satz vom Grund, p. 117 (the allusion to Mozart); Heidegger, 
Ursprung, p. 83 (the priority accorded to poetry). 
122 
least an unrecognised implication, in Heidegger's philosophical project, hidden from 
Heidegger himself, and this hermeneutical wager will guide the explorations 
constituting the remainder of the present Chapter. 
It has been noted by others that Heidegger is concerned to make the point that 
"Being speaks" as a voice within language and that "within" here is ambiguous. 
Clearly the presence of Being is "within" language in the sense of being veiled and 
hidden. But there is also a possible nuance whereby "Being speaks" through a medium 
which is itself within language, in other words, that it is not language but something 
which is itself, in tum, hidden within language, which is the essential unveiling of 
Being. No less than being expanded verbal meaning (that is to say, allusive, 
suggestive, metaphoric), poetry is about the musicality of sound in language. 
Everything points to Heidegger's interest in poetry not just as poetic meaning but as 
poetic sound. William and Harriet Lovitt, commenting on passages in On the Way to 
Language, make these observations: 
He can say, in a passage in which he is emphatically distinguishing the word from anything whatever that 
the word might name forth, 'It, the word, gives (Es, das Wort, gibt)' ... [H]e does suggest that perhaps 
'the disposing enduring (Wesen) of the word' - i.e., primal Saying, which holds sway therein - 'conceals 
in itself that which gives Being.' It is worth noting here that for Heidegger what we may call the 
musicality of language as finally spoken forth as uttered words is as intrinsic as the carrying of 
meaning. 72 
For Lovitt and Lovitt, in this quotation, it is the word set apart and distinguished 'from 
anything whatever that the word might name forth' which 'gibt Sein ': the word does 
not give Being but 'conceals in itself that which gives Being.' It is not the word 
considered in its every aspect, but some hidden aspect of the word which is the source 
of the poetic word as "ontophany." In fact, the ontophany is not in the naming power 
but in the sounding power of the poetic word. 'Primal showing-Saying is, Heidegger 
72 William Lovitt and Harriet Brundage Lovitt, Modern Technology in the Heideggerian Perspecti\'(;!, 
vol I (Lampeter. Dyfed: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), p. 155, footnote 46. References to Martin 
Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 266, translated as On the Way to 
Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 135; also to Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 196, trans. On 
the Way to Language, p. 90: also to US, pp. 193f., tr. WI. p. 88; and to US, pp. 204ff., tr. WL, p. 98. 
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says, itself 'the mode (Weise)' - not so much in the sense of kind or manner as in that 
of melody or song (melos) - 'in which the Bringing-to-pass-that-owns-forth (Ereignis) 
speaks'. ,73 Heidegger wrote: 'Saying is the mode in which Appropriation speaks: 
mode not so much in the sense of modus or fashion, but as the melodic mode, the song 
which says something in its saying,.74 Heidegger proceeds to quote from a poem, 
"Celebration of Peace" by Holderlin: 
Much, from the morning onwards, 
Since we have been a discourse and have heard from one another 
Has human kind learnt; but soon we shall be song. 75 
In another place he quotes Holderlin who identifies poetry and song: 'Poets have 
mostly arisen at the beginning or at the end of a world period. With song the nations 
step out of the heaven of their childhood into active life, into the land of Culture. With 
song they return into original life. ,76 No less than Holderlin, Heidegger appears to 
believe that music crowns verbal language and hence understanding of Being. Indeed, 
for Heidegger: 
The saying of the more venturesome which is more fully saying is the song. But 
Song is existence . . . 
To sing, truly to say worldly existence, to say out of the haleness of the whole pure draft and to say only 
this, means: to belong to the precinct of beings themselves. This precinct, as the very nature of language, 
is Being itself. To sing the song means to be present in what is present itself. It means: Dasein, 
existence . . . The song is hard because the singing may no longer be a solicitation, but must be 
existence. 77 
In this adulation of the "music" of poetry, Heidegger comes close to asserting that 
music is the place where "Being speaks." It is also clear at this point that his 
conception of song here as a possible place where "Being speaks" seems linked to the 
prosodic aspect of the spoken word. In the present context, this recalls again the 
73 Lovitt and Lovitt, ibid, pp. 154-155. Citations from US, p. 266, tr. WL, p. 135. 
7-1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 135. 
75 Friedrich Holderlin, Poems and Fragments (Ann Arbor: Michigan Univ. Press, 1967), p. 438. Cited 
in ibid. 
76 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe: Ausgabe letzter Hand (Collected Works: Author's Final 
Revision), Hermann Heidegger (series ed.), (Frankfurt: n.p., n.d.), 39. 20 (sic). Cited in Safranski, 
Heidegger, p. 284. 
77 Martin Heidegger, "What are Poets For?" In Poetry, Language, Thought (1971) (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1975), pp. 138-139. 
124 
phenomenon of infantile babbling, which may first train the human person in the sonic 
prerequisites, or prosody, of speech as well as in the activity of music-making. As the 
fountainhead of the "music" of speech, perhaps the ontological announcement which 
Heidegger attributes to speech prosody is made first to the infant through its pre-speech 
babbling, which is equivalently an early discovery of music. This observation does not 
yet purport to constitute a conclusion, but builds up a picture preparatory to an 
investigative process to be pursued in Chapter 5. 
It may be asked why Heidegger failed to incorporate discussion of music in the 
wider sense, rather than simply verbal music, into his philosophy, and he himself has 
provided glimpses of his reasons. The following extract seems to express reservations 
that, if music were to be examined, it could only be in the light of the kind of 
calculative thinking, closed to 'receptivity and mystery', 78 which he consistently 
repudiates as the controlling attitude of supposed knowledge of Being by a human 
subject, rather than knowledge by openness to Being in Dasein: 
And let no one suppose that we mean to belittle vocal sounds as physical phenomena, the merely 
sensuous side of language, in favor of what is called the meaning and sense-content of what was said and 
is esteemed as being of the spirit, the spirit of language . . . Weare instead referred to melody and 
rhythm in language and thus to the kinship between song and speech. All would be well if only there 
were not the danger of understanding melody and rhythm also from the perspective of physiology and 
physics, that is, technologically, calculatingly in the widest sense. No doubt much can be learned this 
way that is correct, but never, presumably, what is essential [emphasis added]. It is just as much a 
property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words 
of language to carry a meaning. 79 
Although Heidegger's (here italicised) point is probably made with explicit reference 
to the music of words, it is clearly applicable to the whole of music. He may believe 
that any discussion of music must come so close to "calculation" that silence is 
preferable. Lovitt and Lovitt have speculated that, for Heidegger, music, compared 
with other arts, may have reflected insufficiently the concealing as opposed to the 
7R Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics." 
In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Charles B. Guignon (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press. 1993), p. 302. 
79 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 98. 
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revealing aspect of Being's arising in Dasein, and that this accounts for Heidegger's 
silence regarding music. For' ... Being happens ... first of all as a self-concealing. 
Not all ever apprehend the unconcealing vouchsafed in a work of art. And, in time, 
that unconcealing always dims, as Being's happening as concealing gains upon it. 
When new peoples arise, the . . . power of the fonner works vanishes, as does the 
milieu to which they spoke.,8o However, music's unconcealing, they suggest, does not 
dim. Heidegger's silence regarding music may result from his realisation that music 
centuries old may still speak with an undimmed vitality. The works of 1. S. Bach, for 
example still speak to men and women of our own day vividly, despite the different 
cultural milieu of their origin. Lovitt and Lovitt suggest that music's immediate power 
to speak meaningfully may have rendered music difficult for Heidegger to 
accommodate within this concealing aspect of his understanding of the art-work. 81 
Yet, if Heidegger's written commitment to music is not apparent, anecdotal evidence 
of his personal interest in music abounds. Safranski records his response to hearing in 
private a perfonnance of Schubert's piano Sonata in B-flat, of which he remarked 
appreciatively: 'This we can't do with philosophy. ,82 An incident is recorded after a 
perfonnance of Sophocles' Antigone in Holderlin' s translation with music by Carl 
Orff: ' ... Carl Orff saw a man approaching ... this stranger suddenly grabbed Orff s 
hands and, touched with emotion, said to him, 'Thank you for bringing ancient tragedy 
back to life. My name is Heidegger'. ,83 Here, '[t]wo human beings belonging to the 
creative class ... recognised ... their nearness to each other: one gives a new life to 
80 Lovitt and Lovitt, Modern Technology, p. 138. 
81 See ibid, footnote. 
R2 See Georg Picht, "Die Macht des Denkens." In Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, Giinther Neske 
(ed.), (Pfullingen: n.p., 1977), p. 205. Cited in Safranski, Heidegger, p. 333. 
83 Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger 1929-1976 (Chicago: 
Chicago Univ. Press, 1993), p. 162. 
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the original unity of Greek verse and song, the other calls thinking - which is getting 
lost in science - back to itself out of the original meaning and power of words'. 84 
The implied metaphysical importance of music for Heidegger's understanding of 
poetry may lie in the paradox that, ultimately, although "Being speaks" in language it 
cannot really be "said" at all. 'In distinction from the linguistic work of art, what is 
expressly and properly opened up in music is the non-objective character of the relation 
to world: that is why the resonating sound here takes the place of the word. ,85 This is 
perhaps why Heidegger emphasises the sonic aspect of poetry as ontologically 
disc10sive at least as much as the referential aspect. It is where poetry approaches the 
condition of music. The same limitation on poetry is identified also by Frings: 
'[T]here remains a fundamental difference between poetry and music. In every one of 
its words standard poetry must 'name' something.' 86 George Steiner has deplored 
Heidegger's failure to make the leap of seeing that his reflections were leading him in 
the direction of music. Steiner speaks of the instinct by means of which humans 
attribute an immense but neither paraphraseable nor otherwise restateable meaning to 
music. He remarks that music may distantly suggest Heidegger's concept of Being. 
'Here too there is brazen obviousness and impalpability, an enveloping nearness and 
infinite regress. Being, in the Heideggerian sense, has, like music, a history and a 
meaning, a dependence on man and dimensions transcending humanity. ,87 Steiner 
notes that music is almost wholly absent from Heidegger's considerations, a drawback, 
for it is music which might best have instanced Heidegger's central proposition that 
meaning can be plain and compelling but untranslatable into any other code.88 There is 
R4 Ibid. 
R5 Pbltner. "Mozart and Heidegger," p. 13. 
R6 Manfred S. Frings, "Hannony and the Logos: The Origin of the Musical Work of Art." In 
Understanding the Musical Experience. F. Joseph Smith (ed.), (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1989). 
p.200. 
7 Steiner, Heidegger, p. 44. 
RR See ibid, pp. 13 1-132. 
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a problem inherent in poetry's disclosure of Being which is not found in the case of 
music's parallel or deeper disclosure, the problem that although the verbal language of 
poetry is at a remove from daily life it nevertheless shares most manifestly the same 
verbal medium as forms of language which do not open up the vista of Being as clearly 
or may even be deleterious to Dasein's deeper engagement with Being. 'Assertion' 
(A ussage) , 'discourse' (Rede) and 'idle talk' (Gerede) are just as much functions of 
language for Heidegger as poetry (Sagen). 89 Poetry is simultaneously other than, and 
the same as these other three modes of language, precisely because, despite its 
apartness, it is indeed just another mode of language. Music, precisely because it is not 
implicated in the referentially explicit meaning of verbal language, but only resembles 
language through sonic expressiveness, is, unlike poetry, quarantined from association 
with lower verbal activities thus retaining a non-objectivity which, for Steiner, echoes 
Being itself. Yet, while mysterious in its meanings, music is still 'the universal idiom 
which, being 'free from concepts,' can be understood by anyone who is open to the 
influence of the surrounding world. ,90 It is 'a peculiar 'reference without predication' 
that touches the heart, but numbs the tongue. ,91 
A reason why Heidegger may not have spoken more in a philosophical context of 
music which 'numbs the tongue' is thus that the word is ill-equipped to express that 
which in music is true. The truth of music lies in the irreplaceable event of music 
which, more unequivocally than other art-forms, cannot be represented in the verbal 
medium. 'Music, in essence, neither requires titles nor does it name anything.,92 
'Music is most itself when it is least other things. ,93 Like Schumann, if we are called 
89 See Kearney, Modern Movements, pp. 44-50. 
90 Scruton, Aesthetics. p. 467. 
9\ Ibid, p. 132. 
92 Frings, "Hannony and the Logos," p. 200. 
93 Bowman, Philosophical Perspecril'(!s. p. 87. 
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upon to explain music, we can only play it again.94 As Bowie has observed in another 
context, '[ w]e are evidently confronted here with problems of a hermeneutic circle that 
affects any attempt to explore the meaning of a . . . non-semantic form of articulation 
with semantic means. ,95 Although all art-works embody more than can be reduced to 
words in this way, it may be that Heidegger's silence about music is a response to an 
appreciation of the fact that, in the case of music, this consideration is particularly 
powerful. Moreover, if music is a privileged point of access to Being, though 
unacknowledged by Heidegger himself, this might suggest some integral connection 
between the human person's formative infant encounters with the musical dimension 
and the entire human experience of openness to the unveiling of Being. In Chapter 5, it 
will be shown how, as an extension and development of the exploratory infantile 
paradigm of vocalising, improvisatory music is in fact the place where Being speaks to 
humans throughout their lives. 
IV Poetry, Music and Maritain 
One twentieth-century thinker who, unlike Heidegger, did seek to develop a 
systematic understanding of poetry's musicality, and take a subsequent step of arguing 
for music's supremacy among the arts is Jacques Maritain. For Maritain, rather as for 
Heidegger, Being "speaks" in poetry: 'Poetic knowledge ... is knowledge of the very 
interiority of things ... poetry, like Platonic mousike, enjoys a universal dominion over 
all the arts which have to do with beauty. ,96 For Maritain, this position seems to have 
roots in Holderlin and Heidegger. He writes: ' ... Holderlin, according to an essay by 
Heidegger, thought that 'in poetry man concentrates or retires into the inmost depth of 
human reality. There he penetrates ... through that infinite quietude in which all 
94 See Steiner, Heidegger, p. 44. 
95 Bowie, "Adorno, Heidegger," p. 2. 
96 Maritain, Creative intuition, pp. 236-:~3 7. 
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energies and relations are at play'. ,97 Moving from poetry to music, and the latter's 
priority, Maritain's position is influenced by Thomas Aquinas: 'Poetic experience is 
still freer, still more immersed in the internal recesses of subjectivity, still closer to the 
need and longing of the spirit for utterance, in the composer than in the poet - 'where 
the word stops, there starts the song, exultation of the mind bursting forth into the 
. , St Th . ,98 VOIce, as . omas puts It. 
Regarding poetry, Maritain speaks of 'the essential difference which separates the 
poetic sense from the logical sense ... [T]he poetic sense is to the poem what the soul 
is to man - it is the poetic intuition itself communicated to the work in its native, pure 
and immediate efficacy. ,99 Poetry in fact arises from a poetic experience or intuition 
which is itself musical: thus, the musicality which is connected with poetry is more 
than - though it includes - the musical sound of the poem as spoken. '[T]he very first 
effect, and sign, of poetic knowledge and poetic intuition, as soon as they exist in the 
soul - and even before the start of any operative exercise - is a kind of musical stir 
produced in the depths of the living springs in which they are born.' 100 Maritain 
distinguishes between the musicality of the words (even inner words not yet uttered in 
outward speech) - and the musical stir, linked with poetic intuition itself, in which 
words play no part. The latter precedes, the outpouring of words. It is a kind of 
inaudible unformulated song in the heart, and is the first sign whereby the inner 
f · .. . d 101 presence 0 poetIc expenence IS recognIse . Maritain explains that '[this is a] 
dynamic charge or intuitive pulsion, both imaginal and emotional . . . a complex of 
97 Ibid, pp. 240-241. Citation from Martin Heidegger, "Holderlin und das We sen der Dichtung" 
(incomplete documentation). Maritain quotes also from Mallarme, who 'called the state of poetic 
experience 'ecstasy'.' Reference to Mallarme, letter to H. Cazalis, 25th April, 1864. In (no given name) 
Mondor, Propos sur fa Poesie (Paris: Rocher, 1946), p. 39. . 
98 Maritain, ibid, p. 251. Citation from Thomas Aquinas, Comment. in Psalm., Prolog. (documentatIOn 
sic). 
99 M . . 'b'd ')58 antam, 1 I ,p. ~ . 
100 Ib'd 1 ,p. 300. 
101 See ibid, p. 300-301. Reference to RaIssa Maritain, "Magie, Poesie, et Mystique." In Situation de fa 
Poesie (Paris: Dcsc1ee De Brouwer, 1938), p. 63. 
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virtual images and emotion, stirred in the fluid and moving world of the creativity of 
the spirit, and essentially tendential, dynamic, and transient' .102 This pUlsion is stirred 
to consciousness: '[T]here is in the soul of the poet an enlarged musical stir, a music 
no longer almost imperceptible, but more and more cogent, in which the soundless 
rhythmic and harmonic relations between intuitive pulsions, together with their 
soundless melody, emerge into consciousness.,103 Maritain recapitulates: '1 would say 
that there are two essentially distinct musics, in the designation of which the word 
music has only an analogous sense, the music of the intuitive pulsions, within the soul, 
and the music of words - and of the imagery contained in words - which will pass 
outside the soul, into the external world'. 104 
It is the music of the intuitive pulsions which is the truer and deeper music: '[T]he 
poetry of the Poem or the Song [is] the poetry of internal music ... When I said that 
the poetic sense is the soul or the entelechy of the poem, I thought especially of the 
Poem properly so called, or of the poetry of internal music. It is only in regard to it 
that this statement is entirely true.' 105 Consequently, 'the music of intuitive pulsions 
appears in the foreground ... it has become the royal instrument of poetic expression. 
The reader immediately listens to it, and in his soul are awakened intuitive pulsions 
akin to those in the poet's soul.' 106 This in tum entails, that in matters of creative 
inspiration, the 'first rank' 107 belongs to music: '[M]usic, taken in its nature ... has the 
peculiar privilege, as we have observed, of expressing - beyond any possible meaning 
102 Jacques Maritain, ibid, p. 302. 
103 Ib'd 1 ,p. 303. 
10.J Ibid, p. 304. Reference to T. S. Eliot, The Music of Poet!}': Ker Jfemorial Lecture (Glasgow: 
Jackson, 1942), p. 25. 
105 Maritain, ibid, p. 394. 
106 Ibid, p. 316. 
107 Ibod 1 ,p. 402. 
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of words - the most deeply subjective, singular and affective stirs of creative 
subjectivity, too deep-seated to be possibly expressed by any other art.' 108 
Thus, for Maritain, a 'musical unconscious' 109 underlies poetry. It may credibly be 
suggested that Heidegger, in writing philosophy, also wrote a kind of poetry - poetry 
within which, as Maritain would say, intuitive musical pulsions play their creative part. 
Heidegger may be considered a poet, not only because he regarded poetry as the place 
where "Being speaks," but because, perhaps alone among modem Western 
philosophers, he also viewed his own philosophic - indeed all - writing as ideally an act 
of poetic composition. 'Pure prose is never 'prosaic.' It is as poetic and hence as rare 
as poetry.' 110 'The speech of genuine thinking is by nature poetic. It need not take the 
shape of verse; as Heidegger says, the opposite of the poem is not prose; pure prose is 
as poetic as any poetry. The voice of thought must be poetic because poetry is the 
saying of truth ... the thinker of first rank must accomplish ... a thinking which has 
all the purity and thickness and solidity of poetry, and whose saying is poetry.' III 
Heidegger wants us to 'attend to language exclusively as language,! 12 even when it is 
engaged in the task of discursive philosophy, and this makes of his philosophising a 
poetic act which corresponds to Maritain's idea of poetic composition. The poetic 
character of Heidegger's philosophical work is of course consistent with his belief in a 
relationship between truth and poetry. For Heidegger: 'As the clearing and the 
concealing of beings truth happens insofar as it is poetisised' .113 Heidegger's own 
philosophical writings must, on his own principles, be included within this poetic 
conception, or by implication of his own philosophy, truth cannot to any great extent 
lOR Ibid, p. 404. 
109 Ibid, p. 94. 
110 Martin Heidegger, "Language." In Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 208. (First essay from Untenvegs 
~I/r Sprache/On the War to Language.) 
111 Albert Hofstadter, ·:Introduction." In Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. x-xi. 
112 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp. 119-120. 
\\.1 Heidegger, Ursprung, p. 82. Cited in Paltner, "Mozart and Heidegger:' p. 7. 
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be revealed in them. In short, a Maritainian musical unconscious, if it exists, inhabits 
Heidegger's philosophic writing. Moreover, because, for Heidegger, poetic language 
does not merely clothe or express philosophical ideas but is, qua poetry, the unveiling 
of the real, this musical unconscious in his writing, inasmuch as it is the inner life of all 
poetry, becomes the inner life of his ontology itself, inasmuch as the latter is poetic, not 
just poetically expressed. As a poet-philosopher for whom poetry is ontology rather 
than simply the stylistic envelope of ontological insight founded wholly on conceptual 
thought, the musical unconscious from which Heidegger's poetry-philosophy arises is 
ontological in its own right and music appears as the hidden foundation of his 
philosophy, as of poetry in general. Stated succinctly, unless Heidegger's philosophy 
is poetry, it contradicts itself, and, if it is poetry, it may be a product of what Maritain 
has called the musical unconscious. 
V Heidegger, Music and Temporality 
The title of Heidegger's magnum opus is Being and Time. So far, the present 
discussion has not dealt with Heidegger's conception of the temporality of Being. For 
Heidegger '[t]ime is not a medium we move in as a bottle might move in a river ... it 
is something I am made out of before it is something I measure.' 114 It is indeed with 
Heidegger that time first becomes a significant category in the Western philosophical 
tradition. Since all attempted metaphysical descriptions of Being in the Western 
tradition have been constructed in time, and are time-conditioned, shifting intellectual 
paradigms, which constantly supersede one another, Heidegger's solution to this 
endless inconclusiveness in traditional ontology has been to situate the understanding 
of Being in relation to time itself. He writes at the opening of Being and Time: 'Our 
114 Eagleton, Literary Theary, p. 63. 
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aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and 
to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible 
horizon of any understanding whatsoever of Being.' 115 He notes that, at any given 
historical moment, there is a particular, implicit way of understanding Being. This 
means that the notion of Being is itself a shifting idea and subject to mutation. 116 Such 
philosophical shifts continue through the history of Western metaphysics, in which the 
fundamental "being" or "beings" have been variously defined as "Fonns" (Plato), "the 
Unmoved Mover" (Aristotle), "Spirit" (Hegel), and still other ways. Heidegger seeks 
to break with this inconclusiveness, by asserting that the deepest and most enduring 
reality of Being lies in the fact that Being goes on temporally from moment to 
moment, and does not lie in the static metaphysical systems with which man has tried 
to define it. The latter come and go, and presuppose this temporal process within 
which they are fonnulated. 
Music is a temporal art which requires that sounds being heard in a perfonnance are 
placed in the context of sounds just heard and are linked to an anticipation of sounds to 
come. In this sense, music links time with art. By contrast, a painting or a sculpture is 
not in this sense a temporal art-fonn, since it may be taken in by the eye in an instant, 
and even if its details are made the object of a more prolonged contemplation, it is not 
necessary for those details to be considered in any particular order for the work to be 
experienced. There is some suggestion that Heidegger at least speculated that time-
consciousness may actually be dependent on music. This would make of music the 
place where "Being speaks" in a further sense, by linking music as much to 
115 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 19. [No page number marked on page.] 
116 'The very word being (or its functional equivalents) must remain empty and devoid of any real 
meaning to us modems so long as we remain oblivious to the way it came to be and since then has 
become. It is a term we constantly use, but only because it is one we have inherited from a long and 
largely overlooked tradition of thought. Its apparent meaningfulness is simply the result of long 
acquaintance ... [1]t is necessary to undertake a fundamental enquiry into the history of the concept of 
being, an archaeology of being' . Madison, Hermeneutics of Postmodernity, p. 130. 
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Heidegger's idea of temporality as to his idea of poetry. As though to demonstrate a 
link between music and his temporal ontology, he exhibits an interest in what he 
believed to be Mozart's creative processes. Heidegger believed he had found evidence 
that for Mozart when planning a composition: 
during a trip in a coach, or when on a stroll after a good meal ... soon one part after another comes to 
me, as though I were using crumbs in order to make a pastry according to the rules of counterpoint . . . 
Then it becomes ever larger ... and the thing truly becomes almost fmished in my head ... so that 
afterwards I look over it with a glance in my mind ... and hear it in the imagination not at all serially, as 
it must subsequently come about, but as though all at once ... 117 
Unlike the "now" of scientific measurement, the "now" of human experience 
anticipates and remembers. For Heidegger, '[e]xisting as ecstatic temporality, Dasein 
is outside itself - alongside its world. It is at once ahead, behind and alongside other 
daseins.,118 As Frings observes: 'We think that so-called objective, measurable time is 
'the' time ... But we forget that 'lived' time is quite different precisely because the 
protensive and retentive nows of meaning are neither measurable nor 'clockable". 119 
Mozart's ability to imagine the sound of the finished musical composition 'not at all 
serially' but 'all at once' - protensively and retentively - seems, in Heidegger's 
commentary on Mozart's letter, to exhibit '[t]he concealed unity of bringing-in to-view 
and listening [which] detemlines the essence of the thinking that is entrusted to us 
humans who are thinking beings.' 120 In other words, Mozart's ability to imagine the 
temporal flow of music simultaneously suggests to Heidegger the way in which Being 
is experienced "now," but in an ecstatic temporality which encompasses past and 
future. Mozart's experience also suggests for Heidegger the primordial 'listening' 
whereby Being is hearkened to poetically in language. However, the conception of 
language in this particular instance is clearly enlarged to entail music, for music is what 
Mozart is hearkening to, not poetry. Mozart may well not have written this letter, but 
117 
Letter wrongly attributed to Wolfgang Mozart. Cited in Heidegger, Principle of Reason, p. 67. 
II ~ 
Bowles, Rupture in the Temporality of Music, p. 61. 
III) F' 
1 nngs, "Harmony and the Logos," pp. 196-197. 
1_0 H 'd el egger, Principle of Reason, p. 67. 
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might still have composed music in the way described, and Heidegger is impressed by 
the fact that Mozart's experience might suggest an anthropology based on Dasein as its 
most satisfactory explanation. (Presumably it is an argument in favour of the idea of 
Dasein if it can explain or illuminate something otherwise obscure.) Like Dasein, 
'Mozart thinks a gathering of time - not linear, not clock-measurable' 121 and he thinks 
it in a 'listening.' However this is a musical rather than a verbal listening as in the case 
of poetry. It has already been seen that, for Heidegger, Being comes to humans 
through poetic listening; here, however, the 'listening' to which Heidegger has referred 
is Mozart's listening to musical ideas. This points to the idea that, for Heidegger 
certain human experiences in connection with music like Mozart's might grant 
privileged, perhaps essential insight into the nature of Dasein. For Bowles also, 
'certain musical experiences ... can reveal something of what it means for us to be 
primordially temporal beings ... [T]he medium of music is well suited to opening up 
this experience of authenticity.' 122 
In a Heideggerian interpretation of music, the temporality of music, because it 
would link music to the temporality of Being itself, would become one of music's most 
significant dimensions and take on considerable importance in any analysis or 
interpretation of music's own nature. A Heideggerian view of music could thus 
possibly meet an existing need in musical aesthetics. As Bowles argues: '[T]he 
concentration on music-as-object rather than music-as-temporality ... [has] been the 
main stumbling-block for music aesthetic theory ... [W]e have seen that in the 
contemporary music aesthetic theories ... there is an over-all tendency to concentrate 
on the non-temporal (the 'static') and the 'object'. '}23 Ferrara makes the point that 
analytical theories which concentrate on music as the 'object' such as the Schenkerian 
121 
Collins and Selina, Heidegger, p. 78. 
I" 
Bowles, Rupture in the Temporality of Music. Abstract before the text. 
123 
Ibid, p. 40. 
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are unable to account for the widespread attribution of emotional feeling to the 
experience of music, as advanced, for example by Susanne Langer. 124 Perhaps it is 
because such object-based theories fail to consider the temporal experience of music 
that they are cut off from participation in any discussion of widely held assumptions 
about music's perceived link with mood and emotion. Object-based theories cannot 
account for the way the music feels to the listener as it unfolds in time, as all music 
does, and time is precisely the continuum in which music is widely felt as emotion. 
Moreover, at the very point at which a piece of music unveils itself to a listener for 
the first time, object-based theories of analysis can have nothing to say. They offer no 
discussion of the experience of a person's first encounter with a piece of music, despite 
the fact that a first hearing is sometimes an experience of superior and unrepeatable 
significance for the listener. Not knowing what is coming next is part of the experience 
of hearing a musical work for the first time. This experience will include anticipating 
what is about to happen in a musical work, as, for example, when the ear anticipates 
the resolution of a suspension. 125 Yet this aspect of experiencing music assumes a 
temporal experience of the music not included when music is viewed holistically as a 
'static' object. 'Current analytical concepts and methods reflect the premises of the 
Western philosophic tradition. Temporal and aurally-apprehended structures are 
denied reality because they cannot be said to 'exist' in the way that spacial and visually 
apprehended structures do.' 126 Complementing conventional methods of music 
analysis, therefore, both Ferrara and Lochhead propose phenomenological approaches 
to support an understanding of the temporal experience of music. 127 These approaches 
1~4 See Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951), p. 235. 
125 See Judy Lochhead, "Temporal Structure in Recent Music." In Understanding the Musical 
~xperience, Smith (ed.), p. 129. 
u Ib'd 1 ,p. 124. 
127 See Ferrara, Philosophy and the Analysis of Music, p. xiii. Also Lochhead, ibid, p. 132. 
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are phenomenological because they seek to allow the music to announce itself on its 
own plainly temporal terms: '[P]henomenology involves the description of things as 
one experiences them, or of one's experiences of things'. 128 Other commentators have 
noted a recent increase in studies of phenomenological music analysis. 129 Jean-Jacques 
Nattiez is one example of a recent thinker who has sought to recover in analysis this 
sense of the real-time experience of all music. Publishing in 1990, Nattiez writes that 
'the musical work is not merely what we used to call the 'text'; it is not merely a whole 
composed of 'structures' ... The essence of a musical work is at once its genesis, its 
organization, and the way it is perceived.' 130 Ferrara's proposed analytical strategy 
('eclectic analysis,)131 seeks to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the 
experience of music. Essentially he is concerned that the music should be allowed to 
yield to understanding not only those aspects of itself which the fixed interrogative 
preconceptions of conventional analysis make available (where an analyst interrogates 
the music as obj ect), but also those aspects unconcealed temporally out of the music's 
"otherness" in a manner parallel to Heidegger's understanding of the disclosure of 
Being (which is not known as object, but disclosed in Dasein). Heidegger's 
understanding of temporality forms the basis for Ferrara's phenomenological analysis 
of music as it unfolds in time. 
It has been implied in this Chapter that music may be Heidegger's unacknowledged 
point of access to his understandings both of poetry and temporality. Indeed, for 
Frings, 'the essence of 'original thinking' (Heidegger) and of 'original' listening are 
121! Hammond, Howarth, Keat, Understanding Phenomenology, p. 1. 
129 See Irene Deliege, Marc Melen, Dianna Stammers, Ian Cross, "Musical Schemata in Real-Time 
Listening to a Piece of Music." Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal 14, no. 2 (Winter 
1996): 117-160;pp.I17-118. 
130 N tt' \F' dD' . a lez, J 1 USIC an Iscourse, p. IX. 
131 For a description of this methodology, see Ferrara, Philosophy and the Analysis of Music, pp. 181-
186. 
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the same acts of specific time-consciousness'. 132 Thus,' [t ]he art -fonn of ill usic . . . 
represents the temporal nature of Being itself.' 133 If Heidegger's philosophy of Being 
opens up our understanding of reality more authentically than previous metaphysics -
as he claimed - and if it is also inhabited by music at a deep level, as has been 
suggested, it will not be surprising if his ideas prove increasingly fruitful in application 
to musical analysis. As Avery Dulles has commented in a different context, 'every 
genuine discovery opens up a path that leads to a host of further discoveries'. 134 So if 
indeed Being is temporal, and if indeed music is the place where Being speaks in its 
temporality, this will confer renewed recognition on music's temporal dimension, a 
dimension which has been relatively neglected. Such a recognition will lead to a 
renewed philosophical undergirding of real-time, phenomenological analysis of music. 
Perhaps recent growth in real-time musical cognitive studies in some measure echoes 
the wider influence of Heidegger's temporal ontology within the intellectual world, and 
gives a first glimpse of how Heidegger's ideas and music analysis may increasingly 
interact. Heidegger's temporal thinking may also throw particular light on 
improvisation. Musical improvisation, which is an evanescent fonn of music with no 
residual document, may perhaps be linked to time even more fully than music in 
general, since, like time itself, it is lost in the past as it proceeds, nor, like time, is the 
content of the future of an improvisation laid down in advance in the way that sounds 
about to happen in a composed work are wholly laid down. In relation to music in 
general, improvisation stands as the most temporally-oriented aspect of a temporal art-
m Frings, "Hannony and the Logos," p. 193. 
133 Ibid, p. 208. 
134 Avery Dulles, The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992), 
p. 11. 
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form. A Heideggerian approach to music might tend to revive interest in this neglected 
medium. 
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Chapter 5 
Music as the Place where Being Speaks 
I The Link Between Speech and Music 
In Chapter 4, a possible role played by music in Heidegger's philosophy was 
proposed and discussed in its implications for musical analysis, and a speculative 
connection was made between Heidegger's ideas and some ideas of Maritain. Whereas 
Chapter 4 involved a speculative interpretation of Heidegger, Chapter 5 will now 
present an original thesis based on Heidegger. It will propose the thesis that music, 
and especially improvised music, is the place where Being speaks. .if Heidegger's 
thought already harbours an unrecognised musical dimension, the following argument 
acquires a maieutic function of bringing the unsaid to birth, though according to the 
tenns of an original conceptualisation. 
Heidegger proposes that language is the place where Being speaks. Wide evidence 
suggests that, in various respects, speech and music cannot ultimately be separated. 1 In 
the first place, twentieth-century brain research has, very generally, indicated that 
human speech functions are found in the left cerebral hemisphere, while musical 
infonnation is processed mainly in the right. Recently Norbert Jausovec has described 
this as belonging to the 'basic data' of brain hemispheric theory. However he qualifies 
this with the observation that it may be true only of right-handed people.2 This 
division of language and music functions into two hemispheres seems in fact not to 
represent the most primordial condition of the human brain, either for the race or for 
the individual. Left-brain "dominance" has arisen slowly over history. Moreover, left-
I For a thorough discussion of the historical and current controversies, and a survey of literature on the 
possibility and nature of linkages between music and spoken language see Bryan G. Levrnan, "The 
Genesis of Music and Language." Ethnomusicology 36, no. 2 (1992): 147-170. Levrnan himself is in 
favour of a linkage, in the sense of a joint historical evolution from 'a common 'proto-faculty' which was 
primarily musical in nature.' Ibid, p. 147. The present thesis will pursue the argument that music and 
language not merely have been, but still are integrally linked. 
~ See Norbert Jau~ovec, "Brain Biology and Brain Functioning." In Encyclopedia of Creativity, vol 1, 
Runco and Pritzger (eds.), p. 205. 
141 
brain dominance does not emerge in individuals until they are about ten years old. 
This might suggest that infant speech and music are somehow unified.3 Deacon agrees 
that left-brain dominance develops during an individual lifetime4 and confinns that 
hemispheric lateralisation itself evolved in history.s Ultimately, therefore, language 
and music seem not to issue from separate brain "compartments." Indeed, even after 
the eventual lateralisation of music and language in late childhood, there is evidence 
from the nonnal brain that some more intonational and also emotional aspects of 
language continue to share the right hemisphere with music itself, suggesting an 
overlapping identity of the prosody of vocal usages with music usually so called. Thus, 
the right hemisphere, in addition to being associated with music, 'also subserves 
another important language function . . . It is the processing of prosodic features of 
speech.,6 
By way of total contrast, for other parts of the scientific literature, a right-
hemispheric attribution for music is itself fundamentally contestable, and Carroll Izard, 
publishing in 1991, cites contradictory findings from the 1970s and 1980s.7 However, 
3 See Blaukopf, Musical Life, pp. 149-150. Blaukopf cites for this view Marcel Kinsbourne, "Minor 
Hemisphere Language and Cerebral Maturation." In Foundations of Language Development, Eric H. 
Lenneberg and Elizabeth Lenneberg (eds.), (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 111. Also Thomas 
A. Regelski, "Who Knows Where Music Lurks in the Mind of Man: New Brain Research Has the 
Answer." Music Educators Journal 69, no. 9 (1977): 38. 
4 See Deacon, Symbolic Species, p. 315. This position is not, however, held by Springer and Deutsch, 
who claim that 'hemispheric specialization for language is present at birth and does not develop over 
time.' Nevertheless they recognise a special inter-hemispheric flexibility in the infant brain as evidenced 
from 'the ability of the right hemisphere to take over language functions after very early lesions of the 
left hemisphere.' Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch, Left Brain, Right Brain: Perspectives from 
Cognitive Neuroscience (1981) (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1998), p. 253. 
5 See Deacon, ibid, p. 317. 
6 Ibid, p. 313. Arguably this is true chiefly of emotional rather than syntactic prosody: 'Despite over 20 
years of research, the hemispheric specialization for prosody has not been determined.' Tracy L. Luks, 
Howard C. Nusbaum, Jerre Levy, "Hemispheric Involvement in the Perception of Syntactic Prosody is 
Dynamically Dependent on Task Demands." Brain and Language: A Journal of Clinical, Experimental 
and Theoretical Research 65, no. 2 (November 1998): 313-332; p. 313. However, 'studies of patients 
with unilateral brain damage and studies of dichotic listening in normal adults have consistently shown 
that the right hemisphere is superior to the left hemisphere in the perception of emotions conveyed by 
prosody patterns'. Ibid, p. 314. 
7 See Carroll E. Izard, The Psychology of Emotions (London: Plenum, 1991). pp. 74-76. In favour of a 
right-hemispheric association for music. Izard cites G. M. Schwartz. R. 1. Davidson, F. Maer, E. 
Bromfield, "Patterns of Hemispheric Dominance in Musical, Emotional Verbal, and Spatial Tasks." 
Paper presented at the meetings of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, Galveston, Texas. 
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in the present context, the point is not to seek to detennine some kind of unambiguous 
left- and right-hemispheric associations for given brain functions, but to give a sense of 
the inconclusiveness of current research, and also of how hemispheric division 
between speech and music is widely presented as subtended by a deeper unity. Two 
recent techniques may be able in due course to map more effectively the brain's neural 
architecture for processing music. Functional magnetic resonance imaging, developed 
in the late 1980s, and most recently, the magneto encephalogram, locate sources of 
cerebral activity through the latter's effect on the brain's magnetic fields. Positron 
emission tomography discovers the location of increased cerebral activity through 
identifying radioactivity arising from increased use of glucose by active sectors of the 
brain.8 In some quarters, even the well-established idea of hemispheric specialisation 
itself is contested, as in a 1990 book by Robert Efron.9 'It will take more than his 
book, however, to tum the tide against localization. Efron is prematurely tolling the 
death knell for hemispheric specialization.' 10 Bolinger and Sears speculate on the 
'possible connection between the lateralization of the brain and the persistent dualisms 
that have cropped up in human thinking over the centuries: body and mind, substance 
1973. Against a right-hemispheric association for music, Izard cites V. L. Deglin, "Clinical-
Experimental Studies of Unilateral Electroconvulsive Block." Journal of Neuropathology and 
Psychiatry 11 (1973): 1609-1621. 
R For an account of these techniques, see Jausovec, "Brain Biology," p. 207. Also Springer and 
Deutsch, Left Brain, Right Brain, pp. 222-224, for their application to music. References to J. Sergent, 
E. Zuck, S. Terriah, B. MacDonald, "Distributed Neural Network Underlying Musical Sight-Reading 
and Keyboard Performance." Science 257 (1992): 106-109; T. Elbert, C. Pantev, C. Wienbruch, B. 
Rockstroh, E. Taub, "Increased Cortical Representation of the Fingers of the Left Hand in String 
Players." Science 270 (1995): 305-307; G. Schlaug, L. Jancke, Y. Huang, J. Staiger, H. Steinmetz, 
"Increased Corpus Callosum Size in Musicians." Neuropsychologia 33 (1995): 1047-1055. For an 
account of the use of magnetic resonance imaging in identifying brain sites relevant to dylexia, see Sally 
E. Shaywitz, "Dyslexia." Scientific American (November 1996): 78-84. 
9 See Robert Efron, The Decline and Fall of Hemispheric Specialization (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
1990). 
10 Barbara A. Barresi, Review of ibid. Applied Ps),cholinguistics 15, no. 3 (1994): 397-408: p. 407. 
Barresi's review is also a short summary of the history of brain hemispheric theory. Briefly, it appears 
that the period c. 1860 to World War One emphasised hemispheres; the period from World War One 
until the 1960s emphasised holistic models (e.g .. in works of Henry Head, Pierre Marie, von Monakow. 
Kurt Goldstein); since the 1960s (see work of Geschwind) the idea of hemispheres has again been 
foregrounded. See ibid. 
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and form, constancy and change'. 11 For Isaiah Berlin, '[0 ]ne of the deepest of human 
desires is to find a unitary pattern in which the whole of experience . . . is 
symmetrically ordered.' 12 Brown has concluded that binary thinking, as embodied in 
such binary distinctions as "male" and "female," "good" and "bad," and innumerable 
others, is one of the 'absolute universals' 13 of what he terms 'Universal People.' 14 
Another important recent attempt to demonstrate a connection between language 
and music is associated with the work of Fred Lerdahl and Ray lackendoff. Basing 
their researches on Chomsky's generative-transformational grammar of language, they 
have sought to show how the internal structuring of music parallels the deep structures 
of language as the latter are common to all human beings. For example, Lerdahl and 
lackendoff have instanced metrical rules in music which are 'reminiscent of the 
principles governing prosodic features of language. ,15 They add that this 'can hardly 
be a coincidence. Rather it seems that we are dealing with a more general cognitive 
organization that has manifestations in both musical and linguistic structure.' 16 
There is evidence arising from studies of patients with Williams syndrome of the 
possibility of a symbiosis between speech and musical aptitudes. These patients are of 
interest since the 'study of distinct, well-defined, and atypical popUlations affords a 
unique opportunity to investigate specific aspects of cognition. d7 'IQs of individuals 
with Williams syndrome range from 40 to 100 ... accompanied by commensurate 
impairments in spacial, quantitative, and reasoning abilities.' 18 'The disproportionately 
good language ability among individuals with Williams syndrome suggests that 
11 Bolinger and Sears, Aspects of Language, p. 189. 
12 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 106. 
13 Brown, Human Unil'ersals, p. 140. 
14 Ibid, p. 132. 
15 Lerdahl and lackendoff, Generative Theory, p. 85. 
16 Ibid. See also pp. 314-329. 
17 Daniel 1. Levitin and Ursula Bellugi, "Musical Abilities in Individuals with Williams Syndrome." 
Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal 15, no. 4 (Swmner 1998): 357-389; p. 357. 
II! Ibid, p. 359. 
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language may not 'piggyback' on general mental function and intelligence, but may 
truly represent an independent faculty.' 19 It also appeared 'that the subjects with 
Williams syndrome had an unusually high degree of engagement with music. Music 
seemed to be not just a very deep and rich part of their lives, but one that was 
omnipresent; most of them spent a great proportion of the day singing to themselves or 
playing instruments' .20 This too would suggest that musical and linguistic ability have 
a considerable overlap, for here, where language alone is retained at a normal level of 
functioning by a mind in other respects cognitively challenged, a facility for music 
seems to be heightened also. 
Robin G. Collingwood perhaps argues that musicality is indispensable to speech 
acts, thereby identifying music with verbal prosody: 'If you don't know what tone to 
say [words] in, you can't say them at all: they are not words'. 21 This use of tone is 
possibly what the human infant is learning about through its pre-speech intonational 
exploration, discussed in Chapter I. The consequences of a speech-music symbiosis 
may be observed in the history of human speech practices. Bruno N ettl claimed that 
'an undifferentiated method of communication existed in remote times, one which was 
neither speech nor music but which possessed the three features that they hold in 
common: pitch, stress, and duration. ,22 For Ehrenzweig, '[I]ater this primeval 
language would have split into different branches; music would have retained the 
articulation mainly by pitch (scale) and duration (rhythm), while language chose the 
articulation mainly by tone colour (vowels and consonants).,23 Joseph Ki-Zerbo writes 
that in African cultures 'music is so much a part of tradition that certain messages can 
19 Ibid, p. 364. 
20 Ibid, p. 375. 
21 Robin G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1938), p. 266. 
~2 Bruno Nettl, Music in Primitive Culture (1956) (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), p. 136. 
_3 Anton Ehrenzweig, The Psycho-analysis o/Artistic Vision and Hearing: An introduction to a Theory 
of Unconscious Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1953), p. 164. 
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only be passed on in sung fonn. ,24 'Most African languages have ... a built-in 
tune . . . This makes ordinary speech musical, and greatly narrows the gap between 
speech and song. ,25 Moreover, for Anoop Chandola, '[ t]o treat musical tones like 
linguistic tones is not a new thing. The Indic phoneticians, for example, had already 
discussed musical tones in connection with the accentual system of their Vedic or 
Sanskrit' .26 The same writer also remarks: '[I]ntonation and rhythm are the basic 
elements of music. We cannot imagine any language either which does not have its 
own intonational and rhythmic patterns.,27 Nattiez, referring to work of George List, 
shows how the West has, by comparison, lost a sense of the interpenetration of 
language and music, despite the 'intennediary' fonns which arise from it in Western 
culture such as 'the droning of the public auctioneer, proclamations, ritual chant, 
Sprechgesang ... In western culture, these fonns only appear 'intennediary' because 
we so polarize spoken language and singing voice (hence our perpetual astonishment at 
that alien entity, the half-sung half-spoken voice in Pierrot Lunaire). ,28 
II Music and Proto-Existence 
The interconnectedness of music and language will be seen in due course to be 
relevant to Heidegger's view of language as the place where "Being speaks." For 
Heidegger, "Being speaks" not in the content or detail of language in use (somewhat 
comparable to what Saussure would call parole) but in our sheer immersion in the 
24 Joseph Ki-Zerbo, "Methodologie et prehistoire africaine." In Histoire generale de l'Afrique, vol 1, 
Joseph Ki-Zerbo (ed.), (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), p. 31. Cited in Blaukopf, Musical Life, p. 148. 
25 Peter van der Merwe, Origins of the Popular Style: The Antecedents of Twentieth-Century Popular 
Music (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p. 34. 
26 Anoop Chandola, Music as Speech: An Ethnomusicolinguistic Study of India (New Delhi: Navrang, 
1988), p. 3. 
27 Ib·d 1 ,p. 1. 
28 Nattiez. Music and Discourse. p. 58. Reference to George List, "The Boundaries of Speech and 
Song." Ethnomusicology 7, no. 1 (1963): 1-16. 
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general fact of language (similar to what Saussure would call1angue).29 Being comes 
to us in the sheer holistic event of language in general. Mankind is not brought into a 
relationship with Being by discussing Being, saying things about Being: humans are 
brought into a kind of communion with Being simply as language-users. So for 
Heidegger, ontology is no longer a rational "knowing that." (As Karl Jaspers would 
say, this would only be 'allowing Being to disappear by absolutising it away into a self-
enclosed object of cognition. ,)30 Ontology is instead a kind of instinctual participating 
consciousness in Being through language. For Heidegger, this consciousness 
rediscovers a primordial pre-Socratic ontology, overlain and obscured by the later 
Greek thinking, after the latter became engrained in the subsequent history of Western 
thought. Poetry represents for Heidegger the true pre-Socratic model of language, not 
an adjudication of Being by rational language, but a presencing of Being. For 
Heidegger, poetry makes possible a higher knowledge of Being than ideas and 
deductions. Poetry makes possible a knowledge that touches the reality of Being, 
rather than merely giving "information" about it. Chapter 4 suggested that the sonic 
value of poetry played a significant part in Heidegger's estimate of poetry's revelatory 
role, and it was suggested by Steiner that the pre-rational nature of Being's disclosure 
might find its natural home in music (Chapter 4, Section III). Perhaps music engages 
with Being more deeply even than poetry, because music does not involve determinate 
reference in the manner of words. 
29 This distinction was fIrst outlined by Ferdinand de Saussure in Course in General Linguistics (1916) 
(London: Duckworth, 1983). 'This distinction serves as the cornerstone of structuralist linguistics. 
Language or langue is defmed as the systematic totality of all possible linguistic usages. Speech or 
parole, by contrast, refers to any particular act of language; it is the actual manner in which we realise 
the possibilities of the abstract language system in our everyday concrete utterances.' Kearney, Modern 
Movements, p. 24l. 'Where parole is the realm of the individual moments of language use, of particular 
'utterances' or 'messages', whether spoken or written, langue is the system or code ... which allows the 
realization of the individual messages.' Stephen Heath, "Translator's Note." In Roland Barthes, Image. 
Music Text (London: Harper Collins, 1977), p. 7. 
30 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal 0.( History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953). p. 18. 
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Western thought has tended to operate by distancing itself from its object, that is, 
by using the mind to abstract from what it seeks to examine, in order to compile an 
objective account of it. As Susan Bowles observes: 'In conceptual thinking, we 
impose a concept between the immediate experience and the phenomenon (thereby not 
experiencing the phenomenon immediately or directly) and in this way we hold a 
representational picture of how things are outside of us. ,31 Being, however, cannot be 
known in this way, because such an abstractive method seeks only to say things about 
Being: it does not bring the mind into communion with Being in a direct way. The 
paradox here is essentially that in trying to grasp conceptually the idea of existence, we 
try to abstract our minds from it, standing apart from the very Being we seek to 
understand, and assuming a radical subject-object relationship to it. Yet, as Morris 
Berman points out, the pre-Socratic tradition did indeed think Being more on a level of 
communion or original participation. 32 Here, the idea is that the deepest kind of 
understanding comes from placing oneself within the full being of an object and 
allowing it to speak. Before the time of the Iliad (c. 900-850 BeE) little distinction 
was made by the Greek mind between external phenomena and subjective thought 
processes. 'The Iliad contains no words for internal states of mind. ,33 It has been 
argued that the middle voice in Greek verbal conjugation reflects a mentality in which 
the modem subject-object dichotomy has not yet developed for 'the rhetorical stance of 
the middle voice asserts the disappearance of the writer [and] dissolution of any point 
of view outside the work'. 34 For J ean-Pierre Vernant, 'in thought as expressed in 
31 Bowles, "Rupture in the Temporality of Music," p. 47. In a footnote Bowles observes, 'for instance, 
'epistemology' is the study of the reliability of knowledge. 'The theory of knowledge, especially the 
critical study of its validity, methods and scope.' (Collins English Dictionary, [n.p: n.p.] 1991).' 
Bowles, ibid. 
31 Bennan attributes the tenn 'original participation' to Owen Barfield. See Morris Bennan, The 
Reenchantment of the World (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981), p. 71. Reference to Owen Barfield, 
Saving the Appearances (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), esp. ch. 16. 
33 B 'b'd ennan,l 1 . 
. '4 Hans Kellner, '''Never Again' is Now." In Postmodern History Reader, Jenkins (ed.), p. 399. 
Reference to Hayden White, "Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth." In Probing the Limits 
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Greek or ancient Indo-European there is no idea of the agent being the source of his 
action. ,35 Between the time of Homer and Plato, however, a shift away from original 
participation took place in Greek thinking; indeed, 'the poetic, or Homeric mentality, 
in which the individual is immersed in a sea of contradictory experiences and learns 
about the world through emotional identification with it (original participation) is 
precisely what Socrates and Plato intended to destroy. ,36 It will be suggested shortly 
that infantile musicality universally perpetuates for the human person the paradigm of 
ontological engagement through original participation. 
The conceptual tradition of Western ontology against which Heidegger protested, 
because of its cognitive emphasis on clear and objective rationality and 'fetishization 
of detachment' 37 harbours a bias in favour of masculine models of knowing. Because 
child-rearing is dominated by the mother, there is some indication that differing 
degrees of individuation are required by boys and girls in infancy, the former having 
greater need to establish their difference from the mother, and so developing a more 
radical general sense of division between themselves and what is other. Thus the male 
needs to set himself up over against reality, in a 'transcendence of the body,38 while the 
female blends with reality in communion, because of a greater early empathy with the 
body of the mother.39 For the female, as a result of this early paradigm, conscious, 
objective relationship to the world is thereafter linked to a greater interior and pre-
conceptual closeness to the world. This model from female development is useful in 
providing deeper insight into the empathetic, pre-rational basis of all experience of 
of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution," Saul Friedlander (ed.), (Cambridge MA: n.p., 
1992), p. 48. 
35 lean-Pierre Vernant. In "Discussion: Barthes-Todorov." In Roland Barthes, "To Write: An 
Intransitive Verb?" In The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist 
Control'ersy, Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (eds.), (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1970), p. 152. 
-'6 Berman, Reenchantment of the World, p. 71. 
:: Bordo, Flight to Objectivity, p. 7. 
. Ibid, p. 8 
39 See Nancy Chowderow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: California Univ. Press, 1978). 
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existence: 'We do not coincide with ourselves. We exist before we are conscious of 
our existence: and this means that our reflective consciousness is always to some 
extent out of joint with the existential conditions that fostered it. ,40 '[R]eflection is 
inevitably shaped by and in some ways dependent on our more primordial participation 
in a world of meaning. ,41 This 'primordial participation' characterises the infant's 
musical participation in Being through song, as will be seen later. However, in 
seeking, following the masculine paradigm, a 'cleaner, purer, more objective and more 
disciplined epistemological relation to the world, ,42 the surface mind in later life may 
become dislocated from this more original kind of participatory knowledge of Being 
based on improvisatory music rooted in infant song. For Jaspers, knowledge by 
original participation is primordial and Edenesque: 'In the beginning was the 
manifestness of Being in a present without consciousness. ,43 In words also of Nicholas 
Berdyaev, '[p]hilosophic knowledge cannot have its source in books or in schools ... 
The only true philosopher is he who has an intuition of being, whose philosophy has its 
source In life. Genuine philosophy has immediate connection with being. ,44 
Heidegger contrasts the immediacy of such openness to reality with the abstract, 
secondary nature of the 'thing-concept': 
[T]his thing-concept again leaves us at a loss. We never really fIrst perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., 
tones and noises, in the appearance of things - as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the stonn 
whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate 
distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We 
hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to 
hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly.45 
40 Stanislaus Breton. In Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contempormy Continental Thinkers 
(Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 99-100. 
-II David 1. Bryant, Faith and the Play of Imagination: On the Role of the Imagination in Religion 
(Macon GA: Mercer Univ. Press, 1989), p. 170. 
42 Bordo, Flightto Objectivity, p. 105. 
43 Jaspers, Origin and Goal, p. xv. 
-1-1 Nicholas Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act (1916) (London: Victor Gollancz. 1955), pp. 
52-53. 
-IS Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art." (Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. 1960) In Poeff),. 
Language, Thought, p. 26. 
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In this sense, the vocal ising infant is not listening to his or her sounds: the infant is 
listening beyond them and through them to Being itself, though, of course, without 
forming any kind of "Being-concept." 
Heidegger regarded poetry as the revelatory and meditative medium which, in 
contrast to rational and technical language, had the power to announce Being fully in 
language. He speaks of the vocation of the poet to speak language 'purely, ,46 for here 
language speaks Being prior to being put to work in lower, technical capacities. 
'Refusing to reduce language to an objectifiable concept - by standing above it or 
speaking about it - the poetic thinker experiences and thinks language from within. 
We do not 'represent' language to ourselves; language presents itself to us and speaks 
through us. ,47 Heidegger hints that the improvisatory dimension is important for his 
understanding of poetry. He speaks in one place approvingly of some improvised 
poetry by Rilke. Its 'unforeseen character opens for us a perspective in which we are 
able to think Rilke's poetry more clearly ... [A]t this moment in the world's history 
we have first to learn that the making of poetry, too, is a matter of thinking. Let us take 
the poem as an exercise in poetic self-reflection. ,48 Heidegger here links the 
improvised or 'unforeseen character' of the poem to 'thinking' itself, and to poetry's 
adverting to its own inner nature in 'self-reflection.' Moreover, any understanding of 
poetry 'more clearly' is, on Heidegger's premises, a clearer understanding of the way 
in which "Being speaks." In this citation, it is therefore to improvised poetry that this 
clearer understanding of poetic utterance adverts. It is improvised poetry which shows 
more clearly how poetry speaks Being. Here Heidegger draws attention to the poem 
valued not chiefly as finished product, but under the aspect of the process by which it is 
created, 'the making of poetry.' Possibly Heidegger feels that the improvising of 
46 Heidegger, "Language," p. 194. 
4C Kearney, Modern Movements, p. 4l. 
4R Heidegger, "What are Poets For?" In Poetry, Language. Thought, pp. 99-100. 
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poetry, because it is where a poem first makes its appearance in time, is where the 
human poetic impulse opens up fully to temporality: thus, Being as temporality is more 
fully disclosed within the context of the poeticising process than in the finished poem, 
and poetic improvisation is where poetry opens up to temporality, hence Being, in a 
special degree. Also, presumably, because of Heidegger's emphasis on language as 
speech (Chapter 4, Section I), a poem must actually be delivered vocally as it is 
improvised, rather than simply improvised as thought in the poet's head, in order for 
this plenary ontological unveiling to arise. All this would suggest that Heidegger's 
ideal poem may not be a static finished object, whether recited or in writing, but an 
instance of speech-song or prosody sounding and being created in temporality, 
improvised verbal music. This insight concerning improvised poetry will be 
significant for understanding the application of Heidegger's ideas not merely to music 
in general, but increasingly to improvisatory music in particular. Moreover, infant 
babbling in human development may suggest itself as a prototype of improvised 
speech-song, the place where such speech-song has a universal basis in human 
experience, rather than being something only certain people, poets, produce. 
It was seen in Chapter 4 how Heidegger's thought is conducive to, though does not 
actually make the claim that music, rather than simply poetry, is the place where Being 
speaks. It was arguably as speech-song that poetry possesses its special status for 
Heidegger. If Heidegger does not explicitly make the leap from poetry to music as 
ontologically disclosive, Steiner certainly does: 'The energy that is music puts us in felt 
relation to the energy which is life: it puts us in a relationship of experienced 
immediacy with the abstractly and verbally inexpressible but wholly palpable, primary 
fact of being. ,49 Parallel are the claims of Adorno: 'Signifying language would say the 
49 George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), p. 196. 
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absolute in a mediated way, yet the absolute escapes it in each of its intentions, which, 
in the end, are left behind, as finite. Music reaches the absolute immediately, but in the 
same instant it darkens, as when a strong light blinds the eye, which can no longer see 
things which are quite visible. ,50 Steiner laments what he sees as the 'major tactical 
oversight'S! which causes Heidegger to draw scarcely at all on the issues raised by 
music, a subject which 'damagingly ... Heidegger continually passes by. ,52 Insights 
concerning a possible role for music in Heideggerian ontology will now be extended 
especially to music which is improvised. This extension seems reasonable in view of 
Heidegger's possible prioritisation of poetry which is improvised. Indeed, given that 
Heidegger's is a search for primordiality, it can hardly be overlooked that' [0 ]riginally, 
both music and poetry were free auditory activities without printed pages and solely for 
auditory consumption. ,53 
III Music and Pre-Natal Existence 
Evidence will now be advanced to indicate that what might at first appear to be 
mere compound speculation on Heidegger's thought is undergirt by evidence from 
infantile development. Infantile development appears to involve a prototypical 
encounter with improvisatory music as speech-song, and in this sense it supports, 
though from a different angle, the idea already proposed of the primordiality of 
improvisatory speech-song. The correlations made by Steiner, Adorno, and perhaps 
implicitly Heidegger, between music and deep human involvement in reality recall 
Gadamer's theory that human immersion in language (where, as Heidegger says, 
"Being speaks") is established and maintained by the quality of language chiefly as 
50 Theodor Adorno, "Music, Language, and Composition." (1965) The Musical Quarterly 77, no. 3 
(1993): 401-414; p. 404. 
51 Steiner, Heideggcr, p. 30. 
52 Ibid, p. 43. 
53 Frings, "Harmony and the Logos," p. 20 l. 
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audible pleasure. For Gadamer, 'the play of language itself ... addresses us, proposes 
and withdraws, asks and fulfils itself in the answer. ,54 Perhaps this idea could be 
linked to the prosodic, "musical" nature of the earliest human contact with vocal 
sound, in the form of pre-natal experiences of the inflections of maternal speech. Jean-
Pierre Lecanuet noted in 1996 that '[ r ]ecent acoustical recordings revealed that the 
maternal voice as well as external speech located near the mother clearly emerged from 
the uterine background noise . . . [T]he mother's and others' speech . . . was 
muffled ... [and] had well preserved prosodic characteristics,.55 Consequently, in 
experiments 'newborns preferred an 'intra-uterine' form of their mother's voice over 
an airborne version,56 when the former was artificially reproduced for the attention of 
the newborn. 'Other research has demonstrated infants' sensitivity to melodic contour, 
octave equivalence, and auditory grouping on the basis of frequency similarity, 
amplitude similarity, and spectral similarity. ,57 Prosody, or the music of language, thus 
constitutes the first intra-uterine encounter with language for the human person. 
These intra-uterine experiences of language, as pure sound being inflected, suggest 
how Being's first disclosure in language for the human person is wholly assimilated to 
attractive linguistic sound. For the unborn baby, a proto-musical experience in the 
54 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 446. 
55 Jean-Pierre Lecanuet, "Prenatal Auditory Experience." In Musical Beginnings: Origins and 
Development of Musical Competence, Irene Deliege and John Sloboda (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1996), p. 7. 
56 Ibid, p. 22. References to experiments conducted by W. P. Fifer and C. Moon. W. P. Fifer and C. 
Moon, "Psychobiology of Newborn Auditory Preferences." Seminars in Perinatology 13 (1989): 430-
433; C. Moon and W. P. Fifer, "Newborns Prefer a Prenatal Version of Mother's Voice." Infant 
Behavior and Development 13 (1990): 530 (special ICIS issue). 
57 Christoph Fassbender, "Infants' Auditory Sensitivity Towards Acoustic Parameters of Speech and 
Music." In Musical Beginnings: Deliege and Sloboda (eds.), p. 79. References to S. E. Trehub, 
"Infant's Perception of Musical Patterns." Perception and Psychophysics 41 (1987): 635-641; L. 
Demany and F. Armand, "The Perceptual Reality of Tone Chroma in Early Infancy." Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America 76 (1984): 57-66; L. Demany, "Auditory Stream Segregation in Infancy." 
Infant Behavior and Development 5 (1982): 261-276; L. A. Thorpe. S. E. Trehub, B. A. Morrongiello, 
D. Bull, "Perceptual Grouping by Infants and Preschool Children." Developmental Psychology 24 
(1988): 484-491; L. A. Thorpe and S. E. Trehub, "Duration Illusion and Auditory Grouping in Infancy." 
Developmental Ps.vchology 25 (1989): 122-127; C. Fassbender, Auditory Grouping and Segregation 
Processes in Infancy (Norderstedt: Kaste Verlag, 1993). 
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womb is the result, and, as was seen, the baby retains a preference for the intra-uterine 
"music" of language even once it has been born. For the baby in the womb, auditory 
experience of the prosodic is attractive, presumably because these prosodic 
impressions announce the presence of the mother. In addition, they announce the real 
in the only way that pre-natal consciousness can apprehend it. For the baby in the 
womb, the real outside itself, its first object of sensory awareness, is prosody, pure 
inflected, expressive sound. '[A]uditory perception prompts the baby's first realization 
that there is something beyond itself to which it is nevertheless related. ,58 In other 
words, within the womb, it is prosodic vocal inflections in which Being speaks, for 
such is pre-natal apprehension of the real. Heidegger also hinted that it was chiefly as 
something attractive that language exercised its hold over human beings: '[S]trictly, it 
is language that speaks. Man first speaks when, and only when, he responds to 
language by listening to its appeal. ,59 In the womb, it is indeed language which first 
appealingly speaks to the human person, not the person who speaks. 
Once born, an infant is coaxed toward speaking by the 'appeal' of the prosodic or 
musical characteristics of the voices she hears. For Gadamer, man is played upon by 
language. It is in the irresistible delight and desire of sound-play that the infant learns 
speech. For Morley, 'the child produces sounds apparently for the pleasure and 
satisfaction of so doing. ,60 Language is thus arrived at through the dimension of 
prosodic sound, and, in the case of the pre-verbal response to maternal sound by 
babbling and singing of an infant, sound as spontaneously played with in an 
exploratory way. As heard by the infant, 'sound is an experience of invitation to 
engagement, a fundamentally unitive act connecting ... the sound perceiver with the 
58 Storr, Music and the Mind, p. 9. 
59 Martin Heidegger, " ... Poetically Man Dwells ... " In Poetry. Language Thought, p. 216. 
60 Muriel E. Morley, The Dn'elopment and Disorders of Speech in Childhood (London: Churchill 
Livingstone, 1972), p. 10. 
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sound, the sound producer with the sound receiver,.61 As taken up by the infant, 
singing links 'the sound producer in a new way with him- or herself. ,62 This is a 
highly inclusive table of interactive relations with the world. It is as a consequence of 
the link between sound and early awareness of Being that '[ t ]he ear is a metaphor for 
human beings open to reality, to engagement with the sounds and the people and things 
which produce them. ,63 Babbling is the infant's pre-verbal response to her experience 
of reality presented to her first as attractive sound: it has an ontological significance in 
first actively connecting the infant to reality. Musical improvisation will continue to 
embody the same significance throughout the lifetime of the person, evoking a 
primordial memory, because musical improvisation is the activity in which 
unconscious memories of babbling are especially preserved into later life. Musical 
improvisation will continue to link the person with his or her world. 
For Heidegger, "Being speaks" in language. Infant music is embryonic language. 
For Hanus Papousek, early musical activity is plainly linguistic, corroborating the link 
between speech and music: 'Musical elements participate in the process of 
communicative development very early; in fact, recent research has suggested that they 
pave the way to linguistic capacities earlier than phonetic elements can do so. ,64 
Mechtilde Papousek speaks of 'three closely interrelated facets of preverbal 
communication: emotional signalling; precursors to speech; and playful creative 
61 Jan Michael Joncas, "Liturgy and Music." In The Pontifical Liturgical Institute Handbook for 
Liturgical Studies, vol 2 Fundamental Liturgy, Anscar J. Chupungco (ed.), (Collegeville, Minnesota: 
The Liturgical Press, 1998), p. 313. References to Edward Foley, "Toward a Sound Theology." SL 23/2 
(1993): 121-139 (documentation sic); P. W. Hoon, "The Relation of Theology and Music in Worship." 
Union Theological Seminary Quarterly Review 11, no. 2 (1956): 33-43; A. Pike, A Theology of Music 
(Toledo: n.p., 1953); E. Routley, Church Music and Theology (Philadelphia: n.p., 1965): M. T. Winter, 
Why Sing? Toward a Theology of Catholic Church Music (Washington D. c.: n.p., 1984). 
62 J 'b'd oncas, 1 1 . 
63 Ibid. 
64 Hanus Papousek, "Musicality in Infancy Research: Biological and Cultural Origins of Early 
Musicality." In Musical Beginnings, Deliege and Sloboda (eds.), p. 43. Reference to M. Papousek. H. 
Papousek, M. H. Bomstein, "The Naturalistic Vocal Environment of Young Infants: on the Significance 
of Homogeneity and Variability in Parental Speech." In Social Perception in Infants, T. Field and N. 
Fox (eds.), ("Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey"), pp. 269-297. 
156 
activity in spontaneous singing ... The preverbal origins of musical skills cannot be 
differentiated from the prelinguistic stages of speech acquisition and from the basic 
alphabet of emotional communication. ,65 The same writer speaks later of: 
six stages of vocal production: phonation (0-1 months); melodic modulation and primitive articulation in 
cooing (2-3 months); exploratory vocal play (4-6 months); repetitive babbling (7-11 months); variegated 
babbling and early words (9-13 months); and the one-word stage (12-18 months). 
Precursors of spontaneous singing may be indiscriminable from precursors of early speech. Preverbal 
communication may represent a common ontogenic avenue along which two highly structured and 
exclusively human capacities develop: (1) speech, enabling verbal communication and thinking; and (2) 
singing, enabling creative activity in vocal music. Both capacities are also intimately related to functions 
of affective vocal signalling and communication.66 
There appears here a view of the infant as developing by means of musical 
investigation on the way to discovering speech. Music is integral with the first 
encounter with language, where Being speaks. 
The foetus heard the mother's heartbeat dividing its sonic experience into regular 
units of duration, and thus began its discovery of time. Conceivably, the newborn 
infant brain continues learning about time sonically through music. Roger Sessions 
has speculated that time-consciousness is linked to rhythm, early breathing, 
vocalisation and music: '[T]he basic rhythmic fact is ... a specific type of alternation 
with which we are familiar from the first movement of our existence as separate 
beings. We celebrate that event by drawing a breath, which is required of us if 
existence is to be realized. The drawing of the breath is an act of culmination, of 
65 Mechthild Papousek, "Intuitive Parenting: a Hidden Source of Musical Stimulation in Infancy." In 
ibid, Deliege and Sloboda (eds.), pp. 91-92. Reference to Mechthi1d Papousek, "Determinants of 
Responsiveness to Infant Vocal Expression of Emotional State." Infant Behavior and Development 12 
(1989): 505-522. 
66 M. Papousek, "Intuitive Parenting," pp. 103-104. References to D. K. Oller, "The Emergence of the 
Sounds of Speech in Infancy." In Child Phonology: Production, vol 1, G. H. Yeni-Komshian, J. F. 
Kavanagh, C. A. Ferguson (eds.), (New York: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 93-112; R. E. Stark, "Stages 
of Speech Development in the First Year of Life." In ibid, Yeni-Komshian, Kavanagh, Ferguson (eds.), 
pp. 73-92; K. Holmgren, B. Lindblom, G. Aurelius, B. Jalling, R. Zetterstrom, "On the Phonetics of 
Infant Vocalization." In Precursors ofEar~v Speech, Wenner-Gren International Symposium Series, vol 
44, B. Lindblom and R. Zetterstrom (eds.), (New York: Stockton Press, 1986), pp. 51-63; F. J. 
Koopmans-van Beinum and F. J. van der Stelt, "Early Stages in the Development of Speech 
Movements." In Precursors of Ear~l' Speech, Wenner-Gren International Symposium Series, vol 44, 
Lindblom and Zetterstrom (eds.), pp. 37-50; M Papousek, Vom ersten Schrei ::um ersten Wort. Anfonge 
de,. Sprachentwicklung in del' l'orsprachilichen Kommunikation (Berne: Huber, 1994). 
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tension which is then released by the alternative act of exhalation. ,67 'Here it is not a 
question of the alternation of tension and relaxation but of our experience of time 
itself. We gain our experience, our sensation of time, through movement, and it is 
movement, primarily, which gives it content for us. ,68 Early breathing and its time-
disclosing rhythms flower into the early musical impulse: '[1]s it not clear that much of 
our melodic feeling derives ... from a vocal impulse which first of all is connected 
with the vital act of breathing?,69 A young child continues to learn about time by 
producing improvised musical sounds: 
Of what use is music-knowledge? Here is one idea. Each child spends endless days in curious ways; we 
call it 'play.' He plays with blocks and boxes, stacking them and packing them; he lines them up and 
knocks them down. What is that all about? Clearly, he is learning Space! But how, on earth, does one 
learn Time? Can one Time fit inside another, can two of Them go side by side? In Music we fmd out! 
Many adults retain that play-like fascination with making large structures out of smaller things - and 
one way to understand music involves building large mind-structures out of smaller music-things. So 
that drive to build music-structure might be the same one that makes us try to understand the world.70 
Thus, exploratory music may be where understanding of time is developed in infancy. 
These ideas evoke the suggestion in Chapter 4, Section V (in connection with 
Heidegger's attention to Mozart) that music may disclose the temporality of Dasein in 
a unique and even necessary way for the human person. Moreover, if the infant mind 
is indeed learning about time, and if exploratory music is thus integrating the infant 
with reality under the twin aspects of time and language, then Being, disclosed 
precisely in Heidegger's terms as time and language, is "speaking" to the infant in 
improvisatory musical vocalising. A pre-conceptual, participatory knowledge of reality 
is the result. 
The intra-uterine experience of reality as attractive maternal prosody, and the new-
born experience of Being as mediated to the baby by its and the mother's free 
67 Roger Sessions, The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener (1950) (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), p. 12. 
68 Ibid,p. 15. 
69 Ibid, p. 17. 
70 Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning." In Music, Mind and Brain, Clynes (ed.), pp. 4-5. 
Cited in Jonathan Kramer, The Time of Afusic: New Meanings, New Temporalities. Net'" Listening 
Strategies (New York: Schirmer, 1988), p. 1. 
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vocalising will leave a pennanent imprint in the human mind, so that no intellectual 
attempt by the mind in later life to contemplate the real as a totality, however 
persuasive it may seem to the conscious understanding, can ever usurp musical 
improvisation's greater power over the unconscious memory. Nor, for the same 
reasons, will any other art-fonn equal or surpass the primitive potency of music, and 
especially improvised music, as depth expressions of the real. In musical 
improvisation, to borrow Heidegger's famous title, the mind lays hold upon its whole 
"Being and Time." Because musical exploration is the medium in which the human 
baby first actively engages language as the place where Being speaks, and because this 
engagement arises from the draw of the beautiful and lovable maternal object who 
addresses the infant, it is, accordingly, also a prototype of all aesthetic responses. It is 
the prototypical response to the draw of the beautiful. Infant vocalising is the 
prototype not only of musical improvisation the art-fonn, but indeed of art and 
response to art in general. 
Infant musical exploration is no less a basic aesthetic response from having as its 
object something other than an art-work, namely the mother, for aesthetic feeling can 
result from 'interactions with phenomena of nature or from interactions with non-art 
objects or events.,7l Vocalising arises from aesthetic response to the mother: 'One or 
two weeks after he has begun to smile at his mother in response to her, he begins to 
vocalise as well as smile'. 72 The baby's vocal responses contain the elements of 
interaction, perception of beauty and feeling reaction associated with aesthetic 
experience.73 There is also the aesthetic pleasure found in language itself. In words of 
one writer, babbling is 'a fonn of art ... it represents the beginning of the art of 
71 Rudolf E. Radoey and 1. David Boyle, Psychological Foundations of Musical Behavior (Springfield, 
lllinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1979), p. 184. 
72 R. S. Illingworth, The De\'elopment of the Infant and Young Child: Normal and Abnormal (London: 
Churchill Livingstone, 1987), p. Ill. 
73 See Radocy and Boyle, Psychological Foundations, p. 216. 
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language in the life of the child.' 74 '[A ]lmost from the very outset the practical and the 
aesthetic functions of language develop side by side. Thus there are twin impulses in 
the development of language in the child's life: on the one hand, the satisfaction of his 
primary needs, and, on the other, the satisfaction of aesthetic tendencies'. 75 '[T]here is 
pleasure in the patterns of the sounds themselves, pleasure in their rhythms and their 
tunes.,76 This pleasure is discriminating: '[I]nfants 'prefer' consonant, or pleasant 
sounding, combinations of tones over dissonant, or unpleasant sounding 
combinations.,77 For Zentner and Kagen, 'the human infant may possess a biological 
preparedness that makes consonance perceptually more attractive than dissonance.' 78 
'[T]he child does not respond indiscriminately to any musical sound, but ... responds 
by selecting the sensuously beautiful sound.' 79 Mursell claimed that, at three months, 
babies produce 'comfort sounds. They do not belong definitely in the category of 
either speech or song, but are the matrix out of which both develop, and they have an 
appreciable tonal content. It has been argued that such experiences and reactions are 
the original sources of what later becomes aesthetic pleasure in music and in the sheer 
sound of language. ,80 
Exploration of sound is the common origin of art and language in the human 
person. Conversely, all human aesthetic responses are distant extrapolations of, and 
recall unconsciously, pre-natal sonic conditions and the later infant sonic exploration 
by which aesthetic pleasure developed. Not just the origins of music in the individual 
74 M. M. Lewis, Infant Speech: A Study a/the Beginnings a/Language (1936) (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 66. 
75 Ibid, p. 69. 
76 M. M. Lewis, Holt' Children Learn to Speak (London: George G. Harrap, 1957), p. 44. 
77 Sandra E. Trehub and Laurel Trainor, "Singing to Infants: Lullabies and Play Songs." In Advances in 
Infancy Research. vol 12, Carolyn Rovee-Collier, Lewis Lipsitt, Harlene Hayne (eds.), (London: Ablex, 
1998), p. 65. References to (no given names) Trainor and Heinmiller, in press; Marcel R. Zentner and 
Jerome Kagen, "Perception of Music by Infants." Letter in Nature 383, no. 6595 (1996): 29. 
78 Zentner and Kagen, ibid. 
79 Helmut Moog, The Musical Experience of the Pre-school Child (1968) (London: Schott, 1976), p. 55. 
80 James L. Mursell, Education for All/sical Growth (n.p.: Ginn, 1948), p. 30. Cited in ibid. 
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developed human person, but even the primeval origins of music in primitive homo 
sapiens may possibly be accounted for by these considerations. Lecanuet's recent 
work described above, on how humans in the womb experience awareness of maternal 
prosodic noises, implies that sensations prototypical of these might be included in the 
intra-uterine auditory sensations of the higher primates. If this is the case, the raw 
material of musicality is already present in experience from the earliest moment of the 
biological evolution of human beings from higher primates. Indeed, humanness might 
be distinguished from apeness and in part defined as a new kind of foetal hearkening to 
maternal vocalisations and heartbeat (which existed auditorily for foetal apes but were 
not listened to in the same way by them) leading to a new and opened-out existential 
engagement with time and language, along the lines which indeed characterise the 
human being for Heidegger. Is it possible to grasp more completely how awareness of 
Being enters consciousness through foetal sound-awareness, infant babbling and early 
song, and, ultimately, humanity's entire project of (especially improvisatory) music-
making? Being is not somehow "in" the musical sound any more than human 
experiences of smell are coterminous with the inhaled molecules, nerve-receptors in 
the nose and electrical currents by which the cortex is stimulated. The smell is not 
these things, indeed, it is a total mystery what the final experience of smell actually is. 
The unveiling of the real in the music event might well be a comparable phenomenon 
to the presence of smell in physical phenomena. 
I~ r Music as Lived Engagement with Being 
It is necessary to consider now in more detail the nature of the human person's 
primordial relation to things. 'A child's first question is very often: 'What is it for?' 
The notion of a bare thing-in-itself, inert, indifferent, would seem to be a very 
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sophisticated idea and certainly one that is remote from everyday existing. ,81 Ong 
instances, from illiterate adult subjects, a similar 'situational thinking' to this. He 
writes: 'Subjects were presented with drawings of four objects, three belonging to one 
category and the fourth to another, and were asked to group together those that were 
similar or could be placed in one group or designated by one word. One series 
consisted of drawings of the objects hammer, saw, log, hatchet. Illiterate subjects 
consistently thought of the group not in categorical terms (three tools, the log not a 
tool) but in terms of practical situations - ('situational thinking')- without adverting at all 
to the classification "tool" as applying to all but the log. If you are a workman with 
tools and see a log, you think of applying the tool to it, not of keeping the tool away 
from what it was made for - in some weird intellectual game. A 25-year-old illiterate 
peasant: "They're all alike. The saw will saw the log and the hatchet will chop it into 
small pieces. If one of these has to go, I'd throw out the hatchet. It doesn't do as good 
a job as a saw." Told the hammer, saw, and hatchet are all tools, he discounts the 
categorical class and persists in situational thinking: "Yes, but even if we have tools, 
we still need wood - otherwise we can't build anything." Asked why another person 
had rejected one item in another series of four that he felt all belonged together, he 
replied: {'Probably that kind of thinking runs in his blood". ,82 Even artistic works can 
be seen as conforming to this principle of situatedness in human thought. As Curt 
Ducasse puts it: 'Slang paraphrases the assertion that an object is beautiful by saying 
that it is 'easy to look at' ... To be 'easy to look at,' is to be as if made for the 
purpose,.83 
81 Macquarrie, Existentialism, p. 84. 
82 Ong, Orality and Litera(l', p. 51. Citations from Aleksandr Romanovich Luria, Cognitive 
Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976), p. 56. 
83 Curt John Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art (1929) (New York: Dover, 1966), p. 239. 
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Heidegger gives the example of a hammer, where 'the more we seize hold of it and 
use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly 
it is encountered as that which it is ... as equipment. ,84 Thus, for Heidegger, our 
involvement in the world is likewise as situated and coping beings, rather than beings 
who set out in the first instance to know the world objectively: to use a hammer is thus 
to know it better than to think about a hammer. Heidegger points out that if I use a 
hammer, I can do this successfully without even objectively thinking of my 
hammering,85 but am nevertheless involved in the world in and through my hammering. 
A parallel which might be drawn here is that while hearing, without necessarily 
attending to music, humans are at an unconscious level specially involved with Being-
in-the-world. An intuition of Being passes transparently through us in the medium of 
music simply because we are musico-linguistic creatures situated in Being. As in the 
womb and in infancy, so into adulthood, music is where Being continues to "speak" to 
us. Moreover, to return to Heidegger, it is only when the nail I am hammering slips, or 
I bang my finger that I become conscious of hammering per se, and must regrasp the 
hammer with conscious attention. Suddenly I am back with a jolt to my objective 
consciousness of being-in-the-world, and back to consciousness of my hammering. Is 
there a parallel here with the way humans sometimes have conscious recourse to music 
by grasping at it when under stress and in need of harmonious reintegration with their 
world? In being so grasped, music is consciously reappropriated as what 
unconsciously it always is for situated humans. When the entirety of our Being-in-the-
world is dislocated by a generalised sense of stress, we grasp consciously at the 
S4 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 15, po 980 
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normally unconscious medium of our world-integration, music, in the same way as we 
might stop to renew our grip on the hammer or bandage our finger. 86 
In this connection, improvised music is to a special degree available or (to use 
Heidegger's term) "ready to hand," for normal human persons have always been able 
to produce it from the resources of their own bodies, as in humming or whistling, 
without external artefacts or special training. 87 This use of music "ready to hand" 
when affected by stress would suggest an ontological interpretation of much casual 
humming, whistling and tapping which are of course often improvisatory.88 In so 
using music, or reappropriating it under stress, we act knowingly in the sense described 
by Jean-Franyois Lyotard: '[W]hat is meant by the term knowledge is not only a set of 
denotative statements ... It includes notions of 'know-how,' 'knowing how to live,' 
'how to listen' ... etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes beyond 
the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth'. 89 When 
reappropriating music in stress, we also perform an act of philosophising of the kind 
characterised by Karl Jaspers: 'Philosophy demands a different thinking, a thinking 
that, in knowing, reminds me, awakens me, brings me to myself, transforms me. ,90 
86 There is also a link here between the state of stress which evokes the need for music, and the idea of 
the 'limit situation' as expounded by Jaspers. In limit situations, the experience of Transcendence is 
opened up to man through 'ciphers'. 'No cognition and no insight attests the truth of ciphers, only their 
illuminating power in the existential history of the individual.' Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith and 
Revelation (1931) (London: Collins, 1967), p. 108. The implication here is that the 'limit situation' of 
stress calls forth the need for music as the 'cipher' of our existence in the world. 
87 See Jean During, "Le Point de vue du musicien: improvisation et communication." In 
L 'Improvisation, Lortat-Jacob (ed.), pp. 43-44. 
88 If improvisatory music is the voice of Being, it is also by that token our guarantor against nothingness. 
Perhaps whistling in the dark is an attempt to affirm the Being of the self against an invasion of 
"nothing" closing in through the loss of our vision and concomitant reduction of self-confidence in the 
dark. 'Every moment I stand before nothingness, so every moment I must be dowered anew with being.' 
Edith Stein, L 'Etre fini et l'etre hernel (Louvain: n.p., 1972), pp. 60-61. Cited in Brendan Purcell, 
"Understanding the Human Mystery: Human Origins in Palaeoanthropology and Philosophy." In At the 
Heart of the Real: Philosophical Essays in Honour of Archbishop Desmond Connell, Fran O'Rourke 
(ed.). (Blackrock, Co. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), p. 369. 
89 Jean-Fran<;:ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Kno·wledge (1979) (Manchester: 
Manchester Univ. Press. 1984). p.18. 
90 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy ofE'(istenc{' (1937) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), p. 12. 
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Oliver Sacks speaks as a neurologist of the therapeutic power of music in general. 
Referring to one clinical instance where music was used, Sacks quotes a patient who 
experienced the ontological power of music as granting 'not just movement, but 
existence itself. ,91 Sacks asserts that 'music has been the profoundest non-chemical 
medication for our patients. ,92 As Jaspers says, 'being itself comes out of all origins to 
meet me. I myself am given back to myself. ,93 As psychological studies have shown, 
music is effective for those in need of sanative, holistic reintegration with their world. 
Thus, in one case, an autistic boy finally learns to tie his shoe-laces when his therapist 
relates the process to singing: 'A song is a form in time. David had a special 
relationship to this element and could comprehend the shoe-tying process when it was 
organized in time through a song. ,94 Within the context of wider music-therapeutic 
procedures, improvisatory music is sometimes central.95 '[Nordoff and Robbins'] ... 
technique, Creative Music Therapy, emphasizes the creation of musical improvisations 
which serve as a nonverbal means of communication between the therapist and the 
child. ,96 Perhaps these improvisations succeed therapeutically because they re-
implement the comforting mother-infant paradigm of musical communication. 
Mechtild Langenberg writes: 'What is involved in the product of musical 
improvisation? The living process of encounter and relating provokes feelings, 
fantasies and images that are SIgnS for the staging of subjectively experienced, 
internalized, interhuman relational expenences and conflicts from earlier 
91 Oliver Sacks, Awakenings (1973) (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 282. 
92 Sacks, ibid, p. xiii. 
93 Jaspers, Existence, p. 28. 
94 Paul Nordoffand Clive Robbins, Therapy in Music/or Handicapped Children (1971) (London: 
Gollancz, 1992), p. 105. 
95 See Juliet Alvin and Auriel Warwick, Music Therapy/or the Autistic Child (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1994), pp. 36-39. 
96 Cindy Lu Edgerton, 'The Effect of Improvisational Music Therapy on the Communicative Behaviors 
of Autistic Children." The Journal 0/ Music Therapy 31, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 31-62; p. 34. See also 
Mercedes Pavlicevic. Colwyn Trevarthen, Janice Duncan, "Improvisational Music Therapy and the 
Rehabilitation of Persons Suffering from Chronic Schizophrenia." The Journal 0/ .Hush' Therapy 31, 
no. 2 (Summer 1994): 86-104. 
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developmental phases. ,97 In other words, musical improvisation recalls the babbling 
stage, a proposal which repeats claims made above. 
V Improvised Music, Time and Mood 
The distinction between improvised and non-improvised music, as it applies in the 
present context, may be usefully clarified at this point. In the first place, all music is 
closely linked to temporality. The wider issue of music and time was raised above in 
Chapter 4, Section V, and in this Chapter, Section III. In recent musicological 
discussion, issues concerning the relationship of music and time enjoy continuing 
exposure. For Philip Bohlman, '[m]usic may be ontologically dependent on time, but 
time is ontologically dependent on music'. 98 He speaks of how musical performance 
serves as an act of remembering in Sufism, Aboriginal culture, Homeric and Hindu 
epics and Asian and Japanese musical practices.99 Klaus P. Wachs mann '[c]oncludes 
that music is a special kind of time and the creation of musical time a universal 
occupation of man.' 100 For David Greene, the link between music and time may even 
be narrowed down to the way in which music mirrors the changing ways time is 
perceived within a given society, in this case, modem Europe: 'Bach's music is an 
I . f N . . ,101 aura Image 0 ewtonlan tIme. Thus Bach's musical structures reflect the 
unfolding necessity implied by a consistently Newtonian world-view. Likewise, in 
sonata-allegro form the present calls the future into being, but in this context, the future 
97 Mechtild Langenberg, "On Understanding Music Therapy: Free Musical Improvisation as a Method 
of Treatment." The World of Music 39, no. 1 (1997): 97-110; p. 98. 
98 Philip V. Bohlman, "Ontologies of Music." In Rethinking Music, Cook and Everist (eds.), p. 29. 
99 See ibid, pp. 29-30. Reference to Gilbert Rouget, Music and Trance: A Theory of the Relations 
betwccn Music and Possession (1980) (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press. 1985). 
100 Schuursma, Ethnomusicology Research, p. 65. Reference to Klaus P. Wachsmann. "Universal 
Perspectives in Music." Ethnomusicology 15, no. 3 (1971): 381-384. 
101 David B. Greene, Temporal Processes in Beethoven's Music (New York: Gordon and Breach Science 
Publishers, 1982). p. 7. Greene refers extensively in a footnote (pp. 45-46) to Edward Lowinsky, "Taste, 
Style and Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Music." In Aspects of the Eighteenth Century, Earl :\. 
Wasserman (ed.), (n.p.: n.p., 1965), pp. 179-18l. 
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feels like a fresh occurrence not the result of mechanical necessity like the future in 
Newtonian temporality, because forward thrust characterises sonata structure. Thus 
Christopher Ballantine can propose similarities between Haydn's, Mozart's and 
Beethoven's sonata-allegro forms and the Hegelian idea of the dialectic which shapes 
the temporal process. 102 Gamelan music has been found to be expressive of Hindu-
Buddhist time conceptions. 103 
Improvised music, however, embodies time still more fully than music in general. 
It not only announces time, but like time itself, also disappears into the past, 
evanescent. Also, the significance of specifically improvised music in the overall 
human experience of evocation of time in music may be all the more engrained in the 
human person, since improvised music was the preponderant music of primitive 
humanity whose instincts still haunt the depths of the modem psyche. Just as reference 
was made above to the infant's use of improvised music as a primary way of learning 
about time (Section III), it is possible that adult humans have a continuing impulse to 
explore their time especially through music which is improvised. Although the term 
"real-time music" for improvisation was severely criticised in Chapter 3 in connection 
with existing musicological agendas, against the horizon of these new insights it might 
arguably be readmissible. 
Musical improvisation as an adult musical practice remains more pervaSIve In 
cultures removed from Western rationalism, and, ipso facto, from Western 
metaphysical constructions of Being of the type Heidegger repudiates. Is this because 
102 See Greene, ibid, pp. 18-20. References to Christopher Ballantine, "Beethoven, Hegel and Marx." 
The Music Review 33 (1972): 34-46; Charles Rosen, The Classical Style (1971) (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1972), p. 44. Rosen writes that the Classical style employs a 'dramatic effect [which seems] at 
once surprising and logically motivated'; for 'paired phrases' see Rosen's 'articulated periodic 
structure.' In Rosen, ibid, pp. 57-58. 
103 See 1. Becker, "Hindu-Buddhist Time in Javanese Gamelan Music." In The Study 0/ Time IT": 
Papersjrom the Fourth Conference o/the International Society/or the Study o/Time, Alpbach. Austria, 
1. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence, D. Park (eels.), (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981). 
167 
improvisation is archetypally intuited in these cultures as corresponding in a special 
degree to the ontological project humans unconsciously pursue in making music? 
Thus it is implied that the instinct to "tune in" to the temporality of Being through 
musical improvising in peoples outside the range of Western philosophical influence 
has never been impaired by that influence. The suggestion is that where static, 
Western-style ontologies which overlook Being's temporality do not inform the 
prevailing cultural ethos and imply the superiority of an intellectual integration with 
reality based on rational thought, adults continue to integrate themselves with Being-
and-time through musical improvisation, just as children do. As Westernisation 
increases, the cultural practice of improvisation recedes: '[I]n Iran's classical music 
improvisations playa smaller role than they did some decades ago ... The prestige of 
the notated piece as a Westernized phenomenon seems to have crowded improvisation 
into a position of diminished esteem and also to have made it more like a 
composition.,104 A similar point is made by Hazel Smith and Roger Dean in relation to 
Japanese music. 105 It has also been argued that, even in the case of Western European 
listeners, there remains a deep response to music as if it were largely improvisatory, 
even though what is being heard is known to be a standard Western composed piece. 
Thus it has been suggested by Jerrold Levinson that most modem Western listeners do 
not try to attend to any overall architectonic structure in the music but, instead, like to 
listen from moment to moment. There is arguably an unconscious desire manifested 
by them to reconceive music as improvisatory even when it is not. The fundamental 
cognitive experience of the listener will always apprehend music chiefly in terms of 
temporal flow rather than overall design, and as such all listeners perceive as secondary 
104 Bruno Nett!, The Western Impact on World Music: Change, Adaptation and Survival (New York: 
Schinner, 1985), p. 67. 
105 See Smith and Dean, Improvisation, p. 21. 
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those structural attributes of music which non-improvisatory creative processes alone 
facilitate. 106 
For Paul Ricoeur, the temporal structure of Being finds expression in language, 
specifically in narrative forms. It will be suggested here that, as a complement to a 
necessary language narration as proposed by Ricoeur, there is also a necessary musical 
narration for the human person. For Ricoeur, narrative is actually required by human 
beings as a fundamental way of making sense of time, 107 since 'speculation on time is 
an inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity alone can respond.' 108 If 
arguments in favour of a right-hemispheric association for music are preferred (see 
Section I), there would appear to be a physiological basis for the claim, to be pursued 
here, that music falls under the wider designation of narrative, because there is 
evidence that the right hemisphere processes narrative sequence as well as music. 
Thus, '[p]atients who have suffered extensive damage to their right but not left 
hemispheres are generally able to speak well, without any unusual increase in 
grammatical errors or mistakes in choice of words; but when required to follow and 
106 See Jerrold Levinson, Music in the Moment (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 13-14. 
107 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol 3, (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 241-274. 
For a summation of Ricoeur's understanding of narrative, see Hayden White, "The Metaphysics of 
Narrativity." In On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, David Wood (ed.), (London: 
Routledge, 1991). White explains that for Ricoeur, '[to] 'emplot' a sequence of events and thereby 
transform what would otherwise be only a chronicle of events into a story is to effect a mediation 
between events and certain universally human 'experiences of temporality'. And this goes for fictional 
stories no less than for historical stories.' Ibid, p. 144. Ricoeur has said: 'My basic hypothesis ... is the 
following: the common feature of human experience, that which is marked, organized and clarified by 
the fact of storytelling in all its forms, is its temporal character. Everything that is recounted occurs in 
time, takes time, unfolds temporally; and what unfolds in time can be recounted. Perhaps, indeed, every 
temporal process is recognized as such only to the extent that it can, in one way or another, be recounted. 
This reciprocity which is assumed to exist between narrativity and temporality is the theme of my present 
research.' Paul Ricoeur, "On Interpretation." In Philosophy in France Today, Alan Montefiore (ed.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), p. 176. 'My work on narrativity, Temps et recit [Time and 
Narrative], develops this inquiry into the inventive power of language. Here, the analysis of narrative 
operations in a literary text, for instance, can teach us how we formulate a new structure of 'time' by 
creating new modes of plot and characterization. My chief concern in this analysis is to discover how 
the act of raconter, of telling a story, can transmute natural time into a specifically human time, 
irreducible to mathematical, chronological 'clock time'. How is narrativity, as the construction or 
deconstruction of paradigms of story-telling, a perpetual search for new ways of expressing human time, 
a production or creation of meaning? That is my question.' Paul Ricoeur. In Kearney, Dialogues, p. 
17. 
108 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol 1 (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1984), p. 6. 
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interpret a short narrative, they seem to fail to grasp the logic of the whole.' 109 This 
physiological claim might bring music within the ambit of Ricoeur's understanding of 
a narrative practice, on the basis of shared cerebral location. It has also been 
speculated that improvisatory human behaviour is predominantly a right-hemispheric 
function. llo This would relate physiologically narrative practice with music which is 
specifically improvisatory. The right hemisphere is the key to all these dimensions: 
narration, musicality and improvisation. 
My narrative existence in the world is inseparable from the fact that I exist now: 
"now" is always a new experience requiring a new tum to my narrative story and must 
be included in it for any account of my existence in the world to be complete. Parallel 
with the way in which the events of my life "now" can be narrated only in improvised 
verbal narrative, music can narrate the "now" only through improvisation. Children's 
behaviour suggests the primordial nature of improvised verbal and musical narration as 
ways of realising present experience, the experience of the "now," more fully. 
Improvised verbal narrative about what is happening "now" is common in young 
children: 'Here comes mummy with my tea. It's baked beans tonight. How many 
beans are there? One, two, three, four [etc.].' III Also, as Kartomi notes, '[ w ]hile 
concentrating on their play activity, children often utter spontaneous musical 
phrases.,112 'While at play children often produce musical improvisations, which are 
understood in the broad sense of the creation or rendering of an artistic idea in an 
109 Deacon, Symbolic Species, p. 312. Deacon cites Howard Gardner, H. Brownell, W. Wapner, D. 
Michelow, "Missing the Point: The Role of the Right Hemisphere in Processing of Complex Linguistic 
Materials." In Cognitive Processes and the Right Hemisphere, E. Perecman (ed.), (New York: 
Academic Press, 1983); B. Larsen, E. Skinhoj, N. A. Lassen, "Variations in Regional Cortical Blood 
Flow in the Right and Left Hemispheres during Automatic Speech." Brain 101 (1978): 193-209; N. A. 
Lassen, B. Larsen, "Cortical Activity in the Left and Right Hemispheres during Language-Related Brain 
Functions." Phonetica 37 (1980): 27-37. 
110 See Jausovec, "Brain Biology," p. 205. 
111 Michael Grey, personal communication, Edinburgh, 14th August, 2000. 
112 Margaret J. Kartomi, "Musical Improvisations by Children at Play." The World of Music 33, no. 3 
(1991): 53-65; p. 53. 
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unpremeditated, spontaneous manner.' 113 Play is a reverie focused on the "now" and 
its changing moods are reflected in the accompanying vocalisations; thus '[a] pleasant 
or painful experience . . . may be intense enough to result in an improvised [musical] 
comment about it while at play . . . New immediate experiences grasp the children's 
attention and create a need for new musical doodlings and songs.' 114 
What musical improvisation relates in these cases is the child's emotions and mood 
narrative in audible music now. 1 IS Our Being-in-the-world is inseparable from mood 
and must speak equally in mood, and therefore also in mood narration. Heidegger 
himself says: 'Understanding always has its mood.,116 Music is linked to the 
dimension of mood and emotion. F or Hood, music is 'directed primarily at the 
emotions.,II7 This is a 'universal in music.' 118 The link between mood, emotion and 
music was also identified by M. Papousek above: 'The preverbal origins of musical 
skills cannot be differentiated from . . . the basic alphabet of emotional 
communication.,I 19 For Flury, 'singing mothers play a vital role in their babies' 
development. The varying sound pattern of a mother's voice in lullabies and nursery 
rhymes helps the child to understand and express its emotions.' 120 Since emotion is 
113 Ibid, p. 63. 
114 Ibid, p. 6l. 
115 The special relationship between improvisation and present-time experience has been argued also by 
Ed Sarath. 'My central premise is that the improviser experiences time in an inner-directed, or 'vertical' 
manner, where the present is heightened'. Sarath, "New Look at Improvisation," p. 1. Sarath 
acknowledges dependence (ibid, p. 32, endnote 1) on Jonathan Kramer for this use of "vertical," as 
found in Kramer, Time of Music. 
116 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 31, p. 182. 
117 Hood, "Universal Attributes of Music," p. 65. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Papousek, "Intuitive Parenting." In Musical Beginnings, Deliege and Sloboda (eds.), pp. 91-92. 
Reference to Papousek, "Determinants of Responsiveness." 
120 Annie Flury, "Singing Helps Emotional Development." Article in The Times newspaper, 7th August, 
2000, p. 3. Flury is describing current research by Helen Marwick and Colwyn Trevarthen at the 
University of Edinburgh. Marwick comments, linking music and emotion: 'When we speak or sing, we 
are unaware of the intonation being used as it comes naturally to us. But babies do not know words and 
are only aware of the sounds expressed to them. As they start to pick up words, they learn the emotion 
attached to them. That is how babies learn the meaning of words ... Song is the most emotionally 
expressive form of language, so it accelerates the process of recognising voice pitch and associating that 
with the correct emotion. If a child does not hear emotion expressed in this way, it may not learn how to 
express its own emotions.' Helen Marwick. Cited in ibid. 
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widely regarded as linked with the right hemisphere,121 the connections made by 
Papousek, Hood and Marwick between emotion and music might reinforce an 
argument in favour of music's right-hemispheric association. This in tum would 
reinforce music's proposed link with narrative and improvisation, likewise seen above 
to be processed by the right hemisphere. This hemisphere now seems, in sum, to be 
responsible for: emotion, music, narrative, improvisation. 
Verbal narrative is event narration and musical narrative is mood narration. 122 If 
'[u]nderstanding always has its mood' (Heidegger, supra) then from infancy upwards, 
musical narration thus seems no less necessary to humans than verbal narration as they 
humanise their time in narrative terms, as Ricoeur describes. For David Elliott: 
'[C]onsciousness is integrated. There is likely no such thing as thinking without 
feeling or feeling without thinking. Thinking and feeling are hybrids, neither 
completely emotive nor completely cognitive in content. ,123 Indeed, some languages, 
such as Javanese, reflect this mood/meaning link more obviously than English. 124 
Humans are unavoidably embedded affectively in the world, in family, in culture. If 
language necessarily projects us intellectually into situations, mood projects us 
emotionally. Mood thus has an ontological bearing: in the words of Ricoeur, 
121 Izard asserts that this is the 'most widely held opinion.' Izard, Psychology of Emotions, p. 74. 
However 'the scant evidence is divided.' Ibid, p. 75. See also ibid, pp. 74-76. Izard cites in favour of 
the view that emotions are processed by the right hemisphere D. Galin, "Two Modes of Consciousness 
and Two Halves of the Brain." In Symposium on Consciousness (AAAS 1974), P. R. Lee, R. E. 
Ornstein, D. Galin, A. Deikman, C. T. Tart (eds.), (New York: Viking, 1976), pp. 26-66; M. A. Safer 
and H. Leventhal, "Ear Differences in Evaluating Emotional Tones of Voice and Verbal Content." 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 3 (1977): 75-82. Other 
studies have suggested that 'the right hemisphere is more likely to be involved in mediating negative 
emotion and the right [clearly a misprint for 'left'] hemisphere positive emotion.' Izard, ibid, p. 99. 
Reference to N. A. Fox and R. J. Davidson, "Hemispheric Substrates of Affect: A Developmental 
Model." In The Psychobiology of Affective Development, N. A. Fox and R. J. Davidson (eds.), 
(Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum, 1984), pp. 353-381. 
122 'The question of musical narrativity, while by no means new, is making a comeback as the order of 
the day in the field of musicological thought.' Jean-Jacques Nattiez, "Can One Speak of Narrativity in 
Music?" Journal o"the Roml Musical Association 115, no. 2 (1990): 240-257; p. 240. 
123. 'j. 
EllIott, Music Maffers, p. 64. 
1~4 See Fernandez-Armesto, Truth, p. 27. 
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'[ t ]hrough feeling we find ourselves already located in the world.' 125 Thus feelings are 
not chiefly personal emotions, such as inner joy or grief, but an essential way of 
belonging to, and participating in the world. 126 
Being must inevitably speak in mood. For Ricoeur, it must also be humanised as 
temporal narrative. Yet mood is narrated only inadequately in words. Music is needed 
for Being to speak narratively in mood, and improvised music for Being to speak 
narratively in mood "now." For Susanne Langer, 'any exact concepts of feeling and 
emotion cannot be projected into the logical form of literal language . . . Crude 
designations like 'joy', 'sorrow', 'fear' tell us as little about vital experience as general 
words like 'thing', 'being', or 'place' tell us about the world of our perceptions.' 127 
'Because the forms of human feeling are much more congruent with musical forms 
than with the forms of language, music can reveal the nature of feelings with a detail 
and truth that language cannot approach.' 128 'Indeed, the presence and importance of 
singing in most of the world's cultures attest to the universal binding of music and 
speech.,129 This is to be expected if there is 'no such thing as thinking without feeling 
or feeling without thinking' (Elliott, supra). 
Chandola has shown how the three elements, mUSIC, language, and mood or 
emotion, form an integral triad: 
Music cannot exist prior to speech evolution. I would even go so far as to say that music as a system is a 
secondary evolution of speech ... In fact, in the Indian tradition instrumental music is considered to be 
secondary to vocal music ... [S]peech is representative of language and language is situations ... That 
is to say, natural language also contains emotions as integral constituents. Emotions, therefore, are 
linguistic in nature. And speech as a modality of language transmits emotions in every sentence 
produced by a human. 
If we believe that natural speech is emotive, then it is also easy to see why a musical performance is 
considered to be emotive too. In fact, the Sanskrit word raga means 'emotion'. When we say that a raga 
expresses an emotion, we are really supporting the argument that music is like speech. Music like 
125 Paul Ricoeur, "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor." Philosophy Today 17, no. 2 
(1973): 97-111; p. Ill. 
126 See Bryant, Faith and the Play of Imagination, pp. 204-205. 
127 Susanne Langer, Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures (London: Routledge and Kegan PauL 
1957), p. 91. 
128 Langer. Philosophy in a Nnl' Key, p. 235. 
129 Aiello, "Music and Language," p. 43. 
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speech is also naturally emotive. We believe that this is due to the fact that music and speech evolved 
together. 130 
Chandola's suggestion here is that music is the phenomenon in which speech naturally 
extends its emotional range: the 'secondary evolution of speech' is 'raga.' Music is 
the place where verbal expression transmutes fully into expression of emotion. This is 
especially true of expressing emotions in the form of mood, for mood is emotion which 
does not have an identifiable object. About these vague states of mood, words are even 
less well able to speak than when they describe specific objects which elicit emotion. 
'Sometimes one feels sad without its being the case that there is anything about which 
one feels sad.' 131 'Music as emotional expression provides a vehicle for expression of 
ideas and emotions which might not be revealed in ordinary discourse.' 132 This mood 
narration of music, including the mood narration of the present moment in musical 
improvisation, thus seems as central to human experience as the verbal narration which 
includes the improvisatory ability to narrate verbally what I am doing "now." Indeed, 
it is widely noted that improvisatory singing, humming or whistling may be a natural 
expression of a person's mood in circumstances where use of words neither suggests 
itself to that person, nor would be satisfying self-expression. 133 
VI Ontology Beyond Paradigms 
It has been seen that Being is unveiled in a plenary manner in improvised music, 
and in performing, or listening to improvised music, adult humanity becomes open to 
130 Chando1a, Music as Speech, pp. 115-116. 
IJI Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press. 1994), p. 213. 
Davies provides here a survey of current literature on issues of emotion and mood in music. 
132 Radocy and Boyle, Psychological Foundations of Musical Behavior, pp. 164-165 Reference to 
Merriam, Anthropology of Music, n.p. 
133 Consistency has been found in people's attachment of mood adjectives to particular types of musical 
expression. Surveys of this phenomenon take their origin substantially from the work of K. Hevner. See 
K. Hevner, "Expression in Music: A Discussion of Experimental Studies and Theories." Psychological 
Re\'jc\I' 42 (1935): 186-204; K. Hevner, "Experimental Studies of the Elements of Expression in Music." 
American Journal of Psychology 48 (1936): 246-268. 
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the unveiling of Being through unconscious re-implementation of infantile paradigms 
of musicality in which exploratory vocal ising likewise integrates the human person 
with the real. This position subsumes ideas of Heidegger that "Being speaks" in 
poetry, or improvised poetry. Trapped in verbal referentiality, the latter genres 
function as disclosures of Being though of lesser intensity. Likewise music in general, 
which is less congruent with temporality than the evanescent music of the kind babies 
produce, speaks Being, though less fully than improvised music. 
Improvisation is the musical activity furthest from the possibility of notatability (it 
generally moves too fast for the scribe to notate) and furthest removed from being 
referred to as a finished musical object, for its form is being created in the present. 
Thus improvised music tends to resist objectifying acts of reference to itself of any 
kind. 134 Representational activities, or models, scores or analyses are, in 
improvisation, chiefly neutralised. In this respect again, improvisation evokes Being 
rather more closely than other musical activities, for Being itself is resistant to 
representation in rational models, as Heidegger showed. The proposal that 
improvisation is resistant to representation is not undermined by the fact that it may 
seem easy for improvisation to be modelled retrospectively with the aid of sound 
recording, perhaps by writing it down in notation while listening to the recording. 
Such a "model" based on repeated listening, however, does not model the 
improvisation as such, for one of musical improvisation's constructive dimensions lies 
in the fact that its creative time seeks to be as nearly as possible correspondent with a 
single stretch of clock time. In this, it differs from other types of musical creativity 
which, from the moment of first intention are removed from a single stretch of time 
(i.e., into preparation time and performance time) and whose products may thus be 
1.14 • [A ]ny attempt to describe improvisation must be, in some respects, a misrepresentation, for there is 
something central to the spirit of voluntary improvisation which is opposed to the aims and contradicts 
the idea of documentation.' Bailey, Improvisation, p. ix. 
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legitimately analysed outside the time of their auditory manifestation. In short, a 
model must take account of the cultural conventions attaching to the production of the 
musical genre it strives to model. Any true model of improvisation would have to be 
constructed while the improvisation is taking place, would have to be temporal, or it is 
not actually a model of the improvisation but instead of a finished composition 
achieved using an improvisatory event plus a sound recorder. 135 There is a clear 
parallel here between the way improvisation can only be modelled in real time, and 
Heidegger's view that Being is expressed only through historical process, and cannot 
be described in static formulations. This fact enhances the proposal that improvised 
rather than fixed musical forms most purely announce Being. 
For George Steiner, like Heidegger, the human mind can never have a complete 
rational grasp of Being in its wholeness. Indeed, there seems inevitably to be a kind of 
hiatus between Being as a whole and the attempted human "knowledge" of it. Such 
"knowledge" of Being, as it has appeared in the history of philosophy, is thus always 
shown to contain some incompleteness. Steiner observes that, for example, an 
axiomatic system in mathematics 'can prove its own consistency only by including at 
least one postulate which cannot itself be proved from within that system.' 136 
Moreover, both Descartes and Kant included unprovable postulates in their 
philosophical systems, the former in assuming without apparent justification that God 
could not have devised the universe in such a way as to deceive reason, the latter in 
assuming an inbuilt accord between human understanding and perception of things, 
135 For a discussion of some further implications of seeking to analyse improvised music see Roger T. 
Dean, New Structures in Ja::.::. and Improvised Music since 1960 (Milton Keynes: Open Univ. Press, 
1992), pp. 191-207. In connection with a general insight that the essence of improvisation cannot be 
captured through recording, Dean cites Cornelius Cardew: 'Documents such as tape recordings of 
improvisation are essentially empty, as they preserve chiefly the form that something took and give at 
best an indistinct hint as to the feeling and cannot convey any sense of time and place.' Cornelius 
Cardew, Treatise Handbook (London: Peters, 1971), p. xvii. Cited in ibid, p. 200. Also on analysis of 
improvisation, see John Rink, "Schenker and Improvisation." Journal of Music Theory 37, no. 1 (1993): 
1-54. 
136 Steiner, Real Presences, p. 213. 
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despite asserting that "things in themselves" cannot be known. For Steiner every 
attempt rationally to describe the real as a whole has involved some unprovable 
• 137 
assumptIon. 
The ambitious and failed project represented by such rational ontologies drew 
confidence from the historical rise of the natural sciences whose methodology it 
emulates, yet even here a similar problem is in fact also found. In constructing any 
scientific model of the real world, certain properties (such as mass, velocity) are chosen 
and isolated because they can be precisely measured. Yet there are many other 
properties to things which cannot be measured ( complexity, for example) and 
which are not included in the model. 'To isolate some properties from others is already 
to construct an abstract model of the world, not to say what the world is really like.' 138 
Such a model does not express in toto what the world is. All rational ontologies 
therefore fail. In words of Ricoeur: 'What fails is not thinking ... but the impulse - or 
to put it a better way, the hubris - that impels our thinking to posit itself as the master 
of meaning ... [TJime, escaping our will to mastery, surges forth on the side of 
what ... is the true master of meaning.' 139 Nevertheless, because of its strong hold 
over the Western metaphysical tradition, 'the abandoning of this philosophy' is felt 'as 
a wound'. 140 If reality cannot be domesticated by the human intellect it is presumably 
kneaded back into itself, into its own absolute otherness, turning a volte-face to mock 
the totalising pretensions of the human mind. Man cannot speak Being: Being, as time 
and language, speaks man. Only the Cartesian pretensions of a "transcendental 
137 See ibid, pp. 213-214. 
138 Keith Ward, God, Chance and Necessity (Oxford: One World, 1996), p. 54. 
139 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol 3, p. 261. 
140 Ib'd 1 ,p. 206. 
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subject" rooted in the cogito could have conceived of the project of objectifying the 
whole of reality successfully in consciousness as a detached spectator. 141 
A further criticism of rational ontologies of the type which Heidegger repudiated is 
that they are intellectual paradigms, which, following Thomas Kuhn, arise as 
accidental products of social and cultural forces and in which 'an apparently arbitrary 
element, compounded of personal and historical accident, is always a formative 
ingredient' :42 Paradigms are related to contexts of social action which provide the 
categorial framework for certain kinds of human experience rather than others, and 
they can only be understood in the context of the history of human societies. 
Philosophies, including rational ontologies, may ultimately even be projections of what 
a particular social and intellectual community unconsciously needs to believe. In this 
light, a psychoanalytic interpretation of the mistaken philosophical quest to totalise the 
real in the intellect is suggestive, in the sense that rational ontologies invest the chaotic 
nature of experience with a reassuring semblance of intelligibility. 143 
In these critiques of rational ontologies, reality re-emerges as that which the mind 
never has fully grasped, and never will grasp, and, as such, reality is released from the 
illusory golden cage of conceptualisation, reverting to being one thing with historical 
process, as Heidegger indeed claimed. Through the pursuit of rational ontological 
mirages, the mind of Dasein, laced through and through with absence, since in no 
sense the master of its own existence, has nevertheless been constantly tempted by a 
kind of illusion to constitute for itself intellectually the meaning of Being as a whole. 
Yet a mind which is prima facie absent from itself twice (prior to birth and after death) 
and present to itself only once (in life) seems a wispy standpoint from which to seek a 
141 See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979) 
for a discussion of the Cartesian roots of this position. 
142 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1962), p. -+. 
143 See Madison, Hermeneutics of Postmodernify, pp. 125-126. 
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grasp of totality. This mind, borrowed from absence, never asked to be born, is never 
sure it will not die before it has said all it wants to say, will die either too soon or too 
late, either still asking questions, or too tired to ask questions any more. Once it is 
seen how thought must submit to 'the wound of time' 144 it becomes clear how limited 
is the scope of human subjectivity. 
It is now widely recognised in the philosophical community that the notion of 
rational ontology formulated in static concepts, a complete explanation of Being in 
general, in concepts and ideas, is severely problematical. It is suggested here that 
improvised music replaces rational ontology. A new ontology, Being arises for 
humans in improvised music as an experience not an intellectual construction: we think 
in Being, not about it, and in experiencing Being in improvised music we experience it, 
like infants (and following Heidegger) as time and language. This new ontology 
represents a growth, not a rupture in the Western discourse on Being. Heidegger 
already shifted the focus of philosophical analysis away from ideas and towards the 
language which expresses them. To the question 'What permits meaningful thinking?' 
he replied: language. The present thesis simply looks further in the same direction: 
ideas indeed presuppose language, but language presupposes prosodic sound. Prosodic 
sound thus permits meaningful thinking. It is not in the sphere of rational meaning that 
the word is constitutive of metaphysical meaning for man, but in the wider musical 
implications of language as auditory. Even as vigorous an opponent of Heidegger as 
Rudolf Carnap observed, '[m]etaphysicians are musicians without musical ability' .145 
This new musical ontology is also akin to the oldest metaphysical intuitions of 
144 Mark Taylor, "Aparte." In Ray Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology 
and a Rhetoric of Revelation (1968) (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), p. xvi. 
145 See Rudolf Carnap, "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language." In 
Heideggcr and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays. Michael Murray (ed.), (New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1978), pp. 33-34. 
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humanity: 'For most primitive peoples the origin of life is a sound: it was God's hum, 
croak, gibber, laugh or chuckle that stirred creation within the void.' 146 
The argument for resituating human understanding of the real within the musical 
domain is more than an attempt to respond to the fact that rational, verbal ontological 
projects are failing. This negative incentive to encounter reality in another medium 
than verbal rationality is complemented by a powerful positive recognition that, for 
many discourses outside ontology, parallel needs to establish non-verbal presentations 
of the real are increasingly felt. Indeed, much modem thought in genetics, physics, 
cosmology, and other scientific specialisms can only be expressed in mathematics. 147 
Steiner describes common speech as 'Ptolemaic' and 'alchemical' in its attempts to 
describe the world presented by science. 148 There is surely a parallel between the idea 
that aspects of reality are accessible not to the literate but only to the numerate, and the 
idea that reality as a whole is known not through rational 'alchemical' verbal meaning 
but through musical sound. 149 
Music is a deep vein of concrete, existential "wild" knowing surging beneath the 
abstract, intellectual "tame" knowing of conscious reason. Rather than trying to master 
Being with concepts, we should listen to Being. It is of course the music event itself, 
not the fact that music is the unveiling of truth, that is the truth: the unveiling is not the 
same as referring to the unveiling. Nor is the inscribing of it in musical notation the 
unveiling, for this unveiling is the event of music heard. The light does not fall upon 
music from ourselves, but breaks forth from its interior just as music itself breaks forth 
146 Wilfred Mellers, "The Meanings of Monody." Choir and Organ 8, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 
15-18; p. 15. 
141 See Steiner, Real Presences, p. 114. 
14H S ·b·d ee 1 1 . 
149 In the case of realities known only through mathematical formulae, independence of the linguistic 
dimension is only relative: the scope and function of the formulae still need to be explained. The 
formulae do not violate the principle that all meaning seeks a home in language. Music does not need to 
seek a home in language because it is already a dimension of language. Thus, as ontology, it 
communicates itself without verbal rationality, but nevertheless linguistically. 
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from the interior of language, in the form of prosody which grants meaning to the 
word. This idea of the breaking forth of the true already falls within our understanding, 
and is not in the least obscure where that breaking forth relates to more prosaic 
realisations. Thoughts and ideas often come to us, not as directly concluded to, but as 
a breaking forth from within our thinking. Conclusions often occur to us or strike us 
rather than being arrived at through a controlled process. Heidegger said: 'We never 
come to thoughts. They come to us.' 150 Thought is often something which happens to 
us before it is something we do. 'A close friend of Einstein's has told me that many of 
the physicist's greatest ideas came to him so suddenly while he was shaving that he had 
to move the blade of the straight razor very carefully each morning, lest he cut himself 
with surprise.' 151 
The musical disclosure of Being appears, moreover, to present a solution to another 
profound methodological problem inherent in the concept of the rational ontology. 
There is a hiatus between the knower and the knowable which rational ontologies fail 
to take account of, and still less bridge, namely that the rationality by which such 
ontologies seek to define the real cannot rationally demonstrate that there exists any 
"real" to define. The fact that existence and thought are is not rationally demonstrable 
without circularity. The fact that thought exists cannot be proven, without circularity: 
a man cannot say that he knows that he knows, without infinite regress. I cannot prove 
ad infinitum that 'I know that I know that I know.' I cannot reach behind the fact that I 
just do know. Nor can the fact that existence just is be demonstrated. The fact that 
existence "is" is a presupposition of reason because reason is included in things that 
are. Thus I cannot consciously get behind the fact that I just am. This means that the 
150 Martin Heidegger, Aus de,. Erfahrung des Denkens (Pfullingen: n.p., 1954), p. 11. Cited in Fran 
O'Rourke, "The Gift of Being: Heidegger and Aquinas." In Heart of the Rea/' 0' Rourke (ed.), p. 314. 
151 Julian Jaynes. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral AJind (1976) 
(Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 44. 
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horizon of reality cannot be restricted to what rational thinking is able to present to our 
minds. 'No matter what I think, my own being as a whole is not contained in any 
thinking or thought. ,152 Experience goes before all systems of thought. The resistance 
to 'antiseptic rationalism, and indeed all abstract thought which passes over the whole 
person,153 was already strongly felt in the eighteenth century by 'Rousseau, Jakobi, 
Herder, Fichte, Schelling ... in their efforts to get at the experiential fullness of human 
existence in the world.' 154 In the late nineteenth century, Nietzsche and Dilthey 
represent a similarly oriented school of "life philosophy," and, in addition, the 
following quotation from Newman is suggestive: 'If I may not assume that I exist, and 
in a particular way, that is, with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to 
speculate about, and had better let speculation alone. Such as I am, it is my all; this is 
my essential stand-point, and must be taken for granted; otherwise, thought is but an 
idle amusement, not worth the trouble' .155 
Being thus comes before rational thinking, which means that knowledge of Being 
will be found in experience somehow prior to the rationally meaning word. As 
William James said: 'The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, 
h d . b f: xh·b·· ,156 t e reasone argument IS ut a sur ace e 1 ItlOn. Following Kierkegaard, 
existence must be thought 'not dispassionately and objectively, but with the whole of 
our personality.' 157 'The unshakeable belief that rational thought, guided by causality, 
can penetrate to the depths of beings . . . This sublime metaphysical illusion is an 
instinctual accompaniment to science' . 158 As Heidegger realised, because, by 
152 Jaspers, Existence, p. 70. 
153 Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 10 l. 
154 Ibid. 
155 John Henry Newman, Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870) (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. 
Press, 1979), p. 272. 
156 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (London: Longmans and Green, 1902), p. 74. 
157 Peter Rohde, Sorell Kierkegaard (1959) (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 149. 
158 Friedrich Nietzsche, no documentation. Cited in David West, An Introduction to Continental 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 130. 
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definition, rational "ontologies" can never get to the heart of the real, they constantly 
contradict one another, and, because history is the matrix, it is not possible to say that a 
particular rational ontology will never be revised or replaced, which disqualifies it 
from the start from being a final expression of Being. Music, however, reaches out 
from a deeper place beneath the word, in much the same way as existence reaches out 
to man prior to man's attempts to think existence. '[T]he musical work of art expressly 
sets to work that originary movement [Ur-Bewegung] of being's address to us and our 
correspondence with it ... For here the common origin of all human languages is set to 
work. That is why it has been possible to describe music as the 'universal language': 
man's relation to that which truly sustains his essence ... In an emphatic sense, 
therefore, music is the art of man's 'belonging and hearkening to the world' 
[Weltzugeh6rigkeit], and thus the art of the very play of time and space.,159 Unlike 
metaphysical philosophy, music never contradicts itself because its disclosure of Being 
is not in the partial representation associated with concepts, but a primary experience 
of time itself expressed in a medium which also belongs within the overall 
phenomenon of language. 
In Ricoeur's post-Cartesian concept of the subject, the individual is always already 
constituted by what is outside himself and '[ c ]onceptualization cannot reach meaning 
directly or create meaning out of itself ex nihilo; it cannot dispense with the detour of 
mediation through figurative structures.' 160 Likewise, for Heidegger, the subject is 
constituted by language. It is proposed now that, via such a hermeneutical detour, 
through music, Dasein is constituted. In this way, although we make music, we do not 
"speak" music: music "speaks" man. On the one hand, the power of music belongs to 
ourselves, since humans alone have the power to produce music. On the other hand, as 
159 P61tner, "Mozart and Heidegger." p. 16. 
160 Ricoeur. In Kearney, Dialogues, p. 23. 
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an emotional power which overcomes us, music does not belong to us. The power of 
music grips and seizes a human being entirely and immediately in a way unparalleled 
by any other art. We cannot identify the ultimate source from which the power of 
music arises. It does not come from ourselves; indeed rather than being in control of 
music, music overwhelms us. Moreover, it is not the violin which seizes us but the 
violin music. And it is not the singer or composer who captivates us but the song. We 
are seized by the music itself, not its physical causes. 161 When music seizes the human 
person in this way it surely elicits that 'primal experience of astonishment'162 that 
anything exists at all, the attitude of wonder by which, for Heidegger, man is brought 
into the presence of Being, and which he calls "attunement" (Stimmung).163 Music 
seizes us in an energising thrill which infuses wonder, because here Being is speaking 
us. Composer John Taverner has observed of music that '[ w]e do not dissect it; it 
dissects us.' 164 Jean During also writes of a primordial human experience of the 
performer's being swept up by music as by a force from outside himself, and speaks 
especially of improvisation in this connection. 165 For Gabriel Marcel, 'existence is 
inseparable from a certain astonishment. ,166 For him likewise, '[ t ]he engaged musician 
... is possessed by the real in such a way that he no longer knows exactly whether it is 
he who is fashioning the music, or music which fashions him.' 167 Marcel has written 
that when he comes to love a piece of music slowly yet more deeply 'it obliges me to 
invent new categories for it; it exercises its authority on me, it becomes a centre which 
161 See Poltner, "Mozart and Heidegger," pp. 18-19. 
162 Safranski, Heidegger, p. 105. 
163 'The attuning which became the grounding attuning of the ftrst beginning was that which the Greeks 
named as the origin of philosophy: thaumazein (wonder, Erstaunen.)' Gail Stenstad, "Attuning and 
Transfonnation." Heidegger Studies 7 (1991): 75-88; p. 77. 
164 John Taverner, "Notes from the Celestial City." Interview with Jeremy Begbie. Third Way 
(December 1998): 18-21; p. 19. 
165 See DUring, "Point de vue," pp. 43-44. 
166 Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity (New York: Noonday. 1964), pp. 63-64. 
167 Elaine R. Schenk, "Musical Meaning in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel." Ph. D dissertation. 
University of New York, 1994, p. 187. Reference to Gabriel Marcel, Homo ~ Tiato,.: Introduction to a 
Metaphysic o/Hope (1945) (New York: Harper and Row. 1962). p. 145. 
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imposes on me a regrouping of myself.' 168 Music is disclosive of 'the world in which I 
move when I am improvising on the piano, a world which is also, I am quite certain, 
the world in which the creative musician constructs his melodies. It is a world in 
which everything is in communication, in which everything is bound together.' 169 
'How many times, when I felt cut off from myself, that is from my profound roots, and 
somehow absorbed by the everyday, as soon as I sat down at the piano and let my 
hands wander over the keys, have I not had a kind of physical feeling of sails being 
filled, of a heart that began to beat once more.'}70 'How music possesses us is a 
question to which we know no credible, let alone materially examinable answer, as 
might be expected of something which resists formulation in words. All we have are 
further images. And the defiant self-evidence of human experience.,} 71 If it is music 
which possesses man rather than man who possesses music, then it is presumably only 
man who divides music into separate musical "pieces." Where music is not divided 
into pieces, people pass in and out of it and music becomes a state of Being with a 
different significance from music as symbolic form. 'The communal music of African 
peoples from the Shona to the Arabs, with its ties to both mystical trance and tribal 
conviviality, often goes on for hours without interruption; it does not comprise 
'pieces,.,I72 It may indeed often be protracted improvisation. Similarly, for John 
Cage: '[Q]uite a lot of people in India feel that music is continuous; it is only we who 
tum away. This is a cliche in Indian thinking and, surely, in Indian experience.' 173 
168 Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. 233. Cited in Sam Keen, 
Apology for Wonder (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 34. 
169 Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being II: Faith and Reality (1949) (London: Harvill Press, 1951), p. 
15. 
170 Gabriel Marcel, "La musique et Ie Regne de l'esprit." In L 'esthetique musicale de Gabriel Marcel 
(Paris: Aubier, 1980), p. 58. Cited in Schenk, "Musical Meaning," p. 131. 
171 Steiner, Real Presences, p. 198. 
172 Lee Konitz, "All the Things 'All the Things You Are' Is." In Ja:::: Text: T'oice and Improvisation in 
Poetry, Ja::::, and Song, Charles O. Hartman (ed.), (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), p. 9. 
173 William Duckworth, "Anything I Say will be Misunderstood: An Interview with John Cage." In 
John Cage at Seventy-Five, Richard Fleming and William Duckworth (eds.), (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
Univ. Press, 1989), p. 22. 
185 
The desire which prompts philosophers to the metaphysical quest has probably 
always been rooted in the search for beauty though generally in an unconscious way. 
There has always been an underlying assumption that the "truth" they hope to disclose 
will satisfy the mind with a consoling intellectual vision which is similar to satisfaction 
found in an aesthetic object. Truth is sought because it pleases. Music is where the 
desire which secretly drives metaphysics is finally emancipated. Music converts 
philosophy back to desire, mirroring philosophy's roots in desire back upon itself. In 
words of Gabriel Marcel: 'It is nearly impossible to express in conceptual language this 
secret action of music upon the heart of a thought that is passionately engaged in a 
metaphysical search.' 174 Heidegger' s belief was that philosophy was destined to find a 
second beginning, through a shift similar to the ancient transformation away from pre-
Socratic participation in Being,175 though in this case a positive shift. The event of 
music, as the new path for thinking, seems to provide the solution to Heidegger's 
problematic to the effect that the question 'What is Being?' leads into a hermeneutical 
circle in which we are inevitably involved in a pre-comprehension of the answer, for 
we cannot even ask 'What is Being?' without using some part of the verb "to be.,,176 
This paradox implies that Being cannot be formulated in response to the question 
'What is ... ?' Because Being is anterior to thinking, that is to say, already present in 
the is of the question, it can only be pre-understood. 
This pre-understanding is music. For Heidegger's thought, a distinction obtains 
between the ontic and the ontological. 'The term 'ontic' designates everything that 
exists. The term 'ontological' designates the curious, astonished, alarmed thinking 
174 Gabriel MarceL "La musique dans rna vie et mon oeuvre." Lecture given in Vienna, 19th September, 
1959, and Brussels, 15th October, 1959. In Marcel, L 'esthetique musicale (incomplete documentation), 
p.95. Cited in Schenk, "Musical Meaning," p. 32. 
175 See William Barrett, "Heidegger and Modem Existentialism." In ,\fen of Ideas: Some Creators of 
Contemporary Philosophy. Dialogues with Brian Magee (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 
1978), p. 94. 
176 See 0' Rourke, "Gift of Being," pp. 31 0-31l. 
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about the fact that I exist and that anything exists at all.' 177 In connection with this 
distinction between Being as ontically pre-understood and Being as ontologically 
examined and questioned, Pattison makes the observation that: 
because Heidegger's own statement regarding what is involved in the second beginning of philosophy 
requires the postulating of a movement beyond all prevailing paradigms of knowledge (shaped as these 
are by the metaphysical presuppositions of philosophy's fIrst beginnings), the very distinction that 
Heidegger himself makes between the ontical and the ontological is rendered questionable - if, that is, 
the 'merely ontical' is no longer evaluated according to criteria derived from metaphysics. In other 
words, isn't the division between the merely ontical and fundamental ontology itself all too redolent of 
such metaphysical dualities as the essential and the existential or the necessary and the contingent? If 
this question is taken seriously ... then the 'turning' towards the second beginning of philosophy that 
Heidegger so eloquently invokes will itself demand an occurrence in the realm of the ontical or of 
experience before it can become an event in thought. 178 
This position would tend to enhance a claim that Being is disclosed in the music event, 
both the musical event as normally understood and the musical event which is present 
in all speech events, the musical event always remaining logically prior to any attempt 
to formulate it in words (it preconditions the words themselves), and situated in the 
realm of the ontical and the pre-thought. Music is Pattison's 'occurrence.' Derrida 
speaks also of a certain kind of 'second beginning,' and music provides an answer to 
his question: '[F]rom what site or non-site can philosophy as such appear to itself as 
other than itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner? 
Such a non-site or alterity would be radically irreducible to philosophy. But the 
problem is that such a non-site cannot be defined or situated by means of philosophical 
language.,)79 The sound which underlies the word cannot be 'defined or situated by 
philosophical language' because the latter presupposes sound, and, as has been argued 
here, music. Music is the 'non-site or alterity' and is 'radically irreducible to 
philosophy' because, being a hidden presupposition of language, it cannot be 
objectified in language, cannot be referred to without an implied circularity. It was no 
177 Safranski, Heidegger, p. 150. 
178 Pattison, Agnosis, p. 169. 
179 Jacques Derrida. In Kearney, Dialogues, p. 108. 
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less a writer than Lyotard who observed that art 'present[s] the fact that the 
unpresentable exists. ,ISO 
The musical event is thus the 'unrepresentable before' (Levinas), the 'dreadfully 
ancient' (Blanchot), lSI the non-fundamental fundament which forever funds and 
refunds experience as the 'non-reflexive, pre-theoretical, pre-thetic given,,IS2 the 
primordial word of Being 'left unthought"IS3 an 'uncanny 'fundament' that neither is 
nor is not.' IS4 It cannot be brought to verbal meaning without generating an infinite 
regress: to identify it, I would have to use more words, underlain by still more musical 
events, musical events which would in tum need to be explained in more words ... etc. 
ad infinitum. Yet, as the voice of Being, the musical event announces everything. In 
words of Marcel, 'existence . . . comes to us as something which contains and also 
goes beyond everything to which we might seek to reduce it. ,ISS Moreover, existence 
is temporality as well as language, and only the primordial improvisatory expression of 
music, wedded to a single seamless stretch of time, can articulate this temporal 
dimension fully. Other spontaneous attempts to be expressive in musical performances 
(Chapter 1) and prosodically expressive speech, are improvisation's cognates, for these 
too are expressive in virtue of improvisatory decisions taken in the temporal flow. 
180 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, p. 78. 
181 See Taylor, "Aparte." In Hart, Unfinished Man, p. xv. 
IR1 Ib'd ' 
- I, p. XIV, 
183 Ibid, 
184 Ibid, 
185 Marcel, Mystery of Being II, p. 33. 
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PART THREE: MUSICAL IMPROVISATION AND HOPE 
Chapter 6 
Improvisation and the Fundamental Hope of 'Dasein ' 
1 Music and Projection in 'Dasein' 
For Heidegger, Dasein is characterised by a fonn of forward projection: 
Understanding always presses forward towards possibilities of being which it is 'not yet' because, 
inherent in Understanding, is the existential structure of 'projection'. Projection does not mean that 
Dasein has some plan or design which it has thought out in advance and which it hopes to carry through 
in one way or another - though this may result from projection. Rather, projection means that Dasein has 
always already projected possibilities of being on the basis of its self and the kind of situation in which it 
finds itself ... As thrown being-in-the-world Dasein always is already projecting possibilities of being 
whether or not it is ever aware of doing SO.l 
This sense of implicatedness with a future belongs to the very structure of Dasein, and 
to the essence of what it means to be alive, an a priori comparable with experiences of 
embodiment or of language. Humans feel their very existence as a future which comes 
along, which they meet, and into which they carry on. Thus they do not exist with the 
result that they have a future, as though they first existed in some static atemporal 
condition and only then carried on, as it were, into the future: humans exist because 
they have a future. Existence is a projection into the future. 
The projective nature of Dasein which defines human existence is made possible 
by the human imagination. For Heidegger 'the imagination and the temporal nature of 
man are the fundamental conditions that make understanding possible; and, of course, 
temporality and imagination are precisely what we see in the activity of projecting 
possibilities and meanings and even the world itself. ,2 Kearney asks: 'Are we not 
[imagining] every day, every night, every time we dream, pretend, play, fantasize, 
invent, lapse into reverie, remember times past or project better times to come?,3 For 
Bronowski, '[m]an is distinguished from other animals by his imaginative gifis.,4 
1 Christopher Macann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, .\ferleau-
Pon~l' (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 88. 
2 Macquarrie, Existentialism, p. 131. 
3 Richard Kearney, Poetics of lmaginingfrom Husserl to L,votard (London: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 1. 
4 J. Bronowski, The Ascent of Man (1973) (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1976), p. 20. 
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Gaston Bachelard writes of the way in which this imagination which defines the 
human person is precisely the faculty which opens up the future in human experience: 
'[T]he imagination separates us from the past as well as from reality; it faces the 
future. To the function of reality, wise in experience of the past, as it is defined by 
traditional psychology, should be added a function of unreality, which is equally 
positive ... If we cannot imagine, we cannot foresee. ,5 In a similar vein, Ray Hart has 
written: 'The 'ontological reach' of the imagination refers to the order upon which it 
opens and in which it participates. Imagination intends, and extends, the realm of the 
'coming to be.' Stated abstractly, the domain upon which imagination opens is 
ontological incompleteness, being aborning, unfinished dominions whose finishing is 
not a matter of rightly reading a blueprint offormality,.6 
The reason why imagination is oriented towards the future is that it always begets 
an image which has not been formed before. Humans can never imagine the same way 
twice. Even to attempt to imagine the same way twice will entail that more or less 
inchoate impressions which will have been registered by the mind between the first and 
second attempted imaginings of the same object will affect the way in which that 
object is imagined the second time, for the whole of a person's consciously or 
unconsciously remembered experience contributes somehow to the way in which that 
person imagines at any given moment. This unrepeatability of the imaginative act is in 
contrast to acts of reason. A reason-based activity (like an act of arithmetic) may be 
repeated unchanged, indeed arithmetic would not be possible if this were not the case. 
It is of course true that if an identical arithmetical act is performed a second time a 
different imaginative ambience may attend the act from the first time the arithmetical 
act was performed (for example, a mood of boredom may arise from having to check a 
5 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics o.fSpace (1958) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994). p. xxxi\'. 
6 Hart, Unfinished Man, p. 135. 
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calculation), and in this sense the second act will differ from the first. However, the 
rational aspect of the arithmetical calculation is absolutely repeatable in a way which 
makes for a clear contrast with the unrepeatable nature of imagination. So laced with 
newness is every imaginative event, because imagination always somehow draws from 
the well of the imaginer's entire experience up to the instant when the imagination acts, 
that even acts of imagination related to the past, such as memory, will never arise in 
exactly the same form. Such an attempt to employ imagination in a purely 
reproductive capacity, for instance, an attempt to remember something very simple 
exactly as it was, will produce a modified image at each attempt, even if modified only 
by mood, context or association, thus realising imagination's invariably productive 
dimension however slightly or elusively: '[R ]emembering is not the re-excitation of 
innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, 
or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of 
organised past reactions or experience' .7 
This evocation of the future is indeed one of the essential functions of the 
imagination in human understanding. A human "mind" consisting entirely of rational 
processes could not conceive of a future at all. Avery Dulles has remarked that 
'[r]adically new meanings cannot be grasped by formal reasoning, for the mind in such 
reasoning remains fixed in the mental categories with which it began"g and acceptance 
of the possibility of radically new meanings is undoubtedly integral to any recognition 
that a future can arise for us. '[F]resh and unforeseen meanings arise,9 he adds, only 
when 'clues work on the imagination with symbolic power.' 10 For Michael Polanyi, 
7 Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Stud.v in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1932), p. 213. 
s 
, Dulles, Craft o(The%gy, p. 30. 
!) Ibid. .. 
10 Ibid. References to Polanyi, "Creative Imagination"; Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Nfeaning 
(Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1975). 
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imagination means 'all thoughts of things that are not present, or not yet present - or 
perhaps never to be present' 11 and this brings us back to the earlier point that 
imagination and futurity are mutually implicated. 
Where, though, is the imagination, this future-directed power, at its most 
concentrated? Following some strong hints in Jean-Paul Sartre, for whom 
'imaginative consciousness ... presents itself to itself ... as a spontaneity which 
produces and holds on to the object as an image,' 12 it seems that it might be claimed 
that spontaneity is the intensest activity of the imagination. For example, in largely 
relinquishing rational deliberation, the spontaneous act comes nearest to achieving the 
total emancipation of the imagination from reason and approaches a reason-free 
imagining or a kind of ecstasy of the imagination. Of course, some train of ideas has 
always hatched the spontaneous act. It is not an isolated phenomenon in 
consciousness however much it may appear to be. But this qualification does not 
affect the fact that, in the spontaneous moment, the human person has chosen to 
dissolve the now into the future, to lean upon the future, to face the future with a 
unique exclusiveness. Conscious reason is cumbrous, for it often acts more effectively 
the longer it has for deliberation, and even though it operates in the present like 
spontaneity, it feels rooted in the past, for reasoning, unlike spontaneity, quite 
consciously depends on what the mind already knows. The will to spontaneity, by 
contrast, is a place of looking forward, because it does not look to the past as the 
ground of its action, and even though spontaneous choices are informed by 
unconscious reasoning processes and past experiences, yet it remains the case that, in 
spontaneity, the acting subject feels that his or her reason is obviated in favour of an 
impulse rooted in the present moment and that the umbilical cord with the past has 
II Polanyi, "Creative Imagination." p. 89. 
11 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology o/Imagination (1940) (London: Methuen, 1972), p. 14. See also 
pp. 18; 144; 153; 172; 181; 183; 185. See also, Kearney, Wake. p. 227. 
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been cut. There is a subjective disappropriation of the past. Bergson said: 'Every 
human work in which there is invention, every voluntary act in which there is 
freedom, every movement of an organism that manifests spontaneity, brings 
something new into the world.,13 In the core of spontaneous action, it is the future-
oriented imagination which is felt to determine the nature of the action, rather than 
experience of the past, and in spontaneous acts humans existentially experience the 
uprising of the future in a unique way. 
What spontaneity especially brings to prominent awareness is the primordial, 
perpetual imaginative projection of the self into the future as described by Heidegger. 
All this would tend to confirm a special link between spontaneity and the projection of 
the self towards the future. If projection towards the future is at the heart of human 
being-in-the-world, and if in tum spontaneity is the place where this futurity is most 
fully laid hold upon, then spontaneity will be at the heart of mankind's ongoing 
experience of being-in-the-world too. This suggests an important role for spontaneity 
in artistic creation since, for Heidegger as was seen (Chapter 4, Section II) artistic 
creation is an unveiling of Being, and '[a]rt is regarded ... neither as a realm of 
cultural achievement, nor as a manifestation of spirit, but belongs rather to the 
appropriative event ... from out of which the 'meaning of being' ... is first 
determined.,14 Art products which prominently feature spontaneous creativity will be 
primordial appropriations in art of Dasein's structure of projection and an essential 
expression of man's being-in-the-world. This throws further light on the claim made 
in Chapter 5 that musical improvisation is the privileged placed where Being speaks. 
It was seen that, to a lesser extent, Being also speaks in musical expressiveness in 
general which, because it is applied to already existing music, is inhabited by a lower 
13 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (1907) (London: Macmillan, 1928), p. 252. 
14 P61tner, "Mozart and Heidegger," p. 6. Reference to Heidegger. Urspnmg, p. 99. 
193 
degree of spontaneity. The definition of music in Chapter 5 was extended to embrace 
speech prosody. This suggests that to speak spontaneous words with prosodical 
alacrity is also musical improvisation, while spontaneous prosodical alacrity applied to 
already existing words entails, like expressive performance of already existing music, 
a slightly lower degree of musical spontaneity. It is now inferred in this Chapter, 
additionally, that the practice of musical improvisation, either in the commonly 
received sense of the term, or when inhabiting prosodic speech, is where the nature of 
Dasein is most clearly expressed in its aspect of futural projection. 
All music, whether improvised or not, opens up the future in a way which is special 
among the arts. This attribution to music of a capacity to direct the mind towards the 
future has roots in the fact that sound, like the present moment, only exists when it is 
going out of existence. Ong speaks of 'one characteristic of sound' as 'its 
evanescence, its relationship to time.' 15 He writes: 
There is no way to stop sound and have sound. I can stop a moving picture camera and hold one frame 
fixed on the screen. If I stop the movement of sound, I have nothing - only silence, no sound at all. All 
sensation takes place in time, but no other sensory field totally resists a holding action, stabilization, in 
quite this way. Vision can register motion, but it can also register immobility. Indeed it favors 
immobility, for to examine something closely by vision, we prefer to have it quiet. We often reduce 
motion to a series of still shots the better to see what motion is. There is no equivalent of a still shot for 
sound. 16 
In this sense the whole of the sound world is disclosive of the future, and insofar as this 
sonic disclosure of the future comes to artistic expression in Dasein, it does so in the 
form of music, because music is sound expressed artistically. Nevertheless, 
improvisatory music plays a special role in evoking projection in Dasein because 
'improvisation embraces, even celebrates, music's essentially ephemeral nature. For 
many people involved in it, one of the enduring attractions of improvisation is its 
momentary existence: the absence of a residual document. ,17 
15 Ong, Oralitv and LiteraCL p. 71. 
16 • . 
Ibid, p. 32. 
17 Bailey, Improvisation, p. 35. 
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II Improvisatory Music and the Fundamental Hope 
For Heidegger's philosophy: '[Care (Sorge)] is one of the broadest characteristics 
of human life ... It involves the fOlWard thrust of the existent into his possibilities in 
tension with the factical conditions and limitations that he already brings with him' .18 
'Heidegger uses ['care'] in the meaning of providing, planning, looking after, 
calculating, foreseeing ... We are caring and providing creatures because we expressly 
expenence a time horizon open ahead.' 19 Care is thus closely related to futural 
projection. Heidegger writes that Dasein 'reveals itself as care. If we are to work out 
this basic existential phenomenon, we must distinguish it from phenomena which 
might be proximally identified with care, such as will, wish, addiction, and urge (Wille, 
Wunsch, Hang und Drang). Care cannot be derived from these, since they themselves 
are founded upon it. ,20 Hope is thus founded on care: 'Willing and wishing are rooted 
with ontological necessity in Dasein as care,.21 
There appears from psychological case studies to be a fundamental human hoping 
rooted in the projection and care of Dasein. Hope appears to be integral to futural 
projection. Joseph Pieper speaks of work carried out at the University Hospital of 
Heidelberg by Professor Herbert Pliigge with people whose life hopes had been 
severely dashed, such as those suffering from incurable illnesses, or who had tried to 
commit suicide. Pliigge identified a special kind of hope, different from ordinary 
everyday hoping. This hope was not directed to success, good news or physical health, 
or other definable objects, and Pliigge described it as "fundamental" or "genuine" 
hoping. This type of hoping has its object, not in something which can be had, but in a 
self-realisation or personal wholeness. For Pliigge, a person's existence is founded 
18 MacqualTie, Existentialism, p. 169. 
19 Safranski, Heidegger, p. 157. 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 39, p. 227. 
21 Ibid, section 41, p. 238. 
195 
upon this mysterious hope. 22 Pieper makes a close correlation, even perhaps an 
identification between hope and projection in Dasein: '[M]an's existence itself has the 
structure of 'not yet'; I could say also: it has the structure of hope. ,23 Here hope is 
presented implicitly as the central core of projecting Dasein. Also speaking of an 
unthematised fundamental hope, 'Gabriel Marcel several times formulates the 
profound insight that the hope always reaches beyond the objects which originally 
kindled it; and that the hope loses its finest quality as soon as man makes conditions, 
and even as soon as he tries to imagine concretely what he is hoping for. ,24 For Marcel 
also, unthematised hope is a founding necessity of human experience so that 'the soul 
which despairs shuts itself up against the central and mysterious assurance in which we 
believe we have found the principle of all positivity. ,25 Clearly for Marcel too, in this 
passage, it is hope by which projection in Dasein is most fully expressed. For 
Macquarrie, hope is 'coextensive with human life itself. ,26 He speaks of a 'pre-
reflective hope ... the basis or condition of hope already there in the constitution of 
human existence as the fundamental tendency of the human being toward hoping . . . 
[T]his root of hoping is an undeniable fact in human nature as we know it in ourselves 
or observe it in others. ,27 It gives rise to a 'diffused hopefulness in all human action. ,28 
Andrew Greeley has noted that '[h]uman nature has a built-in propensity to hope ... 
Death research, resuscitation research, game analysis all demonstrate this powerful and 
persistent tendency of humans to hope even when the situation seems hopeless, even 
when they can find no specific content to their hope. ,29 Thus, someone with a terminal 
22 See Joseph Pieper, "Hope and History." In Heart o/the Real, O'Rourke (ed.), pp. 409-41l. 
~3 Ibid, p. 41l. 
)4 
- Ibid, p. 419. 
2S Gabriel MarceL Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary (1935) (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965), p. 119. 
26 John Macquarrie, Christian Hope (London: Mowbrays, 1978), p. ~. 
n Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Andrew M. Greeley, The Religious Imagination (Los Angeles: Sadlier, 1981), p. i. 
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illness may persist in hoping where there seems to be nothing consciously hoped for. 30 
In Heidegger's analysis, by contrast, Dasein who faces death is in fact marked largely 
by anxiety. '[Heidegger] contends that an awareness of one's death and the resultant 
anxiety are equally natural to man. We can no more escape the anxiety of death than 
we can escape the human condition.,31 However, '[t]he French writers ... are 
generally inclined to modify Heidegger's pessimism. They think that man, despite the 
odds, can do something other and better than stoically accepting his sad fate. ,32 Marcel 
is one such French writer, as has just been seen, and the clinical data above also 
suggest that a modification of Heidegger's emphasis, towards a view of Dasein which 
emphasises projection as hope rather than as anxiety, is indicated as appropriate. Even 
confronted with death, humans largely continue to hope, because hope is to be 
identified with projecting Dasein. It is the fundamental mood of projection. 
Ernst Bloch has analysed extensively in The Principle of Hope 'the surplus of 
utopian thought from early Greek philosophers to the present day. ,33 This inbuilt 
human tendency for constant hoping is, for Bloch, profoundly implicated with the 
experience of music: 'Both the existence and the concept of music are only attained in 
conjunction with the new object-theory, with the metaphysics of divination and 
utopia. ,34 Bloch alludes to '[music's] power of nostalgia, a nostalgia not for an old 
country we have left behind but for a virgin one, not for a past but for a future'. 35 'It is 
that which does not yet exist, which is lost and dimly sensed, our encounters with the 
self and the 'we' concealed in the dark and in the latency of every lived instant, our 
30 See Marcel, Being and Having, p. 79; Gabriel Marcel, Homo T'iator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of 
Hope (Chicago: Regnery, 1951), pp. 46-49; Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel 
(1962) (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1975), p. 73. 
~I Lepp, Death and Its Mysteries, p. 62. See Heidegger, Being and Time, section 40, pp. 228-235. 
~2 Lepp, ibid, p. 132. 
33 Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, Paul Knight, "Translator's Introduction." In Ernst Bloch, The 
Principle of Hope, vol 1 (1959) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. xxviii. 
~4 Ernst Bloch, "The Philosophy of Music." In Essays on the Philosophy of Music (1974) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), p. 13l. 
35 Ib'd 13" 1 ,p. _. 
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utopia calling to itself through charity, music and metaphysics, but not to be realised 
th ,36 on ear. 'Musical expression as a whole is thus ultimately vice-regent for an 
articulation which goes much further than anything so far known. ,37 The 
psychological fact that music generates an unthematised hope within the human person 
is a motif of such ubiquity in recorded human experience as to need no exemplification 
here. Once again, this psychological fact was to be expected in advance of the 
evidence, given the truth of the present proposal that music, as the place where Being 
speaks, must in virtue of this also be the primordial generator of the fundamental 
hoping which characterises human projection in Dasein. Most of the music produced 
by human beings over their entire history has, of course, been improvised, and it was 
shown in Section I how improvised music, including prosody, projects a future with 
primordial intensity. It has now been indicated in this Section that this future is 
fundamentally hopeful, and it is inferred that musical improvisation articulates even 
more fully than music in general this fundamental hope of Dasein. Thus improvised 
music and prosody are where humans project in hope. 
If improvisatory music directs the mind to future fundamental hope in a special 
way, its marked presence in societies which are animated by other powerful hopes and 
aspirations is perhaps to be expected, and if its presence were discovered markedly in 
these societies, this would tend to support the ontological claim for music so far made, 
by showing its concrete expression in human life. A social conjunction of 
improvisation in music and preoccupation with hope for futurity is indeed exemplified 
in the music of slave communities in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. 
'From the midst of their very enslavement [the slaves] looked forward to the time of 
deliverance when they would leave the unbearable oppression of the world around 
36 Ibid, p. 133. 
37 Bloch, Principle o(Hope. yol 3, p. 1069. Chapter entitled, "Venturing Beyond and Most Intense 
World of man in Music [sic]." 
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them. ,38 Their perspective 'enabled oppressed blacks to realize that their existence 
transcended historical limitations. This emphasis is, perhaps, the most important 
contribution of black religion as reflected in the spirituals. ,39 'The Divine liberation of 
the oppressed from slavery is the central theological concept in the black spirituals. ,40 
Prior even to any consideration of the improvisatory music to which they were sung, 
it is clear that the words themselves of the spirituals were often explicitly oriented 
towards a hoped-for future, or at least deplored the circumstances in which the singer 
now found herself, in a way which might be regarded as implicitly rather than 
explicitly ordered hopefully toward a future: 
Soon-a-will be done with the trouble of the world; 
Soon-a-will be done with the trouble of the world; 
Going home to live with GOd.41 
When dat ar ole chariot comes, 
I'm gwine to lebe you, 
I'm boun' for de promised land, 
Frien's, I'm gwine to lebe you. 
I'm sorry, frien's, to lebe you, 
Farewell! oh, farewell! 
But I'll meet you in de momin', 
Farewell! oh, farewell! 
I'll meet you in de momin' , 
When you reach de promised land; 
On de oder side of Jordan, 
For i'm boun' for de promised land.42 
No more hard trial in de kingdom; no more tribulation, 
no more parting, no more quarreling, back-biting in 
de kingdom, 
No more sunshine fer to bu'n you; no more rain fer to 
wet you. 
Every day will be Sunday in heaven.43 
I must walk my lonesome valley 
I got to walk it for myself, 
Nobody else can walk it for me, 
38 James H. Cone, The Spirituals and the Blues: An Interpretation (New York: Seabury, 1972), p. 102. 
39 Ibid, p. 106. 
40 Ibid, p. 34. 
41 Cited in ibid, p. 64. 
4~ Cited in ibid, p. 89. 
43 Cited in ibid, p. 99. 
I got to walk it for myself. 
I must go and stand my trial, 
I got to stand it for myself, 
Nobody else can stand it for me, 
I got to stand it for myself. 
Jesus walked his lonesome valley, 
He had to walk it for himself, 
Nobody else could walk it for him, 
He had to walk it for himself.44 
o wretched man that I am 
o wretched man that I am 
o wretched man that I am 
o who will deliver po' me. 
I'm bowed down with a burden of woe 
I'm bowed down with a burden of woe 
I'm bowed down with a burden of woe 
o who will deliver po' me.45 
I'm a poor pilgrim of sorrow. 
I'm in this world alone. 
No hope in this world for tomorrow. 
I'm trying to make heaven my home. 
Sometimes I am tossed and driven. 
Sometimes I don't know where to roam. 
I've heard of a city called heaven. 
I've started to make it my home. 
My mother's gone on the pure glory. 
My father's still walking in sin. 
My sisters and brothers won't own me 
Because I'm tryin' to get in.46 
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Cone suggests that not only the explicit verbal meaning but also the prosodic style of 
the words expressed a hoping: '[B]lack slaves were affirming their freedom through 
the rhythm, the passion, and the motion of their language. If the words did not sound 
right, feel right, and move smoothly from the lips, then how could they be an 
expression of the soul's yearning for freedom?,47 For Cone, the spoken verbal style of 
the spirituals suggests an animated prosody, a spontaneous "musical" delivery. In 
common with the present thesis, he links this prosodic animation with hope. 
44 Cited in ibid, p. 67. 
45 Cited in ibid, p. 68. 
46 Cited in ibid, p. 91. 
47 Ibid, p. 48. 
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This is a convincing proposal since a general link between intensified tonal and 
rhythmic characteristics of vocal delivery, and intensified hope, is indeed known well 
from ordinary life. The pleading voice which hopes for what it begs, the angry voice 
which hopes that its demands will be met, the fearful voice which hopes that its fears 
will not be realised, or simply the voice which hopes especially to be listened to, are all 
often characterised by intensified prosodic attributes which are spontaneous. 
Phenomenologically, the conspicuous factor in intensified prosody, presented here as a 
fundamental fonn of music, is a greater employment of higher vocal pitches, for' [0 Jur 
voice goes up when we are aroused by fear, anger, excitement, or intense interest. ,48 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine anybody lowering the pitch of their intonation when 
reciting the preceding slave spirituals emphatically; or, at least, if it can be imagined, 
such delivery could hardly have been the usual fonn. Dwight Bolinger's theories root 
speech intonation in the universal, prelinguistic infant use of pitch to signal emotion, as 
when the infant's rising cry indicates hope for some wish to be fulfilled. He writes: 
'The infant cry is the earliest fonn of vocalization and it seems to be the same around 
the world. ,49 Typical are the vocalisations of a certain infant of one year old, who used 
higher voice pitches when he 'wanted something or was eager to have something, or if 
he was having difficulty in doing something and needed someone else's help ... 
Falling pitches ... were used to accompany an action that [he J had just perfonned, also 
if he had found or discovered something, or if he was simply content. ,50 Bolinger's 
theories imply 'a universal common core for intonation,,51 and parallel the present 
thesis in the way they interpret raised pitch. Bolinger suggests that 'high or rising pitch 
48 Dwight Bolinger, Intonation and its Uses: Melody in Grammar and Discourse (Stanford: Stanford 
Univ. Press, 1989), p. 13. 
49 Ib'd 1 , p. 11. 
50 Harold Clumeck, "Topics in the Acquisition of Mandarin Phonology: a Case Study." Papers and 
Reports on Child Language Development (Stanford University) 14 (1977): 37-73; p. 46. Cited in ibid, 
p. 12. 
51 D. Robert Ladd, Intonational Phonology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ, Press. 1996), p. 113. 
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signals interest, arousal, and incompleteness'. 52 The present thesis would understand 
these three dimensions, interest, arousal and incompleteness, as sub-categories of hope. 
They are expressed by higher pitches in this way, because music is where humans 
project in hope. This is why the voice shifts into a more musical gear in interest, 
arousal and incompleteness. It is emphasised by Bolinger that his analysis of vocal 
behaviour is not confined to particular cultures. 53 
In slave spirituals, hoping for freedom, as expressed through intensified spoken 
language sounds, extends itself into the musical improvisations with which the words 
were often clothed. This is because there is a natural concomitance between animated 
prosody and spontaneous music. Animated prosody is already a movement in the 
direction of spontaneous song. The slaves' resulting musical improvisation in song is 
exemplified by this anecdote: 
When asked where black people got their songs, one slave responded: 'Dey make 'em, sah.' He paused 
and was requested to continue: 
'I'll tell you; it's dis way. My master call me up and order me a short peck of com and a hundred lash. 
My friends see it and is sorry for me. When dey come to de praise meetin' dat night dey sing about it. 
Some's very good singers and know how; and dey work it in, work it in, you know; till dey get it right; 
and dat's de way.' 54 
52 Ibid. 
53 'This fundamental opposition between high and low (or up and down) is clearly seen in the use of 
pitch range for obviously emotional expression - raised voice for active emotions such as anger or 
surprise and lowered voice for boredom, sadness, and the like.' Ibid, p. 114. What are referred to here 
as 'active emotions' expressed in a raised pitch seem also to be more hopeful emotions. The link 
between high pitch and expectation or non-finality (associated in the present thesis with hope) is 
exemplified, according to Bolinger, by 'the tendency of pitch to drop at the end of an utterance, and to 
rise (or at least not to drop) at major breaks where the utterance remains incomplete; [also by] the use of 
higher pitch in questions, since in questions the speaker expresses interest, and since the exchange is 
incomplete until the addressee answers.' Ibid. (As this thesis would say: the questioner hopes for an 
answer, and this is reflected in the rising or musical intonation of his question.) Bolinger understands 
these uses of intonation to be independent of cultural differences, and therefore universal. He writes: 'Of 
late there has been growing support for the sort of universal code that we have been more or less taking 
for granted in the realm of prosody, particularly intonation.' Bolinger, Intonation and its Uses. p. 1. 
'[I]ntonation is the same, in spite of superficial differences, no matter where we fmd it, because of its ties 
to human physiology'. Ibid, p. 26. Tone languages do not affect the truth of this generalisation. See 
ibid, pp. 12-13: 26f, 49. 'The tonal use of pitch might be thought of as 'unnatural.' It does not 
correspond to the child's initial genetic program'. Ibid, p. 13. As another writer notes: 'The physiologic 
mechanisms that structure intonation are determined in part by vegetative constraints. They thus are 
clearly not' language-specific' in the restricted sense that many linguists, psychologists, and philosophers 
view the structure of the hypothetical innately determined linguistic 'competence' of Homo sapiens.' 
Philip Lieberman, "The Innate, Central Aspect of Intonation." In The Melody of Language, Linda R. 
Waugh and C. H. van Schooneveld (eds.). (Baltimore: University Park, 1980), p. 188. 
54 Cone, Spirituals and the Blues. p. 42. Citation from James Miller McKim, "Negro Songs." In 
Bernard Katz, The Social Implications of Ear~l' Negro Music in the United States (1939) (New York: 
Arno. 1969), p. 2. 
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The use of clearly improvisatory music in this context operates as a trope of aspirations 
to freedom. Such improvisation extended beyond the context of religious worship into 
the world of daily work: '[I]mprovisation ... is certainly one of the strongest survivals 
in American Negro music. The very character of the first work songs suggests that 
they were largely improvised. ,55 As one slave remarked, 'Once we boys ... went for 
tote some rice and de nigger-driver he keep a-callin' on us; and I say, '0, de ole nigger-
driver!' Den anudder said, 'Fust ting my mammy tole me was, notin' so bad as nigger-
driver.' Den I made a sing, just puttin' a word, and then anudder word. ,56 In this 
quotation, reflection on an oppressive relationship elicits a verbal and musical 
improvisatory act, a song which consists of the spontaneous fitting of one word to the 
next. Here 'imagination itself - through its utopian function - has a constitutive role in 
helping us rethink the nature of our social life ... Does not the fantasy of an alternative 
society . . . work as one of the most formidable contestations of what is?,57 
Irrespective of what may have been the verbal content of the song improvised in this 
instance, it is through the imaginative improvisatory verbal and musical activity itself, 
reaching out futurally, that a healing field of hoping is opened up and the possibility of 
a desired future is evoked. Moreover, blues, too is a style which 'permits extempore 
verse-making' 58 and essentially 'a music of protest' 59 against a prevailing order. 'The 
blues texts were also bulwarks of cultural resistance, providing a composite view of 
American society from the bottom ... Blues texts, sung in the vernacular of the black 
55 LeRoi Jones, Blues People: The Negro Experience in White America and the Music that Developed 
Fom It (New York: Morrow QuilL 1963), p. 27. 
56 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment (1871) (Boston: Beacon Press. 1962), 
p. 219. Cited in Cone, Spirituals and the Blues, p. 42. 
57 Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1986). p. 16. 
58 Paul Oliver "Blues and the Binary Principle." In Popular Music Perspectives: Papers from The First 
International Conference On Popular Music Research. Amsterdam, June 1981, David Hom and Philip 
Tagg (eds.), (Goteborg, Sweden and Exeter, England: International Association for the Study of Popular 
Music.1982),p.163. 
59 Ibid. 
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masses, were the 'true songs' or 'reals' of hope, despair, humor and struggle . 
Improvisation was the centerpiece of the blues perfonners' aesthetic approach to their 
medium. ,60 In this improvised music there may be heard an '[ e ]xaltation of 
creativity ... as the longing of peoples for transcendence and for the transfonnation of 
dehumanising social fonns. ,61 
It would not be critically adequate to explain this use of improvisation solely as the 
perpetuation of musical practices from Africa without regard to the present situation of 
the singers' American enslavement, for even though improvisation had roots in 
'traditional African-American reverence for spontaneity,62 it is also the case that 
improvisation was a flexible community response to the constraints of social reality for 
black people in America.63 'This improvisational tendency was historically connected 
to African Americans' understanding of freedom as social mobility and cultural 
autonomy. To improvise, then, was an individual affinnation of freedom in a group 
setting - a lyrical response to the vicissitudes of life that linked artist and audience in a 
communication process at the center of the African-American cultural experience. ,64 
Musical improvisation by American slaves is thus neither subsumed under the category 
of African musical practices, nor opposed to them, for there was an existing 
connotation of freedom affinnation already inhabiting the African practice of musical 
improvisation, which is now re-engaged on behalf of hoping within the American 
situation. 
This spontaneous ethos within black music has spread and been appropriated by 
aspirations for a better world as expressed within subsequent white popular music, for 
60 William Barlow, "Looking Up at Down": The Emergence of Blues Culture (Philadelphia: Temple 
Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 325-326. 
61 Mary Collins, "Obstacles to Liturgical Creativity." In Concilium: "Liturgy: A Creative Tradition" 
(1983) no. 2: 19-26; p. 20. 
62 Barlow, '"Looking Up at Dowll. 0' p. 326. 
63 S 'b'd 3')7 ee 1 1 ,p. _ . 
64 Ibid. 
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there has been 'a continual, cyclical co-optation of black musical forms by the white 
industry and audiences. ,65 Without African culture in America, 'there would have 
been no blues . . . Without the blues, there would have been no jazz, no reggae, no 
soul, no funklrap,.66 'The existence of the African diaspora functions throughout the 
world as a crucial force for opening up cultural, social, and political space for struggles 
over identity, autonomy, and power. ,67 In this diaspora, improvisation retains its role 
as a trope of hoping, as in jazz. '[M]ore than any other music this century, jazz has 
functioned as a vehicle towards the rebirth and development of an ancient, ecstatic 
sense of existence. ,68 For Martin Luther King, 'God has wrought many things out of 
oppression ... Jazz speaks of life ... When life itself offers no order and meaning, the 
musician creates an order and meaning from the sounds of earth which flow through 
his instrument. ,69 Music influenced by the African tradition such as hip-hop, Afro-
beat, and jazz 'provides a powerful illustration of the potential for contemporary 
commercialized leisure to carry images, ideas, and icons of enormous political 
importance between cultures ... [T]hese expressions ... serve as exemplars of post-
colonial culture with direct relevance to the rise of new social movements emerging in 
response to the imperatives of global capital and its attendant austerity and 
oppression.,70 Lipsitz writes of how hip-hop and other forms of diasporic African 
music serve to construct 'locally based and territorially defined,7l identities for new 
65 Keith Negus, Popular Music in Theory: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 101. 
66 Michael Tucker, "The Body Electric: The Shamanic Spirit in Twentieth-Century Music." 
Contemporary Music Review 14, parts 1-2 (1996): 67-97; p. 83. 
67 George Lipsitz, Dangerous Crossroads: Popular Music, Postmodernism and the Politics of Place 
(1994) (London: Verso, 1997), pp. 27-28. 
68 Tucker, "Body Electric," p. 83. 
69 Martin Luther King, Jr., Opening address to the 1964 Berlin Jazz Festival. Cited in Joachim-Ernst 
Berendt, Ja::: A Photo History (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), p. 221. 
70 Lipsitz, Dangerous Crossroads, p. 27. 
71 Ibid, p. 33. 
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social movements, bringing them to global consciousness,72 and of how the world-
wide popularity of hip-hop, rap, graffiti, and other musical forms from the African 
diaspora expresses post-colonial aspirations. This does not merely reflect a 
compensation for current lack of power and resources among African people; rather the 
music creates a social nexus: 'It brings community into being through performance, 
and it maps out real and imagined relations between people that speak to the realities of 
displacement, disillusion and despair created by the austerity economy of post-
. industrial capitalism.' 73 Writing in a parallel way of certain Indian Temple music, 
Groesbeck has noted that 'performers use improvisation as a symbolic cultural 
category to construct and negotiate their identities through performance and discourse, 
and ultimately to create an imagined sense of place with their audiences in the moment 
of performance' .74 Improvised music is 'employed in performance and discourse for 
the purposes of establishing community, creating an imagined and shared sense of 
place, and constructing and negotiating identity.' 75 
The futural hoping in the rock music of the 1960s and early 1970s (a style with 
much improvisatory drumming and guitar-playing) was evident in the lyrics of the 
period which 'actually showed an awareness of the spiritual quest' .76 Rock music is an 
artistic construction of a fantasised "other place," a preferred locus of the imaginatively 
idealised self. 'Rock is, for its suburban listeners, a way into working-class 
adolescence; it provides the terms of a fantasy community of danger. And there is, 
simultaneously, a rebellious segment of working-class, street youth that finds in rock a 
72 See ibid. References to Manuel Castells, The City and the Grass Roots (London: Edward Arnold, 
1983); Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981). 
73 Lipsitz, ibid, p. 36. Reference to Paul Gilroy, "There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack": The 
Cziltural Politics of Race and Nation (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 223-250. 
74 Groesbeck, "Cultural Constructions," p. 24. 
75 Ibid, p. 26. 
76 Joscelyn Godwin, Harmonies of Heaven and Earth: The Spiritual Dimension of Music from Antiquity 
to the Avant-Garde (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), p. 115. Reference to Joscelyn Godwin, 
"Protest and Quest in Popular Songs." The Golden Blade 26 (1974): 96-105. 
206 
romantic ideal of bohemian culture, the terms (most obviously articulated in the history 
of British youth culture by David Bowie) of a fantasy of self-expression, sexual 
freedom, art and angst'. 77 In short, the music constructs an imaginary order of social 
fulfilment. As one commentator has written: '[O]ne role of popular music in 
socializing the young may be to create, in combination with the other mass media a , 
picture of childhood and adolescence in America as a happy-go-lucky time of 
haphazard clothes and haphazard behavior, jitterbug parlance, coke-bar sprees, and 
'blues' that are not really blue,.78 
For Smith and Dean, the link between improvisation and re-creation of social 
structures is in fact exemplified in a wide range of artistic areas, such as the use of 
improvisation after the Second World War and into the 1960s to articulate the goals of 
socialism.79 'The counter movements, sometimes known as the 'beat generation' or 
'flower power', severely questioned social conventions relating to sex, drugs, 
education and western religion, and the economic self-preservation of the privileged. ,80 
Improvisatory drama exhibits these socially recreative connotations. As Frost and 
Yarrow note, improvisatory drama is one with the beginnings of theatre itself, as in 
Dionysiac rites, which integrated the community and the environment. Yet, as a kind 
of "double" of society, and as an activity which frees feelings and instincts, improvised 
drama has often been suppressed.81 '[M]any social orders have seen the need either to 
repress or to marginalise (by licensing in a strictly limited way) anything to do with the 
spirit of creative play. Individual creativity, from the point of view of order, is a 
77 Simon Frith, "The Sociology of Rock: Notes from Britain." In Popular Music Perspectives, Horn 
and Tagg (eds.), p. 151. 
78 David Riesman, "Listening to Popular Music." (1950) In On Record: Rock, Pop, and the Written 
Word, Simon Frith and Andrew Goodwin (eds.), (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 7. 
79 See Smith and Dean, Improvisation, p. 19. 
80 Ibid, p. 19. 
81 See Anthony Frost and Ralph Yarrow. Improvisation in Drama (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 
177. 
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dangerous and disruptive thing ... and even more dangerous if it issues in communal 
ceremony and performance.,82 '[A]s a challenge to the dominant cultural assumptions 
about what is 'the basis of the actor's art' ... the adoption of impro as a method of 
play creation becomes a political act itself. It de-emphasises the individual writer, and 
privileges the creative ensemble - the workshop, with all its connotations of crafts and 
working-class skills. ,83 In connection with jazz, John Szwed writes: '[J]azz requires 
that musicians be able to merge their unique voices in the totalizing, collective 
improvisations of polyphony and heterophony. The implications of this esthetic are 
profound and more than vaguely threatening, for no political system has yet been 
devised with social principles which reward maximal individualism within the 
framework of spontaneous egalitarian interaction. ,84 'In the most successful 
improvisational art, the give-and-take of conversation functions as a model of 
democratic interaction. ,85 In short, as Roger Frampton remarks, improvisation is a 
'utopian state' .86 Clearly, just as individual improvisation opens up a future, collective 
improvisation can do so eloquently for the group. 
It was seen above how Dasein's futural projection In hope was expressed 
primordially in musical improvisation. This is reflected in the fact that the use of 
musical improvisation as an expression of hope, or to gain access to states of 
consciousness which enter or at least contact the desired "other place" appears from 
historical and cultural evidence to be a human universal. Such desire always has a 
futural character since hoping is always in some way directed to something which is 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ib'd 1 , p. 148. 
84 John Szwed, "Josef SkvoreckY and the Tradition of Jazz Literature." World Literature Today 54, no. 
4 (Autumn 1980): 586-590; p. 588. 
85 Belgrad, Culture of Spontaneity, p. 2. 
86 Roger Frampton, "Teletopa, AZ Music, Free Kata and Free Improvised Music in Australia: An 
Autobiographical Approach." Sounds Australian: Journal o.fAlistralian Music 32 (Summer 1991-1992): 
21-24; p. 22. 
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"not yet." 'Musical improvisation has . . . been considered as a vehicle for 
consciousness expansion and the tapping of deep intuitions. A full history ... would 
go back thousands of years to the sacred texts of many religions. ,87 Musical 
improvisation is a central feature of shamanism. 'The central idea of shamanism is to 
establish means of contact with the supernatural world by the ecstatic experience of a 
professional and inspired intermediary, the shaman. ,88 Mircea Eliade has 'discerned in 
the shamanic experience a 'nostalgia for paradise,,89 and he regards the ecstatic 
experience to which the shaman seeks access as a "primary phenomenon' because we 
see no reason whatever for regarding it as the result of a particular historical moment, 
that is, as produced by a certain form of civilisation. Rather, we would consider it 
fundamental to the human condition, and hence known to the whole of archaic 
humanity' .90 The prophetic anticipation of earthly futurity, and understanding the 
'causes and effects of life's experiences,91 are also the object of the shaman's special 
insight and '[h]e may be able to predict how one lives and how one needs to live. ,92 
Eliade writes of the use of specifically improvisatory songs used to produce ecstasy by 
North American shamans,93 and sung during trace states by Eskimo shamans.94 The 
shaman believes he 're-establishes ... a situation that was once general ... [a] 
recovery of the primordial human condition ... he can abolish time and re-establish the 
primordial condition of which the myths tell.,95 Peg Weiss has observed that '[i]n the 
87 Pressing, "Improvisation: Methods and Models." In Generative Processes in Music, Sloboda (ed.), p. 
142. 
88 A. Hultkrantz, "Ecological and Phenomenological Aspects of Shamanism." In Shamanism in Siberia, 
V. Di6szegi and M. Hoppal (eds.), (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1978), p. 30. 
89 Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (1951) (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1964), p. 508. 
90 Ibid, p. 504. 
91 Luh Ketut Suryani and Gordon D. Jensen, Trance and Possession in Bali: A rVindow on Western 
MUltiple Personality. Possession Disorder. and Suicide (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univ. Press. 1993), p. 
84. Reference to J. 'Halifax, "The Psychotherapist as Shaman: Methods for Madness," n.p. Workshop at 
Esalon Institute, Big Sur, California, 4th-16th February, 1992. 
92 Suryani and Jensen, ibid. Reference to Halifax ibid. 
9,\ See Eliade, Shamanism, p. 303. 
94 See ibid, p. 290. 
9S Ibid, p. 17l. 
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Chukchee rites ... the shaman's ritual vocabulary consisted of a vast medley of sounds 
... cleverly improvised to suit the situation. ,96 For Tim Hodgkinson, 'shamanic 
performances, despite following a loose sequence of identifiable phrases, [are] largely 
improvised.,97 'Several practitioners told us that shamanising involves following your 
feelings. We also heard a great deal of visual description of the psychological phases. 
That is, shamanising seems almost invariably to involve seeing. ,98 The conjunction 
between improvisation and imaginative access to a hoped-for alterity is here 
exemplified. '[T]he shaman's hypnotic drumming, chanting and singing combine to 
propel consciousness far beyond the limits of everyday feeling and perception . 
Beating the drum ... shamans fly to the upper Paradisal realms' .99 
The use of improvisation in the context of healing, another shamanic practice, has 
been appropriated by Don Cherry (1936-1995) and Nana Vasconcelos who 'sought and 
developed the healing potentialities of improvised music' .100 Again, this is clearly a 
project based on hope, in which the hoped-for state is the state of wholeness and 
health. Jazz has been compared to shamanic music. It has been claimed that 'in 
Jazz ... one finds the most fruitful and inspiring musical response to the problem 
which haunted such key nineteenth-century poets and thinkers as Thoreau and 
Whitman, and which continues to haunt us today: the problem of the alienation of 
consciousness from its own roots . . . [T]he variously improvised, circular play of 
melody, harmony and (above all) rhythm through which jazz musicians have sought to 
exalt life has unearthed and made new what is essentially a shamanic source of 
96 Peg Weiss, Kandinsky and Old Russia: The Artist as Ethnographer and Shaman (New Haven: Yale 
Univ. Press, 1995), p. 108. 
97 Tim Hodgkinson, "Siberian Shamanism and Improvised Music." Contemporary Music Revie\\' 14. 
parts 1-2 (1996): 59-66; p. 60. 
98 Ibid, p. 63. 
99 Tucker, "Body Electric," p. 74. 
100 Ib'd 8'" 1 ,p. ~. 
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potentially healing, transfonnative energy.' 101 '[I]mprovisers as musically different as 
Armstrong and Ellington, or Hawkins and Young . . . speak . . . of the bringing into 
being of an ecstatic state of consciousness in their work. d02 Moreover 'various so-
called pop groups and artists can be seen to reveal (whether consciously so or not) 
certain degrees of shamanic musicality ... In 1990 Mickey Hart, long-time drummer of 
The Grateful Dead, published a well-researched, beautifully illustrated book entitled 
Drumming at the Edge of Magic, where he traced his life-long fascination with the 
power of drumming back to the ancient archetype of the shaman.' 103 How such 
popular music looks forward in hope has already been described. 
All spontaneity, as a concentrated forward projection of the imagination out of the 
present, invites an intuition of the "other place." Spontaneity is a liminal fonn of 
activity, activity pursued in the real world but at the imaginative threshold (limen) of 
an aspirational state. Victor Turner has explicitly identified an important linkage of 
the state of liminality with spontaneity. Turner distinguishes the social 'structure' of 
daily life as ordinarily led, from what he calls the 'communitas' of liminal 
("threshold") situations104 and refers to a 'spontaneous, immediate, concrete nature of 
communitas, as opposed to the nonn-governed, institutionalized, abstract nature of 
social structure.' 105 He observes that: 
Communitas breaks in through the interstices of structure, in liminality ... Liminality ... [is a 
condition] in which are frequently generated myths, symbols ... and works of art. These cultural forms 
provide men with a set of templates or models which are, at one level, periodical classifications of 
reality and man's relationship to society, nature and culture. But they are more than classifications, 
since they incite men to action as well as to thought. 106 
101 Ib'd 1 ,p. 86. 
102 Ibid, p. 88. 
103 Ibid, p. 85. References to Micheal Tucker, Dreaming with Open Eyes: The Shamanic Spirit in 
Twentieth-Centull' Art and Culture (London: AquarianlHarper, 1992), pp. 210-214; Mickey Hart with 
Jay Stevens, D~mming at the Edge of Magic: A Journey into the Spirit of Percussion (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1990). 
104 See Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 96. 
105 Ibid, p. 127. Reference to Martin Buber, I and Thou (1958) (Edinburgh: Clark, 1961). p. 51. 
106 Turner, ibid, pp. 128-129. 
211 
Spontaneity in art, it may be inferred, is a natural expression of this liminal sensibility 
of the 'existential or spontaneous communitas.' 107 Such art sustains for the 
imagination an idealised separation from immediate reality into the liminal state of 
expectancy of the aspirational state. Following Turner, it may perhaps incite 'to action 
as well as to thought.' This instinctive acknowledgement of the power of spontaneous 
art to bring about action related to the engendering of aspirational states is connected 
to points made above concerning the frequent fear of, and consequent suppression of 
improvisatory art-forms, especially, it would seem, in drama, which clearly depicts 
social relationships, and their possible mutation, more unequivocally that other 
improvised art-forms. 
III Improvisatoriness and Hope in some Twentieth-Century Western Composers 
In certain cases musical improvisations may be so constructed as to give the 
architectural impression of a written work. It is possible to improvise, for example, a 
simple binary or ternary piece, and sometimes improvisations successfully imitate 
more complex traditional written styles. However, improvisation nevertheless often 
proceeds without the degree of regard for overarching form available to a 
"conventional" composer, who, unlike the improviser, can stand back and survey his 
work outside its concrete manifestation in time. 108 '[W]hile the improviser can recall 
past ideas, this must be done while creating the present, whereas the composer can 
practically 'freeze' time and contemplate the past at length.' 109 Within his 
improvisation, at any given instant, an improviser must often organise his musical 
product mainly on the basis of the sounds he has just produced, rather than on the basis 
of any longer memory of what he did further back in the improvisation. 
107 Ibid, p. 132. 
108 SkI .." 3 ee Sarath, "New Loa At mpro\"1satlOn, p. . 
109 Ib.d 1 ,p. 4. 
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Correspondingly, it is hard for him to organise what he does on the basis of any 
anticipation of what, within the same improvisation, he may do in the middle or longer 
term, for the same reason that he must concentrate on the present and what he is just 
about to do, or run the risk of failure. Ed Sarath describes how, in a composition and 
in an improvisation respectively, a given musical moment, E, is differently generated 
subsequently to its predecessors A, B, e, D. In a composition, 'the prime determinant 
for selection of event E is the aggregate of its predecessors, ABeD. That is to say, 
when the creating artist completes D, he or she infers an implication field shaped by 
the cumulative conception of materials ABeD.' I lO In improvisation, 'the artist 
proceeds in a more moment-to-moment manner, generating an implication field at each 
time point, not based in an aggregate conception, but one in which each moment is 
perceived as self-contained and autonomous. Therefore event E ... is not a result of 
ABeD, but only of its most recent predecessor D.' I I I When compared with a 
composed piece, this predisposes a given improvisation towards the generation of 
musical occurrences which, within the context of what has preceded, are unpredictable, 
since they are not precipitated by an accumulation of antecedents which have 
impressed themselves upon the memory and form the basis for the improviser's 
anticipation as the music proceeds. However, the degree of unpredictability will vary 
greatly from one improvisation to another. 
This characteristic unpredictability of improvisation may be imitated deliberately by 
those composers who consciously wish their compositions to sound improvisatory, or 
it may arise unconsciously in composed music as a result of a partiality for 
improvisatory effects. Thus any music, whether it is an improvisation or a worked-out 
composition, which feels to the listener as though it may be proceeding according to 
1111 Ibid. 
III Ibid. 
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Sarath's model, exhibits fundamental improvisatory attributes. Charles Ives, Arnold 
Schoenberg, John Cage, Cornelius Cardew, Frederic Rzewski and Olivier Messiaen are 
instructive in the present context, for their pieces, as will be shown, are often either 
worked-out compositions with marked structural affinities with improvisatoriness as 
just described, or are actually improvisations. In addition, all these composers have a 
declared interest in music as a project which expresses the hoped-for future. In Ives's 
and Cage's cases this future is the ideal and harmonious humanity proposed by the 
nineteenth-century American ideology of Transcendentalism; for Schoenberg, the 
music represents an attempt to arrive at an ideal transformation and perfecting of 
Western musical style; in the case of Cardew and Rzewski, the "other place" is the 
socialist society of Marxism, while in Messiaen's case this future is the Christian 
Kingdom of God and the heavenly reward of the Christian life. Music of Ives, 
Schoenberg, Cage, Cardew, Rzewski and Messiaen further exemplifies in the context 
of contemporary Western composition the claim being made here for a profound link 
between improvisation, and hope for the future as the desired "other place." 
'[Ives] has always been a highly articulate man, and he found compatible bedrock 
for his thinking and writing about music in the New England Transcendentalists, 
whose attitude toward life placed so indelible an imprint on the developing American 
character after the middle of the nineteenth century.' 112 Ives, indeed, venerated the 
Transcendentalist philosopher Emerson, claimed to enjoy new ideas and experiences 
every time he read Emerson, and regarded the "Emerson" movement of his Concord 
Sonata as 'as far as I know the only piece which every time I play it or tum to it seems 
unfinished ... It is a peculiar experience and I must admit a stimulating and agreeable 
one that I have had with this Emerson music.,I 13 Ives set out not merely to produce 
112 Henry Cowell and Sidney Cowell, Charles Ives and His Music (New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
1955), p. 7. 
113 Charles Ives, no documentation. Cited in ibid, p. 13. 
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music, but, like Emerson, to explore reality. For Ives, the ultimate hope of humanity is 
to share in the Emersonian "over-soul," a pantheistic consummation of everything 
there is. 'Emerson suggested that the fundamental purpose of human life is an ultimate 
union with the 'over-soul' - an amorphous entity somewhat akin to Spinoza's monist 
substance or Hegel's 'Spirit'.dI4 Music's task is to promote this apotheosis of man. 
Indeed, for Ives, 'the time is coming, but not in our lifetime, when music will develop 
possibilities inconceivable now - a language, so transcendent, that its heights and 
depths will be common to all mankind.' I 15 I ves' s attitude to truth will find expression 
in his attitude to musical composition, for 'to the Transcendentalist, music is not 
separate from the rest of the universe but permeates and is in tum permeated by all else 
that exists. For Ives, music is no more an expression of the universe than the universe 
is an expression of music.' 116 
It has been remarked in connection with the spontaneous, improvisatory dimension 
in Ives's music that 'when we hear the beginning of an Ives piece, we don't necessarily 
know what kinds of things will and will not follow. And the more Ives we hear, the 
less comfortable we may feel making predictions.' I 17 The 'mechanics and semantics 
of improvisation,118 in Ives's music 'embrace not only 'musical' sounds but also 
random acoustic phenomena (bands passing one another on the march, music heard 
I · d bl I·' I 19 I' . over water, and so on); parody, game-p aylng an pro em so vIng . ves s mUSIC 
explores the process to truth, and is in this sense an expression of hope. Writing of 
Ann Street, Star observes that here existence is depicted as a progression of rapid and 
114 Dave Robinson and Judy Groves, Philosophy for Beginners (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1998), p. 106. 
115 Charles Ives, no documentation. Cited in Cowell and Cowell, Charles Ives and His Music, p. 10. 
116 Cowell and Cowell, ibid, p. 148. 
117 Lany Star, A Union of Diversities: Style in the Music of Charles Ives (New York: Macmillan, 1992). 
p.8. 
118 Wilfred Mellers, "Music, the Modem World, and the Burden of History." In Companion to 
Contemporarv Musical Thought, vol 1, Paynter, Howell, Orton, Seymour (eds.), p. 14. 
119 Ibid. . 
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variegated expenences, disjointed on the surface, yet with a large-scale ordering. 
'However, the orderings and patterns that may be discovered in existence are, of 
necessity, tentative, unfinished, and 'imperfect,' due to the nature of existence as 
process, rather than as product.' 120 Here again the idea of hope is seen, for the 
underlying nature of existence reveals an open-ended, proleptic movement towards 
order, below the disjointed nature of surface appearances. Also, this emphasis on 
existence as process rather than product is clearly another point of contact with the idea 
of improvisation from a slightly different angle. This is because, where, as for Ives, 
music conjoins with a metaphysical world-view, improvisation readily suggests itself 
as an artistic counterpart to a view of reality as process. In improvisation it is the 
creative musical process which is highlighted, while the final product is constantly 
variable and uncertain and, indeed, may well be for ever lost. 
Schoenberg was affected, in a profound and sustained way, by the work of the 
painter Kandinsky. Schoenberg'S Theory of Harmony and Kandinsky's On the 
Spiritual in Art 'appeared shortly after one another in 1911.,121 In the latter, 'one of 
the seminal formulations of the principles of abstraction' /22 Kandinsky actually 
quoted Schoenberg. In the same year Schoenberg wrote to Kandinsky in these words: 
'You are such a full man that the least vibration always causes you to overflow ... I 
am very proud to have found your respect, and tremendously glad of your 
friendship.,123 Kandinsky was profoundly influenced by the idea of the improvisatory 
in his paintings. Imbued with a rich variety of cultural factors, and 'born in Moscow, 
[Kandinsky's] family comprised an eclectic mix of ethnic nationalities. Relatives on 
120 Star, Union of Diversities, p. 27. 
121 lelena Hahl-Koch, "Kandinsky and Schoenberg." In Arnold Schoenberg, Wassi(v Kandinsky: 
Letters. Pictures, Documents, lelena HaW-Koch (ed.), (1980) (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 144. 
122 Joan Allen Smith, Schoenberg and His Circle: A Viennese Portrait (London: Collier Macmillan, 
1986), p. 276. 
123 Arnold Schoenberg, letter to Wassily Kandinsky, 8th March, 1912. In Schoenberg, Kandinsky, 
Hahl-Koch (ed.), p. 10. 
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his mother's side came from the German Baltic region, but his father had been born in 
Kyakhta, on the border between Russia and Mongolia,!24 For Peg Weiss, the 
shamanism of primitive Russian societies may have provided Kandinsky with a 
paradigm for his artistic philosophy. Siberian life is intimately bound up with 
shamanism, and Weiss claims that Kandinsky identified with the shamanic ideas of 
divine mediation and the mission to heal. It was claimed by others and by Kandinsky 
himself that his personality exhibited shamanic characteristics. It is particularly 
notable that he claimed to have been inspired to paint Composition II while in a 
hallucinatory state. 125 Weiss speaks of the motif of the 'artist-shaman' as being 
intended by Kandinsky's depiction of St George, Improvisation 13. In this painting the 
artist is presented as a mystical shaman figure who watches over humanity in the 
heroic role St George: '[T]he saint even rides the shaman's piebald horse, and in 
1mprovisation 13 Kandinsky also monumentalized the figure, conflating the image of 
St George and World-Watching-Man,.126 'World-Watching-Man ... was thought to 
ride or soar about the world at night, watching over the affairs of humankind.' 127 
Through this fourfold conflation (shamaniartist/St GeorgelWorld-Watching Man) it 
seems that the artist watches over the whole world and, being a shaman, "translates" 
the world's mysteries to humanity. Through identification with the figure of Saint 
George, the artist is also conferred with heroic status, and the whole artistic conception 
is then linked to the idea of improvisation through its title Improvisation 13. 
Improvisation becomes by implication symbolically associated with the artist-shaman's 
prophetic voice, and it was indeed seen in Section II how shamanism speaks typically 
of a hoped-for "other place." Moreover, '[i]n speaking of the creative experience 
124 Weiss, Kandinsky and Old Russia, p. 6. 
125 See ibid, pp. 72-73. Reference to Odd Nordland, "Shamanism as an Experiencing of the 'Unreal'." 
In Carl-Martin Edsman. Studies in Shamanism (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1967), pp. 167-185. 
126 Weiss, ibid, pp. 76-77. 
127 Ibid, pp. 54-55 
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Kandinsky echoed the sense of 'transport,' the image of 'riding' and 'reining in' or 
'bridling' his inner resources in much the same language ethnographers have used to 
d ·b h . . ,128 I h .. escn e s amanIC expenence. n anot er paIntIng Improvisation (Ravine), the idea 
of the improvisatory seems explicitly juxtaposed with the idea of futurity. 'The rider 
apparently represents the Apocalyptic rider with his scales of justice . . . The work 
seems to speak of final things, of guilt and innocence, death and resurrection, 
aspiration and despair, the contradictions between day and night, indeed, of [the] 
'thundering collision of worlds'. ,129 In Improvisation (Gorge) the H611ental gorge is 
linked to images of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, doom and destruction, once 
again associating improvisation with the idea of the future. Something similar may be 
said of Improvisation (Deluge), representing Noah's Ark and the Flood, where an angel 
blowing the Last Trumpet adds to the sense of Apocalypse and Last Judgement which 
'occur frequently in Kandinsky's pictures from 1911 onward.,130 All the end-time 
events described above, despite their sometimes cataclysmic character, are figured 
within Christian tradition as presaging the final triumph of God and His coming Reign, 
and are thus proper objects of hope. There is thus a strong suggestion that Kandinsky 
associated an improvisatory style with issues of the future consummation of humanity, 
once again implying the link between spontaneity, and hoped-for futurity. 
Schoenberg'S own writing, influenced by Kandinsky, hints strongly at a view of 
improvisation seen as the primordial exercise of the artistic impulse. He writes: 
When Karl Kraus calls language the mother of thought, and Wassily Kandinsky and Oskar Kokoschka 
paint pictures the objective theme of which is hardly more than an excuse to improvise in colours and 
forms and to express themselves as only the musician expressed himself until now, these are symptoms 
of a gradually expanding knowledge of the true nature of art. 131 
128 Ib·d 1 ,p. 79. 
129 Ib·d 1,p.125. 
\30 Annegret Hoberg, Commentary on figure 45, Wassily Kandinsky, Improl'isation (Deluge). In Armin 
Zweite, The Blue Rider in the Lenbachhaus, Afunich (Munich: Prestel, 1989), no page numbers. 
131 Arnold Schoenberg, "The Relationship to the Text." (1912) In Style and Idea: Selected Writings of 
Arnold Schoenberg, Leonard Stein (ed.), (1975) (Berkeley: California Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 144-145. 
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The clear implication here is that the 'true nature of art' inheres in the improvising 
activity rather than the artistic product in the form of any 'objective theme', and that 
'gradually expanding knowledge' means acknowledging this priority. Schoenberg 
furnishes a parallel critique in relation to musical composition: 'Real music by a real 
composer might produce every kind of impression without aiming to. Simple and 
beautiful melodies, salty rhythms, interesting harmony, sophisticated form, 
complicated counterpoint - the real composer writes them with the ease with which one 
writes a letter.' 132 Here, too the emphasis in the creative process is taken off the 
finished product - which, to borrow Schoenberg's phrase, is not aimed at. The process 
described here is to be unhampered by struggle (pursued 'with ... ease'), similar to a 
free-flowing improvisation and not at all like composition in which effort and perhaps 
revision have been dominant in the creative process. He says elsewhere, associating 
improvisatory spontaneity with divine creativity: 
[T]he concept of creator and creation should be formed in harmony with the Divine Model; inspiration 
and perfection, wish and fulfilment, will and accomplishment coincide spontaneously and 
simultaneously. In Divine Creation there were no details to be carried out later; 'There was Light' at 
once and in its ultimate perfection. 
Alas, human creators, if they be granted a vision, must travel the long path between vision and 
accomplishment; a hard road where, driven out of Paradise, even geniuses must reap their harvest in the 
sweat of their brows. 
Alas, it is one thing to envision in a creative instant of inspiration and it is another thing to materialize 
one's vision by painstakingly connecting details until they fuse into a kind of organism. \33 
Schoenberg claims to be heavily, even painfully dependent on such inspiration. 134 
Improvisation seems therefore to be his paradigm of composition for 'composing is 
a slowed-down improvisation. ' 135 Schoenberg also makes a link between 
improvisation and music in its primordial form, for 'nature's musicians' are compared 
with improvisers at the keyboard: 'Continuo playing is ... basically very similar to the 
132 Arnold Schoenberg, "Heart and Brain in Music." (1946) In ibid, Stein (ed.), p. 55. 
m Arnold Schoenberg, "Composition with Twelve Tones (1)." (1941) In ibid, Stein (ed.), p. ~15. 
114 See Schoenberg, "Heart and Brain," p. 67. 
135 Arnold Schoenberg, "Brahms the Progressive." (1947) In Style and Idea, Stein (ed.), p. 439. 
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method practised by nature's musicians'. 136 And '[r]eal folk music could not exist or , 
survive, were it not produced ... spontaneously, as an inspired improvisation.' 137 The 
power of Schoenberg's predilection for the improvisatory is a hidden presence in his 
compositional techniques. For Godwin, atonal music, 'liberated from the gravitational 
pull oftonalityd38 is able to move freely in any direction and it is possible that, if such 
musical teleology is a function of tonality, music which avoids tonality will 'be 
experienced as generating random movementd39 in a manner which may be said to 
resemble to the ears of listeners music produced according to Sarath's improvisatory 
model. For Ernst Bloch, indeed, this openness 'created through the absence of set keys 
and prescribed paths of musical development'140 in serial composition functions as a 
kind of aspirational rebellion against late capitalism, of which serial music is one of the 
'most fragmented, alienated aesthetic forms,.141 '[S]erial music ... constructs the 
hope for an alternative working against this same alienation.' 142 Thus, Schoenberg's 
music may be figured in relation to certain sociological/political discourses as at once 
improvisatory, and directed to a hoped-for future. In the wider sense of representing an 
attempt to transform the nature of musical language, it is clearly futural and 
aspirational. 143 
Cage has been glad to acknowledge the influence of Charles Ives upon him.144 
However, he was also strongly influenced by the emphasis on the improvisatory found 
136 Arnold Schoenberg, "About Ornaments, Primitive Rhythms etc. and Bird Song." (1922) In ibid, 
Stein (ed.), p. 306. 
137 Arnold Schoenberg, "Folkloristic Symphonies." (1947) In ibid, Stein (ed.), p. 166. 
138 Godwin, Harmonies of Heaven and Earth, p. 118. 
139 Davies, Musical Meaning, p. 238. Reference to Zofia Lissa, "On the Evolution of Musical 
Perception." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 24 (1965): 273-286. 
140 Caryl Flynn, Strains of Utopia: Gender, Nostalgia, and Hollywood Film Music (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1992), p. 92. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. Reference to Edward Said, Musical Elaborations (New York: Columba Univ. Press. 1991). 
143 See Malcolm MacDonald, Schoenberg (London: 1. M. Dent, 1976), p. 29. 
I~~ See Marjorie Perloff and Charles Junkerman, "Introduction." In John Cage: Composed in America, 
Perloff and Junkerman (eds.), p. 1. 
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in the painting of Kandinsky and the ideas of Schoenberg. Indeed,' [o]f his various 
composition teachers, Arnold Schoenberg looms largest as a figure of lasting 
importance for Cage. In 1980, when Cage was nearing his seventieth birthday, 
Schoenberg still figured in his list of the fifteen men who were most important to his 
k ,145 wor. This relationship to Schoenberg was something in which Cage took a 
personal pride: '[I] think I am actually an elitist. I didn't study music with just 
anybody; I studied with Schoenberg.' 146 In addition to being affected by Kandinsky's 
ideas through Schoenberg, Cage was introduced to the work of Kandinsky more 
directly through his early relationship with Galka Scheyer. 147 However, although 
Cage's music is forged in this multi-faceted improvisatory tradition, reaching back to 
Ives, Schoenberg and Kandinsky, it seems in other ways at first sight antithetical to 
such previous forms of improvisation, since in previous improvisation, the intuitions 
and spontaneous intentions of the self are paramount, whereas for Cage they are to be 
suppressed. One of the most important concepts In Cage's mUSIC IS 
nonintentionality.148 'A concept borrowed from Buddhism, and usually considered a 
145 James Pritchett, The Music of John Cage (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), p. 9. 
146 Duckworth, "Anything I Say will be Misunderstood," p. 27. 
147 See Thomas S. Hines, "'Then Not Yet 'Cage": The Los Angeles Years, 1912-1938." In John Cage: 
Composed in America, Perloffand Junkerman (eds.), pp. 86-88. 
148 There are not only similarities between Cage's music and shamanic ritual, but a personal link between 
them, via Kandinsky. Kandinsky in his contact with shamanism seems to have anticipated, and may have 
inspired indirectly some of the musical objectives of Cage, including his nonintentionality. The 
description of shamanic music below, as ideologically appropriated by Kandinsky, conveys a sense both 
of its ontological connotations and its non intentionality, two dimensions which are characteristic of 
Cage's musical philosophy also: 'Kandinsky drew from shamanist tradition in the creation of [a] 
synthetic rift-healing Gesamtkunstwerk, for the shaman's drum offered not only a visual paradigm to 
inspire Kandinsky's imagination, but an aural one as well. For an artist whose works were so often 
entitled 'Improvisation' or 'Composition,' 'Sonority' or 'Resonance,' the shamanic ritual in its entirety 
was a mixed-media 'performance piece' par excellence. The drum was at once the shaman's 'map of the 
universe,' the canvas upon which he drew the hieroglyphic tale of his magic journey, and his vehicle of 
transport, a musical instrument empowered to induce his ecstatic trance. 
By 'tuning' the drum over the fire and by the adroit manipulation of his drumstick, the shaman was 
able to coax from his instrument a wide variety of eerie and hypnotic tones. The drum was often hung 
besides with numerous metallic ornaments, sometimes miniature bells, that clanged together as the drum 
wa~ beaten.' Weiss, Kandinsky and Old Russia. p. 106. References to Peg Weiss. Kandinsky ill 
Munich: The Formative Jugendstil Years (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), esp. pp. 81-91; Peg 
Weiss, "Evolving Perceptions of Kandinsky and Schoenberg in the Twentieth Century: Toward the 
Ethnic Roots of the 'Outsider'." Paper presented at the Arnold Schoenberg Institute, University of 
Southern California, November 1991. In Constructive Dissonance: Arnold Schoenberg and 
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philosophical matter, Cage saw that it had musical applications as well. For him, it 
was not only a question of freeing himself from his own intentions and ego, as 
prescribed by Zen masters, but also of creating a music that itself would be without 
intentions.,149 In the words of Zen Buddhist scholar Dr D. T. Suzuki who influenced 
Cage: 'Man is a thinking reed but his great works are done when he is not calculating 
and thinking. 'Childlikeness' has to be restored with long years of training in the art of 
self-forgetfulness. When this is attained, man thinks yet he does not think.' ISO 
Yet if Cage is seeking to reduce human intention in his music, he is nevertheless 
inviting the effect of improvisatory music, by producing compositions which either 
(like those written prior to about 1952) follow a score which is fixed but randomly 
generated, or (as with later works) one in which the musical instructions the score 
comprises are deliberately unpredictable as regards the way they are to be carried out. 
Thus, the earlier works, such as Music of Changes were based on the random selection 
of musical events by automatic means, analogous to throwing dice, to produce a fixed 
score. His later work, such as 'the Fontana Mix score [1958] is so open that quite 
different realizations are possible, and the sequence of events or even the events 
themselves can differ considerably from one realization to the next.,ISI As one 
commentator says: 
All [the] works written between 1952 and 1956 show an evolution from the rigid performance strictures 
of the early ... 'determinate' works (e.g., Music of Changes, Imaginary Landscape No.4) to a new 
freedom involving varying degrees of indeterminacy in performance. Cage explains the essential 
difference between chance operations and indeterminacy: 'In the case of chance operations, one knows 
more or less the elements of the universe with which one is dealing, whereas in indeterminacy, I like to 
think ... that I'm outside the circle of a known universe and dealing with things I literally don't know 
anything about. ,152 
Transformations of Twentieth-Century Culture: Vienna, Berlin, Los Angeles, Julie Brand, Christopher 
Hailey, Leonard Stein (eds.), (Los Angeles: California Univ. Press, n.d.). 
149 Tom Johnson, "Intentionality and Nonintentionality in the Performance of Music by John Cage." In 
Cage at Seventy-Five, Fleming and Duckworth (eds.), p. 262. 
150 D. T. Suzuki, no documentation. Cited in Preface to Eugen Herrigel, Zen in the Art of Archery (New 
York: Random House, 1971), n.p. Cited in Margaret Leng Tan, '''Taking a Nap, 1 Pound the Rice': 
Eastern Influences on John Cage." In ibid, Fleming and Duckworth (eds.), p. 37. 
151 Kramer, Time of Music, p. 59. 
152 Tan, 'Taking a Nap," p. 52. Citation from John Cage, no documentation. In John Cage, Richard 
Kostelanetz (ed.), (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 141. 
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Cage also observes that 'the thing I think that is consistent 1n my work, where 
otherwise inconsistency appears - like the difference between indeterminacy and the 
Music of Changes which is not indeterminate at all - the thing that is in common 
b h · . . ,153 C etween t em 1S non-1ntentIOn. age seems to recognise the paradox that his non-
intention has produced, at various stages in his career, both law and freedom. 
However, in both Cage's early and later methods, the composition is, in one way or 
another, "unprepared" ("improvisus") by the composer. It is simply that the lack of 
preparation for what is to come about in the music takes different forms from the lack 
of preparation characteristic of more traditional improvisation rooted in intention. The 
important point is that Cage is not abandoning the idea of improvisatoriness as handed 
down from Ives, Kandinsky's painting and Schoenberg, but expanding and exploring 
it. Cage indeed appears to have taken an interest in James Joyce's novel Finnegan's 
Wake, a novel written in a "stream of consciousness" technique which is intended to 
suggest the free flow of human thought, and is suggestive of spontaneous, intentional, 
improvisatory writing. 154 Likewise, for Cage's listeners, even though they may 
understand the nonintentional nature of the music, there is an immediate point of 
reference to improvisation which Cage's music so much resembles, if not chiefly in 
compositional method, at least very much in sound. The music sounds random or 
unpredictable: event E does not seem to flow from ABCD. When they ask themselves, 
confronted with the strangeness of Cage, 'What kind of music is this like?' the answer 
will be: 'improvisation.' As a result, the music will be received by them as a new 
permutation of Western improvisatory tradition. 
153 John Cage, Interview with Deborah Campana. New York, 12th February, 1985. Cited in Deborah 
Campana, "A Chance Encounter: The Correspondence between John Cage and Pierre Bou1ez, 1949-
1954." In Cage at Seventy-Five, Fleming and Duckworth (eds.), p. 236. 
154 See Pierre Boulez, letter to John Cage, January 1950. In The Boulez-Cage Correspondence, Jean-
Jacques Nattiez (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), p. 46. 
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An additional consideration is Cage's idea of the nowmoment. Cage writes: 
Many composers no longer make musical structures. Instead they set processes going. A structure is 
like a piece of furniture, whereas a process is like the weather. In the case of a table, the beginning and 
end of the whole and each of its parts are known. In the case of weather, though we notice changes in it, 
we have no clear knowledge of its beginning or ending. At a given moment we are when we are. The 
155 ' 
nowmoment. 
In improvisation, the idea of the present moment is likewise important, as the music is 
being created in the present to a degree not the case with conventional scored 
composition where creative evolution is revisable. The present moment is highlighted 
in improvisation. Thus, in the first place, Cage's nowmoment ideology may be said to 
draw, musically speaking, on the ideas of artistic improvisation and spontaneity, 
transmitted, as has been seen, by Kandinsky, Schoenberg and Ives. Moreover, in 
keeping with the present argument, Cage's improvisation is, despite his nowmoment 
philosophy, also geared to a future hope. John Cage sees, as the future purpose of 
musical activity, an expression of humanity socially harmonised. Through music's 
improvisatoriness, society is directed explicitly towards a hoped-for future. Cage has 
indeed expressly linked his musical aesthetic to the Transcendentalism of Henry 
Thoreau: 
At the beginning of the Essay on Civil Disobedience, Thoreau has this quotation: 'That government is 
best which governs not at all.' He adds: 'And when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of 
government which they will have.' Many musicians are ready. We now have many musical examples of 
the practicality of anarchy. Music with indeterminate parts, no fIxed relation of them (no score). Music 
without notation. Our rehearsals are not conducted ... Musicians can do without government. Like ripe 
fruit (I refer to the metaphor at the end of Thoreau's Essay), they have dropped away from the tree ... 
The masterpieces of Western music exemplify monarchies and dictatorships. Composer and 
conductor: king and prime minister. By making musical situations which are analogies to desirable 
social circumstances which we do not yet have, we make music suggestive and relevant to the serious 
questions which face Mankind. 156 
Thus Cage regards his improvisatory music as a vehicle for the future integration of 
humanity. Cage has also written of another major influence on his nowmoment 
conception which tends to root it still more deeply in the idea of a penetration to the 
sought-after heart of the real as "other place," this time by equating it with mystical 
155 John Cage, "The Future of Music." In Empty Words: Writings '73-'78b)/John Cage (London: 
Marion Boyars, 1980), p. 178. 
156 IbOd 1 • p. 183. 
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expenence. It is on Meister Eckhart that he draws, in order to propose his view that the 
experience of the "now" may, in music, be divorced from acts of relation or 
memory. 157 
The nowmoment conception in Cage's music claims to remove the experience of 
the present from the linear sequence of past and future experience. This idea needs to 
be examined in some detail, since it might at first sight appear to conflict with the 
argument being pursued here, that Cage's music is future-directed in the manner being 
ascribed to improvisation. Expounding the nowmoment conception, or 'vertical 
music,' Jonathan Kramer explains that 'vertical music ... is a holistic music that offers 
a timeless, temporal continuum, in which the linear interrelationships between past, 
present, and future are suspended,:58 The alleged suspension of linear temporality 
produces '[a] composition in which each sound exists for itself, rather than as 
participant in a progression' :59 This proposal leads to an even larger generalisation 
that '[i]n giving up goal-oriented listening, we eventually forsake all expectation of 
meaningful change, of realized implication of progression.' 160 
On one hand, there seems little question, that, by reducing perceptible connections 
between given musical sounds in a work and those which follow them (for example by 
following them with harmonic surprises or using unpredictable melodic shapes), a 
relative obviation of the sense of that music's structural continuity will be achieved. 
This is because, for the listener, structural continuity is what the mind expects, and 
expectation in the listener has been thwarted in this case. However this is not opposed 
to the forward projection of the music. On the contrary, it will suggest the presence of 
157 See Paul Griffiths, Cage (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), p. 22. In Cage's period as a Fellow of 
Wesleyan's Center for Advanced Studies, he compiled a list of ten books having the greatest influence 
on his thought. One of them was the Works of Meister Eckhart. See Cage, Kostelanetz (ed.). p. 139. 
158 Kramer, Time a/Music, p. 387. 
159 Ib'd 385 1 ,p. . 
160 Ib'd 56 1 ,p. . 
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constant spontaneous decisions underlying the creation of that music as though an 
improviser were at work. Such music becomes an icon of the musical improviser in 
action, for the improviser is also dependent on spontaneous decisions. Thus the lack of 
continuity characteristic of nowmoment composition interrupts the forward flow of the 
music in one sense, but the analogical/iconic spontaneity which "intervenes" to keep 
the music moving forward reasserts forward flow in another sense by foregrounding a 
sense of imagination constantly and spontaneously intervening to renew the music. In 
music of the nowmoment, the music, thus impeded from forward motion in the sense 
of predictable structure being realised, nevertheless assumes a different kind of forward 
projection by suggesting the spontaneous, decision-making process of the improvising 
imagination. 
Undoubtedly, as a poetic evocation of timelessness, vertical music such as that of 
the nowmoment seems to come as close as music can come to suggesting an absence of 
temporality, but such music nevertheless takes place over time, is perceived in time 
and identified in time. There is no such thing as atemporal thinking. However, there is 
a human poetic capacity to frame an idea of atemporality within the context of ordinary 
temporal thinking, and this is what is happening in nowmoment composition. Such 
poetic framing of the idea of the absence of time is not itself outside the temporal 
process. By way of comparison, a poet might write a poem about "Timelessness" 
using poetic means for suggesting a state of timelessness, but the poem itself would not 
be timeless. Insofar as vertical compositions might seek to convey a novel suspension 
of the temporal process, they are in the same category as such a poem, not timeless, but 
suggestive of timelessness. Kramer notes that vertical music reached its apogee in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century. He refers to composers La Monte Young and 
Philip Corner; early minimalist music like Steve Reich's Violin Phase (1967), Philip 
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Glass's Music in Fifths (1969), and Frederic Rzewski's Les Moutons de Panurge 
(1969); as well as the numerous works of Cage, including the Variations pieces, 
Cartridge Music (1960), and Atlas Epicticalis (1962).161 
Vertical music's ideology is well represented by Morton Feldman. 'While Cage has 
remained concerned with the compositional process, which can be linear even when 
the resulting music is not, Feldman simply put down one beautiful sound after another. 
Feldman's esthetic had nothing to do with teleology: '1 make one sound and then I 
move on to the next'. ,162 Feldman's bizarre ideology gives itself away in its 
contradictory claim to put down "non teleological" sounds and then 'move on to the 
next.' Contradictory, because a moment can only be "next" in relation to a previous 
moment. Because of the temporal nature of experience, it is impossible to remove 
memory and expectation in some form from musical experience, including that of the 
composer. In Husserl's words: 'The pieces and phases of perception are not externally 
glued together; rather, they are unitary in the precise sense that one awareness is one 
with another awareness, that is to say, they are one because they are awareness of the 
same thing ... This identity always resides in consciousness proper and is apprehended 
through synthesis.' 163 Frings writes in a Heideggerian vein: 'The nows of time-
consciousness are not points between past and future . . . the nows are 'stretched' 
paradoxically, overlapping each others' emergent and fading meanings. In short, time-
consciousness is 'nowing' consciousness' .164 'Sounds, for instance, that have just been 
heard are still 'retained' in passive memory, while sounds that have not yet been heard 
161 See ibid, p. 386. 
162 Ibid. Reference to Young's Dream House 'literally an everlasting piece, without beginning or end.' 
See Wim Mertens, American Minimal Music (New York: Alexander Broude, 1983), p. 89. Citation 
from Morton Feldman, in Mertens, ibid, p. 106. 
163 Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp.17-18. Cited in 
Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1983), p. 98. 
1M Frings, "Hannony and the Logos," p. 195. 
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are already 'anticipated' and already being subsumed into a 'now'.' 165 Bowles refers to 
Jonathan Kramer: 'We cannot escape, he says, from the temporal linearity in music, 
and insufficient attention has been given to the phenomenon of 'cumulative listening'. 
There is an (unavoidable) process which involves taking previous moments into 
account and which mitigates against the possibility of achieving static time in 
. ,166 Kr . I h musIc. amer wntes e sew ere: 
There are as many different Nows as there are different people. 
Each Now has its own individual length. 
Hence Nows overlap. 
Several events become past by human choice. 
All recalled past comes through the filter of the present. 167 
Even though Cage's explicit association between his music and mysticism tends to 
reinforce the link between improvisation and the "other place," his companson 
between claims to atemporal musical expenence and vanous spiritual or mystical 
traditions is ultimately unconvincing. In the case of mystical out-of-time experiences 
such as those of Eckhart, whom Cage uses as an exemplar, these experiences are 
identified as such after they are over, by a subject who has returned to normal 
consciousness and who makes his or her judgement about the nature of the mystical 
experience in and from the retrospective standpoint of time. Nowmoments are not 
experienced as nowmoments while they are taking place in the mystic's experience: 
they are remembered only subsequently as nowmoments. Adverting to "now" as 
"now" is a temporal act. There is thus something unconvincing about the claim to a 
"conscious nowmoment," whether musical or mystical, because all conscious knowing 
is in fact locked in temporality, taking previous moments into account. Nevertheless, 
despite the unsustainable claims made by the nowmoment philosophy as practised by 
165 Ibid. 
166 Bowles, Rupture in the Temporality o/Music, pp. 125-126. Reference to Kramer, Time of,\fusic, 
n.p. See also Kramer, ibid, pp. 408-409. 
167 Jonathan Kramer, letter to Barney Childs, 1st April, 1976, p. 3. Cited in Barney Childs, "Time and 
Music: A Composer's View." Perspectives o/NeH' Music 15, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 1977): 194-219; p. 
200. 
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Cage, it remains the case that one implication of all chance or indetenninate musical 
events, while not actually ensconcing the present in a discontinuous nowmoment, is to 
place a new poetic focus on the present. Such a relative focusing on the present 
musical "now" and an unpredictable musical future serves only to intensify the 
suggestion of spontaneous decision-making needed to drive the music forward, with its 
connotations of improvisation taking place "now." Cage's nowmoment philosophy 
does not conflict with the idea that his improvisatoriness is future-oriented, but rather 
supports it. 
Insofar as his work is interpreted as belonging to an improvisatory musical tradition 
coming down from Schoenberg and Ives, Cage nevertheless seems largely to reject the 
idea of intentional improvisation by a human creator: indeed as the following quotation 
would suggest, for Cage, it is not a person who improvises. Rather, music is somehow 
allowed to improvise itself or speak through the medium of the person. Cage remarks: 
Though the doors will always remain open for the musical expression of personal feelings, what will 
more and more come through is the expression of the pleasures of conviviality (as in the music of Terry 
Riley, Steve Reich, and Philip Glass). And beyond that a nonintentional expressivity, a being together of 
sound and people (where sounds are sounds and people are people). A walk, so to speak, in the woods 
of music, or in the world itself. 168 
Consequent upon this reduction of the role of the self, it is in fact by setting the self 
back into the world, rather than by engagement in the world by the self, that ontological 
consciousness, this 'walk ... in the world' arises: 
Art and music, when anthropocentric (involved in self-expression) seem trivial and lacking in urgency to 
me. We live in a world where there are things as well as people. Trees, stones, water, everything is 
expressive. I see this situation in which I impermanently live as a complex interpenetration of centers 
moving out in all directions without impasse. This is in accord with contemporary awareness of the 
operations of nature. I attempt to let sounds be themselves in a space of time. 169 
Thus, in Cage's world, man is not the centre: there are many centres which 
interpenetrate. Transcendentalist influence is evident here, in the idea of a merger of 
the human person with the wider reality of all else that is. This is the immersion of the 
168 Cage, "Future of Music," p. 179. 
169 John Cage, letter to the New York Herald Tribune newspaper, 22nd May, 1956. Cited in Johnson, 
"Intentionality and Nonintentionality," p. 262. 
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human subject in the pantheistic over-soul, entailing 'the unity of the world in God and 
the immanence of God in the world [so that] ... [t]he soul of each individual is 
identical with the soul of the world, and contains, latently, all which it contains.' 170 
Moreover, the walk 'in the woods of music' which Cage clearly equates with man's 
experience of being-in-the-world, and which for him largely replaces the experience of 
music as subjectively intentional or an 'expression of personal feelings,' seems to 
imply that for him music has an ontological status as the announcement to man, rather 
than/rom man, of the experience of being-in-the-world. Cage's music might thus be 
seen as a place where Being is disclosed to man. Clearly, for Cage, man's world arises 
for him musically in something not unlike Dasein, and there is a sense in which for 
Cage music is the place where "Being speaks." 
What remains of the present discussion on Cage will digress briefly from this 
Section's central trajectory of improvisation and hope, in order to investigate 
similarities between Cage and Heidegger, and therefore perhaps between Cage's ideas 
and the present thesis which has a Heideggerian basis. An inversion in Cage's musical 
aesthetics parallels Heidegger's inversion of the traditional conception of language -
the idea in Heidegger that man does not first speak language, but that language first 
speaks or grounds man. Both thinkers accord priority to a passivity to, rather than to 
an active use of a medium of ontological disclosure, language in Heidegger's case, 
music in Cage's. Of this passivity Cage has observed: 'I wished when I first used 
chance operations, to make music in which I would not express my feelings or my 
ideas, but in which the sounds themselves would change me.' 171 While Heidegger 
170 Harold Clarke Goddard, Studies in New England Transcendentalism (1908) (New York: Hillary 
House, 1960), p. 4. 
171 John Cage, Interview with Hans C. Helms. In "Conversations with John Cage, Christian Wol~f, ~d 
Moreton Feldman." On E. M. 1. disc: lC165-28954/57Y (1972). Cited in Solomon, "ImproVIsation 
(1),"p.77. 
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said: 'We never come to thoughts. They come to US. d72 Such an outlook has complex 
ramifications for music: 'Now, the music wants to tell the composer what to do. Now 
the performer must become the composer'. 173 
It has already been seen that Cage's music is also in a certain sense improvisatory. 
Cage's ideas therefore exhibit a certain prima facie convergence with the proposals of 
the present thesis that Being speaks in improvised music. However, there is also a 
divergence. The difference between the present thesis and Cage's theories lies in the 
difference between their respective emphases on intentional and nonintentional 
improvisation, or, stated another way, on the perceived significance of the human 
subject in relation to the musical process. In Transcendentalism, and therefore in Cage, 
the human subject seems to be no more significant than other entities in the world: 
anthropocentricity is trivial for '[ w]e live in a world where there are things as well as 
people. ' Such a subject cohabits with the rest of the world, but does not in any way 
stand out. This is why Cage seeks to make his music nonintentional, to bring the 
person down to the level of the world. However for Heidegger, and thus for the 
present thesis, the self is crucially needed for a world to arise. In words of Kisiel: 
'Speech speaks in order to summon the world and things to their essence,.174 Or as 
Heidegger says: 'Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein 's 
Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.' 175 Heidegger 
dismantled the Cartesian subject, but not - as does Transcendentalism - the subject as 
an existent an "I " who in some unique degree stands out. Indeed, Heidegger's earlier , , 
172 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, p. 11. Cited in 0' Rou~ke, "Gift of Being," p. 314. 
173 Davey Williams, "Concerning the Music that Will Be." ~n A~stm, ~~ (Prev?st and .. Rowe), 
Bailey, Budd, Golea and Kaplan, Schwartz, Solomon, Goldstem, Silber, WIlhams, Ohvero~, Forum: 
Improvisation," Childs and Hobbs (eds.), p. 101. 
174 K' . I f th E "98 ISle, "Language 0 event, p. . 
175 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 4, p. 32. 
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descriptions for Dasein were the 'historical ego' or the 'ego of the situation.' 176 This 
Heideggerian egological emphasis is preserved in the present thesis where, following 
Heidegger, Dasein is held to project futurally and actively, and also by means of 
musical improvisation of an intentional kind. Therefore on one hand, Cage's 
philosophy coincides with Heidegger and the present thesis insofar as Cage reduces the 
ontological distinctiveness of the subject in the form handed down by the Cartesian 
tradition. Viewed from this standpoint of shared divergence from the Cartesian ego, 
Transcendentalistists and Heidegger are alike in teaching a degree of melding of the 
human person with the world as a whole. On the other hand, Cage, following a 
Transcendentalist paradigm, ultimately reduces the distinctiveness of the human 
subject more than Heidegger reduces it, and therefore more than the present thesis 
reduces it. Unlike Heidegger's Dasein, Cage's Transcendentalist human subject is not 
set apart from other things in the world in any special way at all. 
The wider similarities between Cage and Heidegger have been noted by 
commentators. For Perloff and Junkerman, Cage is in debt 'to Emerson and Thoreau, 
to the notion that Heidegger explored most fully, of 'thinking as the receiving or letting 
be of something, as opposed to the positing or putting together of something'.' 177 Cage 
himself, quoted above, attempts to 'let sounds be themselves in a space of time.' In 
this connection, Gerald Bruns has remarked, '[ c ]hance operations are the Cagean . . . 
equivalent of Heidegger' s Gelassenheit [letting be]; chance brings openness to mystery 
down to earth in the form of acceptance (acknowledging the es gibt of things).' 178 
176 See Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview." In Zur 
Bestimmung der Philosophie (1919 Freiburg lectures). In Gesamtausgabe, vols 56/57, Bernd 
Heimbiichel (ed.), (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1987), pp. 205-206. Cited in Thomas Sheehan, 
"Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard Times." In Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Guignon (ed.), 
p. 78. A discussion of Dasein in relation to its subjective or ego logical aspect is provided in Harrison 
Hall, "Intentionality and the World." In ibid, Guignon (ed.), p. 124. 
l77 Perloff and Junkerman, "Introduction," p. 10. Citation from Stanley Cavell, "An Emerson Mood." 
In The Senses of Walden (San Francisco: North Point Press, Expanded Edition, 1981), p. 132. 
178 Gerald L. Bruns, "Poethics: John Cage and Stanley Cavell at the Crossroads of Ethical Theory." In 
John Cage: Composed in America, Perloffand Junkerman (eds.), p. 215. 
232 
Rather than any direct influence of Heidegger on Cage, shared interests in Eastern 
philosophy, as well as in Eckhart, may constitute the link between Cage and Heidegger. 
'During the 1950s it became apparent that, under the influence of Eastern philosophy, 
in particular Zen Buddhism with its anti-rationalist teaching, Cage's desire to tum 
away from the Western concept of artistic tradition, individual taste and even memory, 
was an increasingly powerful force in his thinking.' 179 And as one interviewer has 
asked: 
MAGEE: [O]ne of the main ideas of Heidegger is ... this notion that if we really want to understand our 
situation - or, to put it another way, if we really want to understand reality - we must try not to impose 
ourselves on it but, rather, submit ourselves to it. Do you think this links up in any serious way with 
Eastern ideas - with notions one is used to associating with Buddhism and Hinduism, or with oriental 
philosophy generally? 
BARRETT: I think it does. There are indications of this in some of Heidegger's later writings, with its 
passing references to Taoism and, at one point, Zen Buddhism. 180 
Cage's explicit involvement with the thought of Meister Eckhart has already been 
touched on above, while, on the subject of Heidegger's relationship to Eckhart, John D. 
Caputo points out that: 'Heidegger himself tells us that the mystical rose in [Angelus] 
Silesius's poem ['Rose is Without Why'], which is as we have seen a poetic expression 
of Eckhart's teaching on the soul, is also a model in terms of which we can understand 
man and thinking.' 181 
However, as well as sharing ideological traits and philosophical antecedents, 
Heidegger may actually have affected Cage more directly through Germanic influences 
in America. 'American musical life has ... been shaped and enriched by the influx of 
refugee musicians from the 1930s onwards . . . There can be little doubt . . . that 
American musicology ... was founded on works of the largely Austro-German emigre 
musicologists who settled there for good. Such names as Gustave Reese, Paul Henry 
179 Otto Karolyi, Modern American Music: From Charles Ives to the Minimalists (London: Cygnus 
Arts, 1996), p. 71. 
180 d M dE' 'aI' " 87 Barrett, "Heidegger an 0 ern xlstentl Ism, p. . . 
181 John D. Caputo. The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (n.p.: Villanova Umv. Press. 1978), 
p.140. 
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Lang, Alfred Einstein and Curt Sachs come immediately to mind.' 182 Although any 
speculation is highly generalised concerning Cage's possible contact with 
Heideggerian philosophy as a result of Germanic influences in America, it is neither 
idle nor arbitrary. Cage's post-war work coincided chronologically with a rise in 
Heidegger's philosophical influence in the Anglo-American intellectual world: indeed, 
'[t]he period after the war saw the spread of Heidegger's writings throughout the 
intellectual world in an explosion of interest that crossed lines of language, culture and 
academic disciplines.' 183 Cage would no doubt have been temperamentally drawn to 
the newest ideas. In connection with possible Heideggerian influence, Cage's phrase 
'[a] walk ... in the woods of music' in his Writings from the 1970s, quoted above, 
leaps off the page. Heidegger published The Origin of the Work of Art in 1950, in 
Frankfurt, in a volume entitled Ho/zwege, which means "a walk in the woods." 
Moreover, Cage's new trend towards performance indeterminacy is dated by Tan 
above as having begun just after this, around 1952, which is also the composition date 
of Cage's perhaps most extreme example of performance indeterminacy, the piece 4' 
33' '. This piece bears more than passing resemblance to some conceptions in 
Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of Art. 
In 4' 33' the performer (in fact there may be more than one) sits in silence at her 
instrument without doing anything, for four minutes and thirty-three seconds, while her 
audience listen to the ordinary sounds made by the environment. Although Cage must 
have seen the funny side, the piece is not frivolous. In the first place, to situate 
ordinary environmental noise within the context of an art-work is to make a statement 
about the worldedness of the self who is the art-producer: the statement, in other 
words, that if I can produce a work of art, I must already be in the world, not some kind 
IS2 Karolyi, Modern American, p. 129. Alfred Einstein was a cousin of Albert Einstein the scientist. 
183 Sheehan, "Reading a Life," p. 89. 
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of disembodied subjectivity aloof from it. Such disembodiedness had been the 
implication of the "worldless subject" which fonned the cornerstone of the Cartesian 
scheme,184 and '[i]t is this 'interpretation of the being of consciousness' that Being and 
Time criticised and replaced with a radically different conception of the subject - the 
'existing subject,' as Heidegger puts it - as Dasein.' 185 Cage's re-worlding of the 
subject here in 4' 33" can, of course, be accounted for in tenns of either a 
Transcendentalist or a Heideggerian paradigm. However, a more plainly Heideggerian 
connotation awaits, since 4' 33" is also about a musical instrument which is not played 
and, as Heidegger commentator Gunther P6ltner observed, '[t]he quiet which precedes 
the sounding of . . . music, is the gathered and collected presence [versammelte 
Anwesenheit] of the entire piece of music.' 186 Musical perfonnances, though 
understandably thought of chiefly in tenns of sound, are nevertheless often deeply 
implicated in and interactive with the experience of silence in this sense. People often 
fall silent in order to begin listening, and according to a Heideggerian understanding, in 
such instinctive silence before a piece, the listeners might consciously or, more likely, 
unconsciously be understood to gather the art-work, which will in tum shortly gather 
world and earth. In making an art-work out of the silent expectation which precedes a 
perfonnance, Cage's 4' 33" renders into artistic symbolisation the tacit expectation 
which listeners, waiting for a perfonnance to begin, have of art as the place where 
"Being speaks," their theoretical or pre-theoretical recognition of art as ontological 
disclosure (Chapter 4, Section II). Moreover, the silence here clearly is anticipatory, 
since the audience do not necessarily know, and ideally should not, that this piece will 
remain silent, and the point of the presence of a musical instrument is to suggest that 
184 See Frederick A. Olafson, "The Unity of Heidegger's Thought." In Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, Guignon (ed.), pp. 110-111. 
185 Ib'd 1 ,p. Ill. 
186 P "I M d H . d "15 o tner," ozart an el egger, p. . 
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the silence is to be broken. This anticipatory silence, which, in 4' 33" may for the first 
time be seen as extrapolated to form an entire art-work, possesses here a significance 
rather like the emptiness of Heidegger's Greek temple in The Origin of the Work of Art 
(1950), which embodies both world and earth through a gathering emptiness. The 
temple's colonnaded space is both open to the outside and enclosed. 187 Its emptiness 
speaks of a primordial worlding of earth lying at the basis of all works of art, anterior 
to whatever a given art-work might additionally be in terms of depiction, content or 
medium. John Cage's silent piece is similarly open to the world-sounds outside it, 
which are brought to light and enclosed by the cultural context of the art-work. 4 '33 " 
reminds us, like the temple, that every art-work, prior to the details which define it as 
this or that art-work, is a gathering of what is already available, a worlding of earth. 
Thus, in 4 '33" musical performance reflects on itself in the light of an arguably 
Heideggerian approach to the work of art, and sets out to remember its rootedness in 
sounds available in the world. 
The piece also highlights a paradox in Cage's supposedly nonintentional 
methodology, namely that all musical art requires some kind of intentional human 
activity, and this implies, notwithstanding Cage's philosophy, the residual presence of 
the intentional human subject. Even 4' 33" has a performer who takes the intentional 
decision as to when the piece commences, for example, and possibly which instrument 
to "play" it on, or even, indeed, whether to "play" it rather than simply walk away. For 
Cage in his nonintentional 4' 33 ", a world arises through music, but only, perhaps 
following Heidegger, at the summons of man. This piece fails to place man on an 
equal level with the other things in the world in the manner favoured by 
Transcendentalism. There is no 'complex interpenetration of centers' for it is the 
187 See Steiner, Heideggcr, pp. 134-135. 
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human person's intentions which determine the existence of the perfonnance, and 
some aspects of the performance. In 4' 33' the human person remains centre and 
summoner, essentially Dasein. In a 1989 interview, Cage comments on the significant 
aporias in his nonintentional procedures: 
DUCKWORTH: So ... even in indeterminate, nonintentional music value judgements playa part? 
CAGE: Oh, certainly. 188 
As has been observed: 
Cage's music has become much more widely and deeply understood, and today Cage interpreters 
sometimes produce truly exquisite musical objects, perhaps exquisite in ways that Cage himself never 
imagined. 
Do they do so intentionally? 
If so, doesn't that go against the basic intentions, or nonintentions, of the music? 
What are the real intentions of a composer of nonintentional music? 
What does nonintentional music intend to convey to the listener, and how can the interpreter help the 
message come across? 
If a performer plays with great control, achieving exactly what he or she intends, does this contradict 
the nonintentions of the music? 
The contradictions fold over one another endlessly, like one of those ever-confusing Zen koans, and 
we will never untangle all these ironies. 189 
Cage both views his music ontologically as an expression of reality, and, also, his 
nonintentional procedures remain intentional by default. Thus his work seems to 
encompass, though in an inexplicit and unfonnulated way, the idea of intentional 
improvisation as an ontological unveiling. Even 4' 33 ' is laced through with a residual 
intentionality, the presence of the summoner. An ontological claim for intentional 
improvising is, of course, made by the present thesis, a claim which thus has pre-
echoes in Cage's musical practices, though not his theories. This suggests that one of 
the twentieth century's most original composers was reaching unconsciously towards 
the ideas being here proposed. 
For another composer Cornelius Cardew, seeking to articulate a political radicalism 
and hope in the early 1970s, 'the experience of improvisation was a politically 
188 Duckworth, "Anything I Say will be Misunderstood," p. 22. 
189 Johnson, "Intentionality and Nonintentionality," p. 264. 'Koans are nonsensical riddles which Zen 
masters pose for novice monks who come to their elders expecting to be told what is real.' Charles 
Junkerman, "'nEw/forMs of living together': The Model of the Musicircus." In John Cage: Composed 
in America, Perloff and Junkerman (eds.), p. 51. 
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radicalizing influence, for its lessons of fruitful co-operation and productive freedom 
seemed ready for application to the wider world. ,190 Cardew's Scratch Orchestra 
which sought to 'break down barriers between professional and amateur,,191 included 
works by La Monte Young, Terry Riley, and Frederic Rzewski, and included 
'improvisation rites' 192 which sought to 'establish a community of feeling, or a 
communal starting-point, through ritual. ,193 For this school of composers, 'musical 
issues were political issues in microcosm' 194 and 'temporariness was an invitation to 
deal with issues of the moment, be they musical or political.' 195 Cardew sought to 
move beyond the musical methods of the existing avant-garde in the pursuit of his 
political goals: 
I have discontinued composing music in an avantgarde idiom for a number of reasons: the exclusiveness 
of the avantgarde, its fragmentation, its indifference to the real situation of the world today, its 
individualistic outlook and not least its class character (the other characteristics are virtually products of 
this). I have rejected the bourgeois idealistic conception which sees art as the production of unique, 
divinely inspired geniuses, and developed a dialectical materialist conception which sees art as the 
reflection of society ... At a time when the ruling class has become blatantly vicious and corrupt, as it 
must in its fmal decay, it becomes urgent for conscious artists to develop ways of opposing the ideas of 
the ruling class and reflecting in their art the vital struggles of the oppressed classes and peoples in their 
upsurge to seize political power. 196 
In a similar manner Frederic Rzewski seeks 'to model socio-political phenomena and 
to teach specific lessons about these phenomena on both intuitive and intellectual 
levels to both performers and listeners. ,197 'Rzewski has been a committed Marxist 
since the early 1960s and has openly consecrated his art to bringing about a 
consciousness that will aid world revolution.' 198 'Rzewski is clear about how music 
190 Paul Griffiths, Modern Music and After (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 185-186. 
191 Ibid, p. 186. 
192 Cornelius Cardew, "A Scratch Orchestra: Draft Constitution." The Musical Times 110, no. 1516 
(June 1969): 617-619; p. 619. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Griffiths, Modern Music and After, p. 188. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Cornelius Cardew, Programme notes to Piano Album (London: n.p., 1973). Cited in Timothy D. 
Taylor, "Moving in Decency: The Music and Radical Politics of Cornelius Cardew." Music and Letters 
79, no. 4 (November 1998): 555-576; p. 563. 
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should be used as a revolutionary tool. It must . . . foreground the participants' 
dissatisfaction with existing power structures, convey the possibility and hope of 
something better, model this alternative, and suggest a way of obtaining it.' 199 He 
aspires to a 'situation of spontaneous concerted action . . . whether it be a musical 
performance or a revolution' .200 In Les Moutons de Panurge, the improvisatory 
method of performance 'can model the experience of oppressed individuals engaged in 
tedious and pointless drudgery, halfway believing that what they are doing will 
somehow advance them to a state of freedom and happiness in the vague future. ,201 
Messiaen's first contacts with musical improvisation probably came from his early 
association with the French Catholic tradition of liturgical organ improvisation. He 
studied organ improvisation as a young man with Marcel Dupre202 and continued to 
improvise regularly as a liturgical organist long into his performing career. 203 
Messiaen's understanding of rhythm is highly distinctive: 'Now most people think that 
rhythm and the steady beat of a military march are one and the same. Whereas rhythm 
is in fact an unequal element given to fluctuations, like the waves in the sea, the sound 
of the wind, or the shape of tree branches. ,204 'Schematically, rhythmic music is music 
that scorns repetition, squareness, and equal divisions, and that is inspired by the 
movements of nature, movements of free and unequal durations. ,205 Clearly 
Messiaen's unusual view of rhythm has the effect of minimising the predictability of 
his music, introducing a spontaneous feel which moves in the direction of an 
improvisatory ethos. h hm· I ,206 He favours a 'r yt IC rest essness. As he says: 'My 
199 Ibid, p. 430. 
200 Ibid, p. 433. 
201 Ibid, p. 426. 
202 See Claude Samuel and Olivier Messiaen, Olivier Messiaen: Music and Color. Conversations with 
Claude Samuel (Portland, Oregon: Amadeus, 1994), p. 22. 
203 See ibid, p. 25. 
204 M' . 'b'd '149 eSSlaen. III 1 1 , p. ~ . 
205 M' "b'd 67 eSSlaen, III 1 1 ,p. . 
206 Messiaen, in ibid, p, 182. 
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rhythmic language is precisely a combination of all these elements: note-values 
distributed in irregular numbers, the absence of equal times . . . and the action of 
rhythmic characters,?07 For Messiaen, this approach IS, indeed, consciously 
spontaneous.208 
Messiaen's ideas of spontaneity in rhythm have futural connotations. He asserts 
that his first rhythmically important works were La Nativite du Seigneur and Quatuor 
pour fa fin du temps.209 The first is clearly a religious work rooted in Christian hope, 
and the second is quite explicitly related to the end of time, a future hope, being based 
on a text from the Book of Revelation (10: 1-7). The latter musical work was moreover 
written in a prison camp in 1941,210 suggesting a refusal of a painful present which 
complements the hope which inhabits the work. Matheson suggests that this choice of 
text from Revelation may have been prompted by Messiaen's situation in the prison 
camp, 'in which time might indeed have seemed literally endless, and the Apocalypse 
close at hand. ,211 It may even be helpful to suggest a parallel between Messiaen's 
spontaneous, improvisatory style of religious musical composition while in the prison 
camp, and the recourse to improvisatory singing in a religious context by black slaves 
in America, as discussed above. 
Tim Hodgkinson finds a parallel between Messiaen's music and shamanism in the 
sense that both seek to evoke a mystical dimension212 a parallel also found by 
Tucker.213 Indeed, specifically rhythmic irregularity as a way of making contact with a 
hoped-for future has been identified in some shamanism for it has been noticed that 
207 M" " "b"d 79 eSSlaen, In 1 1 , p" " 
208 S M" " "b"d 79 ee eSSlaen, In 1 1 , p. . 
209 S M " . "b'd 80 ee eSSlaen In 1 1 , p. " 
210 See lain G. Matheson, "The End of Time: A Biblical Theme in Messiaen's Quatuor." In The 
Messiaen Companion, Peter Hill (ed"). (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 235" 
~II Ibid" 
2P "S"b "Sh " " 64 
- See HodgkInson," 1 enan amanlsm, p. " 
213 See Tucker, "Body Electric," p. 84" 
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'the healing songs of the North American Indians [studied by F. Densmore] are 
characterized by changes of stress and rhythmical irregularities that distinguish them 
. I I fr h 'b 'h ,214 M . qUIte c ear y om t e tn es ot er songs. eSSlaen also has his own version of the 
nowmoment philosophy. Messiaen compares his music to that of Stockhausen's 
Momente which 'evolves moment by moment, minute by minute, fragment of time by 
fragment of time. ,215 He has associated his religious concerns with a 'static' element 
in his music: 'I myself am a static composer because I believe in the invisible and in 
the beyond; I believe in eternity. ,216 In a similar way, he 'sought to do away with time, 
to destroy the notion of duration, and to present music as impressions with neither 
beginnings nor endings. This musical environment, freed from time, evokes sensations 
of deep contemplation and religious ecstasy. ,217 This musical emphasis on the present 
does not, however, obviate the claim that his music is future-directed, and the 
considerations and paradoxes here essentially correspond to those which applied to, 
and put in question, Cage's idea of the nowmoment as a radical breach with past and 
future. 
IV Schelling as Resonator for the Primordial 
Chapter 2, Section III described the effects of the German philosophical ideas of 
spontaneity on Liszt. It was seen how the impact of Schelling's thought on Liszt 
fostered an improvisatory tendency in the latter's artistic work, musical improvisation 
being seen there, by implication of Schelling's philosophy, as a power which 
penetrates to the depths of reality. It might be conjectured in this case that humanity's 
~14 Rouget, Music and Trance, p. 8l. Reference to Frances Densmore. "The Us.e of Music in the 
Treatment of the Sick by American Indians." In Music and Medicine, D. M. Schulhan and M. Schoen 
(eds.), (New York: Henry Schuman, 1948), pp. 36-37. 
215 Messiaen, in Sanmel and Messiaen, Conversations, p. 187. 
216 M' . 'b'd 103 eSSlaen, 10 1 1 ,p. . 
211 Madeleine Hsu, Olivier Messiaen, The Musical Mediator: A Study of the Influence of Lis:::!, Debussy, 
and Bartok (London: Associated Univ. Presses, 1996), p. 25. 
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primordial shamanic instinct concerning improvised music as the unveiling of the 
desired "other place" somehow found an indirect outlet in this German philosophy. 
Schelling was noted for his respect for and interest in mythology, which entails a 
familiarity with primitive cultures and their artistic and religious practices of which 
shamanism is clearly one. Along with Goethe and H6lderlin, Schelling was 
responsible for a growth of interest in myth at the end of the eighteenth century218 and 
along with A. and F. Schlegel he was a founding figure in the German mythological 
school of the nineteenth century. For Schelling, mythology was 'the necessary 
condition and primary material for all art.,219 He believed that 'a renaissance in 
national art is possible only if artists tum to mythology. ,220 Given that art is at the 
heart of Schelling's philosophy, these statements imply a large claim for the 
significance of mythology, and, by implication primitive culture. It would not be 
unreasonable, given this immersion in archaic human ideas and practices, to speculate 
that primitive practices in the area of the search for truth, such as shamanism, 
impressed themselves favourably on Schelling's imagination so as to find a subtle echo 
in his philosophical work. Indeed, Schelling's marked emphasis on the idea of art as 
access to truth already echoes a characteristic primitive human belief for '[t]he 
religions of humanity and the art of humanity have always been intertwined. ,221 
Schelling would certainly have been made familiar with the idea of the shaman, even 
from an early and impressionable age, as his father was a professor of oriental 
languages,222 an occupation that would clearly bring him into contact with folk cultures 
of the east where shamanism survived. Schelling was also influenced by the prevalent 
218 See S. S. Averintsev, "Myth." In The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (1974), vol 16, Jean Paradise 
(group editorial director), (New York: Macmillan, 1977), p. 616. 
219 Friedrich von Schelling, no documentation. Cited in V. E. Gusev, "Mythological School." In ibid, 
Paradise (group editorial director), p. 614. 
220 G 'b'd usev, 1 1 . 
221 Olivier Christin, "Religion and Aesthetics." In Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol 4. Micheal Kelly 
(ed.-in-chief), (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), p. 124. 
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Orientalism.223 Moreover,' Schelling believed that philosophy was the substitute for, 
or the equivalent of, a mystical experience - a jump into Being ... a grasp of (or for) 
the Absolute, with neither a demonstrative nor a psychological basis, but rather an 
experience of transcendent wholeness. ,224 This affinity with mysticism runs even 
deeper than his ideas, and embeds itself in his written style. Kearney has written of 
Schelling's 'deep determination to reconcile mystical and scientific thought [which] 
was also manifest in the very style and form of his presentation. ,225 Schelling often 
wrote in 'incantatory formulations,226 and favoured 'visionary rumination. ,227 
The influence of Schelling, and sometimes additionally Liszt, also appears to have 
figured significantly in the compositional/improvisational and hope-oriented outlook of 
Ives, Kandinsky, Schoenberg, and through them, Cage. The Transcendentalism, 
associated with Emerson, which influenced Ives was rooted in fact in this German 
philosophy. In the definition of one commentator: 'Let us say, then, simply, that New 
England Transcendentalism was produced by the deliberate importing of certain 
imperfectly understood elements of German idealism into American Unitarianism; that 
it became a creative force in American life and letters; but that as a philosophy it was 
merely a sort of mystical idealism built upon pragmatic premises. ,228 Schelling's ideas 
having been taken up in England by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, there appears to have 
been a 'striking similarity between Emerson's thought and Coleridge's, and 
consequently between Emerson's and Schelling's,.229 Schelling's ideas are likely to 
222 See Philip W. Goetz (ed-in-chief), The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol 10, (Chicago: Chicago 
Dniv. Press, 1990), unattributed article "Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von," p. 512. 
m See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 150. 
224 Nemoianu, Taming of Romanticism, p. 28. 
225 Kearney, Wake, p. 179. 
226 Ibid. 
')7 
-- Ibid. 
228 Henry David Gray, Emerson: A Statement of New England Transcendentalism as Expressed in the 
fhilosophy o.fits ChiefExponenf (New York: Frederick Ungar, n.d. [1917?]), pp. ~-l-15. . 
29 Ibid, p. 31. References to (no given name) Lockwood, Emerson as a Phzlosopher (mcomplete 
documentation), pp. 6, 7; H[arold] C[larke] Goddard, "Studies in New England Transcendentalism." Ph. 
D dissertation. Columbia University, 1908, pp. 80-81. 
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have been transmitted to Emerson in some degree also from France by the writings of 
Victor Cousin, to whom reference was made above in connection with his pro-
Schellingian articles in the 1830s in the Paris Revue musicale: 'In one of his earliest 
addresses [Emerson] speaks as if acquainted with Cousin's system .. In English Traits 
he speaks of him again - 'whose lectures we had all been reading in Boston' . ,230 
Schelling's conception of freedom as a necessity arising from within the human 
person echoes also in Kandinsky. For commentator Paul Overy: 'A phrase that occurs 
again and again in Concerning The Spiritual in Art and in other writings of Kandinsky 
is inner necessity or inner need. The phrase is not original but is used by many writers, 
musicians and artists towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the beginning of 
the twentieth. ,231 Overy continues: 'In the work of art the external expression is the 
form of the work, the internal necessity the inner tensions within the artist's mind or 
soul which demand to be formulated in external terms: 'The artist wishes to express 
himself and chooses only forms which are sympathetic to his inner self.' 'The artist 
may use any form which his expression demands; his inner impulses must find suitable 
external form'. ,232 The ideas here of 'the external expression [of] ... internal 
necessity', and 'inner impulses [which] must find suitable external form' echo 
Schelling's conception of the artist. As representative imaginer and prophet, he is 
230 Goddard, Studies in New England Transcendentalism [(1960)], p. 77. Reference to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Works, vol 1 (Boston: Riverside, 1883-1894), p. 165. Cousin appears to have influenced the 
Transcendentalists quite extensively. Goddard refers to his influence on Henry Channing (see Goddard, 
ibid, pp. 50-51) and Theodore Parker (see ibid, p. 84). 'The works of Cousin ... also became familiar to 
the Americans, - reviews and translations going where the eloquent original was not heard - and helped 
to free the young mind from the gross sensationalism of the academic Philosophy on one side, and the 
grosser supernaturalism of the ecclesiastical Theology on the other.' Ibid, p. 106. 'Of French writers 
who helped to carry German thought, the most important were probably Mme. De Stael, Cousin and 
]ouffroy, and of these the second seems to have been the most widely read.' Ibid, p. Ill. Goddard cites 
an article in the North American Review (July 1841) in which was written: 'The writings of Cousin form 
the popular philosophy of the day. Their success in this country is attested by the appearance of the 
three translations, of which the titles are given above, one of which has already passed to a second 
edition and has been introduced as a text book in some of our principal colleges.' Ibid, p. 111, note 2. 
231 Paul Overy, I\andinsky: The Language o/the Eye (London: Elek, 1969), p. 77. 
m Ibid, p. 78. Citations from Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1911) (New York: 
Wittenborn, 1947), p. 53. 
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compelled to create by, in the words of Herbert Read 'an unconscious power which ... 
possesses him. ,233 Will Grohman, who enjoyed personal contact with Kandinsky,234 
has also spoken of Kandinsky's cultural connections with Schelling, particularly in the 
context of contemporary revivals of German idealist thinking: 'Several of his ideas 
were derived from the German Romantic philosophers, from Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre ... and Schelling. Schelling's theories were familiar in Russia, 
and we find echoes of them among Kandinsky's friends, particularly Franz Marc 
(Aphorisms).,235 Grohmann remarks that both On the Spiritual in Art, and even more 
the preface to the catalogue of the second Blaue Reiter exhibition of February 1912 
contain pages that 'remind us of Schelling. ,236 Moreover, whether Kandinsky's 
youthful fascination with a certain painting of Liszt, and especially the depiction in it 
of Liszt's hand, may have fuelled his interest in the improvisatory is worthy of 
conjecture. Kandinsky reports that he often used to gaze as a youth on Repin's 
painting of Liszt in order to study the hand with prolonged attention.237 
In the case of Schoenberg, there is evidence from the contents of his library of the 
direct literary influence of Kant and of the post-Schellingian philosophical tradition on 
him, as represented especially by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who had taken up the 
233 Read, True Voice of Feeling, p. 17. 
234 See Clark V. Poling, Kandinsky 's Teaching at the Bauhaus: Color Theory and Analytical Drawing 
(New York: Rizzoli, 1986), p. 19. 
235 Will Grohrnann, Wassily Kandinsky: Life and Work (1958) (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), p. 
84. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, or The Science of Knowledge (1794) has been referred to above 
(Chapter 2, Section III). 
236 Grohrnann, ibid, p. 86. The catalogue passage to which Grolunann refers in connection with 
resemblance to Schelling (see ibid, p. 67) is as follows: 'Nature creates form for its purpose. Art creates 
form for its purpose ... It is our warm desire to arouse joy by showing examples of the inexhaustible 
wealth of forms that, unceasingly, the world of art creates by the operation of law.' From the catalogue 
of the Second Exhibition of the Editors of the HBlaue Reiter" (Munich, 1912). In Kandinsky: Complete 
Writings on Art, vol 1, Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo (eds.), (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), p. 
228. 
237 See Wassily Kandinsky, "Riickblicke." In Kandinsky: Die Gesammelten Schriften, vol I, Hans K. 
Roethel and lelena Hahl-Koch (eds.), (Bern: Benteli, 1980), p. 32; Wassily Kandinsky, "Anmerkungen 
zu'Riickblicke'." In ibid, Roethel and Hahl-Koch (eds.), p. 152. 
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central points of Schelling's metaphysic of art.238 William Thomson places 
Schopenhauer and Kant in the forefront of Schoenberg's interests. 239 The 
improvisatory connotations of Schoenberg's understanding of creativity may also be in 
some way connected with an admiration for Liszt. It is in the 1911 essay on Liszt that 
Schoenberg observes that 'the perfected work of the great artist, is produced, above all, 
by his instincts; and the sharper ear he has for what they say, the more immediate the 
expression he can give them, the greater his work is. ,240 Since improvisation may be 
defined as the ability to give immediate expression to musical instinct, as Liszt did pre-
eminently in his piano improvisation, it is the Lisztian practice of improvisation which 
goes furthest towards satisfying Schoenberg's definition of ideal musical creativity 
here. Nor was Messiaen untouched by the influence of Liszt, since Marcel Dupre's 
outstanding keyboard technique, and his improvisatory pedagogy had deep roots in the 
Lisztian inheritance. Messiaen described Dupre as 'the Liszt of the organ. ,241 
It would seem thus that rves, Kandinsky, Schoenberg and Messiaen were 
responding in their music or painting not just to a primordial human tendency to link 
improvisatoriness with the "other place" of aspiration, as exemplified in shamanism, 
but also to the influence of a European cultural and philosophical tradition associated 
especially with Schelling. Their linking of improvisatoriness and the "other place" 
might thus be interpreted as overdetermined by more than one cultural cause. 
However, if what has been said above about Schelling's interest in primitive human 
culture is also taken into account, a division between these two cultural influences 
should not be too firmly drawn. It might be possible to interpret the influence of 
238 See Christopher Butler, Ear~v Modernism: Literature, Music and Painting in Europe J 900- J 9 J 6 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), p. 83, note 81. 
239 See William Thomson, Schoenberg's Error (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Univ. Press. 1991), p. 18. 
240 Arnold Schoenberg, "Franz Liszt's Work and Being." (1911) In Style and Idea, Stein (ed.), p. 442. 
241 Olivier Messiaen, "Hommage a Marcel Dupre." Le Courrier ,\[usical de France 35 (1971): 113. 
Cited in Murray, Marcel Dupre, p. 4. 
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Schelling as a further cultural effect of the original, primordial link made by humans 
between improvised music and hope, a link now refracted conceptually through the 
German philosophical tradition newly stimulated by mythological and Oriental themes. 
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Chapter 7 
Improvisation and Christian Hope 
I Liturgy and Hope 
The idea of musical improvisation's primordial expressive affinity with human hope 
and aspiration has now been examined here in the context of a range of specific objects 
of hope. These were the freedom of American slaves, the supernatural aspirations of 
shamanism, union with the over-soul in American Transcendentalist philosophy, the 
Schoenbergian transformation of Western music, the perfected socialist society 
proposed by Marxism, and the heavenly goal proposed by Christianity. A cultural 
expression of the fundamental relationship between improvised music and hope seems 
also to be found in the history of Christian ritual, and this suggestion will now be 
considered in some detail, both historical and theological. 
An important aim of Christian ritual, or liturgy, is the elicitation and expression of 
various interrelated hopes: hope for a perfect heavenly existence following upon 
earthly life; hope for a present earthly existence significantly enhanced by justice and 
the implementation of God's will; hope for a finally transformed earthly existence (the 
'new earth,' Revelation 21: 1) lived in total harmony with God's will. These three 
dimensions of hope may be heard expressed, for example, in the following prayer from 
the Order of Holy Communion of the Church of England (emphases added): 
Father of all, we give you thanks and praise, that 
when we were still far off you met us in your Son 
and brought us home. Dying and living, he 
declared your love, gave us grace, and opened 
the gate of glory. May we who share Christ's 
body live his risen life; we who drink his cup 
bring life to others; we whom the Spirit lights 
give light to the world. Keep us finn in the hope 
you have set before us, so we and all your 
children shall be free, and the whole earth li\'e to 
praise your name: through Christ our Lord. 1 
1 The Alternative Service Book 1980: Services Authorized for use in the Church of England in 
conjunction H'ith the Book of Common Prayer together 'with the Liturgical Psalter (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press and A. R. Mowbray, 1980), p. 144. 
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Liturgical activity is not concerned exclusively with this future orientation, for the 
remembrance, or anamnesis of Christ's earthly work is also a central component: 
Eat and drink in remembrance that he died for 
you, and feed on him in your hearts by faith with 
thanksgiving.2 
However, the liturgical trajectory of futural hoping has a certain priority over this 
other, historical trajectory. In words of Leonide Ouspensky: 'Christian life is based on 
two essential realities. One is the redeeming sacrifice of Christ, the need to participate 
in this sacrifice, to partake of communion in it in order to be saved. The other essential 
truth is the goal and the result of this sacrifice: the transfiguration of man, and with 
him, of the whole visible world, resulting in peace between God and the world. This 
second truth is the main subject of Church symbolism: the forthcoming universal 
Kingdom of God. It is precisely this orientation towards the future, this building up of 
the future, which distinguished Christian worship from all others. ,3 
This due priority accorded to hoping arises from the fact that the future heavenly 
existence, and the final transformation of the earth at the end of time, may be correctly 
described as the 'definitive state of human existence. ,4 Then, the work of Christ on 
behalf of the human race, which liturgy celebrates, will achieve fulfilment. In 
Christian theology, the world and mankind were first created, then also subsequently 
renewed in their relationship to God through the earthly activity of Christ, in order to 
be drawn into an ever closer relationship with God over a historical process. 'The 
universe was created 'in a state of journeying' (in statu viae)'.5 The future, not the past 
will exhibit the greater completion of God's purposes, for God guides his creation 
) 
- Ibid, p. 143. Emphasis added. 
3 Leonide Ouspensky, Theology of the Icon (Crestwood NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1978). p. 
26. 
4 Neil Onnerod, Introducing Contemporary Theologies: The What and the Who ofTheologv Today 
(Newtown NSW Australia: Dwyer, 1990), p. 28. 
5 Catechism o(the Catholic Church (London: Geoffrey Chapman. 1994), section 302, p. 71. 
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'toward an ultimate perfection yet to be attained, ,6 and all creation awaits a final 
consummation, when it will be transformed, made perfect by God in a mysterious way 
fully understood by God alone. It is to the final goal of this process that the Christian 
liturgy looks forward in hope. 
Christianity is approximately two thousand years old. For the entirety of Christian 
tradition during its first millennium, and for the preponderance of Christians since that 
time, though the latter have become divided in due course into three main theological 
groupings, there is a notable consensus on how Christian truth is most fully set forth. It 
is chiefly the ritual liturgical proclamation and activity, what is said and done in 
liturgy, which have been regarded as the primary expression of Christian truth. 
Geoffrey Wainwright observes: 'This communion with God, symbolically focused in 
liturgy, is the primary locus of religious language for the Christian. Theological 
language belongs to the second order: it is the language of reflection upon the primary 
experience. The language of worship mediates the substance on which theologians 
reflect; without that substance, theological talk would have no referent.' 7 This 
relationship of liturgy and theology is as old as Christianity itself. The earliest 
understanding of Christian belief was as something found in the Church's day-to-day 
preaching and living liturgical practice.8 For example, '[t]he Church was assured of 
the divinity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit because, or at least partly because, divine 
functions were attributed to them in prayer and sacramental worship ... It knew that 
even infants needed to be redeemed by Christ because it had from the beginning 
practised infant baptism.,9 Liturgical practice formed the cornerstone of Christian 
6 Ibid. 
7 Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology: A Systematic Theology. The Praise o/God in Worship. Doctrine and 
Life (London: Epworth, 1980), pp. 20-21. 
s See 1. N. D. Kelly, Ear~v Christian Doctrines (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958), p. 34. 
9 Dulles, Craft o/Theology, p. 8. 
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belief at a primitive stage before the canon of Scripture was fixed, and indeed before 
the New Testament documents had even been written. 
The Roman Catholic Church has reasserted the continuing centrality of liturgy in 
its recent official teaching. For the encyclical Mediator Dei of pope Pius XII, liturgy is 
the climax of God's activity on earth: 'The Church ... faithful to the mandate of her 
Founder, continues the priestly office of Jesus Christ, and does this primarily through 
the Sacred Liturgy.do In the subsequent words of the Second Vatican Council: 
'[E]very liturgical celebration, because it is an action of Christ the Priest and of His 
Body, which is the Church, is a sacred action surpassing all others. No other action of 
the Church can equal its efficacy by the same title and to the same degree.' II '[T]he 
liturgy is the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed; it is also the 
fount from which all her power flows.' 12 Liturgical rites thus constitute a primary 
ontological announcement of the Christian mystery, and, by the same token, the 
primordial place where Christian hope is expressed symbolically. Moreover, in the 
liturgy, much of the essential meaning is spoken, and this entails that, historically, and 
in principle, Christian hope in its highest expression has been and is inseparable from 
the word as spoken. It is in consequence of this permanent embodiment of Christian 
hope in the vocal and auditory that the relevance to Christian liturgy of earlier 
Chapters, which concerned music and prosody as unveilings of Being in projection and 
hope, will begin to emerge. 
10 Pius XII, "Mediator Dei," (1947) para 3. In Four Great Encyclicals of Pius XlI (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1961), p. 98. 
II Second Vatican Council, The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy. section 7. In Vatican Council :!: 
The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, Austin Flannery (ed.), (Leominster: Fowler Wright, 
1975), p. 5. 
12 Ibid, section 10, p. 6. 
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II Music in the Liturgy: Roots in Christian Anthropology 
Despite the corporate dimension of liturgy, reflecting the importance of Christian 
community, Christian belief cannot arise in a human person without some individual 
intervention of God on that person's behalf. He or she must receive from God 
personally the supernatural capacity for subjective assent to the content of the Christian 
message. In granting a person the supernatural capacity for this assent, or free 
response, known as faith, God does not alter the existing natural constitution of the 
person, but builds up the same human nature to a new level. God builds upon existing 
nature, since nature was created good by God, indeed created in His image as an 'echo 
of the divine being' .13 Moreover, the theological concept of human nature goes beyond 
that of philosophy or anthropology, for it implies that nature is already radically open 
to, and expectant of, this initial communication by God: it possesses potentia 
obedientialis. 14 Human nature inherently waits for God to prompt it towards a free 
response in faith. Once faith is born, Eastern theology has tended to speak of God's 
"deification" of the human person,15 'a direct encounter of man with the Holy Spirit' 16 
where 'the divine energies by which God shapes creation are trinitarianly personal.' 17 
Western theology has tended to speak of 'justification" of the human person by a 
divinely created supernatural power, and tended 'to subordinate the work of the Holy 
Spirit to the concept of grace, which is interposed between God and man.' 18 The main 
point here, however, is that human nature does not need to be fundamentally modified 
when God comes to prompt it to faith and towards a full relationship with Himself. 
13 Kevin Vanhoozer, "Human Being, Individual and Social." In The Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Doctrine, Colin E. Gunton (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), p. 177. 
1-1 See Richard P. McBrian, Catholicism (1981) (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1984), p. 158. 
IS See Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, vol 1 The 
Beginnings to the Reformation, (1986) (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), p. 3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Geoffrey Wainwright, "The Holy Spirit." In Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, Gunton 
(ed.), p. 290. 
18 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, vol 1, p. 3. 
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'Theologically, nature includes the radical capacity for grace.,J9 What God does seek 
to alter in the person, rather than the essential nature, are certain contingent defects 
which have come to affect all humans since the first creation of the race. These are a 
defective or absent knowledge of God, and a defective or absent co-operation with the 
will of God, that is, sin. Humans have universally "missed the mark,,20 in terms of 
their understanding of God and obedience to His will. Through deification, or grace, 
God also supernaturally empowers the natural human capacity for hope, in view of the 
fact that henceforward hope's highest function in the human person will be to have as 
its object the end-time promises of the gospel and the consummation of creation. 
However, by implication of grace's relation to nature, grace builds on the hope which 
is already characteristic of human nature. Grace does not here create a wholly new 
kind of hope, nor obliterate what hope formerly was. 
'It is impossible to carry through the project of systematic theology without explicit 
commitment to particular philosophical options. ,21 Thus, starting from a Heideggerian 
interpretation of the individual person as futurally-projecting Dasein, Christian Dasein, 
that is, Dasein which has come to embrace a state of Christian faith, is now - in the 
Heideggerian sense - projected futurally, but in a specifically supernatural hope. This 
newly graced or deified22 hope of Christian Dasein must inevitably be founded upon 
Dasein's existing, natural futural projectedness in hope, since God builds on human 
19 McBrian, Catholicism, p. 160. 
20 The Greek word for sin, hamartia (in English letters) means "missing the mark." 
21 Dulles, Craft of Theology, p. 119. Christian theologians who have drawn on Heidegger include Karl 
Rahner, Paul Tillich, Rudolf Bultmann, Gotthold Hasenhuttl, Schubert Ogden, John Macquarrie, 
Gerhard Ebeling, Ernst Fuchs and James Robinson. See ibid, pp. 124-125. 
22 The distinction between grace and deification, mentioned here for the sake of historical 
comprehensiveness, is not required for the following argument, which might in any case be prosecuted 
with reference to either culturally-conditioned conceptualisation of God's activity. The Western tenn. 
grace, will be employed from now on. It might also be mentioned that the opposition to be discussed 
below between nature and grace is not absolute: nature is God's good creation, created with an emptiness 
only God can fill, and is, as thus oriented to completion in God, already graced. There is no state of 
"pure nature" without grace. In what follows, "grace" will be contrasted with "nature" in the sense of the 
grace which flows from the incarnation of Christ. For a discussion of the God-oriented expectancy of 
nature see Karl Rahner. Foundations of the Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity 
(1976) (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978). p. 123. 
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nature, His good image. In Chapter 6, Sections I and II, it was seen how Dasein's 
natural futural projectedness in hope was linked to the experiences of spontaneous 
imagination and improvised music. Here, the Heideggerian analytic of Dasein was, in 
effect, extended so as to portray humanity as consisting of intrinsically musical hopers. 
Against the assertion made here that the new graced, Christian hope builds upon 
the salient characteristics of natural hope in Dasein, some theologians would claim that 
'Christian hope is in fact so peculiar, so distinct and unique, that it cannot be 
understood as a special case of some general phenomenon of hope. ,23 Such 
theologians might claim, adopting a reverse perspective to that adopted here, that only 
from an understanding of Christian hope can any understanding of the natural 
phenomenon of hope be attained.24 Undoubtedly, for believers of all traditions, 
Christian hope is different in important respects from any natural hope. Rather than a 
vain hope, or one whose outcome, like the outcomes of natural hopes, cannot be 
predicted, Christian hope in God's promises is hope for what will certainly happen 
(Hebrews: 11: 1). It might even be argued that it is thus not hope at all, but expectation: 
'Something desired and longed for may be expected with joy and confidence - and yet 
possibly no one would call such expectation 'hope".25 Thus, it might be argued, 
Christian hope, assured of its objects, is not, in fact, like natural hope. Macquarrie 
concedes that 'there are new dimensions in Christian hope that cannot be derived from 
considerations of the general human experience of hope, ,26 which results in a need to 
let Christian hope 'confront us in its own integrity.,27 Thus he recognises that it is 
desirable not to 'assimilate it to a prior understanding of what all hope must be ... 
23 Macquarrie, Christian Hope, p. 2. 
24 See ibid. 
25 Joseph Pieper, Hope and History (1967) (London: Bums and Oates, 1969). p. 20. [Note: this is a 
different item from Joseph Pieper "Hope and History," in Heart of the Real, O'Rourke (ed.), Cited 
above.] 
26 Macquarrie, Christian Hope, p. 2. 
27 Ibid, p. 3. 
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because we have already decided what the scope and limits of hope are. ,28 
Nevertheless, he points out that 'if Christian hope is not related at the outset to the 
perspective of human hope in general, then we run that greater danger of falling into 
the all too common misunderstanding of Christian hope as something quite 
otherworldly in character and thus unrelated to the ordinary hopes of the mass of 
nk· d ,29 rna In. 
This last assertion provides additional theological grounds for regarding the salient 
characteristics of graced Christian hope as being one with those of ordinary natural 
hope, at the risk of otherwise dehumanising Christian hope and, despite its points of 
uniqueness, consigning it to some imaginary independent sphere in other respects. 
Whatever points of difference may be found between natural and Christian hope, future 
projection towards a desired alterity is undoubtedly common to both. The similarity of 
natural and Christian hope, in this particular respect at least, suggests the conclusion 
that spontaneous imagination and improvised music will play the same part in the 
expression of supernatural Christian hope as they do in natural hope. It will indeed be 
claimed here that there is a relationship between the universal human ability to 
improvise in music (where music is understood to include speech prosody), and the 
ability to experience the graced hope for the end-of-time goals disclosed by Christian 
revelation. Thus, it is implied, God first created man as Dasein where Being speaks in 
music, in order that, chiefly through music (where music includes speech prosody), 
man might project futurally in hope, in a fundamental musical hope inherent in the 
natural human person (Chapter 6, Section II). This existential analysis of human nature 
remains intact subsequently to the work of Christ: thus, in the light of Christian 
revelation also, man's graced hope is expressed chiefly in music. This does not imply, 
2R Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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of course, that Christian hope is experienced only at those times when a person is 
actually improvising music, or listening to improvised music. It is the capacity for and 
overall experience of this dimension which is linked to hope. It is also extremely 
important that the reader should grasp that speech prosody is included in the 
understanding of music to be prosecuted here, not least because the argument will 
necessarily be developed with little explicit reference to this dimension, on grounds of 
space. The anthropological complementarity between hope, and spontaneous speech 
and music, finds historical expression in the Christian liturgy as will be shown below. 
Spontaneity, as was seen earlier (Chapter 6, Section I) is in all its manifestations 
the quintessential point of Dasein 's projection towards the future, and at the heart of 
all such projection there was seen also to be an unthematised fundamental hope of a 
natural kind, a point illustrated above with reference to Pliigge and Marcel (Chapter 6, 
Section II). From the time of the New Testament, spontaneous activity was readily 
accepted as appropriate within the context of liturgical rites, as will be shown in 
Section IV, and, it will be implied, functioned for the Christian community as an 
implicit expression of Christian projection towards the future. Particularly when 
implementing the unique prosodic or musical capabilities of the human person, 
spontaneity in liturgy expresses the natural human fundamental hope, in a new 
supernaturally enriched form, of people who have now assented to Christian belief. 
Their natural fundamental hope is now supernaturally reconfigured, since there can 
never be a more fundamental hope than Christian hope, which is cosmic, total and all-
inclusive. 'I am Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End' (Revelation 21 :6). 
There can be no hope beyond the End which is Christ. Christian hope automatically 
fills the unthematised space which opens out within natural fundamental hope, a space 
which was always waiting to receive supernatural hope as human nature's completion 
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III grace. Thus, for Christians, the natural fundamental hope identified by PlUgge has 
become replete with hopes held out by the Christian promIses: this formerly 
unthematised fundamental hope has been graced with a wholly fulfilling content. 'A 
whole new content is injected into the idea of hope by the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ ... If Christ has risen from the dead, then the content of hope has been radically 
transformed and enriched. ,30 
A theologian would be descending into rationalism and reducing the mystery to 
within the limitations of human categories, if he did not understand that, in describing 
the object of Christian hope, he uses analogical terms. '[E]xpressions of Christian 
hope must always be understood as images of what we hope for rather than as 
descriptions of what we know,.31 'We hope for what we do not see' (Romans 8:25) 
and for 'what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived' (1 
Corinthians 2:9). If the Christian is to attempt to hold the heavenly goal and its 
mysteries in imagination, the analogical verbal imagery in which they are clothed must 
be acknowledged in its limits, recognised as analogical. This principle of analogy 
represents a recognition that eschatological hope cannot be thematised and transcends 
ordinary possibilities of description: the angelic "harps" are not real harps, for 
analogical discourse is being used. Yet despite this, even analogical language about 
heaven is still thematised in terms of specific imagery, for an analogical harp is still an 
image of a harp, and herein lies the weakness of analogical language. Analogical 
language seeks to respond to a human need to articulate mystery which it cannot fully 
meet, precisely because it is bound to referential words. Its hamstrung nature has 
constantly to be excused by pointing out that it does not really mean what it says: 
'[t]he most one can do is borrow metaphors and fling them, mixed with denials, in the 
30 Ibid, p. 58. 
31 Brian E. Daley, "Eschatology." In Commentary on the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Michael 1. 
Walsh (ed.), (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994). p. 206. 
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direction of the ineffable. ,32 A link was made above (Chapter 6, Section II) between 
natural unthematised hope in Dasein, and music, with reference to Bloch. Bloch also 
observes that' [m ]usic ... historically and objectively, proves itself to be essentially 
Christian art'. 33 Since music is already the primordial natural expression of 
unthematised fundamental hope in Dasein, it might be hypothesised that music can 
reach further than analogical words also into the unthematised dimension opened out 
by graced fundamental hope, and express this new supernatural hope beyond words in 
a unique, and above all, unthematised way. As a vehicle of unthematised hope already 
ready and present in the constitution of human nature, music is thus waiting to be 
enlisted by graced unthematised hope. This proposal elucidates certain traditional 
insights. Christian hope and music already interact symbolically in Scripture, as in the 
imagery of the "music" and "songs" of angels who inhabit the heavenly realms to 
which humans aspire in hope (Revelation 5). Heaven is here represented as an 
attractive object of hope, by being depicted as containing "music." Perhaps by 
identifying their disposition of hope with music, Christians can pass beyond the 
residual referentiality which ties down even analogical language and contaminates it as 
a potential expression of hope directed towards ultimate mystery, while they continue 
to recognise the relative value of analogical language as first circumscribing for the 
mind the conceptual space within which musical hoping subsequently moves. Music 
manoeuvres apophatically within the space analogical language first encloses. 
Some hints from the mystical tradition suggest how music may sometimes 
penetrate further than words in the disclosure of the Christian mystery. Wolfgang 
Riehle refers to 'the famous experience which Rolle relates in the fifteenth chapter of 
his Incendium Amoris. Whilst reading the evening psalms he felt a 'suauitatem 
32 L. William Countryman, The Poetic Imagination: An Anglican Spiritual Tradition (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1999), p. 70. 
33 Bloch, Principle of Hope. vol 3, p. 1080. 
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inuisibilis mel odie ' come over him, whereupon his thoughts turned to mUSIC, his 
meditation into a poem, and even the psalms changed into a supernatural music ... In 
the mystical unio the divine word and the human answer to it became transformed for 
him, in keeping with the tradition, into a jubilus which transcends human language ... 
Man's attempt to form concepts of God and the world beyond gives way to intuition. 
Thinking of God and about God is transformed into supernatural music, 'thoght tumes 
intil sang and inti I melodie. ,34 Here Rolle's meditation transcends the words, and he 
communes more deeply with the mystery in music. Moreover, if the proposals in 
Chapter 5 are accepted, whereby music and language are seen as reciprocal, Rolle's 
musical experience remains in a wider sense within language: he has not left language 
behind. The philosophical tenet that all meaning seeks a home in language has not 
been violated in his case, for language is already musical, and music has its 
fundamental roots in language. 
The overall anthropological perspective which conjoins natural hope with spoken 
language and music is also reflected at the level of liturgy, where graced Christian hope 
enters into its fullness symbolically. 'The tendency towards the combining of language 
and music is already present in the early Christian liturgy.' 35 F or Vatican II, there is 
indeed a stated interaction between liturgical words and music: 'The musical tradition 
of the universal Church is a treasure of inestimable value, greater even than that of any 
other art. The main reason for this pre-eminence is that, as a combination of sacred 
,\4 Wolfgang Riehle, The Middle English Mystics (1977) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 
120. References to Richard Rolle, Incendium Amaris of Richard Rolle of Hampole: Historical Series. 
]6, M. Deanesly (ed.), (London: Publications of the University of Manchester. 1915); F. Schulte. Das 
musikalische Element in der Mystik Richard Rolles von Hampole. Dissertation, University of Bonn, 
1951 (documentation sic); S. J. Womack, The Jubilus Theme in the Later Writings of Richard Rolle of 
Hampole. Dissertation, Durham, N. C, 1961 (documentation sic); Richard Rolle, "Form of Living." In 
English Writings of Richard Rolle. Hermit of Hampole, H. E. Allen (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon, 1931), 
pp. 106,46. See Riehle, ibid, pp. 119-122, for an Excursus on the significance of metaphors of music in 
English mysticism. 
35 Thrasybulos Georgiades, ,\tusic and Language: The Rise of Western Music as Exemplified in Settings 
(?[the Mass (1 97..f) (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. 7. 
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music and words, it fonns a necessary or integral part of the solemn liturgy.,36 In this 
analysis, liturgical music complements and completes the word. It is at first sight 
arguable whether in referring to a 'combination of sacred music and words,' this 
statement refers solely to, or at least highlights, the idea of words set to music. The 
first alternative is eliminated on the basis of a wider reading of the documents of 
Vatican II, from which it is clear that music without sung words is in fact admissible:37 
in the case of such unsung music, words and music presumably 'combine' liturgically 
in the sense of both being present in a given liturgy, though not at the same time. 
Nevertheless, Vatican II appears to favour music sung with words. 38 In this it reflects 
long-standing emphases in the tradition. For Hayburn, this tradition's liturgical music 
'is to emphasize the words of the liturgical text. It should give these words a dramatic 
force and power. ,39 
In the ideological weighting favoured by Vatican II's liturgical nonns, whereby 
sung words predominate and music from which sung words are absent does not 
predominate, the Roman Catholic tradition effectively mirrors the use to which music 
has been put by homo sapiens. In infancy, music begins in the voice, and is intimately 
connected with first speech in babbling and spontaneous singing. Since the human 
person's original infant tendency in music is towards sung words, it is not improbable 
that world-wide adult music is also predominantly sung words.4o Throughout life, of 
36 Second Vatican Council, Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, section 112, p. 31. '[M]usic is not 
merely an adornment and embellishment of the liturgy, it is liturgy itself, an integral part which, to be 
sure, does not belong to the essence of the liturgy but does form part of its complete frame, just as hands 
and feet belong to the complete figure of man.' Josef Andreas Jungmann, "[Commentary on] 
Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy." In Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol 1, Herbert 
Vorgrimler (general ed.), (1966) (London: Burns and Oates, 1967), p. 77. 
37 See Second Vatican Council, Instruction on Music in the Sacred Liturgy, sections 4, 62, 67. In 
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, Flannery (ed.), pp. 80-81, 95-97. 
38 See ibid, section 5, p. 81. 
39 R. F. Hayburn, Papal Legislation on Sacred Music: 95 A. D., to 1977 A. D. (Collegeville, Minnesota: 
The Liturgical Press, 1979), p. 388. 
40 There are convincing arguments for this from empirical investigation of culture. Thus, African music 
would seem to be predominantly sung. See Kofi Agawu, African Rhythm: A Northern Ewe Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), p. 2. References to J. H. Kwabena Nketia, The Afusic of 
Africa (New York: Norton, 1974); J. H. Kwabena Nketia, Folk Songs of Ghana (Legon: Ghana Univ. 
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all the ways in which music may be produced by the unassisted human body, the voice 
is the most versatile medium, being capable of extensive melodic expression, and not 
merely the rhythmic expression already associated with other parts of the body, as in 
hand-clapping or foot-stamping. In addition, by singing words, the voice uniquely can 
also bring music into direct association with the daily horizons opened out by ordinary 
verbal meaning. Thus, in emphasising sung words, liturgical musical practice, as 
prescribed by Vatican II, mirrors human musical practice in general, as it must, since 
liturgy is where human nature is completed by the action of God's grace - grace which 
must answer to the characteristics of that nature. It is human nature as expressed in 
culture which liturgy must seek to mirror. 'The harmony of signs (song, music, words 
and actions) is all the more expressive and fruitful when expressed in the cultural 
richness of the People of God who celebrate. ,41 Some aspects of human culture are 
local, some universal. In the general musical liturgical norms of Vatican II, insofar as 
they balance the sung with the not sung, it is indeed the fundamental cultural richness 
of the whole of humanity as music-makers, considered as singers mainly but not 
always, which is reflected. In this context, it is appropriate to draw attention to the 
considerations advanced in Chapter 1, where the special role played for humans by 
improvised music was demonstrated. An anthropological argument for improvisatory 
music in liturgy is thereby implied, on the basis that improvised music is a dominant 
expression of music for the human person. 
As investigative knowledge of human musical behaviour becomes more complete, 
the more clearly the true norms for liturgical musical practice emerge. For example, in 
Press, 1963); Klaus P. Wachsmann, "Music." Journal of the Folklore Institute, Indiana University, 6 
(1969): 164-191; p. 187; John Miller Chernoff, African Rhythm and African Sensibility: Aesthetics and 
Social Action in African Musical Idioms (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1979), p. 75; David Locke, 
"Improvisation in West African Musics." Music Educators Journal 66, no. 5 (1980): 125-132; p. 128: 
Francis Bebey, African Music: A People's Art (1969) (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1975), p. 115. . 
41 Catechism of the Catholic Church, section 1158, p. 265. Reference to Second Vatican CounCIL 
Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, section 119. 
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the periods of the New Testament and of the Fathers, purely instrumental music (or, 
more generally, music without words attached) was rejected in the liturgy for various 
reasons.
42 However, it is now apparent that purely instrumental music widely 
accompanIes religious rituals for the human species. 'The history of comparative 
religions proves that the use of musical instruments is almost universally allied with 
the phenomenon of religion. By their power of charming, by their strange timbres -
which are sought after as signs of the sacred by reason of their superhuman 
character - ... musical instruments have always filled an important ritual function of a 
mythical or magical kind. ,43 Consequently, it is now clear, as it was not in earlier 
times, that such instrumental music has its proper place in Christian liturgy. In short, 
one question which must be asked when establishing norms for liturgical music is: 
What forms do mankind's musical activities, especially in religious, ritual contexts, 
widely exhibit? When the phenomena of human music are considered as widely as 
possible, Vatican II's proposals for the uses of music in liturgy are seen to possess an 
authentic anthropological base which lends those proposals credibility as answering to 
the nature and culture of the human person. The same holds good of similar emphases 
expressed by an authoritative body of the Church of England: 'To stress overmuch the 
importance of words is to forget that music is an effective form of communication in 
its own right ... Nevertheless, words will continue to have priority in our worship. 
Music will be used primarily for their enhancement. ,44 
As was seen in Chapter 5, ultimately at a deeper level all words are somehow 
musical already. All liturgical spoken communication will therefore possess a musical 
42 See Joseph Gelineau, Voices and Instruments in Christian Worship: Principles, Laws, Applications 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1964), pp. 149-152. . . 
43 Ibid, p. 148. References to G. Van der Leew. La religion dans son. essence. et ses manifestatIOns 
(Paris: n.p., 1955), p. 369; A. Schaeffner. Origine des instruments de muslque (Pans: n. p .. 1936). . 
44 The Archbishop's Commission on Church Music. In Tllne \I'ill! Hea\~en .. · The. Report oJ (he 
/ hb' h 'C ., ChUf'cll MusI'c (London' Church House PublIshmg With Hodder and 
."1rc IS op S ommlSSlOn 011 . 
Stoughton, 1992), p. 57. 
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character. Any absolute division between mUSIC and word in liturgy is finally 
unconvincing, although words retain the role of communication by rational meaning in 
a way not possible for music. The presence of music in liturgy, in the first instance, is 
actually found in all its spoken words, because liturgy always contains some speech 
and 'speech sounds differ in their tone colour like musical instruments ... Human 
speech ... resembles a progression of changing tone colours following each other with 
unbelievable rapidity. ,45 In addition to this inevitable primary presence of music in all 
human speech, in whatever manner it is uttered, music enters the liturgy in further 
senses. The celebrant's special cultural and personal situation in proclaiming the 
Christian gospel gives rise to joy and enthusiasm through heightening of speech 
prosody. There will also be the introduction of music sung to words, because humans 
widely produce this, and music without sung words, because humans widely produce 
this too. These last three are fundamental expressions of hope through music for 
humans in both the natural and supernatural contexts. In the Instruction on Music in 
the Sacred Liturgy, Vatican II implicitly makes the link between music and 
eschatological hope.46 For Joncas, this document 'provides a new fivefold taxonomy 
of the functions exercised by worship music: alluring or decorative, differentiating, 
unifying, transcendental, eschatological. ,47 It is significant that the only word in this 
quotation which refers music to a specifically temporal trajectory refers music to 
futural hoping: the word 'eschatological.' Music, it might seem, takes up the 
expression of hope where verbal meanings fall short. It is a highway to a dimension of 
hope lying beyond intelligible meaning. It both complements and transcends 
expressions of hope in spoken words. Thus, analogical language about heaven is 
45 Ehrenzweig, Psycho-ana(vsis of Artistic Vision and Hearing, p. 164. . 
46 'Liturgical worship is given a more noble fonn when it is celebrated in song ... Indeed, through thIS 
form ... the whole celebration more clearly prefigures that heavenly liturgy which is enacted in the holy 
city of Jerusalem.' Second Vatican Council, Instruction on Music. section 5, p. 81. 
47 Joncas, "Liturgy and Music," p. 315. 
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needed, but humans also need to pass beyond it to something wholly unthematised. 
Music, whether inhabiting heightened speech prosody, or sung to words, or on its own, 
is the many-faceted liturgical voice of Christian hope. 
III Musical Spontaneity in the Liturgy: A Theological Interpretation 
Some considerations will now be brought forward to show how, at the heart of the 
tradition of music in liturgy which, in the words of Vatican IT just quoted, is both 
placed above the other liturgical arts and linked with hope, there lies musical 
improvisation. The considerations will be presented first in their theological and then 
their more historical aspects. It would have been possible to consider the historical 
dimension first. However, it seemed that the interest of considering the history of 
liturgical spontaneity in music might not be apparent unless its theological significance 
had previously been elucidated. Musical improvisation will here be presented as the 
artistic vehicle by which the sense of the Christian futural trajectory of these rites, their 
opening onto hope, is most eminently expressed, and also shown to possess this role 
through an intrinsic complementarity with its existing role in the constitution of the 
natural human person as Dasein, who always projects futurally in hope through 
musical improvisation. Ouspensky's critique of the liturgical use of the icon in Eastern 
Orthodox liturgy is illuminating here, and it might be possible to appropriate aspects of 
it on behalf of such music. For Ouspensky 'the icon is not merely provoked or inspired 
by the liturgy: Together they fonn a homogeneous whole. The icon completes the 
liturgy and explains it, adding its influence on the souls of the faithful. ,48 Because of 
the significance of improvisatory music for humans, liturgy needs improvisatory music 
in order to be expressive of hope. It must be recalled again that musical improvisation 
4R Ouspensky, Theology o/the Icon, p. 11. 
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is here considered as a wide-ranging phenomenon present also in the spontaneous 
expressive qualities of all musical performance (Chapter 1), and in the spontaneous 
expressive use of speech prosody (Chapters 5 and 6). 
The Christian liturgy is the expression of a journey back to God. It might well be 
fitting that a characteristically liturgical form of music should be evanescent, not like 
permanent composition, and should share in the liturgical movement back to God, by 
being wholly wedded to the liturgical moment which produces it, so that liturgy and 
music both slip into the past together as the liturgy journeys on. For humans, music is 
primordially linked to consciousness of time (Chapter 5, Section V) and this entails 
that any perceived possessibility of music, in the sense of an event which can be 
repeated, may suggest the "possession" of time. The musical fixed composition 
appears here as a metaphor for time "controlled" or "possessed." Yet, humans do not 
own their time. '[TJhe whole course of history, from its initiation in God's creative 
activity to its consummation when God ultimately achieves his purposes ... should be 
conceived as God's act' .49 In the liturgy, if humans always use possessible music, 
they may forget that it is God who possesses mankind in history, the God who created 
and owns all time, not man who somehow "possesses" time in the liturgy. Such 
forgetfulness is obviated in the case of musical improvisation. Humans cannot cling 
to improvisation, since improvisation is ephemeral and cannot be possessed. 
Musical improvisation, considered as evanescent, mirrors the non-possessibility of 
time. It also mirrors its goal-directedness. The improviser, operating purposively out 
of the open-endedness of imagination, is particularly close to the idea of reality 
considered as goal-directed emergence, for he or she brings a musical future into 
being, and in this sense has a proper role in interpreting the inner future-directed 
49 Gordon D. Kaufman, God the Problem (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), p. 137. 
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movement of liturgy more fully to others. The conSCIOusness of the liturgical 
assembly, grafted imaginatively to the activity of an improviser in their midst, opens 
out more deeply to future possibility, for 'people recognize an improvised event as an 
interactive totality where all the participants embrace the unknown. ,50 Imagination 
expressed in musical improvisation is thus an ontological communication showing the 
liturgical community how it passes beyond itself to what is other. A normative mode 
of symbolic human knowing is elicited for the worshippers, whereby poetic 
imagination enables them to arrive at a greater self-understanding. 'The human 
subject can only come to know itself through the hermeneutic detour of interpreting 
signs - that is, by deciphering the meanings contained in myths, symbols and dreams 
produced by the human imagination. The shortest route from the self to itself is 
through the images of others.,5l Here the 'other' is the musical improviser who 
furnishes the futurally-oriented expressive medium by which the liturgical community 
lays hold imaginatively upon its own journeyhood. Spontaneous imagining in music 
captures artistically the idea of Christian futurity, giving rise here to a sapiential 
liturgical gnosis of the future. In short, improvisation and liturgy both look forward, 
and improvisation's looking forward complements the liturgy's looking forward. An 
act of musical leaving behind and of looking forward at one and the same time, 
improvisation intensifies music's innate transience and motion into the future, which 
already arise in music from the nature of sound itself: '[S]ound is an experience of 
impermanence; it makes time audible and renders its form and continuity sensible.' 
50 Jim Denley, "Improvisation: The Entanglement of Awareness and Physicality." Sounds Australian: 
Journal 0/ Australian Music 32 (Summer 1991-1992): 25-28; p. 26. In many cultures '[t]he 
improvisationality of a genre is generally proportional to the degree of audience involvement. In more 
improvised genres, the perfonners are more aware of themselves as responding to the audience; i~ some 
genres, the perfonners believe that they are not creating as agentive individuals, but are actI.ng as 
'vehicles' for the spiritual state of the audience (e.g., Sufi devotionals).' Sawyer, "SemIOtICS. of 
Improvisation," pp. 185-286. Reference to B. Brenneis, "Musical Imaginations: Comparative 
Perspectives on Musical Creativity." In Theories 0/ Creativity, M. A. Runco and R. S. Albert (eds.), 
(NeWbury Park CA: Sage, 1990), n.p. 
SI Kearney, Poetics a/Imagining, p. 141. 
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The same writer immediately adds: 'This aspect of the expenence of sound 
appropriately reveals the nature of God as profoundly involved in human history,.52 
Thus, in improvised music, '[a]rt sees into things and brings forth a sign of the 
spirituality they contain. ,53 
Improvisation also exhibits the relativity of the earthly liturgy by reducing its 
formality, undermining its form as fixed, hence reducing its appearance of being a 
finished and self-contained event rather than the provisional prefigurement of a future 
fullness. Jean During has spoken of improvisation's association with release from 
social constraints 54 and its failure to accommodate itself well to formal settings. 55 
Improvisation is a calculated 'transgression of the established order. ,56 By a calculated 
compromising of liturgy's structural self-containment in this way, improvisation 
announces liturgy'S subordination to eschatology, throwing into relief the fact that 
earthly liturgy is fractile, a provisional pointer, not a goal. It was seen above (Chapter 
5, Section V) how improvisation also places a focus on the present. It may seem 
paradoxical to speak of improvisation's simultaneous emphases on future and present. 
However liturgy shares this tension. The insight into the future given in improvisation 
is an insight into the future entwined with the present, and parallels the realised 
eschatology of liturgy itself. Salvation is both now as a foretaste, and yet to come: the 
"already" and the "not yet" present themselves side by side in Christian eschatology. 57 
52 Joncas, "Liturgy and Music," p. 312. References to Foley, "Toward a Sound Theology"; Hoon, "The 
Relation of Theology and Music in Worship"; Pike, Theology of Music; Routley, Church Music and 
Theology; Winter, Why Sing? 
53 Charles M. Murphy, "The Church and Culture since Vatican II: On the Analogy of Faith and Art." 
Theological Studies 48, no. 2 (1987): 317-331; p. 323. 
54 See During, "Jeu des relations sociales," p. 19. 
55 See ibid, p. 18. 
56 Ibid,p.19. 
57 There is no space to discuss the similarities between the futural "now" of Christian realised 
eschatology, and the futurally projecting "now" of Dasein. If the fonner graced, Christian "now" is 
futural, then, on theological principles, must not any natural "now" already have been inherently futural? 
If not, on what does realised eschatology build, since grace builds on nature? Perhaps this constitutes an 
argument, from within the Christian camp, for this aspect of Heidegger's philosophy. On this argument, 
the graced "now," unlike the natural "now" of Dasein, would be enabled to project eschatologically 
because, in Christ, the ultimate goal of human futural projection has finally been revealed. 
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'In the earthly liturgy we take part in a foretaste of that heavenly liturgy which is 
celebrated in the Holy City of Jerusalem toward which we journey as pilgrims, where 
Christ is sitting at the right hand of God, Minister of the holies and of the true 
tabernacle. ,58 Thus liturgical time is liminal time, expectant time on the threshold of 
the elsewhere, both present and future. Writing of improvisation, Lawrence Archbold 
notes: 'For those who see liturgy itself as a liminal space, at the borders between 
secular and sacred, earth and heaven, this music of the borderlines between 
composition and ambient sound, consciousness and unconsciousness, may seem the 
ideal complement. ,59 As Turner notes: 'Since liminal time is not controlled by the 
clock it is a time of enchantment when anything might, even should, happen. ,60 He 
adds that '[l]iminality is full of potency and potentiality. It may also be full of 
experiment and play. ,61 
By contrast with musical improvisation, it has been noted, one possible implication 
in the liturgy of a written-down, composed piece is that of possession of the music to 
be preserved and repeated, hence possession of time. Of course, 'if everything is in 
time, everything changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recurs ... 
Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract'. 62 However, though no two 
performances of Byrd's Ave Verum Corpus are ever quite the same, a cultural 
jUdgement of identity is passed upon their repetition. When such music is performed 
in the liturgy, the time in which such a piece is performed is poetically represented as 
recoverable by repeating the same piece, with the consequent possible implication that 
58 Second Vatican Council, Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, section 8, p. 5. References to Apoc. 
21 :2; Col. 3: 1; Heb. 8:2. 
S9 Lawrence Archbold, Review of Jan Overduin, Making Music: Improvisation for Organists (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999). Music and Letters 81, no. 3 (August 2000): 476-479; p. 478. 
60 Victor Turner, Process, Performance and Pilgrimage: A Study in Comparative Symbology (New 
Delhi: Concept, 1979), p. 94. 
61 Ibid, p. 95. As Archbold notes, speaking of liturgy, 'organ improvisation ... can be usefully 
understood as the exploration of a kind of liminal space.' Archbold, Review of Overduin, p. 477. 'It is 
neither" holy noodling' nor a sham of a repertoire piece.' Ibid. 
62 Bergson, Creatin' Evolution, p. 48. 
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the liturgical community can possess a moment of time. This subliminal impression 
arises because music is a widely established cultural vehicle by which time is disclosed 
to the human person (Chapter 5, Section V). Clearly liturgy does have its essential 
core of repeatability. Liturgy recalls a fixed past through its yearly cycle of repetition, 
and the New Testament documents understand liturgy as a dialogue between what is 
fixed and what is spontaneous, as will be seen. The fixed dimension of worship 
prevents disproportion and disjointedness, and provides familiar points of reference for 
participants who experience the rite a common ritual property which unites them.63 
Yet, to the extent that the liturgical community unduly emphasise liturgical activity as 
repeatable, they remove it from the flux of time which sweeps the present away, and 
may forget that, in the liturgy, it is God who possesses the liturgical community in 
time, not the liturgical community which possesses God in its own present. A certain 
irrecoverability inherent in all liturgy must be given a voice if the liturgy is to speak 
truly of the eschatological goal of Christian life, and that voice is the voice of 
spontaneity, whose privileged musical voice is the voice of improvisation. 
In a musical context, the correlations made here between "work/past" and 
"improvisation/future" should not of course be simplistically pressed. It may be argued 
that, in regard to its internal stylistic character a musical work may look to the future in 
various ways or degrees (see David Greene, Chapter 5, Section V). Conversely (as 
Philip Bohlman suggests, loc. cit.) improvised music may fund remembering. Yet, 
taking the work at the level of its being, which is repeatable, considering it, that is, 
from the standpoint of its very existence rather than its internal characteristics, it can 
never look forward with the intensity of improvisation. The occurrence in liturgy of 
fixed, repeatable works of music speaks symbolically of what the Christian community 
63 See D. E. W. Harrison and Michael C. Sansom, Worship in the Church of England (1946) (London: 
SPCK, 1982), pp. 10-11. 
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already has in possession and memory, and needs to be counterbalanced by a degree of 
improvisatory performance, which speaks of what the community hopes for. Thus 
'[t]he liturgy can emerge both as something remembered and as something new. ,6-l 
Likewise for Mary Collins 'a peculiar creativity, that of the Christian believer, is 
required to maintain evangelical tension within liturgical assemblies so that they 
are ... a manifestation of what more the reign of God promises. ,65 A spontaneous 
dimension is especially apposite where the liturgy is celebrated by Christians in abject 
circumstances. Writing of the poor in Latin America, Collins notes that '[i]n order for 
these poor to be empowered to collaborate with Christian hope to overcome the 
political, economic, and social forces that oppress them, their bishops say that the 
worshipping assembly must itselfbe open to the liturgically unprecedented. ,66 
The link between improvisation and liturgical hope may be held to explain the 
welcome accorded to improvisatory practices in the normative early periods of the 
Church's liturgy, as will be seen in more detail in Section IV. In the West, such a link 
explains something otherwise hard to account for, namely why an improvisatory 
tradition of organ playing remained a welcome feature of liturgy, even at a time when 
musical improvisation in other social contexts became less valued in consequence of 
the cultural impact of Cartesian philosophy and the rise of the work (Chapter 2). 
64 Joseph Gelineau, "Tradition - Invention - Culture." In Concilium: "Liturgy: A Creative Tradition" 
(I983) no. 2: 10-18; p. 16. 
65 Collins, "Obstacles to Liturgical Creativity," p. 23. 
66 Ibid, p. 20. By implicitly inviting an enhanced imaginative awareness of futurity in liturgy. this 
episcopal recommendation corresponds with insights found in sociological studies. The poorer people 
are, the more they appear to live mentally in the present, and by implication, might need to be stimulated 
imaginatively towards a sense of futurity. Lawrence Leshan notes that '[i]n the lower-lower class, the 
orientation is one of quick sequences of tension and relief. One does not frustrate oneself for long 
periods or plan action with goals far in the future ... In the ... middle ... classes, the orientation is one 
of much longer tension-relief sequences.' Lawrence L. Leshan, "Time Orientation and Social Class." 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47, no. 3 (1952): 589-592; p. 589. Middle class children, 
asked to make up stories, tell stories that cover a longer timespan than those made up by working class 
children. See ibid, p. 591. Bernstein showed how the timespan of anticipation of working class children 
differs from that of a middle class children. See Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, vol I 
Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971). pp. 
29-30. 
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'Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries improvisation continued to playa major part 
in the development of church organ music ... Even in the mid and late 19th century, 
which otherwise seems to have been a depressing time for European improvisation, 
there continued to be many organists who were known as improvising virtuosi. ,67 
Pressing concurs: 'The organ has ... among all nonjazz keyboard traditions, best kept 
alive the traditions of solo improvisation, most notably in France. ,68 The French 
Catholic liturgy always valued the contribution made by improvising organists and a 
strong artistic tradition of improvisation, embodied in men like Fran<;ois Couperin, 
Cesar Franck, down to twentieth-century figures like Louis Vierne and Charles 
Tournemire, was preserved. 
This preservation may be explained in terms of collective spirituality. For Christian 
theology, there is understood to be a deep intuition in the liturgical community at 
prayer which tends to discern and nurture spiritually authentic liturgical activity, 
through 'a sort of instinct, or phronema, deep in the mystical body of Christ. ,69 It is 
arguably in response to an intuition of the futural illumination inhabiting musical 
improvisation in liturgy that improvisation was never allowed to suffer there the 
demise it largely experienced in the secular context during this period. '[T]he 
consciousness of the [artist is] the high voice in a polyphony whose lower voice, the 
collective unconscious, does not merely accompany but actually determines the theme 
... [T]he group [is] an integral psychic field, in which the reality of the individual is 
embedded, so that he is organ and instrument of the collective. ,70 In this way, these 
organists were implicitly endorsed in their improvisatory practice by the liturgical 
67 9 Bailey, Improvisation. p. 2 . 
68 Pressing, Synthesizer Performance, p. 126. . 
69 John Henry Newman, On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine (Kansas Clty: S.hee? and 
Ward, 1985), p. 73. Cited in Dulles, Craft of Theology, p. 9. There would seem to be no obJectlOn to 
re-applying Newman's description of doctrinal discernment to the area of liturgy. 
70 Erich Neumann, Art and the Creative Unconscious: Four Essays (New York: Pantheon, 1959). p. 88. 
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community, as it listened to its inner collective wisdom. Moreover, an organ 
improviser does not explain the future verbally, but alludes to it symbolically. The 
allusive nature of his enhanced unveiling of the future effected through musical 
improvisation then returns to reinforce the communal dimension of liturgical knowing 
itself, raising consciousness of the very communal identity which first nurtured this 
particular form of artistic expression: 
To explain is to alienate: it is to show something as 'outside', observed but not internalized, as in an 
historical narrative or a scientific textbook. It is to prefer conception to experience. Allusions, unlike 
explanations, automatically import a social context - common knowledge, common references, common 
symbols - which are embodied together in a common experience. In understanding an allusion we 
become maximally aware of the community which the experience of meaning implies. 71 
In liturgy, '[t]he distinctive and alternative world set up during the rite is not made 
meaningful by the intellect or encaptured by the mind; its ability to transform rests 
only on the performance itself ... as it becomes imbibed, embodied, and felt by the 
participants. ,72 The organ improviser interacts with the collective nature of this felt 
and imbibed liturgical knowing, receiving a commission from the community, then 
enacting a symbolisation of eschatological destiny which enhances the community's 
intuitive sense of eschatology's communal element. Compare Victor Turner's 
observation: 
[A]n anthropologist tends to think in terms not of solitary but of plural reflection, or, much better, plural 
reflexivity, the ways in which a group or community seeks to portray, understand, and then act on 
itself ... The languages through which a group communicates itself to itself ... include gestures, music, 
dancing, graphic representation, painting, sculpture, and fashioning of symbolic objects.73 
A figure who valuably exemplifies the ideas discussed so far is Charles Tournemire. 
He belonged to a celebrated successi.on of organists at some of the larger churches in 
France in the twentieth century who contributed to a national culture of organ 
improvisation. Tournemire's own prodigious ability in the area of improvisation finds 
71 Scruton, Aesthetics, p. 463. 
72 David Torevill, "Forgetting How to Remember: Performance, Narrative, and Embodiment as a Result 
of the Liturgical Reforms." Irish Theological Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2000): 33-42: p. 34. 
73 Turner, Process, Pel!ormance and Pilgrimage, p. 94. 
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confirmation in the recordings made by him for Polydor between 1930 and 1932, and 
reproduced on L. P. by E. M. 1.74 It is possible for organists to perform these 
improvisations, which were transcribed by Maurice Durufle, a pupil of Toumemire. 
Toumemire needs to be considered in both a musical and a liturgical light. Liturgical 
spontaneity belongs equally to ordinary and exceptional people. Toumemire upheld 
liturgical spontaneity to a level of genius. He himself declared his art to be 'very 
narrowly bound with the liturgy.' 75 Improvisation was for him the creation of a 
'special ambience, thoroughly fitted to the blossoming of the art of meditation.' 76 
Reflecting his commitment to liturgy, his improvisation was often based on Gregorian 
chant seen by him as a bridge between organ and liturgy. This Gregorian foundation 
was present equally in Toumemire's output of written compositions, pre-eminently 
L 'Orgue Mystique. An awakening interest in this chant had been underway at the time 
of his birth. The monks of Solesmes had been exhaustively researching the origins of 
chant, and the Schola Cantorum was founded in 1894 for the study of early music. 
Composers were making increasing use of Gregorian themes in their works. In 1904, 
Pius X sanctioned the preparation of an official edition of chants, the Editio 
Vaticana. 77 
Toumemire's heightened use of chant is significant since organists, including the 
greatest, such as Cesar Franck, had long been content to include, in their usual 
performances in church, solo pieces which, while they might make a magnificent and 
emotional contribution to the liturgy, and even possess a mystical feel, were not, in any 
74 On one of five L. P. records: Orgues et Organistes Fran9ais en 1930 (E. M. L catalogue no. 2: C 
153-1641115). . . 
75 Norbert Dufourcq, "Visites diffusees des eglises Saint-Sulpice, Saint-Eustache, Samte-Clottlde ~t 
Notre Dame de Paris." In Les Amis de l'Orgue, numero special (1936): 21. Cited in Joel-Mane 
Fauquet, "Charles Tournemire and the Organ." In accompanying booklet to L. P. records, ibid. p. 8. 
76 Charles Toumemire, Cesar Franck (Paris: Delagrave, 1931), p. 54. 
77 See Andrew Thomson, The Life and Times o/Charles-Marie Widor, 1844-193 7 (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press. 1987), pp. 66-68. 
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exclusive sense, liturgical music, and were not at all out of place in the concert hall. 
Such music might come to be seen chiefly as liturgical, partly by association, and 
because it was for the organ. While it might be religious emotion, it was not liturgicaL 
nor was it usually linked to the chant thematically. This is a factual observation rather 
than a negative evaluation of such music. So far from meriting negative appraisal, in 
fact such music can well be seen as announcing a certain interaction between liturgical 
and secular reality, a kind of poeticising of the meeting-point C?f Church and world, in 
the entirely constructive sense of unifying the two domains. 78 This is especially true 
when it is played before or after the liturgical celebration, as was often the case, 
functioning less as liturgical music than as an interstice marking liturgy's boundaries. 
Moreover, some of Franck's greatest organ pieces are, in fact, built upon apparently 
fictitious Chorales, or hymn-tunes,79 in a kind of imaginative gesture in the direction of 
the idea of objective liturgical reference, a tribute to the idea that liturgical organ music 
may fittingly ground itself in existing liturgical themes. Similarly, Charles-Marie 
Widor's later organ Symphonies are based on the Easter and Christmas chants, Haec 
Dies and Puer Natus. 80 Nevertheless, most of their music, and that of comparable 
composers, is not thematically grounded in real or imagined musical liturgical texts 
and does double duty in church and concert hall. By contrast, for Toumemire, as his 
pupil Maurice Durufle expressed it, in the Preface to his own transcriptions of 
Toumemire's improvising: 
The soaring of his imagination was at once poetic, picturesque, capricious, then at a turn impassioned, 
tumultuous, abandoned, then suddenly again, blandishing, mystical, ecstatic. The Gregorian chant book 
was ever before his eyes on the organ desk, and he sought his inspiration exclusively in litu~gical ~e~es 
impregnated with the most spiritual sentiments. The fortunate hearers who saw or heard thIS prodIgIOus 
man will never forget the emotions they owed to him. 81 
78 The frequent placement of organs over the main West door effectively reinforced this symbolism. 
79 Cesar Franck, Trois Chorales. 
80 Charles-Marie Widor, Symphonie romane, op. 73; Symphonie gothique, op. 70. . . 
HI Maurice Durufie, "Preface." In Charles Tournemire, Cinq Improvisations pour Orgue reconstltuees 
par Maurice Dum/7e (Paris: Durand, 1958). 
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Toumemire explicitly links organ improvisation in liturgy with Christian hope for 
the eschatological goal. In his book on Franck, concluding Chapter 7, "Cesar Franck 
the Improviser," Toumemire asks: 'Did he not receive from heaven the rich gift to 
believers, that blaze which does not consume the soul but prepares it for the true 
life?,82 Franck, he adds, was 'penetrated by the dazzling ray of the second last Chapter 
of the Apocalypse. ,83 Toumemire proceeds to quote, as a postscript to his Chapter, 
several verses from the Apocalypse, covering nearly an entire page of the 1931 edition. 
Toumemire thus seems to sense that improvisation is the numinous voice of that which 
is to come. 
Other writers have concurred with the idea that, in liturgy, hope and spontaneity are 
linked. Hugo Rahner has examined some of the implications of liturgical spontaneity, 
as mirroring the divine freedom, and as a construction of hope. He writes of Maximus 
the Confessor's 'entire mystical theology of [the] playing of God,84 in the Ambigua, a 
God whose love 'though full of meaning and purpose, is a love that works in creative 
c. d db" ,85 lree om wholly ungoveme y necessIty or constraInt. Rahner refers to the 
'Creator, who performs his work with the divine seriousness which its meaning and 
purpose demand, and yet with the spontaneity and effortless skill of the great artist'. 86 
Human participants in the liturgy are made in the image of this Creator and they 
, [ answer] the game of grace with ... counter-play of liturgy and sacrament, so that 
Church, grace and liturgical action become . . . no more than a prelude to that final 
carefree gaiety of heart which [humans] will experience one day in the everlasting 
game of the Beatific Vision. ,87 Rahner asserts the eschatological trajectory of such 
82 Tournemire, Franck, p. 56. 
113 Ibid, p. 57. 
114 Hugo Rahner, Man at Play or Did You Ever Practise Eutrapelia? (1963) (London: Bums and Oates, 
1964), p. 24. Reference to Maximus, Amhigua 261a (PC 91, 1408ff). 
85 Rahner, ibid. 
/!6 Ibid. p. 28. 
117 Ibid, p. 10. 
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spontaneity, or play. Thus, earthly realities are rendered transient and are left behind 
in a kind of past, as the mind enters an unfettered realm where anxieties are shed and a 
lightness and freedom take over.88 
For Sam Keen, Christianity had from its beginnings proclaimed a view of the 
universe at variance with the Greek idea that history was dominated by fate, and also 
at variance with the perceived Jewish idea that life was circumscribed by religious and 
ceremonial legalism. Thus for the gospel, law is not all powerful; the new can break 
into history; love is greater than law and therefore the man set free by the gospel is no 
longer bound by cosmic or moral legalism. Divine power can grant an invasion of 
ecstasy and freedom. As Christian culture developed in the West it soon produced a 
new legalism, traditionalism, and orthodoxy which restricted novelty.89 Such a 
restriction of the spontaneous in the development of the Western liturgy will shortly be 
exemplified with historical examples. Because Christ was the definitive invasion of 
the divine into history, it seemed to some theologians that nothing radically new could 
occur. Yet liturgical life becomes pathological when, again borrowing words of Sam 
Keen, 'the vision of the necessary destroys the vision of the possible - when law 
denies novelty, when reason eclipses enthusiasm, when compUlsion prevents 
spontaneity, or when the regular ceases to be wonderful. ,90 
IV Musical Spontaneity in Liturgy: A Historical Study 
In the West, the recognition of both order and spontaneity, musical and non-
musical, as complementary aspects of liturgy seems to have been widely taken for 
granted until the period of the Protestant Reformation and the Council of Trent (1545-
1563), after which, within the Roman Catholic Church at least, for reasons to be 
RR See ibid, pp. 65-66. 
89 Sec Keen, Apology/or Wonder, pp. 158-159. 
90 Ibid,p. 164. 
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explained, spontaneous liturgical expreSSIons became suspect. This SUspIcIon 
remained intact until the Second Vatican Council which tended to restore spontaneity 
to the liturgy. Indeed, Roman Catholic theologians since the Second Vatican Council 
typically regard the absence of spontaneity in the Counter-Reformation liturgy as 
decadent and unsatisfactory. Joseph Gelineau speaks of 'the dissatisfaction felt with 
the paralysing rigidity the Roman liturgy had reached on the eve of Vatican II,.91 
'After the long, too long stagnation of liturgical forms, the reform decided on by the 
Second Vatican Council was the signal to start moving.,92 'Vatican II returned to the 
idea that liturgy is not a set of rubrics, but the essential activity of the Church at 
prayer. ,93 Gelineau notes the power of the unprecedented: 'Liturgical symbols very 
often derive their greatest impact - both inherent and extrinsically induced - from the 
kairos of the actual celebration, not the way it is programmed. A word, a tune, a 
silence, an inflexion, a beam of light catching the wall suddenly 'speak'. The 
assembly feels an 'atmosphere', or individuals a 'grace' .94 This recent recovery of 
spontaneity is not confined to the Roman Catholic Church. Michael J. Thompson has 
distinguished between 'explicit' and 'implicit' liturgy across a range of traditions: 
'Explicit liturgy is liturgy in the narrower sense of explicit acts such as a confession of 
the Apostles' Creed or the Nicene Creed, making the sign of the cross and a number of 
ritual acts associated with the Eucharist. Implicit liturgy will 'carry' elements of the 
creeds in the sacraments and in less formal modes of worship: readings from the 
Scriptures, the singing of hymns and songs, prayers and sermons. ,95 Significantly, for 
91 Joseph Gelineau, The Liturgy Today and Tomorrow (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978), p. 
104. 
92 Ibid, p. 9. 
93 Gelineau, "Tradition - Invention - Culture," p. 13. 
94 . IbId, p. 17. 
95 Michael 1. Thompson, "Worship as an Ecc1esial Paradigm." Theology 102. no. 805 
(January/February 1999): 10-19; p. 13. 
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Thompson, 'Churches with both explicit and implicit liturgies have moved towards 
more spontaneity in worship during the last twenty-five years,.96 
The New Testament speaks of a delicate balance to be maintained between the 
predictable aspect of a given liturgy, and spontaneous interpolations within it. 'When 
you assemble,' St Paul admonishes in his First Letter to the Corinthians, 'each one has 
a hymn, a lesson, a revelation, a tongue or an interpretation. Let all things be done for 
edification,' (14:26) for, as he later continues, 'God is not a God of confusion, but a 
God of peace' (14:33). 'Earnestly desire to prophesy ... ' he urges further on, 'but all 
things should be done decently and in order' (14:39-40). Here, the individual 
contributions of worshippers had to be coaxed into a harmonious relationship with the 
external order required by corporate worship. Thus, establishing a creative 
relationship between these twin considerations, order and spontaneity, seems to have 
been one of the earliest and fundamental issues in the Christian liturgical experience. 
Spontaneity was considered to possess a value in itself: '[P]rayers were at first 
improvised freely on the basis of traditional patterns by the bishop, the normal leader 
of the liturgical assembly. As the early Christians conceived it, the ability to do this 
was one of the signs of a person being endowed with the charismatic gifts necessary 
for holding the office of a bishop. ,97 In Justin's Eucharistia, there is found the 
prescription of 'an untrammelled extempore style,98 of prayer. Although the practice 
of improvisatory prayer had roots in the Jewish synagogue,99 such emphasis on the 
improvisatory also seems consistent with the intensified dimension of hope in the 
earliest liturgical communities where 'Christians were counting on an early return of 
96 Ibid,p.17. 
97 Theodore Klauser, A Short History of the Western Liturgy: An Account and Some Reflections (1965) 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), p. 8. 
98 Josef A. Jungmann, The Early Church to the Time of Gregory the Great (1959) (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1960), p. 43. 
99 See Joncas, "Liturgy and Music," p. 288. 
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the Risen Christ and indeed were with some impatience awaiting the day of His 
Second Coming.' 100 
It also seems probable that, perhaps as late as the third or fourth centuries, those 
Prayers which form the most solemn of the Christian liturgy, because they are 
associated with a climactic and mysterious making present of Christ spiritually to the 
gathered assembly, the Eucharistic Prayers, were widely improvised. The first 
surviving fixed formula for these prayers dates only from the Traditio Apostolica of 
Hippolytus (c. 215), and even here Hippolytus asserts that the Eucharistic Prayer 
formula he is providing is not wholly prescriptive, but may be adapted freely by the 
celebrant, provided that the Prayer's meaning remains in accordance with correct 
Christian belief. The ~ormula of Hippolytus anticipates other formulae which appear 
likewise to have been designed to serve as prompts for a widely improvisatory 
approach to this Prayer. 101 Implicitly such spontaneity seems connected with a 
theology of hope. Because spontaneity is linked to the futural projection of Dasein in 
hope, a Eucharistic Prayer improvised to some degree has greater power to speak to 
the imagination of the hopes of the gospel than one which is not improvised. In cases 
where the improvised Eucharistic Prayer was perhaps also enunciated with special 
prosodical alacrity, or swept up into improvised sung melody, the evocation of the 
future in hope would have been still more pronounced, since improvised music is the 
primordial source of hoping in Dasein. 
A recommendation by Hippolytus concerning the use of his Prayer formula reads as 
follows: 
In no way is it necessary for the bishop to give thanks repeating the same words, as though he were 
trying to say them from memory, but each should pray according to his capacity. If one is capable of 
100 Klauser, Short History. p. 10. 
101 See Burkhard Neunheuser, "Lebendige Liturgiefeier und sch6pferische Freiheit des einzelnen 
Liturgen. Geschichtliche Tatsachen und ihre Bedeutung fur heute." Ephemerides Liturgicae 89. no. 1 
(1975): 40-53; p. 42. Reference to Hippolytus Traditio Apostolica, Chapters 4 and 9, B. Botte (ed.), 
(MUnster i. W. [sic]: n.p .. 1963) 5. 10-17 und ~8 (sic). 
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praying at length and saying a solemn prayer let him do so. But if another in his prayers uses only a 
moderate length prayer he should not be prevented, provided his prayer is orthodox. 102 
Although Hippolytus' fonnula, on which the bishop may improvise, is fixed, and 
could be spoken as it stands, Hippolytus 'is careful to indicate that he is giving a 
pattern, not insisting on the exact words to be followed.' 103 It is perhaps inclusive to 
advert here briefly to the existence of a distinction between improvising which seeks 
to be based upon, restrained within, some existing self-sufficient liturgical fonnula as 
here, and free improvising not deliberately founded upon a model. I04 As one 
commentator notes: 'The freedom to which Hippolytus alludes fits well with what we 
have called 'adaptation', less well with what is generally understood by 'creative 
improvisation.,105 However, whatever may be the usefulness of this distinction in 
other contexts, the connection between spontaneity and hope, which fonns the basis of 
the discussion at present, is independent of this distinction: both types of improvising, 
the freely creative and the adaptive improvising "on" a fixed fonnula, exhibit 
spontaneity as an expression of hope. 
Musical improvisation is found prominently in the liturgies of the New Testament 
period, and seems often to have taken the fonn of "singing in the Spirit," 'when the 
worshippers sing . . . spontaneously in unrehearsed melodious hannony with telling 
numinous effect. ,106 As improvisatory music, singing in the Spirit is noted in 
Ephesians 5: 18-20, Colossians 3: 16-17 and 1 Corinthians 14: 15, 'not songs that have 
been written according to the rules of composition but those that rise up while the 
102 Hippolytus, Apostolic Tradition. Cited in Botte, La tradition apostolique (Miinst~r: n.~., 1963),. p. 
29, no. 9. Cited in Pedro Fames Scherer, "Creative Improvisation, Oral and Wntten, m the FIrst 
Centuries of the Church." Concilium: "Liturgy: A Creative Tradition" (1983) no. 2: 29-37; p. 35. 
103 Cyril C. Richardson, "Introduction to Early Christian Literature and its Setting." In Early Christian 
Fathers, Cyril C. Richardson (ed.), (1953) (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 23. Reference to 
Hippolytus, Apostolic Tradition, Chapters 4; 10:4 (sic). . 
104 There is, of course, a third possibility: that of improvising on a model which is not self-sufficient, but 
designed as insufficient in itself, and usable solely if fleshed out by improvisation. 
105 . I .." 36 Scherer, "Creative mprovlsatlOn, p. . 
106 C. G. Williams, "Speaking in Tongues." In Strange Gifts? A Guide to the Charismatic Renewal, 
David Martin and Peter Mullen (eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 74. 
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servIce is being conducted from a full heart, from the fullness of the Spirit.' 107 
Christian tradition understands this singing in the Spirit as something more than an 
example of unaided human inspiration; rather it is understood to be an instance of God 
(more specifically God the Holy Spirit) indwelling the singer and, with the singer's 
active co-operation, supernaturally generating mysterious musical sounds of praise 
through the singer's voice. It is connected with speaking in tongues, the latter being 
supernaturally inspired adoration of God in quasi-verbal utterance not intelligible to 
the speaker, where the speaker is likewise aided directly by the Holy Spirit. 'One who 
speaks in a tongue speaks not to men but to God; for no one understands him, but he 
utters mysteries in the Spirit' (l Corinthians 14:2). His or her meaning may, however, 
be interpreted to the assembly by others inspired to understand it (1 Corinthians 
12:10). 
In the New Testament, as in subsequent Christian understanding, the gift of tongues 
and singing in the Spirit are connected, because the latter incorporates the gift of 
tongues: 'Someone strikes a note, all gather round him, each singing his own 
melody ... and praying at the same time in tongues.' 108 Indeed, singing in the Spirit is 
sometimes called "singing in tongues." Within the liturgical culture of the New 
Testament, this supernaturalised singing is central and prominent, precisely because it 
is linked to the gift of speaking in tongues, which is itself considered important 
enough to be spoken of as one of the gifts of the Spirit, along with gifts of apostles, 
prophets, teachers, miracle-workers, healers, helpers, and administrators (1 
Corinthians 12:28). The presence of speaking in tongues in this list of plainly crucial 
or important roles bears witness to its perceived importance. This is true despite the 
fact that its position as last in the list, and low down on a similar list in I Corinthians 
107 Heribert Miihlen, A Charismatic Theology: Initiation in the Spirit (1975-1976) (London: Bums and 
Oates, 1978), p. 322. 
108 Ibid, p. 155. 
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12:7-10, has sometimes been taken as an indication that Paul does not want speaking 
in tongues unduly emphasised in relation to the other gifis. I09 Singing in the Spirit or 
singing in tongues is thus presented in New Testament theology as dependent upon the 
same immediate activity of the Holy Spirit as gives rise to speaking in tongues, and the 
other named gifts of the Spirit. It is emphasised crucially that no other musical or 
artistic activity possesses this specially inspired, or charismatic status in the New 
Testament. This suggests that, for the New Testament liturgical communities, a 
privileged significance obtains for improvised music in the liturgy, with its underlying 
emphasis on hope. 
Musical improvisation, as well as being directly inspired by God in this way, was 
sometimes also made up with more conscious human art by the liturgical participants. 
Rembert Weakland notes of primitive Christian celebrations that '[fjor the fore-Mass 
and the morning and evening gathering that developed into the Divine Office the 
synagogue practice served as the model. Readings from Scripture were followed by 
Psalm singing . . . The cantor was also permitted a kind of improvised charismatic 
song of joy.' 110 'The improvised charismatic song - associated especially with the 
Alleluia - continued in Christian worship'. III Improvisation was thus extensively 
influential in the early development of liturgical music. 112 
Jeffery has referred to the 'music in medieval sermons, at least from the time of 
the mendicant orders (the thirteenth century and later), whose wandering friars 
incorporated popular singing and dancing into their preaching.' 113 '[T]here is 
evidence that musicians such as the 14th-century blind organist Francesco Landini 
109 See Paul Avis, Christians in Communion (London: Geoffrey Chapman Mowbray, 1990), pp. 136-
137. 
110 R. G. Weakland, "Early Christian Music." In "History of Sacred Music." In The New Catholic 
Encyclopedia, vol 10, William 1. McDonald (ed.-in-chief), (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). p. 105. 
III [bid, p. 106. 
112 See Bailey. Improvisation, p. 29 
113 Jeffrey, Re-Envisioning Past Musical Cultures, p. 74. 
282 
became well known for their improvising abilities.' 114 In the Middle Ages, examples 
of spontaneous lay participation in the liturgy are ready to hand, for 'the popular 
devotional spirit expressed itself with freedom and liberty in the strictly liturgical 
services of the various local churches.,} 15 Eamon Duffy refers to a practice whereby 
the spontaneity of personal lay devotion in the liturgy might be safeguarded even at 
one of the liturgy's most solemn moments of priestly mediation: '[T]he canon of the 
Mass was recited by the priest in silence 'ne impediantur populus orare', so that the 
people might not be hindered from praying.' 116 These illiterate people almost 
certainly prayed aloud, since, as Walter Ong has pointed out, a sense of interiorised 
subjectivity is closely dependent on being able to read or write. 117 However, still more 
extrovert manifestations of spontaneity abound prior to the reforms initiated by the 
Council of Trent. As Duffy observes, participation in a parish eucharist could be 
zestful and dynamic as exemplified by this fifteenth-century carol: 
And by a chapell as y Came, 
Met y whyhte Ih[ es]u to chyrcheward gone 
Petur and Pawle, Thomas & Thon, 
And hys desyplys Euery-chone. 
Mery hyt ys in may momyng 
Mery wayys for to gonne. 
Sente Thomas the Bellys gane ryng, 
And sent Collas the mas gane syng, 
Sente Ihon toke that swete offeryng, 
And By a chapell as y Came. 
Mery hyt ys. 
Owre lorde offeryd whate he wolde, 
A challes alle of ryche rede gollde; 
Owre lady, the crowne offhyr mowlde, 
The sone owte off hyr Bosome schone. 
Mery hyt ys. 
11-1 B·l 1 .. 29 al ey, mproVlsatlOn, p. . 
liS Edmund Bishop, Liturgica Historica: Papers on the Liturgy and Religious Life of the Western 
Church (Oxford: Clarendon, 1918), p. 18. 
116 Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England c. 1400-c: 1580 (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992), p. 117. Citation from T. F. Simmons (ed.), The Lay Folk s Mass Book 
(n.p.: Early English Text Society, 1879), p. xx. 
117 See Ong, Orality and Literacy, pp. 178-179. 
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Sent lorge that ys owre lady knyghte, 
He tende the taperys fayre & Bryte -
To myn yghe a semley syghte, 
And By a chapell as y Came. 
Mery hyt is. 118 
Such was the acceptance accorded to merry freedoms, that '[i]n the middle ages 
that effusive, affective, and devotional spirit continually made itself felt in 
modifications in the liturgical books themselves, and in the mode of carrying out the 
strictly official or liturgical public services.' 119 Thus Chichele's reforms in the reign 
of Henry V encouraged 'a liturgy in which personal devotions could be incorporated 
and the call of private conscience could be harmonized.' 120 It appears, however, that 
assessment of these liturgical freedoms was already becoming ambiguous by the late 
Middle Ages, and, in the words of one writer, 'the arguments about the eucharist in the 
late Middle Ages hinge very much around the issue of so-called 'popular piety,' or as 
its detractors called it, 'lay superstition.,121 This ambiguity might be regarded as the 
working out of a profound ambivalence towards the sphere of the imaginative in 
medieval culture. Orthodox medieval philosophy and theology, exhibited by the 
official ecclesiastical intelligentsia, displayed an antipathy to the imagination, while 
ignoring the vibrant imaginative life found in popular folk and vernacular culture. 122 
Despite these preceding Medieval tensions, it was nevertheless undoubtedly the 
impact of the Council of Trent and Counter Reformation which finally dictated a new 
liturgical ethos. In this new ethos, the spontaneous impulse which, in various degrees 
118 See Duffy, Stripping of the Altars, pp. 129-130. For carol citation, references to Greene, Early 
English Carols (incomplete documentation), no. 323 and notes on p. 428; Carleton Brown, ReligiOUS 
Lyrics of the XVth Century (incomplete documentation), no. 116; D. Gray, Themes and Imagery in the 
Medieval English Religious Lyric (n.p.: n.p., 1972), p. 163. 
119 Bishop, Liturgica Historica, p. 18. 
120 Jeremy Catto, "Religious Change under Henry V." In Henry V: The Practice of Kingship, G. L. 
Harriss (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), p. 115. 
121 Sarah Beckwith, Christ's Body: Identity, Culture and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London: 
Routledge, 1993),p. 37. . 
122 See Kearney, Wake. pp. 131-132. References to 1. Le Goff, L'Imagination Medievale (Pans: 
Gallimard, 1986); E. Gombrich, Ideal and Idols: Essays on T'alues in History and in Art (Oxford: 
Phaidon, 1979). 
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had enjoyed a welcome in the liturgy SInce earliest times, was revalued far more 
negatively. The new liturgical order which dated from the Council of Trent was 
devised to counter social and religious disorder which the Catholic authorities 
perceived as arising from the Protestant Reformation. Thus, 'it was the heretic who 
determined both the subjects treated by the Council and the point of view from which 
they were treated. ,123 The aims of the Council of Trent may be figured as having their 
roots in some form of anxiety in the face of disorder and the need to prevent further 
defections to Protestantism and also win back apostates. The liturgical order 
promulgated at Trent stressed order and the imposition of regularity. With reference 
to the celebration of Mass, the Council warned: 
[M]any practices foreign to the dignity of so great a sacrifice appear to have crept in, either by the wear 
and tear of time or through human negligence or depravity. And so, to restore due honour and worship 
for the glory of God and the spiritual support of the faithful people, the holy council decrees that 
bishops in charge of dioceses should be greatly concerned and under obligation to forbid and root out 
anything that has been brought in, either by greed which is the service of idols, or by irreverence which 
can hardly be distinguished from impiety, or by superstition which is the counterfeit mimic of true 
devotion. 124 
The picture of 'rigid unification and rubricism,125 at this period which comes down 
largely from historical commentators such as Theodor Klauser, Josef Jungmann, and 
Louis Bouyer,126 may in fact be oversimplified. For Simon Ditchfield, in a more 
nuanced critique of the Counter-Reformation Church, 'these centuries witnessed a 
living liturgy - with universalizing pretensions certainly, yet a liturgy which never 
ceased its dialogue with, or to take account of, the particular devotions practised in 
. ld ,127 '[I] . . t dioceses the length and breadth of the Cathohc wor . t IS maccurate 0 see 
123 Bonaventure Kloppenburg, The Ecc/esiology of Vatican II (1971) (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press. 
1974), p. 2. 
124 Council of Trent, Session 22: "Decree on Things to be Observed and A voided in Celebrating Mass." 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol 2, Norman P. Tanner (ed.), (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 
p.736. 
1~5 Simon Ditchfield, "Giving Tridentine Worship Back its History." In Continuity and Change in 
Christian Worship: Papers read at the 1997 Summer Meeting and the 1998 Winter Meeting of the 
Ecclesiastical History Society (Woodbridge, Suffolk; BoydeU, 1999), p. 201. 
126 S 'b'd ee 1 1 . 
127 Ibid. 
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Tridentine liturgical reform simply in terms of the imposition of universal norms on 
local churches by Rome' . 128 
Nevertheless, liturgical spontaneity came to be seen in the Counter-Reformation 
Church not merely as a relic of its own disorganised past, but also as associated with 
the new Protestant piety and thus, by implication, doctrinal error. Protestant traditions 
of worship varied considerably in the relationship they exhibited between order and 
spontaneity. Lutheran worship, for example, was more fixed than that of Anabaptists 
in the sixteenth century. 129 Even so, 'Spirit-inspired extempore prayer [was] the order 
of the day,130 within much of the Protestant community. Although liturgical activity 
was maintained by Protestant communities, private forms of spiritual experience now 
sometimes took the place of dependence on liturgy. For example, in many Protestant 
theologies, for a person's initiation into Christian identity, very often 'not Baptism, as 
demanded by tradition ... [was] decisive, but Conversion. ,131 Baptism, the traditional 
moment of Christian initiation, is intrinsically a corporate and liturgical act: 
conversion is a private experience. Reductive Protestant conceptions of the role of the 
fixed liturgy in Christian life also implied a negative reappraisal of the priesthood 
which was required to perform the liturgical rites. For the Reformers, '[t]he 
ministerial priesthood ... was a mere invention of power-seeking men.' 132 This in 
tum implied an attack on the hierarchical organisation of the Catholic Church itself, 
with the threat of a certain subversion of the laity's subordinate position as then 
perceived. There was a connection between the Protestant idea of increased active, 
IJR Ib'd ~ 1, p. 224. 
129 See James White, "Creativity: The Free Church Tradition." In Concilium: "Liturgy: A Creatil'e 
Tradition" (1983) no. 2: 47-52; p. 47. 
130 Dieter Voll, Catholic Evangelicalism: The Acceptance of Evangelical Traditions by {he Oxford 
MOl'ement During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century (1960) (London: Faith Press. 1963), p. 22. 
131 Ibid. 
1:\2 Clifford HowelL "From Trent to Vatican II." In The Study of Liturgy, Cheslyn Jones. Geoffrey 
Wainwright, Edward Yamold, Paul Bradshaw (eds.), (1978) (London: SPCK, 1992), p. 288. 
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and by implication possibly extempore)liturgical participation by the laity, and the rise 
of the Protestant claim that the priesthood of the laity was the only true priesthood. 133 
Protestant forms of spontaneity were perceived by Roman authorities to be the 
accompaniment to a spiritual individualism which contrasted with the traditional 
corporate conformity of liturgy, and were consequently viewed as anti-liturgical and 
dangerous. 
In the throes of a polemical distortion of perspective, the Catholic Church acted 
upon the assumption, that because a culture of spontaneity was raised up arguably to 
excess within Protestant liturgies, it followed that spontaneity, even when regulated in 
the manner commended by the Pauline writings, must be largely suspect. 
Consequently, '[i]n the domain of the liturgy, [the Church] devoted itself to a stubborn 
maintenance of what was then under attack from Protestantism . . . But the way in 
which it held to and exalted that legacy was to allow it to become fossilized ... And, 
in the end, the liturgy was embalmed in productions which treated it as reverently and 
as indifferently as the King's corpse at a royal funeral.' 134 This state of affairs 
endured, with the result that, by the nineteenth century, there had arisen a 'two-
centuries old process of fossilization and stultification of the rites and formulae of the 
liturgy itself.' 135 Bouyer refers here to the absence of freedom and flexibility in 
liturgical celebration. All this came about despite the fact that the Tridentine revisers 
believed they had the authority of the earliest liturgical traditions, accepted by them as 
normative and prescriptive, for their reforms: 'Their scholarly limitations, however, 
have long been evident.' 136 Flexibility regarding liturgical rubrics was not ended 
entirely, and from its foundation in 1588, until 1887, the Sacred Congregation of Rites 
133 S 'b'd ee I I . 
1.\4 Louis Bouyer, Life and Liturgy (1956) (London: Sheed and Ward, 1978), pp. 6-7. 
135 Ibid, p. 11. .' " 
136 Frederick R. McManus, "Back to the Future: The Early Christian Roots of LIturgIcal Renewal. 
Worship 72, no. 5 (September 1998): 386-403; p. 391. 
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and Ceremonies answered over eight thousand queries from clergy regarding the status 
of customs in the liturgy. 137 Roman Catholic liturgical life was not 'a one-way, top-
down ... static papal hegemony.' 138 Nevertheless, the main emphasis was on rubrics 
laid down in books produced by the Congregation. 139 
The central authority of the Catholic Church had perhaps never inveighed against 
musical practices with such scope as at the Council of Trent, even though interest in 
music at the Council was not extensive140 in comparison with other issues. The 
Council treated four issues relating to music in worship: 'musical settings that 
truncated liturgical texts, compositions that made the sacred words unintelligible, 
inappropriate secular vocal music during worship, and lengthy secular organ pieces 
played during liturgy.' 141 'All students of Renaissance music are familiar with the 
debates about sacred music during the last sessions of the Council of Trent, and with 
the eventual decision that 'the whole plan of singing in musical modes should be 
constituted not to give pleasure to the ear, but in such a way that the words be clearly 
understood by all'.' 142 Although verbal intelligibility was indeed a major point of 
contention, the polyphonic musical styles against which Trent inveighed were also 
steeped in connotations of the improvisatory and spontaneous. Ferand identifies a 
'rich improvisation practice,143 of which the vocal counterpoint of the period was a 
'direct result,' 144 and instances 'the polyphonic Introits in the collection by Ippolito 
Chamatero di Negri (maestro di cappella at the cathedral in Udine) published in 
137 See Ditchfield, "Tridentine Worship," p. 219. 
138 Ibid. 
139 See Bishop, Liturgica Historica, p. 18. 
140 S . d M ." 304 ee Joncas, "LIturgy an USIC, p. . 
141 Ibid. 
142 Richard Sherr, "A Letter from Paolo Animuccia: A Composer's Response to the Council of Trent." 
Early Music 12. no. 1 (February 1984): 74-78; p. 75. Citation taken from the final Decree. Re~erences 
to L. Lockwood (ed). Palestrina: Pope Marcellus Mass (New York: n.p., 1975), p. 19; K. Wemmann, 
Das Konzil \'(In Trient und die Kirchenmusik (Leipzig: n.p., 1919). 
143 d .., "AT' C . 9 Feran , ImprOl'lSatlOn 111 Ivl11e entunes, p. . 
144 Ibid. 
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Venice in 1574.,145 He writes: 'The improvisatory origin of these settings for the 
Proper of the Mass is emphasised in the composer's preface to his collection; he points 
out the novelty of such a procedure (namely, the writing down of a polyphony 
ordinarily left to improvisation) and proudly reports ... the improvisations of his 
choirboys 'nel far contraponti all' improviso' . ' 146 It is in this stylistic context that the 
ecclesiastical suspicion now attaching to polyphonic music, which was supposedly 
liable to 'excite the faithful to lascivious rather than to religious thoughts' 147 needs to 
be viewed, since the condemnations of polyphonic styles appear to contain also an 
implied attack on improvisation. Sherr notes that 'the overall effect of the council's 
decree on music was perhaps not great.' 148 Thus, polyphony survived, but, even so, in 
these censures of polyphony, the seeds of a suspicion of liturgical music, especially 
insofar as improvisatory, had been sown. 
In the seventeenth century, the rising influence of the Cartesian cogito with its 
stigmatisation of those powers of the mind not evidently linked with 'clear and distinct 
ideas' would help to consolidate this trend in the Catholic liturgy. Descartes's 
Discourse on Method appeared in 1637, and Meditations on First Philosophy in 1641. 
Imagination came under attack. As Benedetto Croce observed: 'The French 
philosopher abhorred imagination, the outcome, according to him, of the agitation of 
the animal spirits ... The mathematical spirit fostered in France by Descartes forbade 
all possibility of a serious consideration of poetry and art.,149 For Cote, '[p]ost-
Cartesian philosophers and psychologists belittled the imaginative quality of human 
life, at best relegating it to assorted groups like artists and poets, at worst regarding it 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 See A. Theiner (ed.), Acta Concilii Tridentini (Leipzig: n.p., 1853), part 5, p. 918. Cited in Haybum. 
Papal Legislation on Sacred Music, p. 27. 
148 h &: Anim '" 75 S err, "Letter lrom UCCla, p. . , .. 
149 Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1909) (London: \ ISlOn 
Press and Peter Owen, 1962), p. 204. 
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as a deceptive and dangerous power. The church, too has distrusted imagination and 
excluded imaginal experience (creativity, theopoiesis, playfulness) from much of its 
sanctioned vision of reality.' 150 
Musical improvisation relies more heavily on imagination than does fixed, written 
composition for, in the latter process, rational calculation may playa greater part. In 
musical improvisation, calculative rationality in the creation of the music is reduced to 
a minimum and spontaneous imagination takes over. There is indeed hardly any time 
for the musician to dwell with reasoned thought on the creative musical process here 
as she produces the music, for the priority will be to keep the music flowing. If 
intense imagining stops, the music stops, and this exigency will occupy the musician 
in finding spontaneous musical events to perform at each and every instant, in such a 
way that imagination is stretched and rational calculation largely silenced in that 
instant. Improvisation in its most extreme form is 'an arbitrary stringing together of 
one's own ideas, without special development, a capricious, quick jumping from one 
motif to another without any connection other than that supplied by accident or 
without purpose by the unconscious musical sense of the player.' 151 Compare a 
description of spontaneous imagination. The following definition of '[ s ]pontaneous 
mental acts' provides insight into the way in which a musical improvisation, in its 
most extreme form, proceeds: 
Spontaneous mental acts [are] any or all of the following: not subject to external coercion or control ... 
arising from an apparent lack of cause, motive or reason; appearing in a way that is unsolicited and 
unpremeditated by the imaginer and emerging without any express effort on his part, appearing in such a 
way as to surprise; operating by means of its own self-propelling forces, being wholly self determinative 
in this respect; and generating itself all at once, totum simul, without any significant prolongation or 
sense of steady development. 152 
150 Richard G. Cote, "Christology and the Pascal Imagination." Concilium: "Who Do You Say that I 
Am?" (1997) no. 1: 80-88; p. 80. . 
151 Karl Czerny, Systematische Anleitung ~um Fantasieren aufdem Pianoforte. op. 200 (VIenna: n.p., 
1836), Chapter 9, n.p. Cited in Ferand, Improvisation in Nine Centuries, p. 21. 
152 Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. 1976), 
pp.71-72. 
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Correlating some aspects of this philosophical passage more closely with mUSIC, 
musical improvisation may be 'unpremeditated' and 'surprise' the performer as in the 
case of a keyboard improviser suddenly surprised but pleased by the sound of his own 
harmony. (This experience was famously captured in Arthur Sullivan's popular song 
The Lost Chord.) An example of 'self-propelling' and 'self determinative' forces in 
musical improvisation might be where an improviser for a few moments instinctively 
repeats the same passage, "treading water," as it were, but not in fact concentrating at 
all on what he is doing, because he is actually trying hard to receive into the 
imagination some new spontaneous idea to which to move. Here, a musical motif 
which originally arose as improvisation upholds or propels itself by repetition, rather 
than flowing from any renewed inspiration. The improviser has not actually decided 
to keep the improvisation afloat with these repetitions: they are a strategy of his 
spontaneous imagination. Because the improviser's conscious mind is on an 
inspiration he hopes to think of shortly, not on the repetitions he is actually playing, 
the improvisation becomes for a while self-propelling. He enters a 'liminal space, one 
perhaps known better to the fingers than to the mind.' 153 Much more will be said of 
these "flow experiences" at the very end of the thesis. (Of course, if the improviser 
produces the repetitions deliberately, he acts rationally, and the phenomenon is not the 
same.) 
Humans can deliberately lay themselves open to their spontaneous imaginings, and 
can guide them, nor are these points opposed to the spontaneous nature of such 
imaginings. A musician must decide to improvise, nor is a subsequent element of 
conscious guidance in the execution of the imaginative impulses into sounding 
performance opposed to the fact of their spontaneous origin, for '[ n Jot only are we 
153 Archbold, Review ofOverduin. p. 478. 
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capable of initiating our own imaginative experiences, we are also able to direct these 
experiences in whatever manner we wish once they have been initiated by us. Such 
'guidability' is found even in instances of imagining that we have not ourselves 
initiated. ' 154 Thus the mind in musical improvisation works at several levels, 
initiating, receiving and guiding spontaneous imaginings, and can plan and recall the 
improvisatory performance within which it has situated itself, to the degree the 
performer should so wish. Consequently, improvisation may sometimes be more 
structurally cohesive than the previous quotation from Czerny would suggest, for the 
improvised performance, as a total phenomenon, is the effect of both spontaneous and 
deliberate causes and the balance achievable between these two dimensions is highly 
flexible. 
Nevertheless, because of improvisation's high dependence upon imagination, any 
reductionist philosophy of the imagination, such as the Cartesian, has the power to 
devalue the cultural status of improvisation if such a philosophy comes to prevail as an 
intellectual fashion in a culture where improvisation is present. Moreover, in later 
Western philosophical writing issuing from the Enlightenment, appraisal of the role of 
imagination continued to be negative. In the words of commentator Edward Casey, 
'the claims of imagination have been rebuffed or ignored at almost every critical 
juncture. Far from being the 'Queen of the faculties' ... imagining has been regarded, 
with rare exceptions, as the impoverished chimneysweep of mind, perfonning 
tasks . . . that are considered beneath the dignity of other psychical powers.' 155 The 
Enlightenment regarded imagination as a secondary or tertiary phenomenon in relation 
154 C 1 .. 74 asey, magzmng, p. . 
155 Ibid, p. x. Notable among the 'rare exceptions' was Giambattista Vico who, in 1725, considered that 
'among the gravest faults of the Cartesians was their inability to appreciate the world of imagination and 
poetry. Of his own times [Vico] complained they were 'benumbed by analytical methods and by a 
philosophy which sought to deaden every faculty of soul which reached it through the body, especially 
that of imagination, now held to be the mother of all human error". Croce, Aesthetic, p. 228. Citation 
from a letter of Giambattista Vico to (no given name) De Angelis, 25th December. 1725. 
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to other mental powers, and its uniqueness was not acknowledged. 156 This led to a 
devaluation of musical improvisation in the eighteenth century, as described in 
Chapter 2, Section I. 
The Cartesian exaltation of reason naturally resulted in an unconSCIOUS 
stigmatisation of whatever could be credibly represented as the "other" of rational 
thought and behaviour. Thomas Docherty writes: 'Enlightenment reason is ... a 
potent weapon in the production of social normativity, driving people towards a 
conformity with a dominant and centred 'norm' of behaviour. Reason, in short, has to 
produce the 'scandal' of the Other to keep itself going.' 157 F or Michel Foucault, of 
whose theorising the latter quotation is a critique, the 'Other' is the irrationality of 
madness which, he would maintain, was a concept actually created at this period 
unconsciously to validate the dominance of Enlightenment rationality at the level of 
human behaviour. 158 Prior to the Enlightenment, 'madness was not considered to be a 
disease or illness and the mad were not excluded from the rest of society. Rather they 
were considered to be under the influence of 'folly' - a benign, or even wise and 
revelatory, mode of thought.' 159 However, it seems that, in a social world which 
increasingly regarded Cartesian clear and distinct reasoning as the norm of knowledge 
and social behaviour, those who reasoned and behaved in an unorthodox way had to 
be rendered unacceptable and removed from participation through their confinement 
156 See Casey, ibid, p. 19. 
157 Thomas Docherty, "Postmodemism: An Introduction." In Postmodernism: A Reader, Thomas 
Docherty (ed.), (Heme I Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 14. 
158 See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1961) 
(London: Tavistock, 1967). 'Foucault endeavours to show how Descartes, in the 'First Meditation', 
excludes madness from hyperbolic doubt: Descartes can doubt everything except his own sanity. 
Foucault wants to fmd out what madness and unreason [presumably a misprint for 'reason'] could be in 
the age of Descartes, and why the difference between them was such an issue. Or, as a much later 
fonnulation would have it, he wanted to study the way the division between madness and reason is 
established. Reason and madness are thus presented as the outcome of historical processes: they do not 
exist as universally objective categories.' John Lechte, Fifty Contemporary Thinkers: From 
Structuralism to Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 112. 
159 Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject (1993) 
(London: VCL Press, 1995), p. 15. 
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in asylums. '[S]ocial normativity,' as referred to by Docherty, is likewise what 
Counter-Reformation legislation sought to produce increasingly within the Catholic 
liturgy. Thus, similarly within a Catholic liturgy seeking to reform or purify itself, the 
'Other' became any liturgical unpredictability. Liturgical spontaneity constituted a 
form of "madness," or at least an unwanted disorder precipitated by the dangerous 
sphere of the imaginative, which the Tridentine ethos of hyper-surveillance sought to 
mInImIse. 
In the analysis of Karl Gustav Fellerer, during the Counter-Reformation era, 'a 
music of worship was replaced by music at worship'. 160 Properly speaking, 
'[l]iturgical music is of the liturgy, rather than simply in or occurring during the 
liturgy.' 161 Liturgical music is that music which 'weds itself to the liturgical action, 
serves to reveal the full significance of the rite and, in tum, derives its full meaning 
from the liturgy.' 162 Musical improvisation in liturgy is in two respects especially able 
to be truly of the liturgy rather than simply in the liturgy. Improvised music invented 
in situ is closely wedded to the liturgy here and now being celebrated, because it is 
unique to the liturgical moment which produces it. Gelineau seems, however, to 
favour the additional approach whereby liturgical improvisation is closely related to 
some part of the same liturgy'S existing musical text, an adaptive improvising. 
Gelineau writes that' [b ]etween improvisation pure and simple, with its attendant risks 
of failure or superficiality, and total regulation [sc. of liturgy], with its attendant 
dangers of boredom and lack of warmth, there is a third way, the re-play, which can 
draw on a wealth of memory but is open again to the grace of the moment, which has a 
stable basic pattern but is performed with freedom.' 163 A similar view is found in 'the 
160 Karl Gustav Fellerer, The History of Catholic Church Music (Baltimore: Helican, 1961). p. 134. 
161 J . d M ." 2 82 oncas, "LIturgy an USIC, p. . . 
162 Edward Foley, "Liturgical Music." In A New Dictionary of Sacramental Worship, P. Fink (ed.), 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1990), p. 855. 
163 Gelineau, "Tradition - Invention - Culture," p. 15. 
294 
Constitution on the Liturgy [sc. of Vatican II] [which] gives ample space to the idea of 
adaptation, while not mentioning the concept of 'creativity' ... Such an adaptation, far 
from 'making something out of nothing', consists in modifying existing liturgical 
expressions' . 164 Scherer asserts that 'beyond doubt . . . from the very foundation of 
the Church, we are dealing with adaptation rather than creativity' .165 It is impossible 
to know in detail what liturgies from 'the very foundation of the Church' were like. 
Nevertheless, this generalisation may validly suggest a circumspect guiding principle 
for the practice of liturgical improvisation: unless powerful and authentic charisms of 
the moment invite a transgression of this limitation, liturgical improvisers should lean 
towards an adaptive approach. This point concerning adaptation should not, however, 
be promoted to the point of excluding non-adaptive creativity, or pure spontaneity. 
Spontaneity such as speaking and singing in tongues is not by any means necessarily 
adaptive of existing liturgical elements, and New Testament theology indicates that 
these are liturgical freedoms in which God is powerfully operative. Anselme Sanon 
has commented that 'it is not enough to start from the principle of adaptation: this 
would be to stifle the creativity which so marked the communities of the primitive 
Church. ' 166 
Even under Tridentine rubrics there were small things a celebrant might decide to 
do, and be seen to decide to do, on the spur of the moment which would proclaim his 
identity as an imagining creature, and there were also comparable non-rubrical actions 
by other participants which might be imaginatively spontaneous, and which might bear 
directly upon the liturgical action, as any properly liturgical spontaneity obviously 
must. Moreover, even highly involuntary forms of spontaneity, like the choice of hand 
164 Scherer, "Creative Improvisation, Oral and Written," pp. 31-32. 
165 Ibid, p. 33. 
166 Anselme Sanon, "Cultural Rooting of the Liturgy in Africa Since Vatican II." Concilium: "Liturgy: 
A Creath'(! Tradition" (1983) no. 2: 61-70; p. 66. 
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used to tum a page while reading Scripture, or which foot a person starts to walk with 
when moving around the nave or sanctuary, though perhaps unmotivated by conscious 
will, are nevertheless not devoid of imaginative intention. 167 In short, imagination 
cannot be expunged from the liturgy, any more than from the human person. In the 
musical domain of the Tridentine liturgy, there might also be liturgical improvisers 
like Toumemire. In Toumemire, '[t]he artistic imagination is the human organ of 
transcendence which by its symbols and techniques ... [is] sometimes better able than 
discursive thought to capture and communicate our tacit knowledge of religious 
mysteries.,168 Toumemire's improvisation was instinctively activated in the pre-
Vatican II liturgical community in a way analogous to what Jungian psychology would 
call a surfacing archetype: 'When conscious life is characterized by one-sidedness and 
by a false attitude, [archetypes] are activated ... and come to light in the ... visions of 
artists and seers, thus restoring the psychic equilibrium of the epoch. ,169 Such 
archetypes 'often contain a superior analysis or insight or knowledge which 
consciousness has not been able to produce.' 170 Toumemire' s musical freedoms, and 
those of organists of the same French school, anticipated the recovery of the New 
Testament eschatological spontaneity in worship which would occur in the Roman 
Catholic Church after Vatican II. 
In the Tridentine liturgy, despite general restraints on overt musical improvisation, 
the spontaneous expressive inflections of speech, as well as the expressive spontaneity 
which remained in the performance of fixed musical works, would also have 
embodied an element of musical improvisation. Human beings can never cease to be 
spontaneous, and cannot cease to project themselves towards a future in hope. This 
167 For a discussion of voluntary and involuntary spontaneity see Sartre. Psychology, p. 18. 
168 Murphy, "Church and Culture since Vatican II," p. 328. 
169 Carl lung, "Psychology and Literature." In Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London: Kegan Paul. 
Trench. Trubner, 1933). p. 197. 
170 Carl lung, Psychology and Religion (1938) (New Haven: Yale Uniy. Press. 1970), p. 49. 
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hope seeks a musical dimension even where the latter is forcibly restrained, for Being 
speaks as projection and hope in music. Thus the eschatological-prophetic dimension 
which musical spontaneity safeguards in liturgy was never, nor could it have been, 
eliminated by the Counter-Reformation prescriptions. Bishop notes how spontaneous 
liturgical impulses restrained by the Counter-Reformation ethos became partly 
redirected to feed a growth of extra-liturgical devotions. 171 In repressing the 
spontaneous aspect of liturgy, however, a ritual imbalance was created. Victor Turner 
indicates, that from the perspective of religious anthropology, solemn and ludic are 
simply complementary elements in one ritual field. In '[F]ew rituals are so completely 
stereotyped that every word, every gesture, every scene is authoritatively prescribed. 
Most often, invariant phrases and episodes are interdigitated with variable passages, in 
which, both at the verbal and nonverbal levels, improvisation may not be merely 
permitted but required.,173 As Turner adds, '[t]he 'flat' view of ritual must gO.,174 
Turner, as was noted earlier, identifies the spontaneous dimension with states of 
liminality, the experience of being at the threshold of the "elsewhere." Thus liminal 
spontaneity in ritual 'is ... a trans formative self-immolation of order as presently 
constituted, even sometimes a voluntary sparagmos or self-dismemberment of order, 
in the SUbjunctive depths of liminality.' 175 Turner suggests the comparison of the 
shaman initiand, who is 'broken into pieces then put together again as a being bridging 
visible and invisible worlds.' 176 He suggests that it is the improvisatory dimension of 
171 S B' h L' . U" 18 ee IS op, lturglca nlstonca, p. . 
172 See Turner, Process, Performance and Pilgrimage, pp. 94-98; 102. .. 
173 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York CIty: Perfonmng 
Arts Journal Publications, 1982), pp. 81-82. 
174 Ibid, p. 82. . d' . 
175 Ibid, p. 83. Sparagmos (in English letters) is classical Greek for teanng, ren mg: mangl.mg. 
C I . gony See Henry LI'ddell and Robert Scott (eds.), A Greek-English LeXicon onvu SlOns, spasm, a . . .,., . 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1869 edition), p. 1479. The 'subJunctIve dI~enSlO.n, Turner e~plams. IS the 
domain of what is wished for, or possible, as against the 'indicative' dImenSIOn of what 1S. See Turner 
ibid, pp. 82-84. 
176 Ibid, p. 84. 
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ritual which signifies infinite depth: 'Ritual ... is not only complex and many-layered; 
it has an abyss in it' . 177 
Eastern Orthodoxy never had occasion to inveigh, in the extreme manner of the 
Counter Reformation, against the spontaneous. 'Orthodox worship ... combines form 
with freedom. The service goes its way according to the book, but how freely the 
clergy and their assistants move in comparison with the stiffer ways of Rome or 
England! Meanwhile the congregation, free from the constraints imposed by pews or 
chairs, play their part also with a certain liberty, bowing and crossing themselves at 
such petitions in the litanies as move them specially, going forward to put a candle by 
an ikon, intense or relaxed by turns.' 178 From Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas a 
parallel wisdom comes, that in contemporary liturgical practice, it is eschatological 
awareness which is in need of special emphasis in the wider Church. This theological 
insight complements the spontaneous, eschatological orientation of Orthodox worship 
as just described. Zizioulas stresses paradoxically that eschatology is not, in fact the 
end of the Church's pilgrimage: '[W]e must think of the eschata as the beginning of 
the Church's life, the arche, that which brings forth the Church, gives her identity, 
sustains and inspires her in her existence. The Church exists not because Christ died 
on the cross but because he has risen from the dead, which means, because the 
kingdom has come.' 179 For Zizioulas, 'the only way to preserve the eschatological 
identity is the celebration of the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist, and the 
encounter of the Word, not as a message coming to [the Church] as passed through the 
channels of historical experience, but as an echo of the future state of things.' 180 The 
freedom of Orthodox worship symbolically pre-echoes this future. 
177 Ibid, p. 82. 
17R Oliver Fielding Clarke, Introduction to Berdyaev (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1950), p. 23. 
179 John Zizioulas, "The Mystery of the Church in Orthodox Tradition." One in Christ 24. no. 4 (1988): 
294-303; p. 296. 
IRO Ibid, p. 300. 
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V Resume 
From the earliest auditory experiences in the womb, and explorations of the human 
infant in babbling, improvised music is the locus of Being's unveiling in Dasein 
through language, time and art (Chapter 5). It is also the fullest expression of Dasein's 
projection towards the future in hope (Chapter 6). Musical improvisation is thus where 
Being speaks in the natural order, and it is to be expected that liturgy, where Being 
speaks supernaturally in the light of Christian revelation, would enlist this 
fundamental, ontic role which musical improvisation has for the human person. This is 
because grace builds on nature. Liturgy is where Christians imagine the graced future 
as held out to them by God's revelation. It was seen in Chapter 6, Section I how all 
spontaneity intensifies the future orientation of imagination. As a corollary, where 
imaginative activity in the liturgy is spontaneous, a symbolic, liturgical disclosure of 
the graced future is more intense. Where such spontaneous liturgical imagination is 
musical, the element of future orientation is intensified yet further, since music is 
already linked in a special way to projecting hope in Dasein (Chapter 6, Sections I and 
II). These points converge towards a conclusion that musical spontaneity is central to 
liturgical hoping. Musical improvisation is, more than any other form of liturgical 
imaginative spontaneity, an opening up, a clearing, or a breathing-space for 
eschatological awareness. This applies chiefly to pure improvisatoriness. Spontaneous 
expressiveness in the performance of existing music is almost as potent. However 
spontaneous imagination is less fully operative when adding expression to existing 
music in this way, than when inventing music wholly in performance, and this is why 
the future is less potently evoked by music outside the specific context of 
improvisation in the fullest sense. 
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It has been seen also that speech prosody is musical, and linked to hope in 
proportion to its intensity and animation (Chapter 6, Section II). Conversely, the voice 
when hope is reduced is often marked by minimal intonation and rhythmic flaccidness: 
'[g]rief has a low pitch, narrow range, soft sounds, and slow tempo.' 181 In sadness 
generally '[ s ]peech may be slower and less frequent' 182 and spontaneity or 
'impulsiveness ... is lower for this emotion than any other emotion. ,183 '[S]adness is 
accompanied by a slowing of both mental and bodily functioning' .184 In depressive 
patients, mutism sometimes occurs.185 Their hopes have been reduced to a minimum. 
Yet all human speech retains some spontaneous inflection, because fundamental 
human projection in Dasein is inherently linked to hope and to music, and the primary 
point of access to music for the human person is his or her speaking voice. (Modem 
science-fiction drama understands well this link between inflection and projection, for 
it uses the uninflected voice for the robot: the robot does not act by projecting a future 
but by carrying out a pre-existent program of instructions. That is probably why the 
flattened voice suggested itself as appropriate for robotic speech. Because it has no 
autonomous future, hope, or projection, the robot has no inflected speech.) In the 
liturgy, any special spontaneous tonal expressiveness or alacrity in spoken language 
will correspond with musical spontaneity as eschatologically significant evocation. 
Such utterance might or might not additionally involve making up the words 
themselves, but where it does, the eschatological evocation will be enhanced because 
imagination is being used more intensively. In other words, the same principle is at 
181 Robert Plutchik, The Psychology and Biology of Emotion (New York: Harper Collins, 1994). p. 166. 
182 Izard, Psychology of Emotions, p. 187. . , ~ 
IR3 Ibid, p. 188. Izard refers to any other emotion 'in the Bartlett-Izard expenme~t. . See E. S'. Bartlett, 
and C. E. Izard, "A Dimensional and Discrete Emotions Investigation of the Sub]eCti\'c Expenence of 
Emotion." In Patterns of Emotions: A New Analysis of Anxiety and Depression, C. E. Izard (ed.), (New 
York: Academic Press. 1972), pp. 129-173. 
184 Izard, Psychology of Emotions, p. 190. 
185 See ibid, p. 75. 
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work here as with music when improvised, or non-improvised but expressive. Thus, 
reciting pre-existing words expressively is like an expressive musical performance of 
pre-existing music, and speaking improvised words with alacrity is like improvising 
music. The greater the degree of improvisatoriness embodied by the form, the greater 
the eschatological evocation. 
The cultural recognition of an eschatological connotation attaching to alacrity in 
spontaneous liturgical speech is already reflected in the fact that, within the received 
wisdom and handing-on of the liturgical tradition, 'pre-articulate vocables - Alleluya, 
Selah, Hosanna - . . . persist along with the language of consciousness. The 1 7th-
century theologian Jacob Boehme called them 'the sensual speech': a music of the 
vowels in which, at the Second Coming, all creatures would speak with one accord.' 186 
Such spontaneous exclamations presuppose expressive declamation, and for Boehme, 
as for the present thesis, this spontaneous, verbal music has connotations of hope and 
the Second Coming, the end-time. Such 'pre-articulate vocables' have spontaneity 
engrained in them, both in the vibrant prosody in which they seek to be uttered and in 
the spontaneous way in which liturgical participants sometimes interject them. Even 
when written into a fixed liturgical text, they represent a reaching out towards the ideal 
of spontaneous, prosodic speech in the liturgy. 
A priority of tonal expression over rational content in spontaneous liturgical 
utterance is found also in speaking in tongues. A special form of worship undergirt by 
divine assistance in a most immediate way, speaking in tongues is, in the first instance, 
expressive utterance, 'a question of a sequence of vowels and consonants with a certain 
speech melody and rhythm'. 187 As spontaneity, it is pure prosodic sound. Only in the 
second instance, subsequently to its delivery, may it be interpreted in its rational 
IR6 Mellers, "Meanings of Monody," p. 15. 
187 Miihlen, Charismatic Theology, p. 153. 
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meaning (1 Corinthians 12:10). Moreover, the interactive relationship, recorded from 
New Testament times, between speaking in tongues and singing in the Spirit supports 
the integral link made (Chapter 5, Section I) between music and spoken language in 
general, for the interactive complementarity of speaking in tongues and singing in the 
Spirit implies a graced elevation of some existing natural relationship between speech 
and music. Indeed, '[a ]mong primitive peoples inflection of spoken words and melody 
are closely connected . . . In the earliest music, speaking and singing were in fact the 
same thing. ,188 'The voice is the oldest musical instrument and speech-melody (tiny 
fragments of song growing from the natural inflection of spoken words) the oldest 
music.,189 
Speaking and singing in tongues are always the paradigmatic expressIon of 
liturgical musical improvisation because of New Testament precedents and immediate 
divine inspiration. Apart from these, however, the present thesis does not seek to 
claim a superior liturgical significance for any other species of musical improvisation, 
and particularly not for highly accomplished or skilful forms of musical improvisation, 
which occupy no higher liturgical place than other forms, within the terms of the 
present discussion. Liturgical musical improvisation, with voice or instrument, 
individual or collective, may well be highly skilled and specialised. Yet far from being 
dependent on special skills, it may well take the form of the musical improvisation 
which every human person is capable of producing with voice and body, singing or 
speaking. Whatever outward form it takes, its theological significance is the same. If 
specialised improvisational skills (perhaps those of a highly trained musician) may 
sometimes attract more admiration than the spontaneous sung improvisation of a 
prayer by a member of the congregation, or the improvised singing of an existing 
IRR John Paynter and Peter Aston, Sound and Silence: Classroom Projects in Creative Jfusic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), p. 39. 
IR9 Ibid, p. 157. 
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prayer text by the celebrant, or an improvised singing of the Gospel, or the animated 
reading, or invention, of spoken prayers, or a sermon delivered with special prosodic 
alacrity, this will be for reasons unconnected with the underlying theological rationale 
which unites all such liturgical improvisatory manifestations in respect of their 
theological significance. However this is with the proviso that eschatological 
disclosure inhabits each manifestation in proportion to the degree in which it deploys 
the improvising imagination. This thesis seeks to appropriate universally for musical 
and prosodic improvisers within the liturgy a role comparable to that assigned to poets 
by Heidegger, for whom 'poetry is equivalent to primordial dwelling; man dwells only 
when poets exist in the world. ,190 In this way, the activity of the musical or prosodic 
improviser in liturgy is an essential expression of Christian hope in Dasein, of 
Christian dwelling, and is always in principle desirable in Christian liturgy. 
Valuing the prosodic expressiveness of verbal usage does not entail any conflict 
with the liturgical role of rational meaning. While the expression of the eschatological 
hope beyond words is, in liturgy, ultimately a musical matter, for rational verbal 
meaning only attains the foothills in the expression of this hope of hopes, elicitation of 
hope is not the sole aim of liturgical expression, and doubtless 'texts sung in Catholic 
worship have traditionally been rationally communicative rather than ecstatic 
vocalisations. ,191 If rationally meaning texts are expressively said or sung, there is in 
fact only complementarity with the expressive and sonic liturgical values proposed 
here. If they are not, then, for a moment at least in the liturgy, what is said has not 
situated itself within the hopeful horizon characteristic of liturgical experience. 
Neither does the connection between improvisation and hope imply any general 
insistence upon a greater presence of improvisatory than more fixed styles in all 
190 Paul Ricoeur, "Religion, Atheism and Faith." In The Conflict of Interpretations: ES.5Q\'s in 
Hermeneutics, Don Ihde (ed.), (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 197-+), p. 467. 
191 Joncas, "Liturgy and Music," p. 318. 
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liturgies. Each liturgy will have its own natural chemistry in this respect arising from 
its cultural context. However any liturgy where spontaneity is only minimally 
represented will take place against the horizon that there is known to be more liturgical 
spontaneity happening somewhere else, and that spontaneity is a nonnal aspect of the 
liturgical tradition. 
It is hoped that there has been provided here a belated theoretical basis for the 
proliferation and emancipation of a range of spontaneous (not necessarily sonic) 
freedoms over a wide spread of Christian liturgical tradition, as seen in recent years. 
This development is well established, but has been less extensively theorised. While 
'[t]he attempt to describe the role of music in worship can be neither tidy nor 
precise,192 nevertheless, it is always ultimately to musical improvisation, taken in the 
widest sense ofmusic/prosody, that the liturgy, no less than the black American slaves, 
or the shamans of primitive society, looks for its expressions of hope. At the least, this 
entails that the celebrant must always speak at least some of his or her liturgical words 
with alacrity and vibrancy. Deep down, liturgical participants have always intuited that 
hope needs music. The idea that a celebrant could utter the words 'Let us rejoice in the 
hope of our salvation' in a flat and inexpressive voice entails a grating and intolerable 
combination of sound and meaning. Words spoken with minimal music might be 
tolerated for some other liturgical utterances, but are never enough for hope. 
VI Christian Faith as Creative Imagination 
It was seen in Section IT that, because grace builds upon nature, supernatural hope 
builds on natural hope. Likewise, supernatural faith builds on the natural imagination. 
'[F]aith must take account of its own imaginative nature.' 193 However, the negative 
19~ Archbishop's Commission on Church Music, In Tune with Heaven, p. 51. 
193 Bryant, Faith and the Play of Imagination, p. 129. 
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nature of the Western philosophical understanding of imagination long delayed a 
proper establishment of this theological perspective. 'Christian thinkers like 
Augustine, Aquinas and Bonaventure all warned against [imagination's] susceptibility 
to irrational passion (even demonic possession), while granting that in certain 
pedagogical circumstances it could be used, under the strict supervision of reason and 
revelation, to instruct the faithful.,194 For Thomas Aquinas: 'Demons are known to 
work on men's imagination until everything is other than it is. ,195 For such Christian 
thinkers, imagination was assumed to be largely imaginatio profana. 196 Efforts from 
within philosophical discourse to examine imagination systematically seem in fact to 
date only from the late Renaissance197 and not until the mid-1700s was imagination 
'recognised as a part of the general human process of dealing with information. ,198 As 
recently as 1960, a writer could note: 'It seems that little attempt has been made in 
philosophy or psychology to define imagination.' 199 Moreover, little attention has yet 
been paid by religious leaders to the imagination200 through which the 'raw, 
elementary power of religion comes'. 201 Yet,' [t ]he experience of grace ... is filtered 
through the imagination where it has an enormous and sometimes overwhelming 
effect. ,202 
Faith is in fact a supernatural mental state which both assents to supernatural , , 
events which are understood to have taken place historically, and also imagines a 
human heavenly destiny which, in the case of a given imaginer, is not yet realised. 
194 K p. ifl. .. 3 earney, oeflcs 0 maglmng, p. . " 
195 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (London: n.p., 1925),5, 147 (documentation sic). Cited 10 
Kearney, Wake, p. 130. 
196 See Kearney, ibid, p. 117. . 
197 See Jerome Singer, "Imagination." In Encyclopedia ojCreativity, vol 2, Runco and Pntzker (eds.), 
p. 15. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Kenneth C. Barnes, Creative Imagination: The Swarthmore Lectures, 1960 (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1960), p. 5. 
200 See Greeley, Religious Imagination, p. 3. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ib"d 10 1 ,p. . 
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More widely, humanity's heavenly destiny is something not realised apart from, but is 
actually created by, humanity's faith in it. In this sense, Christian imagination, or 
faith, is a power not only of envisagement, but of creation. The heavenly goal of 
Christian life exists as a direct consequence of the human ability to imagine it. 
Heaven exists in potentia as a divinely revealed offer for humans to imagine, in order 
that, by being so imagined, it may come about. If no human beings had ever imagined 
the heavenly goal of Christian life, this is equivalent to saying that Christian revelation 
had never been embraced by any human person, and, if this hypothesis were 
considered in its implications, the latter would include the absence of a heavenly goal 
for mankind. Heaven is actually mediated into existence by the imaginative faculty. 
Faith is consequently to be understood not just as a supernatural disposition which 
cleaves imaginatively to the hope of a heavenly future. Rather, it is also the causal and 
creative power which, under God and mediately, creates such a future, and without 
which a human heavenly destiny does not arise. Christian eschatological destiny is 
both true and imagined, salvation created because imagined, for God has created 
human beings to share with Him in the creation of their own ultimate destiny, by 
imagination. 
Like the idea of faith as imaginative, the idea of faith as creative may, in a parallel 
way, have been historically overshadowed by a failure to understand the nature of 
creativity itself. 'Creativity is one of those subjects for which we have ... no 
consensus definition. The definition of creativity seems to depend on the 
worldview ... to which the proponent subscribes. ,203 Dutton and Krausz write: 
203 Amit Goswani, "Quantum Theory of Creativity." In Encyclopedia of Creativity, vol 2, Runco and 
Pritzker (eds.), p. 491. '[T]he only constant factor in virtually all discussions of creativity is novelty . .. 
creativity is nowadays widely defmed as the production of relevant and ejJectil"e novelty.' Arthur J. 
Cropley, "Definitions of Creativity." In Runco and Pritzker (eds.), ibid, \"01 I, p. 512. Cropley \\'fltes of 
accepted distinctions between creativity as different applications of the already known, development of 
new principles, "minor creativity" in extending the known and "major creativity" in going beyond the 
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'While the literature on the psychology of creativity is substantial, surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to the subject by philosophers in recent years. ,204 The 
imagination which is Christian faith is clearly somehow creative, an ontic, not simply 
a cognitive power.205 In supernatural faith, graced imagination generates the 
possibilities it opens up, with the result that it creates salvation for human beings. 
Traces of recognition of the creativity of the imagination may in fact be found from an 
early stage in the ludaeo-Christian tradition. In the cognate nature of the Hebrew 
words yetser (imagination), yetsirah (creation), yatsar ( create), there is found a 
correspondence between imagination and creativity. Kearney has noted Saint 
Augustine's 'frequent references to a positive eschatological role for the faithful in the 
order of creation. ,206 'One could cite here Augustine's extraordinary claim that 'we 
ourselves will be the Seventh Day of Creation' (Dies Septimus nos ipsi erimus)'.207 
The idea of the self-creativity in grace of the eschatological human person resonates in 
the Middle Ages in Meister Eckhart: 'For in the same being of God where God is 
above being and above distinction, there 1 myself was, there 1 willed myself and 
committed myself to create this man. Therefore 1 am the cause of myself in the order 
of my being, which is eternal'. 208 The interest of this extract lies in the way in which 
human imagination is here portrayed as creative of the human person, for 'I am the 
known. See Cropley, ibid, p. 514. 'The highest fonn of creativity, which may lead to a 'revolution' in 
an area, requires introducing a new 'paradigm'.' Ibid. 
204 Denis Dutton and Michael Krausz, "Editors' Preface." In The Concept of Creativity in Science and 
Art, Denis Dutton and Michael Krausz (eds.), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. xi [no page 
number marked on page]. 
205 See Hart, Unfinished Man, p. 136. 
206 Kearney, Wake, p. 73. 
~07 Ibid. No documentation of this citation from Augustine. However, Kearney provides the following 
references in connection with further reading on Augustine's understanding of imagination. T. Van 
Bavel, RepertOire Bih/iographique de St Augustin ([The Hague]: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. ,3464-
3502; 4414-4428; 4431; 3298; 3311. Olivier du Roy, L 'intelligence de la Foi selon ,St Augustin, Etudes 
Augustiniennes (Paris: n.p., 1966), pp. 45-46; 204-205; 264-266; 434-435; 437. Etienne Gilson, The 
Christian Philosophy of St Augustine (London: Gollancz, 1961), pp. 211-212: 276-277: 151-152; 217-
224. 
208 Meister Eckhart, "Sennon 52." In Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons. Commenraries. 
Treatises, and Defence (New York: Paulist Press, 1981). p. 202. 
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cause of myself.' In the sense of creating the eschatologically realised human being of 
faith, Eckhart echoes a fundamental Christian idea that imagination, raised by grace 
into faith, does indeed ultimately create the human person as an eternal creature. 
For this graced creativity of Christian faith, Marcel perhaps implicitly identifies an 
imaginative creative foundation in the natural order, when he writes that 'when I 
commit myself . . . it is clear that this active volition not to question something 
again ... intervenes as an essential element in the determination of what in fact will be 
the case . . . [I]t bids me invent a certain modus vivendi which I would otherwise be 
precluded from envisaging. Here there appears in a rudimentary form what I call 
creative fidelity. ,209 Here, natural imagination has created what I will be. The graced 
creative imagination of faith characteristically builds on an imaginative and creative 
basis in the natural order also in the form of the 'originality of everyday life,210 for 
'without the flexible adaptiveness and daily improvisations we all have, we could not 
h . d . ,Ill even s ape a new sentence, never mIn survIve.- 'It is a distinguishing 
characteristic of human beings that they can think what has never been thought before 
and create what has never been made before, so that their experience is ever-
expanding. ,212 Indeed, humans proceed in this way constantly, unlike animals who are 
largely circumscribed by a life cycle of fixed possibilities. Thus the natural human 
person already brings things into being by imagining them, and this propensity acts as 
a foundation for the graced eschatological creativity of Christian faith. However, 
'[t]heologians have been slow to recognize the creative imagination as a central 
209 Marcel, Creative Fidelity, p. 162. 
210 Ruth Richards. "The Four Ps of Creativity." In Encyclopedia of Creativity, vol 1, Runco and 
Pritzker (eds.), p. 734. Widely accepted in the study of creativity are the "~our Ps ?~ Creati\'i~" 
identified by Ross L. Mooney: creative person, press of environment favounng creatIvlty, creative 
process. creative product. See ibid, p. 733. 
211 Ibid, p. 734. 
112 . 1 ., 5 
- Barnes, Creative magmaflOn, p. . 
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component not merely in the 'human response' of faith but also in the very structure 
which evokes faith. ,213 
It was the writing of Immanuel Kant which, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
chiefly broke the philosophical silence concerning natural imagination's creative 
powers implied by the Cartesian and similar prior critiques. For Kant, imagination 
creatively synthesises our sensory experience, while intuition, as an a priori category 
of the mind, creates our time.214 When considering the way in which imagination has 
been understood in Western philosophy, it is thus necessary, since Kant, to be aware 
of the existence of two paradigms: 'The human ability to 'image' or 'imagine' 
something has been understood in two main ways throughout the history of Western 
thought - 1) as a representational faculty which reproduces images of some pre-
existing reality, or 2) as a creative faculty which produces images which often lay 
claim to an original status in their own right. ,215 The first paradigm may well be 
described as Cartesian, the second essentially Kantian. The second paradigm arises 
when 'to cite the canonical metaphor, the imagination ceases to function as a mirror 
reflecting some external reality and becomes a lamp which projects its own internally 
d 1· h h' ,216 generate 19 tonto t lngs. Thus Kant 'distinguishes the transcendental 
productive imagination from the empirical reproductive imagination. ,217 The latter 
idea honours the true insight retained in the narrower Cartesian theory, that 
imagination does indeed include a reproductive aspect, while the productive function 
is referred to by Kant as the 'transcendental function of the imagination. ,218 Whereas 
reproductive imagination 'operates by associating fragments of previous experiences 
213 Cote, "Christology and the Paschal Imagination," p. 80. 
214 See Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: BlackwelL 1995), p. 397. 
215 Kearney, Wake, p. 15. 
216 Ibid, p. 155. 
217 Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory, p. 87. 
218 Kant, CPR A 123. 
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with one another, productive imagination works by synthesizing discrete spatio-
temporal manifolds into genuinely new organic wholes.,219 It is largely to Kant that 
the existence of a contemporary philosophical presentation of the idea of a creative 
imagination is to be attributed in the West. 220 
At the same period, 'when a deep and general change was occurring in man's 
conceptions of himself and of his world, ,221 Samuel Taylor Coleridge 'is generally 
credited with bringing the ideas of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling to England,.222 
Coleridge distinguishes primary imagination, fancy, and secondary imagination: 'The 
primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human 
perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM. ,223 Fancy 'simply produces patterns in the mind drawn from past sense 
experience through an associative rather than a living or creative process ... Fancy's 
219 Casey, Imagining, p. 184. Elliott makes a similar point: 'The original meaning of imagination . .. 
refers to envisaging sights and sounds like those we already experience in reality ... Another sense of 
imagination refers to the ability to formulate possible things or events that do not yet exist in any 
concrete form.' Elliott, Music Matters, pp. 227-228. References to Sparshott, Theory of the Arts, pp. 
138-139. 
220 Vico's important work on imagination, counter-Cartesian and revolutionary for its time, may have 
influenced Kant's treatment: '[I]t has been argued that Vico anticipated ideas developed by Kant . . . 
without, apparently influencing them directly.' H. P. Rickman, "Vico and Dilthey's Methodology of the 
Human Studies." In Giambattista Vieo: An International Symposium, Giorgio Tagliacozzo (ed.), 
Hayden V. White (co-ed.), (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1969), p. 448. 'In its philosophical aspect, the 
New Science might, owing to ... prominence given to ... the imagination (since the doctrine that 
primitive man is a poet and thinks in poetic images is in Vico's words the 'master key' of the work) be 
called, without undue paradox, a philosophy of Mind with special attention to the Philosophy of 
Imagination'. Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vieo (1913) (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1964), p. 46. 'New Science' refers to Giambattista Vico, Seienza Nuova (Naples: Mosca, 
1725). One of Vico's most important contributions to the philosophy of imagination is his 'doctrine of 
imaginary forms.' Croce, ibid, p. 52. 'As examples, Vico quotes traditional anecdotes; for instance, the 
five 'real words' (the frog, the mouse, the bird, the ploughshare and the bow) sent by Idanturas king of 
the Scythians to Darius when the latter had declared war on him: and the parable of the tall poppies 
which King Tarquin enacted before the eyes of his son Sextus's ambassador, concerning the means of 
ruling Gabii - methods of expression parallel to practices still found among savages ... : - and in addition 
to these, heraldry, flags, and the emblems upon medals and coins ... [I]n the Middle Ages heraldry was 
a serious thing. It was, so to speak, the hieroglyphic script of the period: a wordless language to eke out 
the poverty of ordinary speech and alphabetic writing ... [p]rimitive and natural heraldry was dumb, or 
rather spoke without needing an interpreter.' Ibid, p. 51. 
221 I. A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1934), p. 2. 
222 Leonard Orr, "Introduction." In Critical Essays on Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Leonard Orr (ed.). 
(New York: G. K. Hall, 1994), p. 6. On Coleridge's considerable familiarity with Vieo, see George 
Whalley, "Coleridge and Vico." In Vieo: An International Symposium. Tagliacozzo (ed.). White (co-
ed.). 
22:1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Biographia Literaria (1817) (London: 1. M. Dent, 1975). Chapter 13. "On 
the Imagination or Esemplastic Power," p. 167. 
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materials are dead sense-impressions. ,224 Secondary imagination 'dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to re-create ... it struggles to idealize and to unify. ,225 Leonard 
Orr writes: 
[Coleridge] draws an important distinction between fancy and imagination (in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, fancy was casually used as synonymous with imagination) . . . Coleridge 
emphasizes that the imagination is a fusing, unifying, reconciling power, productive and generative, 
rather than merely reproductive and imitative?26 
A further instance in England of the philosophical presentation of a creative or 
productive imagination is found in the nineteenth-century thinker John Henry 
Newman, especially in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent?27 For Dunne, 
Newman appears as a major source for ideas which were to become central in the 
work of Heidegger and Gadamer?28 Imagination plays a decisive role in Newman's 
epistemology. For example, taking the assertion that 'Great Britain is an island, ,229 we 
find that we are quite certain of this assertion at a psychological level; yet, if we try to 
formulate this proposition in an irrefutable way, we cannot do so. This, claims 
Newman, is true in all concrete matters. I cannot prove absolutely that I am not 
deluded with respect to the grounds on which I hold Great Britain to be an island. 
There is, in Newman's words, always a 'margin . . . intervening between verbal 
argumentation and conclusions in the concrete. ,230 Yet in daily life this gap is truly 
and habitually closed. I am not only fairly sure that Great Britain is an island. The 
leap we make here from probable data to psychological certainty is achieved by what 
Newman calls the "illative sense." The consequent implication is that, in all ordinary 
mental processes, our certainty is attained by something more than reason, attained, 
224 Reginald Watters, Coleridge (London: Evans Brothers, 1971), p. 122. See Coleridge, ibid. 
225 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, p. 167. 
226 0 "I d . " 8 IT, ntro uctIOn, p. . 
227 It has been claimed that Newman's thought in this work was influenced by Coleridge. See Rene 
Wellek, Immanuel Kant in England 1793-1838 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1931), p. 276, note 1. 
Reference to Ch. Broicher (sic), "Anglikanische Kirche und deutsche Philosophie." Preussische 
lahrbucher 142 (1910): esp. pp. 205, 457, 469ff. 
228 See Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground. Chapter on "Newman." 
229 Newman, Grammar, p. 158. See also the ensuing argument. 
230 Ibid, p. 282. 
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that is, by a kind of leap of imaginative inference. Newman's metaphor for the 
operation of the illative sense here relates to a regular polygon inscribed within a 
circle.231 If we gradually increase the number of sides which the polygon has, the 
sides become smaller and smaller, until the mind accepts that the polygon has become 
one with the circle in such a way that its sides are dissolved into the circle. This 
conversion of polygon into circle, contrary to the facts of geometry, is made by the 
imagining mind. The perceptual leap from polygon to circle is in fact analogous to the 
leap made by the illative sense when arriving at certainty on the basis of data. It is, for 
Newman, in this way that the mind must leap from data to conclusions all the time. It 
is the creative imagination in the form of the illative sense which functions as the leap 
needed to convert factual data into a conclusion. This philosophical position clearly 
accords to imagination a very high status in the process of knowing. Essentially, for 
Newman, it is imagination, not reason, which finally creates all certainty and thus 
creates our world. Newman has come a long way here from any understanding of the 
imaginary which restricts it to being Casey's 'chimneysweep of mind. ,232 For 
Newman, imagination has been put back firmly at the heart of our knowledge of the 
real world; indeed, in referring to imagination in the form of the illative sense he says: 
'This is the mode in which we ordinarily reason ... and it is especially exemplified 
both in uneducated men, and in men of genius, - in those who know nothing of 
intellectual aids and rules, and in those who care nothing for them, - in those who are 
either without or above mental discipline. ,233 An extended account of the operation of 
the illative sense in such extreme cases as genius is to be found in the Grammar in his 
discussion of "natural inference.,,234 Natural inference, an extreme manifestation of 
23 I See ibid, pp. 253-254. 
232 Casey, Imagining. p. x. 
m Newman, Grammar, p. 261. 
234 See ibid, pp. 260-269. 
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the illative sense, occurs when the hidden yet decisive role played by imagination in 
all knowing is exposed to full view by being manifested in an exceptional way. He 
writes: 
Sometimes ... this illative faculty is nothing short of genius. Such seems to have been Newton's 
perception of truths mathematical and physical, though proof was absent ... 'Professor Sylvester,' it 
was said, 'has just discovered the proof of Sir Isaac Newton's rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots 
of equations . . . This rule has been a Gordian-knot among algebraists for the last century and a 
half ... The proof being wanting, authors became ashamed at length of advancing a proposition, the 
evidence for which rested on no other foundation than belief in Newton's sagacity. ,235 
In the twentieth century, a feature of the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz is 
the idea that imaginative activity, in the form of symbolism, creatively structures and 
brings about entire societies. For Geertz, 'our central nervous system ... is incapable 
of directing our behavior or organising our experience without the guidance provided 
by systems of significant symbols. ,236 Geertz provides the example of cockerel fights 
in Bali. '[T]he cockfight ... is fundamentally a dramatization of status concerns'. 23 7 
Like any art form ... the cockfight renders ordinary, everyday experience comprehensible by presenting 
it in terms of acts and objects which have had their practical consequences removed and been 
reduced ... to the level of sheer appearances, where their meaning can be more powerfully articulated 
and more exactly perceived ... it catches up these themes - death, masculinity, rage, pride, loss, 
beneficence, chance - and, ordering them into an encompassing structure, presents them in such a way 
as to throw into relief a particular view of their essential nature. 238 
The ritual of the fight 'brings to imaginative realisation a dimension of Balinese 
fr . ,239 'A l' fu' f Pl' experience normally well-obscured om VIew. pecu Iar SlOn 0 0 yneSIan 
title ranks and Hindu castes, the hierarchy of pride is the moral backbone of the 
society. But only in the cockfight are the sentiments upon which that hierarchy rests 
revealed in their natural colors. ,240 Moreover, although social structures, for Geertz, 
necessarily precipitate such imaginative, symbolic activities as a means of articulating 
the social structure's essential aspects, for 'societies, like lives, contain their own 
235 Ibid, p. 262. Citation from The Guardian newspaper, 28th June, 1865. Similar examples. of 
discovery by sheer imagining in scientific thinkers are cited in Arthur Koestler, The Act 0/ CreatIOn 
(1964) (London: Penguin Arkana, 1989). pp. 112-120. 
236 Geertz, Interpretation a/Cultures, p. 49. 
237 Ibid,p.437. 
238 Ibid, p. 443. 
239 Ibid, p. 444. 
240 Ibid,p.447. 
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interpretations, ,241 it is clear that such imaginative activity also reciprocally recreates 
the society: '[B]ecause ... subjectivity does not properly exist until it is ... organized, 
art forms generate and regenerate the very subjectivity they pretend only to display. 
Quartets, still lifes, and cockfights are not merely reflections of a pre-existing 
sensibility analogically represented; they are positive agents in the creation and 
maintenance of such a sensibility. ,242 In other words, imaginative forms play their 
part in the creation, not merely the reflection, of human society. 
Gary Madison proposes from Einstein a case for imagination's productive 
creativity: 'The creative imagination in philosophy or science consists in nothing more 
than combining elementary sense impressions into new patterns. What could be more 
absurd? How could the General Theory of Relativity ever be derived from sense 
data?,243 Einstein's Theory could not possibly have been inferred with conscious 
logic from known facts. As William Beveridge observes: 'Occasionally ... there 
flashes into the mind some strikingly original idea, not based on past associations or at 
any rate on associations that are at first apparent. ,244 He refers to these sudden 
imaginative enlightenments as "intuitions" (this usage should be distinguished from 
that of Kant: as Beveridge notes, the word has been used in several varied ways )245 
and he quotes Einstein: 'The really valuable factor is intuition. ,246 'Most but not all 
scientists are familiar with the phenomenon of intuition. ,247 Intuitions appear to arise 
when the subconscious mind acts imaginatively on existing knowledge perhaps by 
some unconscious logic, and then delivers its productions to the conscious mind for 
~41 Ibid, p. 453. 
>.p . 
- - IbId, p. 451. 
243 Madison, Hermeneutics of Postmodernity, p. 180. 
244 William Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investigation (1950) (London: Heinemann, 1957). p. 53. 
245 See ibid, p. 68. 
246 Albert Einstein, no documentation. Cited in ibid. 
247 Beveridge, ibid, p. 72. 
314 
appraisa1.248 For Arthur Koestler, Einstein's unification of matter and energy in a 
single equation confonns to a familiar pattern: 'The Latin word cogito comes from 
cogitare, 'to shake together.' The creative act does not create something out of 
nothing, like God of the Old Testament; it combines, reshuffles, and relates already 
existing but hitherto separate ideas, facts, frames of perception, associative contexts. 
This act of cross-fertilization - or self-fertilization within a single brain - seems to be 
the essence of creativity. I have proposed for it the tenn bisociation. ,249 In this way, 
although new ideas are generated, 'novelty must be tempered by connection with the 
known,.250 On the other hand, '[w]hen Einstein bisociated energy and matter, both 
acquired a new look in the process. ,251 All imagining is in fact both productive and 
reproductive. All productive imagining must be connected to at least something the 
mind already contains, while reproductive imagination always produces something 
(however elusively) novel (Chapter 6, Section I). 
The post-Kantian paradigm, felt here in Coleridge, Newman, Geertz and Einstein 
reveals different ways in which imagination brings about or creates something new, 
rather than simply rearranging existing mental data. The graced imagination which is 
Christian faith shows a broad resemblance to this type of natural creative imagination. 
For example, Christian faith creates a society, though eschatological, with the result 
that some parallel with Geertz's ideas on the social creativity of imagination might be 
conceivable. A person's conversion to Christianity, where graced imagination reveals 
to him or her a new paradigm for reality itself, is the graced counterpart of such 
24R See ibid, p. 73. 
249 Arthur Koestler, "Three Domains of Creativity." In Concept o/Creativity, Dutton and Krausz (eds.), 
p. 2. Being tickled may have helped in the development of Einstein's creativity: '[T]he tickler 
impersonates an aggressor, but is simultaneously known not to be one. It is probably the first situation 
encountered in life which makes the infant live on two planes at once, the first delectable experience in 
bisociation'. Koestler, Act 0/ Creation, p. 81. 
250 R. Harre, "Creativity in Science." In Dutton and Krausz (eds.), ibid, p. 19. 'Kepler already had the 
ellipse, as a form, both geometrical and analytical, before he could creatively apply it to the problem of 
making sense of the orbit of Mars.' Ibid, p. 21. 
251 Koestler, Act o.fCreation, p. 233. 
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reason-transcending imaginative illuminations In the order of nature as that of 
Einstein, which introduced a new paradigm for physical reality. Such a Christian 
conversion might perhaps be described, following Koestler's model, as a new graced 
bisociation of the ideas of life and death, such that life may be seen not only to precede 
chronologically but also be subsequent to death for a given subject, Christ first, and 
believers also. Thus faith validates a revolutionary new conception of life and death, 
as Einstein created a new conception of matter and energy. Moreover the mental leap, 
from Christianity as something merely understood, to Christianity as additionally 
believed is not unlike Newman's leap from polygon to circle, though in the former 
case the leap is of imagination assisted by grace. Supernatural faith is both 
imaginative and creative. 
As has been shown, an idea of imagination as somehow creative had deep roots in 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and the Christian understanding of faith (though not 
necessarily its official expositions) long before it surfaced as prominent in Kant. It is 
possible that Kant's philosophy of the natural productive imagination is acting as an 
unconscious resonator for his intense Christian pietist background which emphasised 
faith in a particularly powerful and experiential way. Thus his idea of the productive 
imagination could probably not have arisen apart from his understanding of Christian 
faith?52 Moreover, for Kant, the productive imagination which produces the synthesis 
f d · 253 o sense ata IS spontaneous. It might therefore be possible to argue for a 
subconscious refraction, in this idea of spontaneity, of the idea of instantaneous "born 
again" conversion experiences which characteristically initiate faith in the pietist 
spirituality in which Kant was brought up. For Friedrich Lampe (1683-1729) 
252 'Kant is a profoundly Christian thinker, more so than Thomas Aquinas, and he could have lived and 
thought only in a Christian era.' Nicholas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: An Essay in A.utobiography 
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1950), p. 104. 
m See Kant, CPR A 97. 
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Christian rebirth was 'that gracious work of God and of His Spirit, through which the 
elect sinner is effectively, wholly and instantaneously changed toward the good'. 254 
Thus for Kant, spontaneity/productive imagination becomes an unconscious analogy 
of conversion/faith, for clearly, each of these dyads suggests the idea of an essential 
form of human understanding as being rooted in instantaneity, a characteristic 
associated both with Kantian spontaneitj55 and this particular brand of Christian 
spirituality. Kant's philosophy of imagination appears in this interpretation as a tum 
to natural anthropology of some of his religious impressions, a secular repristination of 
Protestant mysticism. It has been suggested that, in the pietism which influenced 
Kant's schooldays, the emphasis on violent, sudden religious conversion had become 
excessive.256 '[I]t came too readily to be assumed that every believer, as evidence of 
his vocation, should have undergone a certain type of conversion-experience, 
following a specific pattern. ,257 
Konigsberg, where he grew up, was a centre of pietism.258 This spiritual culture 
caused Kant 'a lasting abhorrence of all religious emotion,259 and to distance himself 
from his Christian roots. From these beginnings, possible psychoanalytic dimensions 
which may have been formative influences upon Kant's philosophy of the imagination 
could have arisen. For example, his philosophy could be a sublimation, in the 
Freudian sense, of repressed and resented religious ideas into the grander form of a 
"nobler" new secular philosophy of the person, conversion/faith being sublimated into 
spontaneity/productive imagination. Reardon has put forward additional possible 
254 Friedrich Lampe, Secret Covenant o/Grace (1712-1719) (incomplete documentation), p. 360. Cited 
in F. Ernest Stoeffler, German Pietism during the Eighteenth Centw}' (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 230. 
255 See Casey, Imagining, pp. 67-72. 
256 See Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, "Introduction." In Immanuel Kant, Religion within 
the Limits of Reason Alone (1793) (Chicago: Open Court, 1934), p. xiii. 
257 Bernard M. G. Reardon, Kant as Philosophical Theologian (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 7. 
258 See ibid, p. 16. 
259 Greene and Hudson, "Introduction," p. xxviii. 
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unconscious influences of the pietist "new birth" culture on the conceptual framework 
of Kant's thinking.26o In general, it is clear that Kant's idea of the productive 
imagination was fonned in the crucible of the Christian faith tradition. A further 
influence on his theory of imaginative productivity may have been the Christian 
doctrine of God's creatio ex nihilo. The idea of creation from nothing presses the 
notion of creativity to its extreme limit, and not all cultures have had in their 
intellectual possession such a conception of extreme creativity. (For example, Plato's 
Demiurge created from pre-existent matter,261 while in Neoplatonism the world is an 
emanation from God.) Although, in orthodox Christianity, this mode of creativity out 
of nothing was only ever predicated of God, it could be that the Kantian idea of 
productive imagination is a distant precipitate within anthropology of the idea of 
creatio ex nihilo, suggesting further Christian antecedents for Kant's view of the 
imaginary. Even though Kant's productive imagination could not strictly be said to 
create from nothing, for it synthesises sense-data, perhaps only familiarity with the 
idea of so extremely creative a God could have suggested to Kant so creative a man. 
Moreover, Kantian man in a certain sense creates time itself, through intuition. Thus a 
high doctrine of creativity links Kantian man with the Christian God. When 
considering Kant's work, it is helpful to speak of Christian ideas refracted through 
Kant, as much as of original philosophy invented by Kant. 
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysici62 Heidegger contributes a further 
inflection to the idea that imagination creates a continuing existence for man, an idea 
with roots in ludaeo-Christianity and Kant. Heidegger observes in the conclusion of 
,. 1· ,263 
the History of the Concept of Time that Daseln . . . tempora lzes. 
260 See Reardon, Kant as Philosophical Theologian, pp. 10 1-1 02. 
~ol See Plato, Timaeus. 
Here. 
262 See Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 92-93. 
203 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (1925) (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1985), p. 319. 
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'Dasein ... originates time. ,264 Around the same time, Heidegger writes: 'Dasein 
[Being-in-the-World], conceived in its most extreme possibility of Being, is time itself, 
not in time. Being futural as we have characterized it is, as the authentic 'how' of 
being temporal, that way of Being of Dasein in which and out of which it gives itself 
its time. ,265 Heidegger also observed, since Einstein, '[t]ime is nothing. It persists 
merely as a consequence of the events taking place in it. ,266 In words of commentator 
Thomas Langan: 'The Dasein who finds himself in the world ... has the basis for the 
true act of interpretation ... which, in bringing new light to the things-that-are, is truly 
creative, i.e., creative of a future. ,267 Thus it seems that for parts of Heidegger's 
thought, at least,268 'the self is not merely 'in time' or temporal. Rightly understood, 
the self is in itself temporalizing. To exist as an authentic self is less to suffer time as 
a fate than to effect time as a work . . . [I]t seems to me that we must penetrate the 
sense of this Heideggerian reversal. ,269 Once again, however, this mental creation of 
the future is a distant precipitate of the idea of Christian faith as creative of the 
eschatological goal. Heidegger's interest in Eckhart is generally known.270 Both Kant 
and Heidegger are products of Christian culture in its mystical/experiential 
264 Robert J. Dostal, "Time and Phenomenology in HusserI and Heidegger." In Cambridge Companion 
to Heidegger, Guignon (ed.), p. 164. 
265 Heidegger, Concept of Time [(1924) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)], pp. BE-14E. 
266 Ibid, p. 3E. 
267 Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology 
(1959) (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1966), p. 48. 
268 Heidegger's stance on the creativity of the imagination is in fact ambiguous. See Dorothea Frede, 
"The Question of Being: Heidegger's Project." In Cambn'dge Companion to Heidegger. Guignon (ed.), 
p. 65. This is apparent from the fact that '[t]he published portion of Being and Time breaks off after the 
repetition of the analysis of everydayness in terms of temporality, the explanation of our concern with 
history, and the accounts of our 'historicality' and of the everyday conception of time.' Ibid. Heidegger 
writes at one point in Being and Time that 'temporality (Zeitlichkeit) temporalizes.' Heidegger, Being 
and Time, section 65, p. 377. Cited in Dostal, "Time and Phenomenology." p. 164. Heidegger also 
observes: 'Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality'. Heidegger, ibid, section 65, p. 380. 
Cited in DostaL ibid, pp. 164-165. This implies that . [t ]ime is somehow prior to Dasein.' DostaL ibid, 
pp. 164-165. Thus elsewhere for Heidegger in Being and Time, human understanding does not, in fact, 
create time. 
269 Mary A. Schaldenbrand, "Time, the Self, and Hope: An Intersubjective Interpretation." In The 
Future as the Presence of Shared Hope, Maryellen Muckenhirn (ed.), (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1968), p. 397. 
270 See Caputo, Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, esp. pp. 140-217. 
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dimensions. Thus Caputo has confirmed 'most interesting, even startling, likenesses 
between Eckhart and the subsequent German tradition. ,271 
VII Musical Improvisation as Theurgy 
Some discussion of the link made in human culture between time and music was 
broached above (Chapter 5, Section V), and discussed in relation to liturgy (this 
Chapter, Section III). Human time is closely wedded to sound. '[O]f all the five 
senses, the sense of hearing is the only one inexorably associated with our sense of 
time. The gestures which music embodies are ... movement ... which gives time its 
meaning and its significance for us. If this is true, then sound is its predestined vehicle 
... By its very nature it embodies for us movement in time,.272 More forcefully, for 
Victor Zuckerkandl, it is impossible to separate 'a thing 'time' from the forces that 
produce rhythm; time [is] nothing but the activity of these forces ... In so far as we 
accept the testimony of music as basic, the existence of time is the same as its activity. 
We observe an oscillation, an accumulation - and this oscillation, this accumulation, is 
time. ,273 'Actually we have not two data, first the metric wave, or the forces active in 
the wave, and then a neutral medium 'time' or 'duration' in which the forces work, in 
which the wave pulses; on the contrary, the pulsing of the wave is itself already time, is 
itself already duration. ,274 Moreover, '[i]t is conceivable ... that tone, in and for itself, 
quite apart from rhythm, as a result of its basic independence from any relation to the 
world of objects, clears our sight for the perception of time as such, time as event. ,275 
271 Ibid, p. 102. 
272 Sessions, Musical Experience, pp. 19-20. 
273 Victor Zuckerkandl, Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World (New York: Pantheon, 
1956), p. 207. 
174 
- Ibid, pp. 209-210. 
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Here, it is music which makes the experience of temporality available to the human 
person, or creates man's time.276 
Music as the creation of human time is a familiar commonplace from its use for 
parties, restaurants and discotheques, where it is intended to 'provide a setting, a 
society, which seems to be defined only by the time-scale of the music (the beats per 
minute), which escapes the real time passing outside. ,277 Perhaps the idea of the 
musical disclosure of time underlies Messiaen's Chronochromie, which is a 
"coloun'ng" of tl·me.278 If' d d d d . t h . h h' In ee soun an musIc crea e uman tIme, t en t IS 
ontological sonic creativity of music may underlie the metaphorical attribution of 
sound to God's creativity, which has all created time as its object. Thus, humans have 
found sonic creativity a fitting metaphor for God's creativity, because they 
primordially intuit that sound is how they themselves create their own time. The dabar 
or word of God, 'a thing of dynamic power, an event creating and manifesting 
276 For the profoundly deaf, access to music consists of contact feeling of music through vibrations in 
the tips of the fmgers touching a sound source, and through the soles of the feet on a resonant floor; there 
is also an experience of amplified sound perceived with the whole body. Different parts of the body may 
register different kinds of sound, low sounds in the lower part of the body and high sounds in the higher 
part. It may even be that the latter physiological fact is the origin of the conventional terminology of 
"low" and "high" pitches for music, for such reception of music by the whole body-frame is not confmed 
to the deaf, though it is an experience understood particularly well by them. Paul Whittaker, personal 
communication, Huddersfield, 5th June, 2000. Whittaker is Artistic Director of "Music and the Deaf," 
registered charity no. 1000025, 7 Northumberland Street, Huddersfield, England. 'Deaf children are 
astonished that they are able to 'feel' the beat by experiencing the vibrations of various musical 
instruments.' "Music and the Deaf: Sensational Sounds," pamphlet produced by the organisation "Music 
and the Deaf," p. 3. 'There seems to be an innate inner response and capacity for music that transcends 
even severe deafness.' Paul Whittaker, "Musical Potential in the Profoundly Deaf." B. A. dissertation, 
University of Oxford, 1986, p. ii. Whittaker refers to two standard works (see ibid, pp. 1-2): E. M. 
Edwards, Music Education for the Deaf (Maine, USA: n.p., 1974); Clive Robbins and Carol Robbins, 
Musicfor the Hearing-Impaired: A Resource Manual and Curriculum Guide (St Louis: n.p., 1980). See 
also Joan Dahms Fahey and Lois Birkenshaw, "Bypassing the Ear: The Perception of Music by Feeling 
and Touch." Music Educators Journal 58, no. 8 (1972): 44-49 and 127-128; Paul Gouge, "Music and 
Profoundly Deaf Students." British Journal of Music Education 7, no. 3 (1990): 279-281; Helen 
Williams, "The Value of Music to the Deaf." British Journal of Music Education 6, no. 1 (1989): 81-98. 
Williams's article is an in-depth analysis of the way in which deaf people perceive music. See also J. D. 
Hood, "Deafness and Musical Appreciation." In Music and the Brain: Studies in the Neurology of 
Music, Macdonald Critchley and R. A. Hansen (eds.), (London: William Heinemann Medical Books, 
1977): Peter Salt, "Feel the Rhythm." Article in The Guardian newspaper, 27th April, 1982, p. 13. 
277 Simon Frith, "Towards an Aesthetic of Popular Music." In Music and Society: The Politics of 
Composition, Performance and Reception, Richard Leppert and Susan McClary (eds.), (1987) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), p. 142. 
278 See Paul Griffiths, Olivier Messiaen and the Music of Time (London: Faber and Faber, 198.:'), p. 
191. 
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reality,279 is presented in the Old Testament chiefly in auditory terms. 'Biblical 
writings emphasize the linguistic sound event as a root metaphor for God's self-
revelation and human response to that revelation. Narratives of divine manifestations 
in the Old Testament privilege auditory over visual, tactile, oral, or olfactory 
imagery' .280 Thus, for the inspired writers, through the sound of His dabar 'God 
brings the created order into being (Gen 1: 3; 6, 9,11,20,24,26),.281 
It was shown in Chapter 6, Section I that imagination is the human power which 
opens up a future. Spontaneity was there demonstrated also to be the intensest 
expression of the imagination. Combining these principles, it seems that the power to 
imagine that a future will arise is vested ultimately in our capacity for spontaneous 
imaginary. Here imagination is most purely and intensively itself in ecstatic forward 
projection; here and only here, imagination moves to break free of its past, and 
envelop itself in futurity. In spontaneity, the human person comes closest to engaging 
pure futurity at the level of experience, the rush of the future sweeping through him or 
her.282 Only through the capacity for deploying imagination spontaneously could 
humans ever have first known future as future in a distinctive sense, and in the 
practice of spontaneous imagination the human person continues to engage futurity 
with a unique intensity. It might be said that if imagination is in some sense also a 
creative act, as has been suggested earlier, spontaneity, as a concentration of the 
279 Joncas, "Liturgy and Music," p. 316. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid, p. 317. 
282 Is it possible that the unique exhilaration and euphoria which can accompany spontaneous behaviour 
represent a heightened appropriation in existential, pre-reflective awareness of the futurally projective 
nature of the self? Thus, in the excitement of spontaneity, I am in some sense brought back to myself as 
one fundamentally defined by futural projection. Slang paraphrases this intuition by means of the idea 
that it sometimes benefits people to "have a fling." This phrase usually implies some sort of interior 
spontaneous abandonment to a possibility, and then its exterior implementation in action. The result of a 
"fling" is perceived to be a certain release of spirit and lifting of inhibitions, resulting, it may be 
surmised, from an intensified projection of the self into futurity and reinforcement at the level of 
subliminal consciousness of a fundamental aspect of human authenticity, futural projection. In such 
spontaneity, a person re-authenticates himself as a futural projector, and this is felt. 
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imagination, also correspondingly creates with a privileged intensity. Spontaneity in 
this sense may be said not only ultimately to disclose the future in a special way, but 
also to create it. (Kant of course happens to concur more or less with this position, 
since, for him, it is spontaneity at an unconscious level, which synthesises the 
manifold of sense and creates the world into which human life futurally opens out.) 
Grace builds on nature, including this natural imagination whose apogee IS 
spontaneity. It may therefore be presumed that the eschatological future (heaven) 
created by graced imagination or faith, towards which the human person is 
supernaturally projected, is created with special intensity by graced imaginative 
spontaneity in particular, the spiritually-oriented spontaneity of the believer.283 Given, 
first, that spontaneity creates a natural future for man, and given, secondly, that 
musical and temporal experience are essentially connected, it must be the musical 
spontaneous imaginary which creates the natural future of man. This of course implies 
a reference to improvisation. In musical improvisation, performers 'are spontaneously 
creating their material as it is performed. ,284 Where such musicians are Christian 
musicians, people with faith operating out of the enlarged horizon of graced 
283 Given that constant spontaneous graced futural projection is essentially the same thing as 
conscientious Christian life taken in toto, the latter might be said to be a concatenation of spontaneous, 
eschatologically-oriented decisions large and small. Spontaneous, eschatologically-oriented Christian 
decisions are indeed sensed by certain mainstream spiritual writers to possess a special spiritual potency 
in the creative realisation of the Christian eschatological economy, in a manner which parallels and helps 
to substantiate the present thesis that Christian spontaneity creates the future. Such self-abandonment 
teaching may be found in Bossuet, A. Piny, J. P. de Caussade, J. N. Grou, H. Ramiere, C. L. Gay, V. 
Lehodey and St Therese of Lisieux. See K. Kavanaugh, "Self-Abandonment, Spiritual." In New 
Catholic Encyclopedia, vol 8, McDonald (ed.-in-chief), p. 60. Caussade writes: 'Ah, would that you 
knew the gift of God, the reward and the merit and the power and the peace, the blessed assurances of 
salvation that are hidden in this abandonment ... [T]here is no more certain path to salvation than that 
which leads through complete and perfect self-abandonment.' P. 1. de Caussade, "Letter IV. To Sister 
Charlotte-Elizabeth Bourcier de Monthueux." (1755) In Spiritual Letters on the Practice of Self-
Abandonment to Divine Providence, Book 3 Obstacles to Self-Abandonment (London: Bums. Oates and 
Washboume, 1948), p. 122. Caussade's statement seems compatible with the idea that. when a person 
responds, by virtuous living, to graced spontaneous imagination from moment to moment, the Christian 
eschatological goal is more intensively created by that person. Such a goal is brought into existence for 
that person especially in view of his or her graced imaginative spontaneity, for 'there is no more certain 
path to salvation'. This parallels the present thesis. [Note: there seems to be inconsistency in sources 
regarding Caussade' s initials, whether P. 1. or 1. P.] 
'R4 . . " 31 
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spontaneous imagination, they correspondingly create the future of the Christian 
community including the enlarged future defined by the heavenly goal. The creation 
of a Christian future by musical improvisation should not, of course, be confused with 
that future's creation through graced spontaneous proj ection in good works and moral 
living. Musical improvisation is the form of futural projection with which natural 
humans already find themselves endowed as linguistico-musical creatures, and it 
becomes in this capacity the inevitable "always-already" temporal foundation of 
graced existence, graced temporality and graced futurity also. It belongs to a founding 
order of existential projection, and although the practice of Christian musical 
improvisation creates the future, it is not yet a morally virtuous form of spontaneity as 
such. It is simply a graced expression of the musical spontaneity by which natural 
imagination projects all human existence futurally in the first instance (Chapter 6, 
Section I). Morality is practised by creatures who already exist: musical 
improvisation is existence itself. Musical improvisation is only the prerequisite of 
subsequent aspects of graced, futurally projected existence, just as of subsequent 
aspects of natural existence, though clearly an improviser has the additional possibility 
of bringing virtuous intentions into the activity of improvising. 
To express more concretely this idea of the musical nature of all human time, 
whether of nature or grace: since the time of the creation of mankind, the possibility of 
the music of spontaneous speech, of babbling, of singing or other forms of musical 
production, such as humming and whistling, has been continuous, in the sense that 
somewhere on earth such sounds are able to be, and indeed are made. It is likely that 
at no moment is music in one at least of these senses ever absent from the human 
scene nor has ever been absent. If this state of affairs ever ceased to be the case, 
man's future would cease to arise. This is what is implied by the claim being made 
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here that music creates the future. It might be reasonable to reply that, if there were no 
music in the world, that is to say, no singing, humming, infantile babbling, nor indeed 
speaking, then this could only be because there were no people, since people 
universally, defined as musico-linguistic creatures, employ at least some of these 
sounds. This reply is not an effective objection, however, but is rather responsive to 
precisely the point being proposed, for this point is that music is the place where 
Being speaks in Dasein. As musico-linguistic creatures, where there are humans there 
is music, and where there is no music, the logical antecedent is that there are no 
humans. Humans, qua existing, project and sustain their own futurity in virtue of 
being musical creatures. 'For Heidegger ... Dasein is neither in time nor timeless but, 
as thrown-projection, human Being is fundamentally temporal. ,285 Such human 
'thrown-projection' into a future seems inseparable from human spontaneity. Music is 
inseparable from human temporality. Therefore musical spontaneity/improvisation in 
some fonn creates all fonns of the future: it is where every human gives himself his 
time. For humans, temporality is conjoint with improvisatory musicality, including 
prosodic musicality.286 
285 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Human Temporality." In The Study of Time II: Proceedings of the Second 
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time, Lake Yamanaka, Japan, J. T. Fraser and 
N. Lawrence (eds.), (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1975), p. 157. 
286 Benjamin Lee Whorf claimed erroneously to have identified a race of people, the Hopi, who had no 
word for, or even experience of time as generally understood. He wrote: 'I fmd it gratuitous to assume 
that a Hopi who knows only the Hopi language and the cultural ideas of his own society has the same 
notions ... of time and space that we have, and that are generally assumed to be universal. In particular, 
he has no general notion or intuition of TIME as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the 
universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a past, through a present, into a future.' Benjamin Lee Whorf, 
posthumously publ. (no documentation). Cited in Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, John B. Carroll (ed.), (Boston: Technology Press of M. I. T., 1956), p. 57. Cited 
in Brown, Human Universals, pp. 27-28. '[I]n other places Whorftook a different position: not that the 
Hopi had no sense of time as we ... might understand it but that the Hopi conception of time was very 
different from ours.' Brown, ibid, p. 28. However in 1970, Ekkehart Malotki studied the Hopi again 
and provides over six hundred pages of Hopi temporal metaphors. See ibid, p. 29. Reference to 
Ekkehart Malotki, Hopi Time: A Linguistic Analysis of the Temporal Concepts in the Hopi Language 
(Berlin: Mouton, 1983), esp. p. 529. For a discussion of Whorfs errors, line of intellectual descent and 
scholarly motives, see Brown, ibid, pp. 30-31. Linguists have 'given Whorfs analysis of Hopi a 'decent 
burial'.' Ibid, p. 31. Reference to Einar Haugen, "Linguistic Relativity: Myths and Methods." In 
Language and Thought: Anthropological Issues, William C. McCormack and Stephen A. \\"unn (eds.), 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1977), p. 12. 
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This idea that musical improvisation furnishes man with his time may be expressed 
in another way. Futurity in the form experienced by humans exists in this way solely 
for humans. Thus, 'man exists in the ... sense that among all the beings that may be 
observed on earth he 'stands out' as the only one that not only is but takes over its 
being in awareness of who or what it is and of who or what it may become'. 287 This 
experience of futurity is unique to humans. Defining our futurity as the ability to 'take 
over' our being in awareness of 'who or what we may become' is a way of identifying 
this futurity with freedom. Spontaneity is how freedom is fully expressed. Thus 
awareness of a futurity, and awareness of a capacity for spontaneity, are co-inherent 
awarenesses for the human person. Through musical improvisation, including 
prosody, humans construct the future in the form of specifically human freedom. The 
primordial association widely made by homo sapiens between music and time 
(Chapter 5, Section V) in primitive culture where music is, of course, improvisatory, 
may be evidence of preconceptual human awareness of improvisatory music's role in 
humanising the future as freedom, that is, in terms of choice and possibility.288 
If this primordial association exists for humans, then clearly musical improvisation 
in liturgy will be very important. Liturgy has been understood in Christian tradition as 
the privileged site of the temporal coming-into-being of the human person, in all his or 
her powers of choice, through grace, as he or she imagines and creates his or her 
heavenly destiny through the creative imagination which is faith. Christian 
eschatology, the most expansive and comprehensive mode of futurity of all, appears, 
no less than the natural future, to depend first on the production of human music and 
prosody. This is why music occupies an important role in liturgy, the pre-eminent site 
287 M . E' . /. 69 acquarne, xlstentza Ism, p. . . . 
28R Music's production of the future may account for Beveridge's conviction that .'muslc lS ra~her 
similar, emotionally, to the enjoyment of creative mental activity, and suitable musiC mduces the nght 
mood for productive thought.' Beveridge, Scientific Im'estigation, p. 76. 
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where faith makes a Christian future arise. The fact that music has always been 
known as the pre-eminent liturgical art-form assumes a new significance once it is 
seen that music first creates the future into which Christian life decisions are 
subsequently poured. The significance of liturgical singing in tongues also emerges 
more fully in this existential analysis of improvised music. Singing in tongues sets 
forth graced futurity as an arena of choice. Assuming human speculation on the 
subject is even fitting, this may be why improvisatory music has been raised in the 
wisdom of God to the status of a charism of singing in tongues. It was seen above 
(Chapter 6, Section II) that, on the natural level, musical spontaneous imagination is 
already where projection-as-hope most intensively arises in Dasein. Consequently, the 
liturgical hoper is fundamentally a musical spontaneous imaginer or improviser. In 
liturgy, where hope is by definition the pre-eminent disposition, musical improvisation 
not merely expresses, but - it would appear now - actually first opens up the possibility 
of the graced destiny for which Christians hope, as a graced corollary of the fact that it 
already opens up the natural future for humans. This is not somehow to put forward 
the curious proposals that Christians have nothing more to do than produce sounds, or 
that the Christian heavenly destiny would fail of realisation if humans "stopped" 
improvising music. It is to assert rather that humans qua human, whether in prosody 
or music more widely, cannot stop improvising, and that it is in this capacity as 
musical improvisers at the level of their fundamental being and identity that, at a 
primary existential level, humans first bring about the possibility of their heavenly 
future, as of their natural future. All other aspects of graced futural projection, 
whether in moral acts or other creativeness, implicitly extrapolate from this primary 
stratum of musical human identity. 
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Current theories from the natural sciences may be advanced in support of a version 
of the view proposed here that spontaneity, coupled with sound, creates the future. 
The history of Western physics has been dominated by the mechanics of Newton, 
Einstein and quantum theory, which all exhibit time-symmetry, that is, the property 
that time could theoretically move both forward and backward. 'One of the deep 
questions in contemporary science is why time moves only forward. Ilya Prigogene, 
1977 Nobel Prize winner in chemistry, and co-author Isabelle Stengers have argued 
that intersecting causal chains, in addition to creating chance, give time its arrow. ,289 
The same writer continues: '[W]hen time runs forward chance overwhelms 
operation . . . if time were to run backward, operation would have to overwhelm 
chance. Time's one way directionality thus affirms the predominance of chance over 
operation. ,290 As Alvin Toffler notes, 'time makes its appearance with 
randomness. ,291 In words of another commentator on this theory, '[i]t is perhaps not 
too far-fetched to say that the universe improvises. ,292 Here is a theory from the 
natural sciences according to which the arising of a future in the physical world is 
closely linked to chance activity. This theory can be extended upward to humans. 
When chance activity takes human form, this form is spontaneous imaginative activity 
and, for humans also, by implication, 'intersecting causal chains ... create chance,' in 
the sense that people's free spontaneous decisions always consist of possibilities 
nested within and prompted by circumstances, and thus partially created by them. If 
the creation of a Christian eschatological future is by means of graced imaginative 
spontaneity, as has been advanced, such spontaneity appears, from the foregoing 
289 N. Catherine Hayles, "Chance Operations: Cagean Paradox and Contemporary Science." In John 
Cage: Composed in America, Perloff and Junkennan (eds.), p. 232. 
290 Ibid, p. 233. For an exposition of this theory see Ilya Prigogene and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of 
Chaos: Man's New Dialogue H"ith Nature (London: Bantam, 1984). 
291 Alvin Toffler, "Foreword: Science and Change." In Prigogene and Stengers, ibid, p. xx. 
292 Frost and Yarrow, Improl'isation in Drama, p. 180. 
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scientific theories, to be founded not merely upon a spontaneous imaginative creativity 
of the future already rooted in human nature but, more deeply still, on a link between 
chance and the arising of futurity exhibited by the whole physical order below man. A 
vision of God's creation emerges from these proposals in which at every level _ 
physical nature, human nature and supemature - chance and spontaneity urge it into 
the future. Echoing Bergson's thinking: 'The creative freedom of the cosmos finds its 
self-awareness in the experience of human freedom. ,293 
In a recent scientific proposal, this cosmic creativity of chance has additionally 
been associated with sound. It is suggested that 'the material world could be created 
out of nothing but noise. ,294 For Reginald Cahill and Christopher Klinger, recalling 
what has already been said, 'space and time and all the objects around us are no more 
than the froth on a deep sea of randomness, ,295 and for Gregory Chaitin, 'randomness 
is at the very heart of pure mathematics. ,296 The further link between chance, 
creativity and, now, sound is then presented as follows: 
Leibniz believed that reality was built from things he called monads, which owed their existence 
solely to their relations with each other. This picture languished in the backwaters of science because it 
was hugely difficult to turn into a recipe for calculating things, unlike Newton's mechanics. But Cahill 
and Klinger have found a way to do it. Like Leibniz's monads, their 'pseudo-objects' have no intrinsic 
existence - they are defmed only by how strongly they connect with each other, and ultimately they 
disappear from the model. They are mere scaffolding. 
The recipe is simple: take some pseudo-objects, add a little randomness and let the whole mix evolve 
inside a computer. With pseudo-objects numbered 1, 2, 3, and so on, you can defme some numbers to 
represent the strength of the connection between each pair of pseudo-objects: B 12 is the strength of the 
connection between 1 and 2; B13 the connection between 1 and 3; and so on. They form a two-
dimensional grid of numbers - a matrix. 
The physicists start by filling their matrix with numbers that are very close to zero. Then they run it 
repeatedly through a matrix equation which adds random noise and a second, non-linear term involving 
the inverse of the original matrix. The randomness means that most truths or predictions of this model 
have no cause - the physical version of Chaitin's mathematical result. This matrix equation is largely 
the child of educated guesswork, but there are good precedents for that. In 1932, for example, Paul 
Dirac guessed at a matrix equation for how electrons behave, and ended up predicting the existence of 
antimatter. 
When the matrix goes through the wringer again and again, most of the elements remain close to zero, 
but some numbers suddenly become large. 'Structures start forming,' says Cahill ... So something like 
our space assembles itself out of complete randomness.297 
293 Safranski, Heidegger, p. 53. 
294 Marcus Chown, "Random Reality." New Scientist 2227 (26th February, 2000): 24-28; p. 24. 
'95 
- Ibid, p. 26. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid, pp. 26-27. 
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If, as this extract suggests, sonic chance in nature below man is creative in its own 
order of being, then perhaps human sonic spontaneity is creative in its own order of 
being also. 
It may be noticed by way of general interest (it is not central to the argument 
though it sheds light on it from a different angle) that a link between randomness, 
improvisation and creativity is found also at the level of human social creativity. It is 
through improvisation that the forward movement of social change often comes about. 
For Turner, society is a 'process punctuated by performances of various kinds ... 
[S]uch genres as ritual, ceremony, carnival, festival, game, spectacle, parade, and 
sports event may constitute . . . a set of intersecting metalanguages . . . [T]he group 
tries to understand itself in order to change itself. ,298 Ritual generally accompanies 
transitions from one cosmic or social situation to another299 and for Turner, as was 
seen, ritual nearly always includes a spontaneous dimension. Likewise in the liminal 
"rites of passage" which effect an individual's change from one social status to 
another, there may often be 'subversive and ludic (or playful) events. ,300 '[W]hat 
frequently typifies the liminality of initiation ritual in societies [is that] ... the bizarre 
becomes the normal ... elements customarily bound together in certain combinations 
[are subject to] ... scrambling and recombining in monstrous, fantastic and unnatural 
shapes,.301 It is because these spontaneous aspects of ritual are unrepeatable, so 
rendering the rite irreversible, that 'their sequence is no illusion - the unidirectional 
. c. . ,302 
movement IS translormatIve. 
298 Turner, Ritual to Theatre, pp. 100-10 1. 
299 See Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (1908) (London: Routledge and Kegan PauL 1960). 
300 Turner, Ritual to Theatre, p. 27. 
301 Ibid, p. 42. 
~o~ Ibid, p. 80. 
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Just as the argument presented so far has sought to grant a constitutive role to 
spontaneity of imagining, and especially of musical imagining, in giving rise to the 
future, for Berdyaev, the highest imaginative creativity is that which is spontaneous, 
'the first flight of inspiration.' Perhaps Berdyaev is echoing a Kantian understanding 
of spontaneity. For Berdyaev, it is 'precisely Kant who makes existential metaphysics 
'b'l' ,303 a POSS1 11ty. Whether or not a Kantian dependency is emphasised, this 
highlighting of spontaneous aspects of the imaginative parallels the perspectives of the 
present thesis. Berdyaev writes: 
It may be said, paradoxical as it seems at fIrst sight, that development and unfolding is the deadly enemy 
of creativeness and leads to its cooling down and drying up at the source. The highest point reached by 
creativeness is not the unfolding of results but the fIrst flight of inspiration, its birth and virginal youth 
and not its fInal achievement. Development, unfolding, improvement, completion mean deterioration of 
creativeness, the cooling down of the creative fIre, decay and old age ... The essence of development 
and evolution is that it conceals fIrst-hand intuitions and fIrst origins of human feelings and ideas ... 
This happens to every human feeling and idea. Development destroys creative youth, virginity and 
originality. That which was born in the free creative act is unrecognizable in its developed form. 304 
Berdyaev's personal creativity followed such a pattern: 'The thoughts to which I attach 
greatest importance came to me like flashes of lightning, like instantaneous 
illuminations. When I begin to write I am sometimes carried away to the point of 
dizziness. My thought flows so fast that I hardly have time to write it down. ,305 From 
the field of psychology, in a twofold analysis not unlike Berdyaev's, Abraham Maslow 
has made a distinction between primary and secondary creativeness. The primary, 
improvisational phase, is characterised by high interest or excitement, the secondary 
by discipline and hard work and a moderately high level of interest.306 Additionally, 
according to Maslow, for human nature, primary creativeness seems central because 
more prevalent: 'Many more people are capable of primary creativeness ... than of 
303 Nicholas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1952), p. 9. 
304 Nicholas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (1931) (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 
1937), pp. 181-182. 
305 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 219. 
306 See Izard, Psychology of Emotions, pp. 121-122. Reference to Abraham H. Maslow, The Farther 
Reaches of Human Nature (1971) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). n.p. See, for example, Maslow. 
ibid, p. 61. 
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primary plus secondary creativeness. ,307 It may be concluded from this that the 
priority of the spontaneous in the sphere of human creativity has two aspects. 
Spontaneous imagination appears not only as the pinnacle of imaginative activity 
(Berdyaev), but, since anybody can be spontaneous, as creative imagination's most 
widespread manifestation (Maslow). 
For Berdyaev, '[t]rue creativeness is theurgy, God-activity, activity together with 
God. ,308 'Creativity will continue creation; it will reveal the resemblance of human 
nature to the Creator. ,309 Berdyaev's ideas develop here the general Christian motif 
already discussed above, of graced imagination as a creative activity and a bringing 
about of man's eschatological destiny. Berdyaev seems to claim this creative power 
especially on behalf of spontaneity. In the long citation from Berdyaev above, the 
fuller creativity is spontaneous imagination, 'virginal,' consisting of 'first-hand 
intuitions and first origins of human feelings.' Elsewhere he writes: 'Through Christ, 
man becomes a participant in the nature of the Holy Trinity, for the second hypostasis 
of the Holy Trinity is Absolute Man ... [man becomes] a mediator between God and 
the cosmos. ,310 'The world is being created not only in God the Father but in God the 
Son. Christology is the doctrine of continuing creation. And creation may be 
completed only in the Spirit, only in man's creativity in the Spirit. ,311 Berdyaev 
speaks of a 'relationship between the mystery of creativeness and the mystery of 
redemption. ,312 As was seen, the emphasis here seems to be on creativeness which is 
spontaneous. 
307 I d 'b'd zar ,1 1 . 
308 Berdyaev, Creative Act, p. 126. 
309 Ibid,p. 121. 
310 Ibid, p. 79. 
311 Ibid, pp. 137-138. 
312 Ibid, p. 93. 
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Berdyaev also implies that man's eschatological goal comes about through artistic 
creativity: 'Theurgy is art creating another world, another being, another life'. 313 . The 
theurge, working together with God, creates the cosmos; creates beauty as being. ,314 
For Berdyaev, therefore, artistic imagination, and especially, it would seem from the 
longer citation above, spontaneous, 'virginal' imagination, actually creates futurity as 
co-agent with God. Such an argument as this leads further in the direction of the 
thought being proposed here concerning musical creativity, especially in spontaneous 
music, which clearly corresponds in music to the "virginal" dimension of art 
highlighted by Berdyaev. Of music Berdyaev indeed wrote: 'The supreme moments of 
my life are connected with an interest in music. ,315 'It is not so much that 1 plunge 
into the given music, as that 1 experience a creative upsurge of my being. ,316 
Berdyaev's lack of theoretical musical expertise may explain why he does not discuss 
his profound experience of music at length, as these accolades suggest he might 
otherwise have done: 'I know little if anything about music. I have a bad ear and a 
poor musical memory, and the shades and subtleties of musical performance escape 
me.,317 However, although Berdyaev nowhere specifically identifies musical 
spontaneous imagination in particular among the arts, or attributes to it any explicit 
significance, it might appear in consequence of his thought to be man's primordial 
creative act. 
For Berdyaev, the spontaneous artist actually contributes to the transformation of 
the world and to the realisation of the Kingdom of God. In addition, Berdyaev is 
known to have preferred Romanticism to Classicism in art, since for him, Classicism 
313 Ibid, p. 247. 
31-1 Ibid, p. 249. . 
315 Nicholas Berdyaev, no documentation. Cited in Donald A. Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet: A Life of 
Nicholai Berdyaev (London: Gollancz, 1960), p. 194. 
316 Nicholas Berdyaev, Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Philosophical Autobiography (n.p.: n.p., 1949), p. 
350. Cited in Lowrie, ibid. . . 
317 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 313. [Dream and Reality is a translation of Se(fKnowledge. ibid.] 
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seeks the earthly perfection of the work of art as form,318 while Romanticism suggests 
a longing for the transfinite. Berdyaev speaks approvingly of Romanticism's 
'pervading sense of the insufficiency of all achievement within the finite' .319 
Berdyaev's preference for 'insufficiency' over Classicism may in fact be figured as 
paralleling the distinction between the open-ended process of improvisation with its 
uncertain closure, and the 'perfection' of the 'classical' autonomous work, whose 
limits are predetermined and hence, he might claim, speak of a spurious perfection in 
this limited world. 
For Berdyaev, the (implicitly virginal and spontaneous) artistic creation of Being is 
a product of creative freedom ('Creativity will continue creation'), and this leads him 
to the more searching question of whether' [from] the thoroughgoing ontological point 
of view freedom is regarded as subordinate to being, ,320 and, he asks, '[ d]oes 
precedence belong to being over freedom or to freedom over being? Does not the 
final mystery of being lie in the fact that freedom is more primary than it and precedes 
it?,321 For freedom arises from the human personality and thus '{p}ersonality is more 
primary than being . .. Being is a product of abstract thought. ,322 Freedom 'proceeds 
from the abyss which preceded being . . . the act of freedom is primordial and 
I I . . I ,323 comp ete y lrratlona. For Berdyaev, this freedom is linked to creativity, for 
'[ c ]reativity is the mystery of freedom'. 324 This freedom is found for Berdyaev in 
spontaneous artistic creativity, as was seen, and' [c ]reativity ... is not an 'insertion' in 
the finite, not a mastery over the medium, or the creative product itself: rather it is a 
318 See Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, pp. 30; 214. 
319 Ibid, p. 215. 
320 Nicholas Berdyaev, Truth and Revelation (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1953), p. 
68. 
321 Ibid . 
. ,22 Nicholas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom (1939) (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press. 
1943), p. 81 . 
. ,23 Nicholas Berdyaev, no documentation. Cited in Macquarrie, Existentialism, p. 179. 
324 Nicholas Berdyaev, no documentation. Cited in Macquarrie, ibid, p. 180. 
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flight into the infinite; not an activity which objectifies in the finite but one which 
transcends the finite towards the infinite. The creative act signifies an ek-stasis, a 
b k· hr h . ,325 I . . rea lng t oug to eternIty. t IS Indeed where man co-creates eschatologically 
with God. This has parallels with the present thesis, which presents 'virginal' and 
spontaneous improvisatory music as the place at which the future rises up for musico-
linguistic human creatures, improvisatory music, produced by man, actually creating 
Being. Following these hints in Berdyaev, musical exploration might appear as the 
kernel of the freedom which creates and is prior to Being, freedom in this musical 
form being demonstrated from very infancy in babbling and spontaneous song, 
identified in Chapter 5, Section III as the progenitors of language, artistic sensibility 
and the discovery of time. 
Additional perspectives on the priority of freedom over Being may be found in the 
thought of Paul Ricoeur. For Ricoeur, through a historical process of action and 
interaction, the self is continuously being transformed. We grasp the self in 
connection with its activity. Consequently action is no longer said to follow from the 
being of the self (agere sequitur esse), but the constitution of the being of the self is 
said to arise out of action (esse sequitur agere). 326 Because action is central in the 
constitution of the self, and because action is brought to full view only in narrative, 
ultimately the self comes into view only through the narratives which are needed to 
describe its actions. It is thus mediated through narrativity. '[T]he meaning of human 
existence is itself narrative. ,327 Ricoeur's thought was linked above (Chapter 5, 
Section V) to musical improvisation via his understanding of narrativity which, it was 
suggested, made of musical improvisation a form of "mood narration" indispensable 
m Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 209. ." . . 
3~6 See Dermot A. Lane, "The Self under Pressure: Theological ReflectIOns. Doctrine and Life 4.9. no. 
5 (May/June 1999): 267-275; pp. 270-271. References to Paul Ricoeur, One Self as Another (ChIcago: 
Chicago Univ. Press, 1992). 
3"27 Ricoeur. In Kearney, Dialogues, p. 17. 
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to the human person who is always constituted by narrative, and for whom, 
additionally, in Heidegger's words above, 'understanding always has its mood. ,328 As 
well as verbal narrative, therefore, the mood narrative of improvised music-making 
mediates the existence of the self, musical freedom prior to Being. 
A further perspective on this priority of freedom and action may be found III 
Kenneth Barnes. Barnes notices that thinking presupposes continuity of experience, 
that is, action: 
[C]ontrary to the general tendency of intellectual assumption since Plato, action is our primary 
experience. Thought is secondary; it is the negative or reflective aspect of action; it is the result of the 
difficulty or frustration of action. This philosophical dictum is implied in the common statement 'I stop 
to think.' It is when we think, or describe an event, that we fill in the gaps between a series of otherwise 
disconnected sense-impressions with an imagined continuity.329 
Barnes gives the example of looking at a matchbox, turning away, and then looking 
back and noticing it again. How do we know the matchbox is the same one? 
Rationally, we cannot: the sense impressions are disconnected. 'It seems to me that 
we fill in the interval with imagined or assumed continuity in time' .330 The person 
seeing the "second" matchbox infers its identity with the "first" matchbox because he 
or she intuits that the continuing existence of the one matchbox is dependent on 
continuing time, not on the matchbox's being perceived by him or her continuously. 
However, time is experienced by humans only through their experience of action. 
(Barnes perhaps follows Einstein here: time exists because events take place. A 
similar point was made above in Chapter 5, Section III, in connection with the baby's 
discovery of time through the action of breathing. )331 The "knowledge" that the "two" 
matchboxes are really one is thus effectively dependent on the underlying fact of 
human action, the primordial place where time is disclosed. It is the overall 
328 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 31, p. 182. 
329 Barnes, Creative Imagination, p. 9. 
330 Ibid. 
331 'We gain our experience, our sensation of time, through movement'. Sessions, Musical E.\perience, 
p.15. 
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propensity of humans for action that ultimately uncovers the fact that the "two" 
matchboxes are really one. Being (here, the fact that the "two" matchboxes are really 
one) has been disclosed through action rather than thought. Perhaps Barnes echoes 
Gilbert Ryle, and the idea that actions are 'nonverbal forms of thinking and knowing in 
and ofthemselves,332 (Chapter 2, Section I). 
Underlying Berdyaev's theurgic view of art as a creative act, there lies a particular 
theology of the Holy Spirit. Indeed as he said above: 'The world is being created not 
only in God the Father but in God the Son. Christology is the doctrine of continuing 
creation. And creation may be completed only in the Spirit, only in man's creativity in 
the Spirit. ,333 Patrick Sherry identifies a recognised link in theology between the Holy 
Spirit and aesthetics334 but he adds that, despite a burgeoning of books on the Holy 
Spirit since around 1970, not much attention has been given to this link. Both the 
theology of the Holy Spirit, and the theology of beauty are underdeveloped areas, he 
notes, and any interaction between these areas is even less explored by Western 
theology, except insofar as the Spirit is acknowledged to be linked to Creation in 
Genesis.335 Sherry points out that creativity is precisely the link between the Holy 
Spirit and aesthetics, God's creativity in the Holy Spirit, and man's creativity in art.336 
He argues that a 'Trinitarian theology of Creation,337 (one which looks at the roles of 
each Person in Creation) is relatively undeveloped, and that this lack underpins the 
failure to develop theologically the link between the Holy Spirit and beauty, with its 
possible corollary, the creative or theurgic nature of artistic beauty where the latter 
332 Elliott, Music Matters, p. 55. 
333 Berdyaev, Creative Act, pp. 137-138. 
334 See Patrick Sherry, Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), p. 20. . . 
335 See ibid. References to Woltbart Pannenberg, for instance in "The Doctrine of the Spmt and the 
Task of a Theology of Nature." Theology 75 (1972): 8-21; Kilian McDonnell, "The Detenninati\'e 
Doctrine of the Holy Spirit." Theology Today 39 (1982): 142-161. 
336 See Sherry. ibid, p. 86. 
337 Ibid, p. 87. 
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shares in and continues the Spirit's creative work. Some theologians undoubtedly do 
recognise the creativity of the human person, including artistic creativity, as a sharing 
in God's creativity. Conceivably, although God does not supplant the human spirit by 
the divine, God uses human creativity as a secondary cause in His own creativity, 
gives some of His creativity to man, and acts in and through human creativity.338 
Leonide Ouspensky links the creation of beauty with the creativity of the Holy Spirit, 
and says that 'true beauty is the radiance of the Holy Spirit, the holiness of and the 
participation in the life of the world to come. ,339 For Faricy: 'The Spirit that inspires 
art is the eschatological Spirit, the Holy Spirit who breaks through into the present 
from God's promised future. The Kingdom of God is to come, and yet it is here 
already, breaking in on us through the Holy Spirit as the pledge of future glory, and 
making all things new now. The Holy Spirit renews us toward the future. Partly, the 
Spirit renews through inspired art. ,340 It is people who produce art. Thus, it is 
implied, the Holy Spirit renews man toward the future partly by raising up the artist as 
co-creator and theurge, to share His work. 
'We can have no proper account of art until we know how art fits into some fuller 
picture of the mind, into an account of its powers of imagination, thought and 
expression and of their origins and developments.,341 Any such 'fuller picture' must 
presumably be based in artistic experience at its fundamental root in the development 
of the person. It was suggested in Chapter 5 that musical exploration is the earliest 
infant aesthetic impulse, and thus the fountainhead of all artistic consciousness. Ever 
338 See ibid, p. 113. References to Roger Hazelton, Ascending Flame, Descending Dove: A~ .Essay on 
Creative Transcendence (philadelphia: n.p., 1975), pp. 117f; Peter D. Ashton, "The Holy Spmt and the 
Gifts of Art." Theological Renewal 21 (July 1982): 12-13; Second Vatican Council, The Church in t~e 
Modern World, section 50; Victor Hugo, Philosophie 1, 265, cited in Monroe C. Beardsley, AesthetICS 
from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History (Alabama: n.p., 1966). p. 262: also Hegel, no 
documentation. 
339 Ouspensky, Theology of the Icon, p. 190. ., " 
340 Robert Faricy, "Art as a Charism in the Church." Thought 57, no. 224 "Faith and ImagmatlOn Issue 
(March 1982): 94-99; p. 98. 
341 Lyas, Aesthetics, p. 221. 
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after through the life of the person, the pattern has now been laid down: the primordial 
and universal human art is inescapably that of musical exploration. If a theology of 
theurgic art is valid at all, it is especially valid here, for this is the art most deeply 
embedded in, and closest to the human person. Rooted ultimately in sonic memories 
of the womb with its musical ambience, and begun at the mother's breast, music of the 
improvisatory kind is linked to personal memories more primordial than any 
expressions of visual, tactile or plastic arts. Musical exploration in infancy is also the 
aesthetic impulse which enables the development of the power of speech itself, which 
in tum defines the human person (Chapter 5, Section Ill). This perspective confirms 
the supreme importance of musical and prosodic improvisation of all kinds for the 
human person, including in the liturgy, the place where art and the person are most 
fully consecrated to their missions. 
VIII Charles Tournemire: Improviser and Theurge? 
If musical improvisation, as the quintessential artistic self-expression of man, 
possesses such significance in liturgy, perhaps divine assistance will sometimes be 
granted to musical improvisers in the accomplishment of their awesome liturgical 
vocation. There may be some evidence for this in the case of Tournemire, in his 
capacity as organist of Ste Clotilde in Paris. Speaking of his improvisatory experience 
in liturgy, he wrote: 
Any 'preparation' is contrary to this special art-fonn ... In the man endowed with this faculty, as soon as 
the sensibility is awakened ... the ordering mechanism is stated, the constructive element is developed, 
as the piece proceeds, smoothly, in a manner at once logical and whimsical, to the point that it sounds 
like a written work, with, furthennore, in the sublime moments, 'flashes' ... One feels remarkably that 
one is listening to somebody else. The subconscious takes over. It seems that one has been visited by an 
angel of inspiration. These are remarkable and rare moments. Could one ask more from heavenly 
providence? ... [E]xcept at times when the unconscious substitutes itself into the conscious, it is almost 
impossible to sustain the same purity of counterpoint as in works which have taken a long time to mature 
d l·f:: '141 an come to l1e.- -
342 Tournemire, Franck, pp. 49-50. 
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Writing in another place he speaks of the improviser being 'upheld by a mysterious 
force which makes him discover beautiful phrases, and points of emphasis' .3-+3 
Toumemire thus sees, in his "flashes" of vision, the way the improvisation is to 
proceed. He speaks of 'an illumination which suddenly enlightens the soul. ,3-+-+ 
Moreover, he is claiming for his highest momentary experiences of inspiration, not 
merely an enhancement of the aesthetic, imaginative aspect of what he is creating, but 
an enhanced facility in what falls firmly within the sphere of music considered as a 
rigorous craft, namely the improvisatory construction of counterpoint at the keyboard. 
It might have been expected that the achievement of contrapuntal structures would be 
all the harder during the imaginative elation of improvising, and Toumemire's 
heightened capacity for counterpoint here would suggest a remarkable and unusual 
capacity for attending to logical detail in the midst of creative excitement. Just as 
when humans are animated they are more likely to bump into other people and knock 
things over, so for the improviser, the more excitement takes over, the more difficult it 
will normally be to re-impose the rigorous craftsmanship of contrapuntal structure, 
since an enraptured human mind does not readily adapt itself to the analytical 
dimension of thinking. Yet Toumemire is claiming that precisely when his 
imagination is most excited, in his "flashes," when he feels he is 'listening to 
somebody else' - at this point his more rational functions of musicianship are neither 
lost, nor even held onto with difficulty, but actually seem to perform themselves, as 
though they too, in some mysterious way, were ultimately under the rule of 
imagination. It is as though imagination gave from unconscious resources what is 
normally given by conscious reason, and supplied not simply wider aesthetic 
possibilities, but also basic contrapuntal structure, in an instantaneous manner. 
J4J Charles Toumemire, Precis d 'execution, de registration et d'improvisation a I 'orgue (Paris: Max 
Eschig, 1936), p. 102. 
,\44 Ibid. 
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Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi has written of "flow experiences," in which creative 
individuals can experience altered states of consciousness where talents and skills are 
pushed to the limit. 'Their disciplined, highly trained, carefully-polished skills react 
quickly, automatically, smoothly, responding with casual decisiveness to every slight 
movement in the situation. It is as though the skills themselves take over and direct the 
. 1 d ,345 Th 'T . fi person Invo ve . us, ournemlre con Ided that when he improvised he could 
bring off technical feats which would have demanded a lot of work in a written 
piece. ,346 In words of Czikszentmihalyi: 'In the flow state, action follows upon action 
according to an internal logic that seems to need no conscious intervention by the 
actor. ,347 Czikszentmihalyi also calls these experiences "optimal.,,348 '[O]ptimal 
experiences frequently include a loss of self-consciousness' ,349 which perhaps accounts 
for Tournemire's sensation of 'listening to somebody else.' Czikszentmihalyi has 
himself connected such flow experiences with the process of conventional musical 
composition. As one 'outstanding composer,350 said: 'You yourself are in an ecstatic 
state to such a point that you feel as though you almost don't exist. I've experienced 
this time and time again. My hand seems devoid of myself, and I have nothing to do 
with what is happening. ,35 I In connection with keyboard improvisation, Charles Rosen 
has noted: 'It may not be completely true to say that the fingers of the pianist have a 
reason of their own that reason knows not of, because improvisation is not exactly 
unconscious, but it is clear that the fingers develop a partially independent logic which 
345 Greeley, Religious Imagination, pp. 11-12. Reference to Mihalyi Czikszentmihalyi, no 
documentation. 
346 Fauquet, "Charles Tournemire and the Organ," p. 8. 
347 Mihalyi Czikszentmihalyi, Beyond Boredom and Anxiety: The Experience of Play in Work and 
Games (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), p. 36. 
348 See Elliott, Music Matters, p. 126. References to Mihalyi Czikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Ps}'chology 
of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1990); Mihalyi Czikszentm~alyi and ,Isabella 
Czikszentmihalyi (eds.), Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow In ConscIOusness 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988). 
349 Elliott ibid, p. 117. 
350 Czikszentmihalyi, Beyond Boredom and Anxiety, p. 44. 
351 Unidentified composer. Cited in ibid. 
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is only afterward ratified by the mind. ,352 When Rosen says that 'improvisation is not 
exactly unconscious' he is referring to the overall process, whereas Tournemire's claim 
to experience inspiration from the unconscious relates to particular instants within that 
process, or "flashes." There is no disagreement between them; indeed, Rosen's idea of 
partially autonomous fingers clearly has some parallel with Tournemire's unconscious, 
which momentarily substitutes for the conscious. Tournemire's special contrapuntal 
facility may also be compared with flow experiences of a chess player: 
Many instances of apparently complex problem solving which seem to implement a long-range strategy, 
as, for example, making a move in chess, may be best understood as direct responses to familiar 
perceptual gestalts. After years of seeing chess games unfold, a chess grandmaster can, simply by 
responding to the patterns on the chess board, play master level chess while his deliberate, analytic mind 
is absorbed in something else.353 
The chess player makes his moves on the basis of the promptings of a liminal 
consciousness, and similarly for Tournemire, borrowing words of Archbold, 'one 
might well speak of the opening of another sort of liminal space, one perhaps known 
better to the fingers than to the mind. ,354 
Tournemire's reference above to angelic inspiration, together with the fact that he 
is improvising in a liturgical setting, suggest that he discerns his sudden flashes of 
inspired creativity as not merely on the level of natural phenomena, but as capacities 
realised in him by a spiritual power. His might appear to be a graced flow experience 
of improvising in the liturgy. Tournemire's phrase 'angel of inspiration' may not 
simply be effusive usage, or a figure of speech but an attempt to convey his sense of 
the felt action of God upon him as he improvises. While generally God's action on 
humans escapes their experience, nevertheless 'the whole tradition of Christian 
352 Rosen, "On Playing the Piano," p. 52. 
353 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. 93. Racing driver Ayrton Senna said: 'I suddenly rea~ised 1 .was no 
longer driving the car consciously. 1 was kind of driving it by instinct, only. 1 was ill a dIfferent 
dimension ... I was going and going, more and more and more and more ... It frightened me bec~use. I 
was well beyond my conscious understanding.' Cited in R. Williams, "Tearing up the Tr~ck.'.' ~lcle in 
The Independent on Sunday newspaper, Sport section, 15th November, 1992, p. 2:. CIted in Aldan P. 
Moran, The Psychology of Concentration in Sport Performers: A Cognitin' AnalYSIS (Hove: Psychology 
Press, 1996), p. 74. 
354 Archbold, Review of Overduin, p. 478. 
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discernment presupposes that our experience can be recognised as being coloured by 
h . f G d' S . . ,355 . t e promptlngs 0 0 s pInt. It IS suggested here that Tournemire experiences 
this discernment of divine prompting in his "flashes." This possibly supernatural 
musical empowerment which arises for Tournemire may have a precedent in the 
empowerment experienced by groups of worshippers singing in the Spirit, where 
counterpoints are often produced supernaturally out of the individual vocalisations of 
the group's members. In singing in the Spirit, harmony and counterpoint are created by 
the power of the Spirit in raising up the powers of the collective musical imagination. 
Perhaps it is the same Spirit who raises up Tournemire's mysterious experiences of 
contrapuntal empowerment while improvising at the organ. Thus, it is implied from 
Tournemire's experiences, supernatural, musical improvisatory empowerment in 
liturgy may not be limited to singing in tongues. 
The overall implication of this thesis would be that singing in tongues is raised by 
God to the level of an inspired charism partly in view of the role played by improvised 
music in creating and sustaining a human futurity. No doubt it is correct to point out 
that the New Testament nowhere explicitly asserts that this future-creating role is a 
reason for the existence of an inspired charism of singing in tongues. Yet as Berdyaev 
says: 'In Holy Scripture we find no revelation concerning man's creativity - not on 
account of its implied denial of human creativity, but because creativity is a matter for 
man to reveal. God is silent on this matter and expects man to speak. ,356 Thus, God 
has not revealed that improvised music creates our future, because, were He to do so, 
the creation of a future through such music would not be fully humanity's creative act. 
Berdyaev comments: 'The notion that God has need of man and of man's response to 
him is, admittedly, an extraordinarily daring notion; yet in its absence the Christian 
355 Gerard 1. Hughes, "Our Human Vocation." In Commentary on the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, Walsh (ed.), p. 339 . 
.156 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 208. 
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revelation of God-manhood loses all meaning. ,357 If the essential liturgical role of 
musical improvisation is thus as an opening up, indeed a creation of eschatology, then 
not only singing in tongues, but every form of musical improvisation in liturgy is 
presumably worthy to receive some special, supernatural empowerment. This would 
amount to - one might dare to say, nothing more remarkable than - a supernatural 
empowerment of the basic liturgical disposition, futural projection in hope itself. 
Since, in the form of singing in tongues, musical improvisation has already been 
spiritually empowered by God as a charism, arguably, for humans to co-create the 
future, why not other forms of musical improvisation, and why not Tournemire's? 
Both singing in tongues, and Tournemire's improvising, are improvisatory, liturgical 
music of a kind which bears directly on the opening out of an eschatological 
dimension. Thus singing in tongues and Tournemire's experience are perhaps in some 
respects connected, as differing expressions of one form of mystical musicality ordered 
toward the future. 
There is a further similarity to mystical experience found in Tournemire's flashes of 
inspiration, for in mystical knowing, reason, with its differentiating and analytical 
properties, is generally pre-empted and the object seized by the understanding, in its 
varied aspects, in joy, admiration and exhilaration, by the operation of higher spiritual 
gifts, precisely as a unity. W. T. Stace identifies this experience of the oneness of its 
object as the essence of a wide range of mysticism,358 and for much Christian 
mysticism, 'the whole world of ultimate reality is seen as a single whole'. 359 In a 
similar sense (though a restricted one, for it is not a divine mystery which is being 
apprehended, but a musical process), it is as an undifferentiated unity of art and craft. 
357 Ibid, p. 209. 
358 See W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1960), p. 87. , 
359 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Den}'s (Oxtord: 
Clarendon, 1981), p. 194. 
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unrestrained musical creativity and the orderly contrapuntal techniques in which that 
creativity is to be clothed, that Tournemire experiences, in his flashes of vision, the 
way his improvisation is to proceed. He writes (note his own italics) that the art of 
musical improvisation is 'the result of a burning imagination which is creative and 
spontaneous, which synthesises, in its conceptualisation, the music in its entirety'. 360 
Since grace builds on nature, this unifying synthesis, not unpredictably, has its 
proper natural basis. Thus John Masefield writes of his poetic flow experience 
(emphasis added): 'This illumination is an intense experience, and so wonderful that it 
cannot be described. While it lasts, the momentary problem is merged into a 
dazzlingly clear perception of the entire work in all its detail. ,361 In Tournemire's case 
supernatural grace, 'angelic' inspiration within the liturgy has now mystically 
embraced his natural human capacity for flow experience, so that he is enabled to 
experience his whole improvised musical conception unically and without effort during 
his "flashes" of illumination, and thus fulfil, with divine assistance, his theurgic 
vocation as musical improviser. As well as a musical improviser, a preacher suddenly 
360 Tournemire, Franck, p. 51. 
361 fi Mase leld, So Long to Learn, p. 240. Masefield's remark needs to be seen not only as that of a poet 
but also against the background of his special concern for the cultural revival of the improvisatory 
dimension of artistic creativity in language. This concern dates from his childhood and deep fears for a 
decline in his innocent powers as an improviser. Of his early youth he writes: 'The old faculty of story-
telling, that had once filled my mind with happiness, seemed dead within me: it was dark there, where 
once there had been light. In earlier years, stories had floated up into my mind as from an unfailing 
spring, and had flowed from it in streams ... the thing had proceeded joyously, as from a source of joy, 
there was no trouble, no hesitancy ... [But now,] [w]hen [my friends] asked me for a yam, I found my 
inner fear confrrmed; the old faculty was gone. What made the loss worse to me was the feeling that 
something dark and sinister had come between myself and the old faculty ... The effect upon myself is 
hard to describe. In part, it was a sense of loss; in part, a sense of exile; but in part also a sense of having 
died and gone to hell'. Ibid, pp. 74-75. In later life, 'deep within me, my seekings after perfection were 
limited to story-telling .. 'What was Flaubert, with his labour and richness of language; what was Pater, 
with his learning and instinct for felicity, to the tellers of the Laxdale or Njala sagas?' Ibid, p. 121 . 
. Man will re-create the arts, or die . . . Then, or some day perhaps, men will think more of those who 
have striven to bring delight into the world ... Story-tellers, then, may be heard, by those who \vish, in 
every city of the land, in rooms built and appointed for the art'. Ibid, p. 237. Against this especially 
improvisatory background in Masefield, parallels between his experience of inspiration as a synthesising 
or unifying of the artistic elements being employed, and Tournemire's "flashes" where art and craft 
similarly coalesce, become particularly apposite, for in both cases reference is to inspiration whik 
improvising. Masefield refers to 'the important thing in all the arts, the breaking of the tomb. the 
resurrection of the dead, known as the coming of inspiration.' Ibid, p. 239. 
345 
inspired with improvisatory fluency can have this type of experience, "flashes" of 
spiritual empowerment, an empowerment or seizure by God of improvising language 
and the speaking voice, where any prepared text is abandoned in a self-sustaining, or 
divinely sustained, exhilaration. Thought is linguistic, and here, the preacher's 
dawning and possible ideas are already seeking a home in language, unconsciously and 
inchoately forming into internal words in the head and only a step away from being 
voiced. God here empowers the preacher's creativity, in respect of his or her ideas, 
with an enhanced unification of prelinguistic dawnings, internal and external words, 
rather as he empowers Tournemire in his "flashes" with enhanced unification of 
preliminary musical ideas, their creative development in the mind, and final execution 
as integral art and craft. For Tournemire, 'the unconscious substitutes itself into the 
conscious,' (supra) and likewise the halting steps of the preacher's conscious planning 
are swept away as thought becomes immediate expression, in flow. Of course, the 
whole thrust of this thesis implies that the preacher is a musical improviser, and thus 
these two phenomena - in preacher and Tournemire - are essentially the same.362 
Theurgic creativity does not necessarily take place only in liturgy. However, in 
Tournemire's case, liturgy, the place where Christ acts among men transformatively in 
a unique degree, becomes the site of the fuller realisation of Tournemire's vocation as 
musical improviser and theurge. It might therefore be possible to speak of a liturgical 
perfecting of Tournemire's gifts. Liturgy is a ritually contextualised perfecting of self, 
and so liturgical involvement is the earthly climax and goal of the identity of the 
human person. This idea of the very identity of the human person as found ultimately 
in ritual involvement resonates with the thought of Ricoeur. Ricoeur observes that, 
362 The inspiration of both improvising preacher and musician, though here described in. ~e special fonn 
they assume in flow experience, share an original threefold character: the mute ~tn\'mg to cxpre~s 
inwardly, the expression inwardly, and the expression outwardly. Com~a.re thIS With ~lanta1l1 ~ 
threefold analysis of poetic inspiration in Chapter 4, Section I\F. The stnnng to express mwardly 
resembles Maritain's 'music of intuitive pulsions.' 
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already for human nature, 'there is no self-understanding which is not mediated by 
signs, symbols and texts' .363 'The presence of the subject to itself, which is the very 
definition of subjectivity and self-consciousness, is an indirect, mediated presence. 
And thus were it not for its participation in the realm of culture, the subject would not 
exist as such. ,364 Liturgy expresses this condition in the order of grace. Such plenary 
expressions of human capacities as those Toumemire exhibits in his inspired 
improvisations are perhaps to be expected in the liturgical context, for, in the graced 
ritual involvement, a human person is more fully constituted by God in his or her 
identity in via, which includes finding access to his or her fuller self together with its 
fuller earthly capacities of imagination and artistic power. Borrowing Masefield' s 
words on inspiration, Toumemire may be approaching 'a rare yet perfect functioning of 
the being. ,365 It is impossible to place limits on what this might imply for a given 
individual in the liturgy. Moreover, in liturgy, the self finds this fuller identity 
precisely as embodied. While musical mysticism is sometimes thought of as a passive 
mysticism of music interiorly perceived, as in Rolle, Toumemire's is an embodied 
liturgical mysticism of musical performance rather than simply of musical perception. 
It shares this attribute with singing in tongues. Toumemire's mysticism of creative 
musical "flashes" is not confined within the mind. It engages with his own performing 
body, with a musical instrument and, through them, with the exterior manifestation of 
the liturgy itself. Berdyaev speaks of a 'white heat of creative ecstasy,366 which is 
prior to 'divisions and differentiations into subject and object'.367 Here. in 
363 Ricoeur, "On Interpretation," p. 191. 
364 Madison, Hermeneutics of Postmodernity, p. 93. 
365 Masefield, So Long to Learn, p. 240. 
366 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 220. 
367 Ibid. 
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Toumemire, '[c]ontemplation must not be understood as a state of sheer passivity or 
receptiveness: it comprises a distinctly active and creative element. ,368 
Relating this finally to the earlier discussion of how improvised music is the place 
where Being speaks in projection and hope (Chapter 6), it seems that, through the 
mediation of Toumemire's improvisatory "flashes" in liturgy, God empowers created 
Being to project itself futurally at the climactic site of liturgy, with a sudden surge of 
fluency, in its own native tongue, that of musical improvisation. God first raises up the 
musical, improvisatory presence of Toumemire within the liturgy to mediate the voice 
of Being in the order of grace. This is because '[o]riginal reality is creative act and 
freedom, and the bearer of original reality is the person, the subject, spirit, rather than 
Being, nature or object. ,369 God then grants to Toumemire a mysterious facility and 
creative capacity. As has been seen, God upholds human beings in existence only 
insofar as musical improvisers are co-agents with Him in the upholding, and here in the 
liturgy, the musical improviser's co-creative, theurgic vocation is brought to particular 
emergence. In his "flashes," Toumemire becomes the seized yet active co-operator 
with God, and God's creative partner in a most immediate way, as befits the climactic 
site of liturgy, for 'creative ecstasy, vision, prophecy and inspiration are a pledge of the 
1· . l' f G d' ,370 IVlng rea lty 0 0 In man. 
Czikszentmihalyi has linked flow experiences with play: play 'fulfils the function of 
maintaining stimulation at an optimal level. ,371 The optimal awakening of the human 
person takes place in the play of flow experience. In the words of Ricoeur: 'Play is not 
determined by the consciousness which plays; play has its own way of being. Play is 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid, p. 286. 
370 Ibid, p. 290. . d h 
371 Czikszentmihalyi, Beyond Boredom and Anxiety, p. 167. References to D. O. Hebb, "Dn~e~. an t e 
eNS." Psychological Re)'ieH' 62 (1955): 243-254; D. E. Berlyne, Conjlicr. Arousal, and CUriosity (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1960). 
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an experience which transforms those who participate in it. It seems that the subject of 
aesthetic experience is not the player himself, but rather what 'takes place' in play ... 
Play is . . . close to dance, which is a movement that carries away the dancer . . . In 
play, subjectivity forgets itself .372 In Toumemire's case, in the case of the inspired 
preacher too, the improvisatory "flashes" indeed take over the improviser, who 
becomes 'the catcher of a ball' :373 
Catch only what you've thrown yourself, all is 
mere skill and little gain; 
but when you're suddenly the catcher of a ball 
thrown by an eternal partner 
with accurate and measured swing 
towards you, to your centre, in an arch 
from the great bridgebuilding of God: 
why catching then becomes a power -
ld' 374 not yours, a wor s. 
372 Paul Ricoeur, "Appropriation." In Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John B. Thompson (ed.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), p. 186. 
373 From a poem by Rainer Maria Rilke. Cited in Gadamer Truth and Method, p. v. [No page number 
marked on page.] 
374 R'lk 'b'd 1 e, 1 1 . 
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